* Thu May 21 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-9.fc11

- Fix qemu argv detection with latest qemu (bug #501923)
- Fix XML attribute escaping (bug #499791)
- Fix serious event handling issues causing guests to be destroyed (bug #499698)

.cvsignore

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+.build*.log
+*.rpm
+i686
+x86_64
+libvirt-*.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.0.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.1.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz

.gitignore

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-.build*.log
-*.rpm
-i686
-x86_64
-libvirt-*.tar.xz

0001-Fix-padding-of-encrypted-data.patch

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 11:32:43 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix padding of encrypted data
-
-If we are encoding a block of data that is 16 bytes in length,
-we cannot leave it as 16 bytes, we must pad it out to the next
-block boundary, 32 bytes. Without this padding, the decoder will
-incorrectly treat the last byte of plain text as the padding
-length, as it can't distinguish padded from non-padded data.
-
-The problem exhibited itself when using a 16 byte passphrase
-for a LUKS volume
-
-  $ virsh secret-set-value 55806c7d-8e93-456f-829b-607d8c198367 \
-       $(echo -n 1234567812345678 | base64)
-  Secret value set
-
-  $ virsh start demo
-  error: Failed to start domain demo
-  error: internal error: process exited while connecting to monitor: >>>>>>>>>>Len 16
-  2017-05-02T10:35:40.016390Z qemu-system-x86_64: -object \
-    secret,id=virtio-disk1-luks-secret0,data=SEtNi5vDUeyseMKHwc1c1Q==,\
-    keyid=masterKey0,iv=zm7apUB1A6dPcH53VW960Q==,format=base64: \
-    Incorrect number of padding bytes (56) found on decrypted data
-
-Notice how the padding '56' corresponds to the ordinal value of
-the character '8'.
-
-Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 71890992daf37ec78b00b4ce873369421dc99731)
----
- src/util/vircrypto.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/util/vircrypto.c b/src/util/vircrypto.c
-index 03410a1a4..8f1e0b7b7 100644
---- a/src/util/vircrypto.c
-+++ b/src/util/vircrypto.c
-@@ -152,8 +152,14 @@ virCryptoEncryptDataAESgnutls(gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t gnutls_enc_alg,
-     uint8_t *ciphertext;
-     size_t ciphertextlen;
- 
--    /* Allocate a padded buffer, copy in the data */
--    ciphertextlen = VIR_ROUND_UP(datalen, 16);
-+    /* Allocate a padded buffer, copy in the data.
-+     *
-+     * NB, we must *always* have at least 1 byte of
-+     * padding - we can't skip it on multiples of
-+     * 16, otherwise decoder can't distinguish padded
-+     * data from non-padded data. Hence datalen + 1
-+     */
-+    ciphertextlen = VIR_ROUND_UP(datalen + 1, 16);
-     if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ciphertext, ciphertextlen) < 0)
-         return -1;
-     memcpy(ciphertext, data, datalen);

0002-spec-Add-support-for-building-the-zfs-storage-driver.patch

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-From: Neal Gompa <ngompa13@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 11:32:46 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] spec: Add support for building the zfs storage driver
-
-Where it can be supported in Fedora, the driver is built and made
-available as a subpackage.
-
-Signed-off-by: Neal Gompa <ngompa13@gmail.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 9af764e86aef7dfb0191a9561bf1d1abf941da05)
----
- libvirt.spec.in | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in
-index 8eb67fa2e..f9a705e7c 100644
---- a/libvirt.spec.in
-+++ b/libvirt.spec.in
-@@ -70,6 +70,13 @@
- %define with_storage_gluster 0%{!?_without_storage_gluster:1}
- %define with_numactl          0%{!?_without_numactl:1}
- 
-+# F25+ has zfs-fuse
-+%if 0%{?fedora} >= 25
-+    %define with_storage_zfs      0%{!?_without_storage_zfs:1}
-+%else
-+    %define with_storage_zfs      0
-+%endif
-+
- # A few optional bits off by default, we enable later
- %define with_fuse          0%{!?_without_fuse:0}
- %define with_cgconfig      0%{!?_without_cgconfig:0}
-@@ -113,6 +120,12 @@
-     %endif
- %endif
- 
-+# zfs-fuse is not available on some architectures
-+%ifarch s390 s390x aarch64
-+    %define with_storage_zfs 0
-+%endif
-+
-+
- # RHEL doesn't ship OpenVZ, VBox, UML, PowerHypervisor,
- # VMware, libxenserver (xenapi), libxenlight (Xen 4.1 and newer),
- # or HyperV.
-@@ -364,6 +377,12 @@ BuildRequires: glusterfs-devel >= 3.4.1
- %if %{with_storage_sheepdog}
- BuildRequires: sheepdog
- %endif
-+%if %{with_storage_zfs}
-+# Support any conforming implementation of zfs. On stock Fedora
-+# this is zfs-fuse, but could be zfsonlinux upstream RPMs
-+BuildRequires: /sbin/zfs
-+BuildRequires: /sbin/zpool
-+%endif
- %if %{with_numactl}
- # For QEMU/LXC numa info
- BuildRequires: numactl-devel
-@@ -597,6 +616,11 @@ Requires: device-mapper
- # For Sheepdog support
- Requires: sheepdog
- %endif
-+%if %{with_storage_zfs}
-+# Support any conforming implementation of zfs
-+Requires: /sbin/zfs
-+Requires: /sbin/zpool
-+%endif
- %if %{with_qemu}
- # From QEMU RPMs
- Requires: /usr/bin/qemu-img
-@@ -1063,6 +1087,12 @@ rm -rf .git
-     %define arg_storage_gluster --without-storage-gluster
- %endif
- 
-+%if %{with_storage_zfs}
-+    %define arg_storage_zfs --with-storage-zfs
-+%else
-+    %define arg_storage_zfs --without-storage-zfs
-+%endif
-+
- %if %{with_numactl}
-     %define arg_numactl --with-numactl
- %else
-@@ -1170,6 +1200,7 @@ rm -f po/stamp-po
-            %{?arg_storage_rbd} \
-            %{?arg_storage_sheepdog} \
-            %{?arg_storage_gluster} \
-+           %{?arg_storage_zfs} \
-            %{?arg_numactl} \
-            %{?arg_numad} \
-            --with-capng \

0003-Avoid-hidden-cgroup-mount-points.patch

@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-From: Juan Hernandez <jhernand@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 17:03:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Avoid hidden cgroup mount points
-
-Currently the scan of the /proc/mounts file used to find cgroup mount
-points doesn't take into account that mount points may hidden by other
-mount points. For, example in certain Kubernetes environments the
-/proc/mounts contains the following lines:
-
-  cgroup /sys/fs/cgroup/net_prio,net_cls cgroup ...
-  tmpfs /sys/fs/cgroup tmpfs ...
-  cgroup /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls,net_prio cgroup ...
-
-In this particular environment the first mount point is hidden by the
-second one. The correct mount point is the third one, but libvirt will
-never process it because it only checks the first mount point for each
-controller (net_cls in this case). So libvirt will try to use the first
-mount point, which doesn't actually exist, and the complete detection
-process will fail.
-
-To avoid that issue this patch changes the virCgroupDetectMountsFromFile
-function so that when there are duplicates it takes the information from
-the last line in /proc/mounts. This requires removing the previous
-explicit condition to skip duplicates, and adding code to free the
-memory used by the processing of duplicated lines.
-
-Related-To: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1468214
-Related-To: https://github.com/kubevirt/libvirt/issues/4
-Signed-off-by: Juan Hernandez <jhernand@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit dacd160d7479e0ec2d8a63f102145fd30636a1c8)
----
- src/util/vircgroup.c                | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
- tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.mounts | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
- tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.parsed | 10 ++++++++++
- tests/vircgrouptest.c               |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.mounts
- create mode 100644 tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.parsed
-
-diff --git a/src/util/vircgroup.c b/src/util/vircgroup.c
-index f2477d5e9..322f7fb54 100644
---- a/src/util/vircgroup.c
-+++ b/src/util/vircgroup.c
-@@ -396,6 +396,7 @@ virCgroupDetectMountsFromFile(virCgroupPtr group,
-             const char *typestr = virCgroupControllerTypeToString(i);
-             int typelen = strlen(typestr);
-             char *tmp = entry.mnt_opts;
-+            struct virCgroupController *controller = &group->controllers[i];
-             while (tmp) {
-                 char *next = strchr(tmp, ',');
-                 int len;
-@@ -405,18 +406,22 @@ virCgroupDetectMountsFromFile(virCgroupPtr group,
-                 } else {
-                     len = strlen(tmp);
-                 }
--                /* NB, the same controller can appear >1 time in mount list
--                 * due to bind mounts from one location to another. Pick the
--                 * first entry only
--                 */
--                if (typelen == len && STREQLEN(typestr, tmp, len) &&
--                    !group->controllers[i].mountPoint) {
-+
-+                if (typelen == len && STREQLEN(typestr, tmp, len)) {
-                     char *linksrc;
-                     struct stat sb;
-                     char *tmp2;
- 
--                    if (VIR_STRDUP(group->controllers[i].mountPoint,
--                                   entry.mnt_dir) < 0)
-+                    /* Note that the lines in /proc/mounts have the same
-+                     * order than the mount operations, and that there may
-+                     * be duplicates due to bind mounts. This means
-+                     * that the same mount point may be processed more than
-+                     * once. We need to save the results of the last one,
-+                     * and we need to be careful to release the memory used
-+                     * by previous processing. */
-+                    VIR_FREE(controller->mountPoint);
-+                    VIR_FREE(controller->linkPoint);
-+                    if (VIR_STRDUP(controller->mountPoint, entry.mnt_dir) < 0)
-                         goto error;
- 
-                     tmp2 = strrchr(entry.mnt_dir, '/');
-@@ -452,7 +457,7 @@ virCgroupDetectMountsFromFile(virCgroupPtr group,
-                                 VIR_WARN("Expecting a symlink at %s for controller %s",
-                                          linksrc, typestr);
-                             } else {
--                                group->controllers[i].linkPoint = linksrc;
-+                                controller->linkPoint = linksrc;
-                             }
-                         }
-                     }
-diff --git a/tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.mounts b/tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.mounts
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..ca036196b
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.mounts
-@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
-+rootfs / rootfs rw 0 0
-+proc /proc proc rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
-+udev /dev devtmpfs rw,nosuid,relatime,size=10240k,nr_inodes=1006404,mode=755 0 0
-+devpts /dev/pts devpts rw,relatime,gid=5,mode=620,ptmxmode=000 0 0
-+sysfs /sys sysfs rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
-+/dev/sda1 / ext4 rw,noatime,data=ordered 0 0
-+tmpfs /run tmpfs rw,nodev,relatime,size=812296k,mode=755 0 0
-+mqueue /dev/mqueue mqueue rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
-+shm /dev/shm tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
-+debugfs /sys/kernel/debug debugfs rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
-+cgroup_root /sys/fs/cgroup tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,size=10240k,mode=755 0 0
-+openrc /sys/fs/cgroup/openrc cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,release_agent=/lib64/rc/sh/cgroup-release-agent.sh,name=openrc 0 0
-+cpuset /some/random/location/cpuset cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuset 0 0
-+cpuset /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuset 0 0
-+cpu /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpu 0 0
-+cpuacct /some/random/location/cpuset cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuacct 0 0
-+cpuacct /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuacct cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuacct 0 0
-+memory /sys/fs/cgroup/memory cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,memory 0 0
-+devices /sys/fs/cgroup/devices cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,devices 0 0
-+freezer /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,freezer 0 0
-+blkio /sys/fs/cgroup/blkio cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,blkio 0 0
-+perf_event /sys/fs/cgroup/perf_event cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,perf_event 0 0
-+hugetlb /sys/fs/cgroup/hugetlb cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,hugetlb 0 0
-+binfmt_misc /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc binfmt_misc rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
-+freezer /some/random/location/freezer cgroup rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,freezer 0 0
-diff --git a/tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.parsed b/tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.parsed
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..694870723
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/vircgroupdata/kubevirt.parsed
-@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
-+cpu          /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu
-+cpuacct      /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuacct
-+cpuset       /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset
-+memory       /sys/fs/cgroup/memory
-+devices      /sys/fs/cgroup/devices
-+freezer      /some/random/location/freezer
-+blkio        /sys/fs/cgroup/blkio
-+net_cls      <null>
-+perf_event   /sys/fs/cgroup/perf_event
-+name=systemd <null>
-diff --git a/tests/vircgrouptest.c b/tests/vircgrouptest.c
-index f55ef74a1..cf0315f16 100644
---- a/tests/vircgrouptest.c
-+++ b/tests/vircgrouptest.c
-@@ -885,6 +885,7 @@ mymain(void)
-     DETECT_MOUNTS("cgroups3");
-     DETECT_MOUNTS("all-in-one");
-     DETECT_MOUNTS("no-cgroups");
-+    DETECT_MOUNTS("kubevirt");
- 
-     if (virTestRun("New cgroup for self", testCgroupNewForSelf, NULL) < 0)
-         ret = -1;

0004-docs-schema-make-disk-driver-name-attribute-optional.patch

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 10:20:35 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH] docs: schema: make disk driver name attribute optional
-
-/domain/devices/disk/driver/@name is not a required or mandatory
-attribute according to formatdomain, and indeed it was agreed on
-IRC that the attribute is "optional for input, recommended (but
-not required) for output". Currently the schema requires the
-attribute, causing virt-xml-validate to fail on disk config where
-the driver name is not explicitly specified. E.g.
-
-# cat test.xml | grep -A 5 cdrom
-    <disk type='file' device='cdrom'>
-      <driver type='raw'/>
-      <target dev='hdb' bus='ide'/>
-      <readonly/>
-      <address type='drive' controller='0' bus='0' target='0' unit='1'/>
-    </disk>
-
-# virt-xml-validate test.xml
-Relax-NG validity error : Extra element devices in interleave
-test.xml:21: element devices: Relax-NG validity error : Element domain failed to validate content
-test.xml fails to validate
-
-Relaxing the name attribute to be optional fixes the validation
-
-# virt-xml-validate test.xml
-test.xml validates
-
-(cherry picked from commit b494e09d058f09b48d0fd8855edd557101294671)
----
- docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 8 +++++---
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-index 9a7d03ed9..38dda780e 100644
---- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-+++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-@@ -1670,9 +1670,11 @@
-     </element>
-   </define>
-   <define name="driverFormat">
--    <attribute name="name">
--      <ref name="genericName"/>
--    </attribute>
-+    <optional>
-+      <attribute name="name">
-+        <ref name="genericName"/>
-+      </attribute>
-+    </optional>
-     <optional>
-       <attribute name='type'>
-         <choice>

Makefile

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME := libvirt
 SPECFILE = $(firstword $(wildcard *.spec))
 
 define find-makefile-common
-for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
+for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
 endef
 
 MAKEFILE_COMMON := $(shell $(find-makefile-common))

branch

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+F-11

libvirt-0.6.2-enable-qemu-0-10-migration.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
+To: libvir-list@redhat.com
+Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2009 15:09:05 +0100
+Subject: [libvirt] PATCH: Enable migration with QEMU >= 0.10.0
+
+The KVM migration code was added to QEMU for the 0.10.0 release, so we 
+should enable this in libvirt now.
+
+Daniel
+
+diff -r be7993675e07 src/qemu_conf.c
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c	Thu Apr 30 14:49:27 2009 +0100
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c	Thu Apr 30 15:08:45 2009 +0100
+@@ -472,16 +472,13 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *
+ 
+     /*
+      * Handling of -incoming arg with varying features
+-     *  -incoming tcp    (kvm >= 79)
+-     *  -incoming exec   (kvm >= 80)
++     *  -incoming tcp    (kvm >= 79, qemu >= 0.10.0)
++     *  -incoming exec   (kvm >= 80, qemu >= 0.10.0)
+      *  -incoming stdio  (all earlier kvm)
+      *
+      * NB, there was a pre-kvm-79 'tcp' support, but it
+      * was broken, because it blocked the monitor console
+      * while waiting for data, so pretend it doesn't exist
+-     *
+-     * XXX when next QEMU release after 0.9.1 arrives,
+-     * we'll need to add MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP/EXEC here too
+      */
+     if (kvm_version >= 79) {
+         flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP;
+@@ -489,6 +486,9 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *
+             flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_EXEC;
+     } else if (kvm_version > 0) {
+         flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_KVM_STDIO;
++    } else if (version >= 10000) {
++        flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP;
++        flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_EXEC;
+     }
+ 
+     if (retversion)
+
+
+-- 

libvirt-0.6.2-event-handling-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From e7be6cc841a5652b73ddd2ccd3769c7f8bbad13d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 16:41:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix interrupting of main event thread & protect against accidental uniniitalized variables
+
+---
+ qemud/event.c |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/qemud/event.c b/qemud/event.c
+index 65f548e..754f2b1 100644
+--- a/qemud/event.c
++++ b/qemud/event.c
+@@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ struct virEventLoop {
+ static struct virEventLoop eventLoop;
+ 
+ /* Unique ID for the next FD watch to be registered */
+-static int nextWatch = 0;
++static int nextWatch = 1;
+ 
+ /* Unique ID for the next timer to be registered */
+-static int nextTimer = 0;
++static int nextTimer = 1;
+ 
+ static void virEventLock(void)
+ {
+@@ -143,15 +143,22 @@ int virEventAddHandleImpl(int fd, int events,
+ 
+ void virEventUpdateHandleImpl(int watch, int events) {
+     int i;
++    EVENT_DEBUG("Update handle w=%d e=%d", watch, events);
++
++    if (watch <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid update watch %d", watch);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].watch == watch) {
+             eventLoop.handles[i].events =
+                     virEventHandleTypeToPollEvent(events);
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -164,6 +171,12 @@ void virEventUpdateHandleImpl(int watch, int events) {
+ int virEventRemoveHandleImpl(int watch) {
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Remove handle %d", watch);
++
++    if (watch <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid remove watch %d", watch);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+@@ -172,11 +185,11 @@ int virEventRemoveHandleImpl(int watch) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].watch == watch) {
+             EVENT_DEBUG("mark delete %d %d", i, eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
+             eventLoop.handles[i].deleted = 1;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             virEventUnlock();
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+     return -1;
+ }
+@@ -232,6 +245,12 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+     struct timeval tv;
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Updating timer %d timeout with %d ms freq", timer, frequency);
++
++    if (timer <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid update timer %d", timer);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) < 0) {
+         return;
+     }
+@@ -244,10 +263,10 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+                 frequency >= 0 ? frequency +
+                 (((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec)*1000) +
+                 (((unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec)/1000) : 0;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -260,6 +279,12 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+ int virEventRemoveTimeoutImpl(int timer) {
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Remove timer %d", timer);
++
++    if (timer <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid remove timer %d", timer);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.timeoutsCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted)
+@@ -267,11 +292,11 @@ int virEventRemoveTimeoutImpl(int timer) {
+ 
+         if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].timer == timer) {
+             eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted = 1;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             virEventUnlock();
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+     return -1;
+ }
+@@ -617,9 +642,12 @@ static int virEventInterruptLocked(void)
+     char c = '\0';
+ 
+     if (!eventLoop.running ||
+-        pthread_self() == eventLoop.leader)
++        pthread_self() == eventLoop.leader) {
++        VIR_DEBUG("Skip interrupt, %d %d", eventLoop.running, (int)eventLoop.leader);
+         return 0;
++    }
+ 
++    VIR_DEBUG0("Interrupting");
+     if (safewrite(eventLoop.wakeupfd[1], &c, sizeof(c)) != sizeof(c))
+         return -1;
+     return 0;
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-event-handling-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+From 6483ee77ed12f037d68a6adc690624fa1b508dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 16:43:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix watch/timer event deletion
+
+---
+ qemud/event.c |  112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 1 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/qemud/event.c b/qemud/event.c
+index 754f2b1..a57d967 100644
+--- a/qemud/event.c
++++ b/qemud/event.c
+@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static int virEventCalculateTimeout(int *timeout) {
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Calculate expiry of %d timers", eventLoop.timeoutsCount);
+     /* Figure out if we need a timeout */
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.timeoutsCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted || eventLoop.timeouts[i].frequency < 0)
++        if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].frequency < 0)
+             continue;
+ 
+         EVENT_DEBUG("Got a timeout scheduled for %llu", eventLoop.timeouts[i].expiresAt);
+@@ -350,32 +350,26 @@ static int virEventCalculateTimeout(int *timeout) {
+  * file handles. The caller must free the returned data struct
+  * returns: the pollfd array, or NULL on error
+  */
+-static int virEventMakePollFDs(struct pollfd **retfds) {
++static struct pollfd *virEventMakePollFDs(void) {
+     struct pollfd *fds;
+-    int i, nfds = 0;
++    int i;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+-            continue;
+-        nfds++;
+-    }
+-    *retfds = NULL;
+     /* Setup the poll file handle data structs */
+-    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(fds, nfds) < 0)
+-        return -1;
++    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(fds, eventLoop.handlesCount) < 0)
++        return NULL;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0, nfds = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+-            continue;
+-        fds[nfds].fd = eventLoop.handles[i].fd;
+-        fds[nfds].events = eventLoop.handles[i].events;
+-        fds[nfds].revents = 0;
++    for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
++        EVENT_DEBUG("Prepare n=%d w=%d, f=%d e=%d", i,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].fd,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].events);
++        fds[i].fd = eventLoop.handles[i].fd;
++        fds[i].events = eventLoop.handles[i].events;
++        fds[i].revents = 0;
+         //EVENT_DEBUG("Wait for %d %d", eventLoop.handles[i].fd, eventLoop.handles[i].events);
+-        nfds++;
+     }
+ 
+-    *retfds = fds;
+-    return nfds;
++    return fds;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -435,26 +429,30 @@ static int virEventDispatchTimeouts(void) {
+  * Returns 0 upon success, -1 if an error occurred
+  */
+ static int virEventDispatchHandles(int nfds, struct pollfd *fds) {
+-    int i, n;
++    int i;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0, n = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount && n < nfds ; i++) {
++    /* NB, use nfds not eventLoop.handlesCount, because new
++     * fds might be added on end of list, and they're not
++     * in the fds array we've got */
++    for (i = 0 ; i < nfds ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted) {
+-            EVENT_DEBUG("Skip deleted %d", eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
++            EVENT_DEBUG("Skip deleted n=%d w=%d f=%d", i,
++                        eventLoop.handles[i].watch, eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
+             continue;
+         }
+ 
+-        if (fds[n].revents) {
++        if (fds[i].revents) {
+             virEventHandleCallback cb = eventLoop.handles[i].cb;
+             void *opaque = eventLoop.handles[i].opaque;
+-            int hEvents = virPollEventToEventHandleType(fds[n].revents);
+-            EVENT_DEBUG("Dispatch %d %d %p", fds[n].fd,
+-                        fds[n].revents, eventLoop.handles[i].opaque);
++            int hEvents = virPollEventToEventHandleType(fds[i].revents);
++            EVENT_DEBUG("Dispatch n=%d f=%d w=%d e=%d %p", i,
++                        fds[i].fd, eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
++                        fds[i].revents, eventLoop.handles[i].opaque);
+             virEventUnlock();
+             (cb)(eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
+-                 fds[n].fd, hEvents, opaque);
++                 fds[i].fd, hEvents, opaque);
+             virEventLock();
+         }
+-        n++;
+     }
+ 
+     return 0;
+@@ -545,22 +543,21 @@ static int virEventCleanupHandles(void) {
+  * at least one file handle has an event, or a timer expires
+  */
+ int virEventRunOnce(void) {
+-    struct pollfd *fds;
++    struct pollfd *fds = NULL;
+     int ret, timeout, nfds;
+ 
+     virEventLock();
+     eventLoop.running = 1;
+     eventLoop.leader = pthread_self();
+-    if ((nfds = virEventMakePollFDs(&fds)) < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
+ 
+-    if (virEventCalculateTimeout(&timeout) < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0 ||
++        virEventCleanupHandles() < 0)
++        goto error;
++
++    if (!(fds = virEventMakePollFDs()) ||
++        virEventCalculateTimeout(&timeout) < 0)
++        goto error;
++    nfds = eventLoop.handlesCount;
+ 
+     virEventUnlock();
+ 
+@@ -572,38 +569,31 @@ int virEventRunOnce(void) {
+         if (errno == EINTR) {
+             goto retry;
+         }
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        return -1;
++        goto error_unlocked;
+     }
+ 
+     virEventLock();
+-    if (virEventDispatchTimeouts() < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventDispatchTimeouts() < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+     if (ret > 0 &&
+-        virEventDispatchHandles(nfds, fds) < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
+-    VIR_FREE(fds);
+-
+-    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++        virEventDispatchHandles(nfds, fds) < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+-    if (virEventCleanupHandles() < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0 ||
++        virEventCleanupHandles() < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+     eventLoop.running = 0;
+     virEventUnlock();
++    VIR_FREE(fds);
+     return 0;
++
++error:
++    virEventUnlock();
++error_unlocked:
++    VIR_FREE(fds);
++    return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ static void virEventHandleWakeup(int watch ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-fix-nosource-label.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -rup libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c new/src/security_selinux.c
+--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-10 22:04:25.000000000 -0400
++++ new/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-10 22:06:09.000000000 -0400
+@@ -338,6 +338,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectP
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ 
++    if (!disk->src)
++        return 0;
++
+     if (disk->shared) {
+         return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
+     } else if (disk->readonly) {

libvirt-0.6.2-fix-qemu-argv-detection-with-kvm-85.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 2b3fcdc378e7bec5c1a78b81632756e92930fd24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 May 2009 15:14:24 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Fix QEMU ARGV detection with kvm >= 85
+
+---
+ src/qemu_conf.c   |   18 ++++++++++++++----
+ src/qemu_driver.c |   12 ++----------
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
+index 9cb71eb..a57d3ab 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -431,18 +431,28 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *qemu,
+         return -1;
+ 
+     char *help = NULL;
+-    enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 8192 };
++    enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 1024*64 };
+     int len = virFileReadLimFD(newstdout, MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE, &help);
+-    if (len < 0)
++    if (len < 0) {
++        virReportSystemError(NULL, errno, "%s",
++                             _("Unable to read QEMU help output"));
+         goto cleanup2;
++    }
+ 
+     if (sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u (kvm-%u)",
+                &major, &minor, &micro, &kvm_version) != 4)
+         kvm_version = 0;
+ 
+-    if (!kvm_version && sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u",
+-               &major, &minor, &micro) != 3)
++    if (!kvm_version &&
++        sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u",
++               &major, &minor, &micro) != 3) {
++        char *eol = strchr(help, '\n');
++        if (eol) *eol = '\0';
++        qemudReportError(NULL, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
++                         _("cannot parse QEMU version number in '%s'"),
++                         help);
+         goto cleanup2;
++    }
+ 
+     version = (major * 1000 * 1000) + (minor * 1000) + micro;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 30642d5..bd60b29 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1391,12 +1391,8 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator,
+                                 NULL,
+-                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
+-        qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+-                         _("Cannot determine QEMU argv syntax %s"),
+-                         emulator);
++                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+-    }
+ 
+     if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(conn, vm->def) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+@@ -3715,12 +3711,8 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(vm->def->emulator,
+                                 NULL,
+-                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
+-        qemudReportError(conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+-                         _("Cannot determine QEMU argv syntax %s"),
+-                         vm->def->emulator);
++                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
+         return -1;
+-    }
+ 
+     if (qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DRIVE) {
+         if (!(devname = qemudDiskDeviceName(conn, newdisk)))
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-qemu-drive-format.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 0ae4c67ff5f1d24698c5cfc8a9719d333c892644 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 11:23:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] qemu -drive takes format= not fmt=
+
+Seems like a simple typo - it has been "format=" since the flag
+was introduced, but we added it as "fmt=".
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/qemu_conf.c                                    |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
+index f36c927..6f9e610 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr conn,
+                 disk->device == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_DISK)
+                 virBufferAddLit(&opt, ",boot=on");
+             if (disk->driverType)
+-                virBufferVSprintf(&opt, ",fmt=%s", disk->driverType);
++                virBufferVSprintf(&opt, ",format=%s", disk->driverType);
+ 
+             if (disk->cachemode) {
+                 const char *mode =

libvirt-0.6.2-shared-readonly-label.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+diff -rup libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c libvirt-0.6.2.new/src/security_selinux.c
+--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c	2009-04-03 15:36:56.000000000 +0100
++++ libvirt-0.6.2.new/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-05 13:39:42.000000000 +0100
+@@ -24,11 +24,12 @@
+ #include "virterror_internal.h"
+ #include "util.h"
+ #include "memory.h"
+-
++#include "logging.h"
+ 
+ #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
+ 
+ static char default_domain_context[1024];
++static char default_content_context[1024];
+ static char default_image_context[1024];
+ #define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI       "0"
+ #define SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME "selinux"
+@@ -148,8 +149,13 @@ SELinuxInitialize(virConnectPtr conn)
+     close(fd);
+ 
+     ptr = strchrnul(default_image_context, '\n');
+-    *ptr = '\0';
+-
++    if (*ptr == '\n') {
++        *ptr = '\0';
++        strcpy(default_content_context, ptr+1);
++        ptr = strchrnul(default_content_context, '\n');
++        if (*ptr == '\n')
++            *ptr = '\0';
++    }
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -275,6 +281,8 @@ SELinuxSetFilecon(virConnectPtr conn, co
+ {
+     char ebuf[1024];
+ 
++    VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon);
++
+     if(setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
+         virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+                                _("%s: unable to set security context "
+@@ -299,6 +307,8 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virConn
+     char *newpath = NULL;
+     const char *path = disk->src;
+ 
++    /* Don't restore labels on readoly/shared disks, because
++     * other VMs may still be accessing these */
+     if (disk->readonly || disk->shared)
+         return 0;
+ 
+@@ -328,8 +338,13 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectP
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ 
+-    if (secdef->imagelabel)
++    if (disk->shared) {
++        return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
++    } else if (disk->readonly) {
++        return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_content_context);
++    } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+         return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
++    }
+ 
+     return 0;
+ }
+@@ -403,9 +418,6 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr co
+ 
+     if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+         for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
+-            if (vm->def->disks[i]->readonly ||
+-                vm->def->disks[i]->shared) continue;
+-
+             if (SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(conn, vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+                 return -1;
+         }

libvirt-0.6.2-svirt-sound.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+--- src/qemu_conf.c.orig	2009-04-02 11:50:10.000000000 +0200
++++ src/qemu_conf.c	2009-04-03 17:46:59.000000000 +0200
+@@ -779,6 +779,20 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr 
+     char domid[50];
+     char *pidfile;
+     const char *cpu = NULL;
++    int skipSound = 0;
++
++    if (driver->securityDriver &&
++        driver->securityDriver->name &&
++        STREQ(driver->securityDriver->name, "selinux") &&
++        getuid() == 0) {
++        static int soundWarned = 0; 
++        skipSound = 1;
++        if (vm->def->nsounds &&
++            !soundWarned) {
++            soundWarned = 1;
++            VIR_WARN0("Sound cards for VMs are disabled while SELinux security model is active");
++        }
++    }
+ 
+     uname_normalize(&ut);
+ 
+@@ -1425,7 +1439,8 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr 
+     }
+ 
+     /* Add sound hardware */
+-    if (vm->def->nsounds) {
++    if (vm->def->nsounds &&
++        !skipSound) {
+         int size = 100;
+         char *modstr;
+         if (VIR_ALLOC_N(modstr, size+1) < 0)

libvirt-0.6.2-xml-attribute-escaping.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 7f7a4403860f56d5a1ad65bfd16f5bf97a971d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 May 2009 16:19:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] * src/buf.c: avoid an XML attribute escaping bug #499791
+ daniel
+
+---
+ src/buf.c |   16 +++++++++++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/buf.c b/src/buf.c
+index cdcdac9..259175d 100644
+--- a/src/buf.c
++++ b/src/buf.c
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ virBufferEscapeString(const virBufferPtr buf, const char *format, const char *st
+         return;
+ 
+     len = strlen(str);
+-    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(escaped, 5 * len + 1) < 0) {
++    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(escaped, 6 * len + 1) < 0) {
+         virBufferNoMemory(buf);
+         return;
+     }
+@@ -290,6 +290,20 @@ virBufferEscapeString(const virBufferPtr buf, const char *format, const char *st
+             *out++ = 'm';
+             *out++ = 'p';
+             *out++ = ';';
++        } else if (*cur == '"') {
++            *out++ = '&';
++            *out++ = 'q';
++            *out++ = 'u';
++            *out++ = 'o';
++            *out++ = 't';
++            *out++ = ';';
++        } else if (*cur == '\'') {
++            *out++ = '&';
++            *out++ = 'a';
++            *out++ = 'p';
++            *out++ = 'o';
++            *out++ = 's';
++            *out++ = ';';
+         } else if ((*cur >= 0x20) || (*cur == '\n') || (*cur == '\t') ||
+                    (*cur == '\r')) {
+             /*
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.3-hostdev-managed.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 3d7771e0570e09096ad9391a857dad48b150bc0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 16:33:28 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix qemu driver's interpretation of <hostdev managed='yes'/>
+
+This change:
+
+  Tue Mar  3 08:55:13 GMT 2009 Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+
+       Don't try to detach & reset PCI devices while running test
+       suite for XML-> ARGV conversion.
+       * src/qemu_driver.c: Add qemuPrepareHostDevices() helper to
+       detach and reset PCI devices.
+       * src/qemu_conf.c: Don't detach & reset PCI devices while
+       building the command line argv
+
+accidentally did this:
+
+-            if (hostdev->managed) {
++        if (!hostdev->managed) {
+
+Which results in managed='yes' not causing the device to be
+detached when the guest is starting.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/qemu_driver.c |    2 +-
+ 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 5898026..59312c0 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static int qemuPrepareHostDevices(virConnectPtr conn,
+         if (hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI)
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if (!hostdev->managed) {
++        if (hostdev->managed) {
+             pciDevice *dev = pciGetDevice(conn,
+                                           hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci.domain,
+                                           hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci.bus,
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.3-refresh-qemu-caps.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+commit 0e51348cb9aeafe5e2fd6469a4bde0baa1eb8720
+Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon May 4 15:06:03 2009 -0400
+
+    Refresh QEMU driver capabilities for each getCapabilities call.
+    
+    Also fix up a couple issues where caps are accessed without locking
+    the driver structure.
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 23ea961..790dac6 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1885,10 +1885,12 @@ static int qemudGetNodeInfo(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+ static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
+     struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
+-    char *xml;
++    char *xml = NULL;
+ 
+     qemuDriverLock(driver);
+-    if ((xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
++    virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
++    if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL ||
++        (xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
+         virReportOOMError(conn);
+     qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
+ 
+@@ -3169,20 +3171,26 @@ cleanup:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
++static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn,
++                                     virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+ {
+     struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData;
+     char *p;
++    int ret = 0;
+ 
+-    if (!driver->securityDriver)
+-        return -2;
++    qemuDriverLock(driver);
++    if (!driver->securityDriver) {
++        ret = -2;
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
+ 
+     p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model;
+     if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) {
+         qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          _("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                          VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1);
+-        return -1;
++        ret = -1;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+     strcpy(secmodel->model, p);
+ 
+@@ -3191,10 +3199,14 @@ static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr sec
+         qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          _("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                          VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1);
+-        return -1;
++        ret = -1;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+     strcpy(secmodel->doi, p);
+-    return 0;
++
++cleanup:
++    qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
++    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /* TODO: check seclabel restore */

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SHA512 (libvirt-2.2.1.tar.xz) = b89a2665bea81c440afc3f9f69c26e314344f1f2fbf53f82b25bdddcc89532ddf3393902e9cf552edb827ce5d8b46b9214b5a25303b19cf0f3f085131d870518
+3035b484861516a1cd425acef1e760e3  libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz