Disable broken nwfilterxml2xmltest on ppc

Ensure %with_libnl is defined on PPC
Update to 0.8.2 release. Fix CVE-2010-2237, CVE-2010-2238, CVE-2010-2239, CVE-2010-2242
2010-07-12 15:30:24 +00:00 · 2010-07-12 14:22:15 +00:00 · 2010-07-12 14:13:54 +00:00 · 2010-07-12 14:13:51 +00:00 · 2010-06-17 16:20:59 +00:00 · 2010-06-17 15:53:20 +00:00
27 changed files with 5018 additions and 3122 deletions
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:43:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] schema: interleave domain name and uuid with other elements
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Allow <name> and <uuid> anywhere under <domain>, not just at the top:
-
-error:XML document failed to validate against schema: Unable to validate
-doc against /usr/share/libvirt/schemas/domain.rng
-Expecting an element name, got nothing
-Invalid sequence in interleave
-Element domain failed to validate content
-
-Introduced with the first RelaxNG schema in commit c642103.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1292131
-(cherry picked from commit b4e0549febe416ffefc16f389423740d6d65fa74)
-Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
---
- docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-index b252a17..48610ce 100644
--- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-+++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
-   <define name="domain">
-     <element name="domain">
-       <ref name="hvs"/>
-      <ref name="ids"/>
-       <interleave>
-+        <ref name="ids"/>
-         <optional>
-           <ref name="title"/>
-         </optional>
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:31:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] leaseshelper: fix crash when no mac is specified
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-If dnsmasq specified DNSMASQ_IAID (so we're dealing with an IPv6
-lease) but no DNSMASQ_MAC, we skip creation of the new lease object.
-
-Also skip adding it to the leases array.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1202350
-(cherry picked from commit df9fe124d650bc438c531673492569da87523d20)
-Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
---
- src/network/leaseshelper.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/network/leaseshelper.c b/src/network/leaseshelper.c
-index 2d528f7..6930310 100644
--- a/src/network/leaseshelper.c
-+++ b/src/network/leaseshelper.c
-@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 
-     case VIR_LEASE_ACTION_OLD:
-     case VIR_LEASE_ACTION_ADD:
-        if (virJSONValueArrayAppend(leases_array_new, lease_new) < 0) {
-+        if (lease_new && virJSONValueArrayAppend(leases_array_new, lease_new) < 0) {
-             virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
-                            _("failed to create json"));
-             goto cleanup;
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:19:56 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] build: predictably generate systemtap tapsets (bz 1173641)
-
-The generated output is dependent on perl hashtable ordering, which
-gives different results for i686 and x86_64. Fix this by sorting
-the hash keys before iterating over them
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1173641
-(cherry picked from commit a1edb05c6028470aa24b74aa0f8d5fb5a181128a)
---
- src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl b/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
-index 2467300..7b80fbf 100755
--- a/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
-+++ b/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
-@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_auth_name(type, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- my $first = 1;
-foreach my $type (keys %auth) {
-+foreach my $type (sort(keys %auth)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (type == ", $type, ") {\n";
-@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_type_name(type, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- $first = 1;
-foreach my $type (keys %type) {
-+foreach my $type (sort(keys %type)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (type == ", $type, ") {\n";
-@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_status_name(status, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- $first = 1;
-foreach my $status (keys %status) {
-+foreach my $status (sort(keys %status)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (status == ", $status, ") {\n";
-@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_program_name(program, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- $first = 1;
-foreach my $prog (keys %funcs) {
-+foreach my $prog (sort(keys %funcs)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (program == ", $funcs{$prog}->{id}, ") {\n";
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_procedure_name(program, version, proc, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- $first = 1;
-foreach my $prog (keys %funcs) {
-+foreach my $prog (sort(keys %funcs)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (program == ", $funcs{$prog}->{id}, " && version == ", $funcs{$prog}->{version}, ") {\n";
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 16:51:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: ensure daemon is spawn even if dead socket exists
-
-The auto-spawn code would originally attempt to spawn the
-daemon for both ENOENT and ECONNREFUSED errors from connect().
-The various refactorings eventually lost this so we only
-spawn the daemon on ENOENT. The result is if the daemon exits
-uncleanly, so that the socket is left in the filesystem, we
-will never be able to auto-spawn the daemon again.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 406ee8c226d2197ba1aaecb9cf3ad2b6df31ae44)
---
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index 51f94d4..6153e0e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
- 
-     while (retries &&
-            connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) < 0) {
-        if (!(spawnDaemon && errno == ENOENT)) {
-+        if (!(spawnDaemon && (errno == ENOENT ||
-+                              errno == ECONNREFUSED))) {
-             virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
-                                  path);
-             goto cleanup;
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:01:24 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Minor cleanups
-
- Add some debugging
- Make the loop dependent only on retries
- Make it explicit that connect(2) success exits the loop
- Invert the error checking logic
-
-(cherry picked from commit f102c7146ed7f6e04af0ad3bce302476239f2502)
---
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index 6153e0e..dcff69e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -548,6 +548,9 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-     char *rundir = NULL;
-     int ret = -1;
- 
-+    VIR_DEBUG("path=%s spawnDaemon=%d binary=%s", path, spawnDaemon,
-+        NULLSTR(binary));
-+
-     memset(&localAddr, 0, sizeof(localAddr));
-     memset(&remoteAddr, 0, sizeof(remoteAddr));
- 
-@@ -608,10 +611,15 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-     if (remoteAddr.data.un.sun_path[0] == '@')
-         remoteAddr.data.un.sun_path[0] = '\0';
- 
-    while (retries &&
-           connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) < 0) {
-        if (!(spawnDaemon && (errno == ENOENT ||
-                              errno == ECONNREFUSED))) {
-+    while (retries) {
-+        if (connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) == 0) {
-+            VIR_DEBUG("connect() succeeded");
-+            break;
-+        }
-+        VIR_DEBUG("connect() failed: retries=%d errno=%d", retries, errno);
-+
-+        if (!spawnDaemon ||
-+            (errno != ENOENT && errno != ECONNREFUSED)) {
-             virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
-                                  path);
-             goto cleanup;
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:08:45 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Explicitly error if we exceed retry count
-
-When we autolaunch libvirtd for session URIs, we spin in a retry
-loop waiting for the daemon to start and the connect(2) to succeed.
-
-However if we exceed the retry count, we don't explicitly raise an
-error, which can yield a slew of different error messages elsewhere
-in the code.
-
-Explicitly raise the last connect(2) failure if we run out of retries.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 8da02d528068942303923fc4f935e77cccac9c7c)
---
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index dcff69e..90951be 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -618,7 +618,9 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-         }
-         VIR_DEBUG("connect() failed: retries=%d errno=%d", retries, errno);
- 
-+        retries--;
-         if (!spawnDaemon ||
-+            retries == 0 ||
-             (errno != ENOENT && errno != ECONNREFUSED)) {
-             virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
-                                  path);
-@@ -628,7 +630,6 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-         if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
-             goto cleanup;
- 
-        retries--;
-         usleep(5000);
-     }
- 
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:13:38 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Don't repeatedly attempt to launch daemon
-
-On every socket connect(2) attempt we were re-launching session
-libvirtd, up to 100 times in 5 seconds.
-
-This understandably caused some weird load races and intermittent
-qemu:///session startup failures
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1271183
-(cherry picked from commit 2eb7a975756d05a5b54ab4acf60083beb6161ac6)
---
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 9 +++++++--
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index 90951be..2ee4b6e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-     virSocketAddr remoteAddr;
-     char *rundir = NULL;
-     int ret = -1;
-+    bool daemonLaunched = false;
- 
-     VIR_DEBUG("path=%s spawnDaemon=%d binary=%s", path, spawnDaemon,
-         NULLSTR(binary));
-@@ -627,8 +628,12 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-             goto cleanup;
-         }
- 
-        if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
-            goto cleanup;
-+        if (!daemonLaunched) {
-+            if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
-+                goto cleanup;
-+
-+            daemonLaunched = true;
-+        }
- 
-         usleep(5000);
-     }
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 10:55:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] security: Do not restore kernel and initrd labels
-
-Kernel/initrd files are essentially read-only shareable images and thus
-should be handled in the same way. We already use the appropriate label
-for kernel/initrd files when starting a domain, but when a domain gets
-destroyed we would remove the labels which would make other running
-domains using the same files very unhappy.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=921135
-
-Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 68acc701bd449481e3206723c25b18fcd3d261b7)
---
- src/security/security_dac.c     | 8 --------
- src/security/security_selinux.c | 8 --------
- 2 files changed, 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/security/security_dac.c b/src/security/security_dac.c
-index deb6980..d01215f 100644
--- a/src/security/security_dac.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_dac.c
-@@ -971,14 +971,6 @@ virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
-         virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.loader->nvram) < 0)
-         rc = -1;
- 
-    if (def->os.kernel &&
-        virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.kernel) < 0)
-        rc = -1;
-
-    if (def->os.initrd &&
-        virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.initrd) < 0)
-        rc = -1;
-
-     if (def->os.dtb &&
-         virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.dtb) < 0)
-         rc = -1;
-diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-index 6e67a86..2475a80 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-@@ -1953,14 +1953,6 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
-         virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.loader->nvram) < 0)
-         rc = -1;
- 
-    if (def->os.kernel &&
-        virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.kernel) < 0)
-        rc = -1;
-
-    if (def->os.initrd &&
-        virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.initrd) < 0)
-        rc = -1;
-
-     if (def->os.dtb &&
-         virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.dtb) < 0)
-         rc = -1;
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2016 17:04:32 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: wait longer for session daemon to start up
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1271183
-
-We only wait 0.5 seconds for the session daemon to start up and present
-its socket, which isn't sufficient for many users. Bump up the sleep
-interval and retry amount so we wait for a total of 5.0 seconds.
-
-(cherry picked from commit ca0c06f4008154de55e0b3109885facd0bf02d32)
---
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index 2ee4b6e..275f1f5 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-     char *lockpath = NULL;
-     int lockfd = -1;
-     int fd = -1;
-    int retries = 100;
-+    int retries = 500;
-     virSocketAddr localAddr;
-     virSocketAddr remoteAddr;
-     char *rundir = NULL;
-@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-             daemonLaunched = true;
-         }
- 
-        usleep(5000);
-+        usleep(10000);
-     }
- 
-     localAddr.len = sizeof(localAddr.data);
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From: Jovanka Gulicoska <jovanka.gulicoska@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 20:02:20 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] driver: log missing modules as INFO, not WARN
-
-Missing modules is a common expected scenario for most libvirt usage on
-RPM distributions like Fedora, so it doesn't really warrant logging at
-WARN level. Use INFO instead
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1274849
-(cherry picked from commit 9a0c7f5f834185db9017c34aabc03ad99cf37bed)
---
- src/driver.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/driver.c b/src/driver.c
-index db03438..f926fe4 100644
--- a/src/driver.c
-+++ b/src/driver.c
-@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ virDriverLoadModule(const char *name)
-         return NULL;
- 
-     if (access(modfile, R_OK) < 0) {
-        VIR_WARN("Module %s not accessible", modfile);
-+        VIR_INFO("Module %s not accessible", modfile);
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:38:00 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] polkit: Allow password-less access for 'libvirt' group
-
-Many users, who admin their own machines, want to be able to access
-system libvirtd via tools like virt-manager without having to enter
-a root password. Just google 'virt-manager without password' and
-you'll find many hits. I've read at least 5 blog posts over the years
-describing slightly different ways of achieving this goal.
-
-Let's finally add official support for this.
-
-Install a polkit-1 rules file granting password-less auth for any user
-in the new 'libvirt' group. Create the group on RPM install
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=957300
-(cherry picked from commit e94979e901517af9fdde358d7b7c92cc055dd50c)
---
- daemon/Makefile.am   | 13 +++++++++++++
- daemon/libvirt.rules |  9 +++++++++
- libvirt.spec.in      | 15 +++++++++++++--
- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 daemon/libvirt.rules
-
-diff --git a/daemon/Makefile.am b/daemon/Makefile.am
-index b95a79d..9c5ea37 100644
--- a/daemon/Makefile.am
-+++ b/daemon/Makefile.am
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST =						\
- 	libvirtd.init.in				\
- 	libvirtd.upstart				\
- 	libvirtd.policy.in				\
-+	libvirt.rules					\
- 	libvirtd.sasl					\
- 	libvirtd.service.in				\
- 	libvirtd.socket.in				\
-@@ -233,6 +234,8 @@ policyauth = auth_admin_keep_session
- else ! WITH_POLKIT0
- policydir = $(datadir)/polkit-1/actions
- policyauth = auth_admin_keep
-+rulesdir = $(datadir)/polkit-1/rules.d
-+rulesfile = libvirt.rules
- endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
- endif WITH_POLKIT
- 
-@@ -263,9 +266,19 @@ if WITH_POLKIT
- install-data-polkit::
- 	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)
- 	$(INSTALL_DATA) libvirtd.policy $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)/org.libvirt.unix.policy
-+if ! WITH_POLKIT0
-+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)
-+	$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$(rulesfile) $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)/50-libvirt.rules
-+endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
-+
- uninstall-data-polkit::
- 	rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)/org.libvirt.unix.policy
- 	rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(policydir) || :
-+if ! WITH_POLKIT0
-+	rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)/50-libvirt.rules
-+	rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir) || :
-+endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
-+
- else ! WITH_POLKIT
- install-data-polkit::
- uninstall-data-polkit::
-diff --git a/daemon/libvirt.rules b/daemon/libvirt.rules
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..01a15fa
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/daemon/libvirt.rules
-@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
-+// Allow any user in the 'libvirt' group to connect to system libvirtd
-+// without entering a password.
-+
-+polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
-+    if (action.id == "org.libvirt.unix.manage" &&
-+        subject.isInGroup("libvirt")) {
-+        return polkit.Result.YES;
-+    }
-+});
-diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in
-index dc327a2..a23629d 100644
--- a/libvirt.spec.in
-+++ b/libvirt.spec.in
-@@ -1631,9 +1631,9 @@ then
- fi
- 
- %if %{with_libvirtd}
-+%pre daemon
-     %if ! %{with_driver_modules}
-         %if %{with_qemu}
-%pre daemon
-             %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
- # We want soft static allocation of well-known ids, as disk images
- # are commonly shared across NFS mounts by id rather than name; see
-@@ -1647,11 +1647,21 @@ if ! getent passwd qemu >/dev/null; then
-     useradd -r -g qemu -G kvm -d / -s /sbin/nologin -c "qemu user" qemu
-   fi
- fi
-exit 0
-             %endif
-         %endif
-     %endif
- 
-+    %if %{with_polkit}
-+        %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
-+# 'libvirt' group is just to allow password-less polkit access to
-+# libvirtd. The uid number is irrelevant, so we use dynamic allocation
-+# described at the above link.
-+getent group libvirt >/dev/null || groupadd -r libvirt
-+        %endif
-+    %endif
-+
-+exit 0
-+
- %post daemon
- 
-     %if %{with_systemd}
-@@ -1925,6 +1935,7 @@ exit 0
-         %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
- %{_datadir}/polkit-1/actions/org.libvirt.unix.policy
- %{_datadir}/polkit-1/actions/org.libvirt.api.policy
-+%{_datadir}/polkit-1/rules.d/50-libvirt.rules
-         %else
- %{_datadir}/PolicyKit/policy/org.libvirt.unix.policy
-         %endif
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+F-12
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+From 953440bd12608a20007ee5da5ab69fbbe910bd28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 15:53:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Extract the backing store format as well as name, if available
+
+When QEMU opens a backing store for a QCow2 file, it will
+normally auto-probe for the format of the backing store,
+rather than assuming it has the same format as the referencing
+file. There is a QCow2 extension that allows an explicit format
+for the backing store to be embedded in the referencing file.
+This closes the auto-probing security hole in QEMU.
+
+This backing store format can be useful for libvirt users
+of virStorageFileGetMetadata, so extract this data and report
+it.
+
+QEMU does not require disk image backing store files to be in
+the same format the file linkee. It will auto-probe the disk
+format for the backing store when opening it. If the backing
+store was intended to be a raw file this could be a security
+hole, because a guest may have written data into its disk that
+then makes the backing store look like a qcow2 file. If it can
+trick QEMU into thinking the raw file is a qcow2 file, it can
+access arbitrary files on the host by adding further backing
+store links.
+
+To address this, callers of virStorageFileGetMeta need to be
+told of the backing store format. If no format is declared,
+they can make a decision whether to allow format probing or
+not.
+---
+ src/util/storage_file.c |  206 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ src/util/storage_file.h |    2 +
+ 2 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
+index 0adea40..80f743e 100644
+--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
+@@ -78,12 +78,33 @@ struct FileTypeInfo {
+     int qcowCryptOffset;  /* Byte offset from start of file
+                            * where to find encryption mode,
+                            * -1 if encryption is not used */
+-    int (*getBackingStore)(char **res, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_size);
+    int (*getBackingStore)(char **res, int *format,
+                           const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_size);
+ };
+ 
+-static int cowGetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+-static int qcowXGetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+-static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int cowGetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+                              const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int qcow1GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+                                const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int qcow2GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+                                const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+                                const unsigned char *, size_t);
+
+#define QCOWX_HDR_VERSION (4)
+#define QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET (QCOWX_HDR_VERSION+4)
+#define QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE (QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+8)
+#define QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE (QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+4+4)
+
+#define QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT (QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE+8+1+1)
+#define QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT (QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE+8)
+
+#define QCOW1_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE (QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT+4+8)
+#define QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE (QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT+4+4+8+8+4+4+8)
+
+#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END 0
+#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT 0xE2792ACA
+
+ 
+ 
+ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
+@@ -119,11 +140,11 @@ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
+     /* QCow */
+     { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW, "QFI", NULL,
+       LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+-      4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8+1+1+2, qcowXGetBackingStore },
+      QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore },
+     /* QCow 2 */
+     { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2, "QFI", NULL,
+       LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+-      4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8, qcowXGetBackingStore },
+      QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore },
+     /* VMDK 3 */
+     /* XXX Untested
+     { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "COWD", NULL,
+@@ -142,11 +163,14 @@ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
+ 
+ static int
+ cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
+                   int *format,
+                    const unsigned char *buf,
+                    size_t buf_size)
+ {
+ #define COW_FILENAME_MAXLEN 1024
+     *res = NULL;
+    *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+
+     if (buf_size < 4+4+ COW_FILENAME_MAXLEN)
+         return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+     if (buf[4+4] == '\0') /* cow_header_v2.backing_file[0] */
+@@ -160,31 +184,98 @@ cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
+     return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+ }
+ 
+
+static int
+qcow2GetBackingStoreFormat(int *format,
+                           const unsigned char *buf,
+                           size_t buf_size,
+                           size_t extension_start,
+                           size_t extension_end)
+{
+    size_t offset = extension_start;
+
+    /*
+     * The extensions take format of
+     *
+     * int32: magic
+     * int32: length
+     * byte[length]: payload
+     *
+     * Unknown extensions can be ignored by skipping
+     * over "length" bytes in the data stream.
+     */
+    while (offset < (buf_size-8) &&
+           offset < (extension_end-8)) {
+        unsigned int magic =
+            (buf[offset] << 24) +
+            (buf[offset+1] << 16) +
+            (buf[offset+2] << 8) +
+            (buf[offset+3]);
+        unsigned int len =
+            (buf[offset+4] << 24) +
+            (buf[offset+5] << 16) +
+            (buf[offset+6] << 8) +
+            (buf[offset+7]);
+
+        offset += 8;
+
+        if ((offset + len) < offset)
+            break;
+
+        if ((offset + len) > buf_size)
+            break;
+
+        switch (magic) {
+        case QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END:
+            goto done;
+
+        case QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT:
+            if (buf[offset+len] != '\0')
+                break;
+            *format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(
+                ((const char *)buf)+offset);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        offset += len;
+    }
+
+done:
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+ static int
+ qcowXGetBackingStore(char **res,
+                     int *format,
+                      const unsigned char *buf,
+-                     size_t buf_size)
+                     size_t buf_size,
+                     bool isQCow2)
+ {
+     unsigned long long offset;
+     unsigned long size;
+ 
+     *res = NULL;
+-    if (buf_size < 4+4+8+4)
+    if (format)
+        *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+
+    if (buf_size < QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+8+4)
+         return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+-    offset = (((unsigned long long)buf[4+4] << 56)
+-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+1] << 48)
+-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+2] << 40)
+-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+3] << 32)
+-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+4] << 24)
+-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+5] << 16)
+-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+6] << 8)
+-              | buf[4+4+7]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_offset */
+    offset = (((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET] << 56)
+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+1] << 48)
+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+2] << 40)
+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+3] << 32)
+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+4] << 24)
+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+5] << 16)
+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+6] << 8)
+              | buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+7]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_offset */
+     if (offset > buf_size)
+         return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+-    size = ((buf[4+4+8] << 24)
+-            | (buf[4+4+8+1] << 16)
+-            | (buf[4+4+8+2] << 8)
+-            | buf[4+4+8+3]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_size */
+    size = ((buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE] << 24)
+            | (buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+1] << 16)
+            | (buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+2] << 8)
+            | buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+3]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_size */
+     if (size == 0)
+         return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+     if (offset + size > buf_size || offset + size < offset)
+@@ -197,12 +288,63 @@ qcowXGetBackingStore(char **res,
+     }
+     memcpy(*res, buf + offset, size);
+     (*res)[size] = '\0';
+
+    /*
+     * Traditionally QCow2 files had a layout of
+     *
+     * [header]
+     * [backingStoreName]
+     *
+     * Although the backingStoreName typically followed
+     * the header immediately, this was not required by
+     * the format. By specifying a higher byte offset for
+     * the backing file offset in the header, it was
+     * possible to leave space between the header and
+     * start of backingStore.
+     *
+     * This hack is now used to store extensions to the
+     * qcow2 format:
+     *
+     * [header]
+     * [extensions]
+     * [backingStoreName]
+     *
+     * Thus the file region to search for extensions is
+     * between the end of the header (QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE)
+     * and the start of the backingStoreName (offset)
+     */
+    if (isQCow2)
+        qcow2GetBackingStoreFormat(format, buf, buf_size, QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE, offset);
+
+     return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+ static int
+qcow1GetBackingStore(char **res,
+                     int *format,
+                     const unsigned char *buf,
+                     size_t buf_size)
+{
+    /* QCow1 doesn't have the extensions capability
+     * used to store backing format */
+    *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+    return qcowXGetBackingStore(res, NULL, buf, buf_size, false);
+}
+
+static int
+qcow2GetBackingStore(char **res,
+                     int *format,
+                     const unsigned char *buf,
+                     size_t buf_size)
+{
+    return qcowXGetBackingStore(res, format, buf, buf_size, true);
+}
+
+
+static int
+ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
+                     int *format,
+                      const unsigned char *buf,
+                      size_t buf_size)
+ {
+@@ -212,6 +354,14 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
+     size_t len;
+ 
+     *res = NULL;
+    /*
+     * Technically this should have been VMDK, since
+     * VMDK spec / VMWare impl only support VMDK backed
+     * by VMDK. QEMU isn't following this though and
+     * does probing on VMDK backing files, hence we set
+     * AUTO
+     */
+    *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+ 
+     if (buf_size <= 0x200)
+         return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+@@ -358,9 +508,12 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+         /* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
+         meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
+         if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
+-            char *base;
+            char *backing;
+            int backingFormat;
+ 
+-            switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&base, head, len)) {
+            switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&backing,
+                                                    &backingFormat,
+                                                    head, len)) {
+             case BACKING_STORE_OK:
+                 break;
+ 
+@@ -370,13 +523,16 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+             case BACKING_STORE_ERROR:
+                 return -1;
+             }
+-            if (base != NULL) {
+-                meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, base);
+-                VIR_FREE(base);
+            if (backing != NULL) {
+                meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
+                VIR_FREE(backing);
+                 if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
+                     virReportOOMError();
+                     return -1;
+                 }
+                meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
+            } else {
+                meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+             }
+         }
+         return 0;
+diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
+index 58533ee..6328ba7 100644
+--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ # include <stdbool.h>
+ 
+ enum virStorageFileFormat {
+    VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO = -1,
+     VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW = 0,
+     VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR,
+     VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS,
+@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virStorageFileFormat);
+ typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
+     int format;
+     char *backingStore;
+    int backingStoreFormat;
+     unsigned long long capacity;
+     bool encrypted;
+ } virStorageFileMetadata;
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+From cab428b1d4d432965cee6f5afb67265557706715 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 16:39:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 02/11] Remove 'type' field from FileTypeInfo struct
+
+Instead of including a field in FileTypeInfo struct for the
+disk format, rely on the array index matching the format.
+Use verify() to assert the correct number of elements in the
+array.
+
+* src/util/storage_file.c: remove type field from FileTypeInfo
+---
+ src/util/storage_file.c |  108 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
+index 80f743e..df0e3a1 100644
+--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
+@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ enum {
+ 
+ /* Either 'magic' or 'extension' *must* be provided */
+ struct FileTypeInfo {
+-    int type;           /* One of the constants above */
+     const char *magic;  /* Optional string of file magic
+                          * to check at head of file */
+     const char *extension; /* Optional file extension to check */
+@@ -108,58 +107,59 @@ static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ 
+ 
+ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
+-    /* Bochs */
+-    /* XXX Untested
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS, "Bochs Virtual HD Image", NULL,
+-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 64, 0x20000,
+-      32+16+16+4+4+4+4+4, 8, 1, -1, NULL },*/
+-    /* CLoop */
+-    /* XXX Untested
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_VOL_CLOOP, "#!/bin/sh\n#V2.0 Format\nmodprobe cloop file=$0 && mount -r -t iso9660 /dev/cloop $1\n", NULL,
+-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
+-      -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL }, */
+-    /* Cow */
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_COW, "OOOM", NULL,
+-      LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+-      4+4+1024+4, 8, 1, -1, cowGetBackingStore },
+-    /* DMG */
+-    /* XXX QEMU says there's no magic for dmg, but we should check... */
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DMG, NULL, ".dmg",
+-      0, -1, 0,
+-      -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL },
+-    /* XXX there's probably some magic for iso we can validate too... */
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_ISO, NULL, ".iso",
+-      0, -1, 0,
+-      -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL },
+-    /* Parallels */
+-    /* XXX Untested
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_PARALLELS, "WithoutFreeSpace", NULL,
+-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 16, 2,
+-      16+4+4+4+4, 4, 512, -1, NULL },
+-    */
+-    /* QCow */
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW, "QFI", NULL,
+-      LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+-      QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore },
+-    /* QCow 2 */
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2, "QFI", NULL,
+-      LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+-      QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore },
+-    /* VMDK 3 */
+-    /* XXX Untested
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "COWD", NULL,
+-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+-      4+4+4, 4, 512, -1, NULL },
+-    */
+-    /* VMDK 4 */
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "KDMV", NULL,
+-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+-      4+4+4, 8, 512, -1, vmdk4GetBackingStore },
+-    /* Connectix / VirtualPC */
+-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VPC, "conectix", NULL,
+-      LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 12, 0x10000,
+-      8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 4, 8, 1, -1, NULL},
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS] = {
+        /*"Bochs Virtual HD Image", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
+        NULL,
+        LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 64, 0x20000,
+        32+16+16+4+4+4+4+4, 8, 1, -1, NULL
+    },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_CLOOP] = {
+        /*"#!/bin/sh\n#V2.0 Format\nmodprobe cloop file=$0 && mount -r -t iso9660 /dev/cloop $1\n", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
+        NULL,
+        LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
+        -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+    },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_COW] = {
+        "OOOM", NULL,
+        LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+        4+4+1024+4, 8, 1, -1, cowGetBackingStore
+    },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DMG] = {
+        NULL, /* XXX QEMU says there's no magic for dmg, but we should check... */
+        ".dmg",
+        0, -1, 0,
+        -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+    },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_ISO] = {
+        NULL, /* XXX there's probably some magic for iso we can validate too... */
+        ".iso",
+        0, -1, 0,
+        -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+    },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW] = {
+        "QFI", NULL,
+        LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+        QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore,
+    },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2] = {
+        "QFI", NULL,
+        LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+        QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore,
+    },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK] = {
+        "KDMV", NULL,
+        LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+        4+4+4, 8, 512, -1, vmdk4GetBackingStore
+    },
+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VPC] = {
+        "conectix", NULL,
+        LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 12, 0x10000,
+        8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 4, 8, 1, -1, NULL
+    },
+ };
+verify(ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST);
+ 
+ static int
+ cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
+@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+         }
+ 
+         /* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
+-        meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
+        meta->format = i;
+         if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
+             char *backing;
+             int backingFormat;
+@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+         if (!virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[i].extension))
+             continue;
+ 
+-        meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
+        meta->format = i;
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,585 @@
+From 57482ca0be29e9e92e242c9acb577e0b770c01d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 14:58:10 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 03/11] Refactor virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD to separate functionality
+
+The virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD did two jobs in one. First
+it probed for storage type, then it extracted metadata for the
+type. It is desirable to be able to separate these jobs, allowing
+probing without querying metadata, and querying metadata without
+probing.
+
+To prepare for this, split out probing code into a new pair of
+methods
+
+  virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD
+  virStorageFileProbeFormat
+
+* src/util/storage_file.c, src/util/storage_file.h,
+  src/libvirt_private.syms: Introduce virStorageFileProbeFormat
+  and virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD
+---
+ src/libvirt_private.syms |    2 +
+ src/util/storage_file.c  |  460 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ src/util/storage_file.h  |    4 +
+ 3 files changed, 335 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms
+index 778ceb1..4607f49 100644
+--- a/src/libvirt_private.syms
+++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms
+@@ -628,6 +628,8 @@ virStorageGenerateQcowPassphrase;
+ # storage_file.h
+ virStorageFileFormatTypeToString;
+ virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString;
+virStorageFileProbeFormat;
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD;
+ virStorageFileGetMetadata;
+ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD;
+ virStorageFileIsSharedFS;
+diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
+index df0e3a1..221268b 100644
+--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
+@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ #define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END 0
+ #define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT 0xE2792ACA
+ 
+/* VMDK needs at least this to find backing store,
+ * other formats are less */
+#define STORAGE_MAX_HEAD (20*512)
+ 
+ 
+ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
+@@ -349,9 +352,14 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
+                      size_t buf_size)
+ {
+     static const char prefix[] = "parentFileNameHint=\"";
+-
+-    char desc[20*512 + 1], *start, *end;
+    char *desc, *start, *end;
+     size_t len;
+    int ret = BACKING_STORE_ERROR;
+
+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(desc, STORAGE_MAX_HEAD + 1) < 0) {
+        virReportOOMError();
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+ 
+     *res = NULL;
+     /*
+@@ -363,29 +371,42 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
+      */
+     *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+ 
+-    if (buf_size <= 0x200)
+-        return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+    if (buf_size <= 0x200) {
+        ret = BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+     len = buf_size - 0x200;
+-    if (len > sizeof(desc) - 1)
+-        len = sizeof(desc) - 1;
+    if (len > STORAGE_MAX_HEAD)
+        len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
+     memcpy(desc, buf + 0x200, len);
+     desc[len] = '\0';
+     start = strstr(desc, prefix);
+-    if (start == NULL)
+-        return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+    if (start == NULL) {
+        ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+     start += strlen(prefix);
+     end = strchr(start, '"');
+-    if (end == NULL)
+-        return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+-    if (end == start)
+-        return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+    if (end == NULL) {
+        ret = BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    if (end == start) {
+        ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+     *end = '\0';
+     *res = strdup(start);
+     if (*res == NULL) {
+         virReportOOMError();
+-        return BACKING_STORE_ERROR;
+        goto cleanup;
+     }
+-    return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+
+    ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
+
+cleanup:
+    VIR_FREE(desc);
+    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -411,148 +432,325 @@ absolutePathFromBaseFile(const char *base_file, const char *path)
+     return res;
+ }
+ 
+-/**
+- * Probe the header of a file to determine what type of disk image
+- * it is, and info about its capacity if available.
+- */
+-int
+-virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+-                                int fd,
+-                                virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+
+static bool
+virStorageFileMatchesMagic(int format,
+                           unsigned char *buf,
+                           size_t buflen)
+ {
+-    unsigned char head[20*512]; /* vmdk4GetBackingStore needs this much. */
+-    int len, i;
+    int mlen;
+ 
+-    memset(meta, 0, sizeof (*meta));
+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].magic == NULL)
+        return false;
+ 
+-    /* If all else fails, call it a raw file */
+-    meta->format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW;
+    /* Validate magic data */
+    mlen = strlen(fileTypeInfo[format].magic);
+    if (mlen > buflen)
+        return false;
+ 
+-    if ((len = read(fd, head, sizeof(head))) < 0) {
+-        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
+-        return -1;
+    if (memcmp(buf, fileTypeInfo[format].magic, mlen) != 0)
+        return false;
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+
+static bool
+virStorageFileMatchesExtension(int format,
+                               const char *path)
+{
+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].extension == NULL)
+        return false;
+
+    if (virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[format].extension))
+        return true;
+
+    return false;
+}
+
+
+static bool
+virStorageFileMatchesVersion(int format,
+                             unsigned char *buf,
+                             size_t buflen)
+{
+    int version;
+
+    /* Validate version number info */
+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset == -1)
+        return false;
+
+    if ((fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset + 4) > buflen)
+        return false;
+
+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
+        version =
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+3] << 24) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+2] << 16) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+1] << 8) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset]);
+    } else {
+        version =
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset] << 24) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+1] << 16) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+2] << 8) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+3]);
+     }
+    if (version != fileTypeInfo[format].versionNumber)
+        return false;
+ 
+-    /* First check file magic */
+-    for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) ; i++) {
+-        int mlen;
+-
+-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].magic == NULL)
+-            continue;
+-
+-        /* Validate magic data */
+-        mlen = strlen(fileTypeInfo[i].magic);
+-        if (mlen > len)
+-            continue;
+-        if (memcmp(head, fileTypeInfo[i].magic, mlen) != 0)
+-            continue;
+-
+-        /* Validate version number info */
+-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].versionNumber != -1) {
+-            int version;
+-
+-            if (fileTypeInfo[i].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
+-                version = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+3] << 24) |
+-                    (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+2] << 16) |
+-                    (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+1] << 8) |
+-                    head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset];
+-            } else {
+-                version = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset] << 24) |
+-                    (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+1] << 16) |
+-                    (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+2] << 8) |
+-                    head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+3];
+-            }
+-            if (version != fileTypeInfo[i].versionNumber)
+-                continue;
+-        }
+    return true;
+}
+ 
+-        /* Optionally extract capacity from file */
+-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset != -1) {
+-            if (fileTypeInfo[i].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
+-                meta->capacity =
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+7] << 56) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+6] << 48) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+5] << 40) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+4] << 32) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+3] << 24) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+2] << 16) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+1] << 8) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset]);
+-            } else {
+-                meta->capacity =
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset] << 56) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+1] << 48) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+2] << 40) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+3] << 32) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+4] << 24) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+5] << 16) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+6] << 8) |
+-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+7]);
+-            }
+-            /* Avoid unlikely, but theoretically possible overflow */
+-            if (meta->capacity > (ULLONG_MAX / fileTypeInfo[i].sizeMultiplier))
+-                continue;
+-            meta->capacity *= fileTypeInfo[i].sizeMultiplier;
+-        }
+ 
+-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset != -1) {
+-            int crypt_format;
+static int
+virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(int format,
+                                 const char *path,
+                                 unsigned char *buf,
+                                 size_t buflen,
+                                 virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+{
+    /* XXX we should consider moving virStorageBackendUpdateVolInfo
+     * code into this method, for non-magic files
+     */
+    if (!fileTypeInfo[format].magic) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+ 
+-            crypt_format = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset] << 24) |
+-                (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+1] << 16) |
+-                (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+2] << 8) |
+-                head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+3];
+-            meta->encrypted = crypt_format != 0;
+    /* Optionally extract capacity from file */
+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset != -1) {
+        if ((fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset + 8) > buflen)
+            return 1;
+
+        if (fileTypeInfo[format].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
+            meta->capacity =
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+7] << 56) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+6] << 48) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+5] << 40) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+4] << 32) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+3] << 24) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+2] << 16) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+1] << 8) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset]);
+        } else {
+            meta->capacity =
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset] << 56) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+1] << 48) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+2] << 40) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+3] << 32) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+4] << 24) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+5] << 16) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+6] << 8) |
+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+7]);
+         }
+        /* Avoid unlikely, but theoretically possible overflow */
+        if (meta->capacity > (ULLONG_MAX / fileTypeInfo[format].sizeMultiplier))
+            return 1;
+        meta->capacity *= fileTypeInfo[format].sizeMultiplier;
+    }
+ 
+-        /* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
+-        meta->format = i;
+-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
+-            char *backing;
+-            int backingFormat;
+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset != -1) {
+        int crypt_format;
+ 
+-            switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&backing,
+-                                                    &backingFormat,
+-                                                    head, len)) {
+-            case BACKING_STORE_OK:
+-                break;
+        crypt_format =
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset] << 24) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+1] << 16) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+2] << 8) |
+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+3]);
+        meta->encrypted = crypt_format != 0;
+    }
+ 
+-            case BACKING_STORE_INVALID:
+-                continue;
+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].getBackingStore != NULL) {
+        char *backing;
+        int backingFormat;
+        int ret = fileTypeInfo[format].getBackingStore(&backing,
+                                                       &backingFormat,
+                                                       buf, buflen);
+        if (ret == BACKING_STORE_INVALID)
+            return 1;
+
+        if (ret == BACKING_STORE_ERROR)
+            return -1;
+ 
+-            case BACKING_STORE_ERROR:
+        if (backing != NULL) {
+            meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
+            VIR_FREE(backing);
+            if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
+                virReportOOMError();
+                 return -1;
+             }
+-            if (backing != NULL) {
+-                meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
+-                VIR_FREE(backing);
+-                if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
+-                    virReportOOMError();
+-                    return -1;
+-                }
+-                meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
+-            } else {
+-                meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+-            }
+            meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
+        } else {
+            meta->backingStore = NULL;
+            meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(const char *path,
+                                 unsigned char *buf,
+                                 size_t buflen)
+{
+    int format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW;
+    int i;
+
+    /* First check file magic */
+    for (i = 0 ; i < VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST ; i++) {
+        if (virStorageFileMatchesMagic(i, buf, buflen) &&
+            virStorageFileMatchesVersion(i, buf, buflen)) {
+            format = i;
+            goto cleanup;
+         }
+-        return 0;
+     }
+ 
+     /* No magic, so check file extension */
+-    for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) ; i++) {
+-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].extension == NULL)
+-            continue;
+    for (i = 0 ; i < VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST ; i++) {
+        if (virStorageFileMatchesExtension(i, path)) {
+            format = i;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+    }
+ 
+-        if (!virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[i].extension))
+-            continue;
+cleanup:
+    return format;
+}
+ 
+-        meta->format = i;
+-        return 0;
+
+/**
+ * virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
+ * pointing to 'path'), returning the detected disk format.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ *
+ * Best option: Don't use this function
+ */
+int
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path, int fd)
+{
+    unsigned char *head;
+    ssize_t len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(head, len) < 0) {
+        virReportOOMError();
+        return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    return 0;
+    if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    if ((len = read(fd, head, len)) < 0) {
+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+
+cleanup:
+    VIR_FREE(head);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * virStorageFileProbeFormat:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'path', returning the detected
+ * disk format.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ *
+ * Best option: Don't use this function
+ */
+int
+virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path)
+{
+    int fd, ret;
+
+    if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot open file '%s'"), path);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ret = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(path, fd);
+
+    close(fd);
+
+    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+/**
+ * virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
+ * for the file 'path'), filling 'meta' with the detected
+ * format and other associated metadata.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ */
+int
+virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+                                int fd,
+                                virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+{
+    unsigned char *head;
+    ssize_t len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(head, len) < 0) {
+        virReportOOMError();
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    memset(meta, 0, sizeof (*meta));
+
+    if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    if ((len = read(fd, head, len)) < 0) {
+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    meta->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+
+    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(meta->format, path, head, len, meta);
+
+cleanup:
+    VIR_FREE(head);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * virStorageFileGetMetadata:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'path', filling 'meta' with the detected
+ * format and other associated metadata.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ */
+ int
+ virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+                           virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
+index 6328ba7..3420d44 100644
+--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
+@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
+ #  define DEV_BSIZE 512
+ # endif
+ 
+int virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path);
+int virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path,
+                                    int fd);
+
+ int virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+                               virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
+ int virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+From 726a63a437efd96510ce316bf30d16f213d4db27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:15:51 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 04/11] Require format to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata
+
+Require the disk image to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata.
+If this is set to VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, then the format will be
+resolved using probing. This makes it easier to control when
+probing will be used
+
+* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
+  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
+  Set VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO when calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
+* src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c: Probe for disk format before
+  calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
+* src/util/storage_file.h, src/util/storage_file.c: Remove format
+  from virStorageFileMeta struct & require it to be passed into
+  method.
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c           |   27 +++++++++++++++++---
+ src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c     |    4 ++-
+ src/security/security_selinux.c  |    4 ++-
+ src/security/virt-aa-helper.c    |    4 ++-
+ src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c |   11 ++++++--
+ src/util/storage_file.c          |   50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ src/util/storage_file.h          |    3 +-
+ 7 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 487bfa3..97f2990 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -3069,7 +3069,9 @@ static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+             }
+         }
+ 
+-        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+                                       VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+                                       &meta);
+         if (rc < 0)
+             VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
+ 
+@@ -3119,7 +3121,9 @@ static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+             }
+         }
+ 
+-        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+                                       VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+                                       &meta);
+         if (rc < 0)
+             VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
+ 
+@@ -9614,6 +9618,7 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
+     virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = NULL;
+     struct stat sb;
+     int i;
+    int format;
+ 
+     virCheckFlags(0, -1);
+ 
+@@ -9658,7 +9663,21 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
+     }
+ 
+     /* Probe for magic formats */
+-    if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, &meta) < 0)
+    if (disk->driverType) {
+        if ((format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(disk->driverType)) < 0) {
+            qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                            _("unknown disk format %s for %s"),
+                            disk->driverType, disk->src);
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+            goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd,
+                                        format,
+                                        &meta) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+     /* Get info for normal formats */
+@@ -9706,7 +9725,7 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
+        highest allocated extent from QEMU */
+     if (virDomainObjIsActive(vm) &&
+         disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_BLOCK &&
+-        meta.format != VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW &&
+        format != VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW &&
+         S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode)) {
+         qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
+         if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(vm) < 0)
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+index 95015b0..acfe48e 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+@@ -115,7 +115,9 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+         virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+         int ret;
+ 
+-        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+                                        VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+                                        &meta);
+ 
+         if (path != disk->src)
+             VIR_FREE(path);
+diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+index e5eef19..5c0f002 100644
+--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+@@ -457,7 +457,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
+         virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+         int ret;
+ 
+-        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+                                        VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+                                        &meta);
+ 
+         if (path != disk->src)
+             VIR_FREE(path);
+diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+index c66f107..2c045e6 100644
+--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+@@ -830,7 +830,9 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
+             do {
+                 virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+ 
+-                ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+                ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+                                                VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+                                                &meta);
+ 
+                 if (path != ctl->def->disks[i]->src)
+                     VIR_FREE(path);
+diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+index f0cd770..d3ac0fe 100644
+--- a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+@@ -75,14 +75,19 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
+ 
+     memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
+ 
+-    if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(target->path, fd, &meta) < 0) {
+    if ((target->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(target->path, fd)) < 0) {
+         close(fd);
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    close(fd);
+    if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(target->path, fd,
+                                        target->format,
+                                        &meta) < 0) {
+        close(fd);
+        return -1;
+    }
+ 
+-    target->format = meta.format;
+    close(fd);
+ 
+     if (backingStore) {
+         *backingStore = meta.backingStore;
+diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
+index 221268b..9712d92 100644
+--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
+@@ -696,18 +696,23 @@ virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path)
+ /**
+  * virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD:
+  *
+- * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
+- * for the file 'path'), filling 'meta' with the detected
+- * format and other associated metadata.
+ * Extract metadata about the storage volume with the specified
+ * image format. If image format is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, it
+ * will probe to automatically identify the format. 
+  *
+- * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
+- * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+- * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
+- * format at will.
+ * Callers are advised never to use VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO as a
+ * format, since a malicious guest can turn a raw file into any
+ * other non-raw format at will.
+ *
+ * If the returned meta.backingStoreFormat is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO
+ * it indicates the image didn't specify an explicit format for its
+ * backing store. Callers are advised against probing for the
+ * backing store format in this case.
+  */
+ int
+ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+                                 int fd,
+                                int format,
+                                 virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+ {
+     unsigned char *head;
+@@ -731,9 +736,16 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    meta->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+    if (format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO)
+        format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+
+    if (format < 0 ||
+        format >= VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST) {
+        virReportSystemError(EINVAL, _("unknown storage file format %d"), format);
+        return -1;
+    }
+ 
+-    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(meta->format, path, head, len, meta);
+    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(format, path, head, len, meta);
+ 
+ cleanup:
+     VIR_FREE(head);
+@@ -743,16 +755,22 @@ cleanup:
+ /**
+  * virStorageFileGetMetadata:
+  *
+- * Probe for the format of 'path', filling 'meta' with the detected
+- * format and other associated metadata.
+ * Extract metadata about the storage volume with the specified
+ * image format. If image format is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, it
+ * will probe to automatically identify the format. 
+  *
+- * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
+- * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+- * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
+- * format at will.
+ * Callers are advised never to use VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO as a
+ * format, since a malicious guest can turn a raw file into any
+ * other non-raw format at will.
+ *
+ * If the returned meta.backingStoreFormat is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO
+ * it indicates the image didn't specify an explicit format for its
+ * backing store. Callers are advised against probing for the
+ * backing store format in this case.
+  */
+ int
+ virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+                          int format,
+                           virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+ {
+     int fd, ret;
+@@ -762,7 +780,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, meta);
+    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, format, meta);
+ 
+     close(fd);
+ 
+diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
+index 3420d44..6853182 100644
+--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
+@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ enum virStorageFileFormat {
+ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virStorageFileFormat);
+ 
+ typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
+-    int format;
+     char *backingStore;
+     int backingStoreFormat;
+     unsigned long long capacity;
+@@ -62,9 +61,11 @@ int virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path,
+                                     int fd);
+ 
+ int virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+                              int format,
+                               virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
+ int virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+                                     int fd,
+                                    int format,
+                                     virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
+ 
+ int virStorageFileIsSharedFS(const char *path);
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+From ac5067f1e2e98181ee0e9230f756697f50d853eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 18:09:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Add an API for iterating over disk paths
+
+There is duplicated code which iterates over disk backing stores
+performing some action. Provide a convenient helper for doing
+this to eliminate duplication & risk of mistakes with disk format
+probing
+
+* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h,
+  src/libvirt_private.syms: Add virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
+---
+ src/conf/domain_conf.c   |   99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/conf/domain_conf.h   |   11 +++++
+ src/libvirt_private.syms |    1 +
+ 3 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+index 378c06e..b20ca97 100644
+--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
+ #include "macvtap.h"
+ #include "nwfilter_conf.h"
+ #include "ignore-value.h"
+#include "storage_file.h"
+ 
+ #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_DOMAIN
+ 
+@@ -7273,4 +7274,102 @@ done:
+ }
+ 
+ 
+int virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+                                bool allowProbing,
+                                bool ignoreOpenFailure,
+                                virDomainDiskDefPathIterator iter,
+                                void *opaque)
+{
+    virHashTablePtr paths;
+    int format;
+    int ret = -1;
+    size_t depth = 0;
+    char *nextpath = NULL;
+
+    if (!disk->src)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (disk->driverType) {
+        const char *formatStr = disk->driverType;
+        if (STREQ(formatStr, "aio"))
+            formatStr = "raw"; /* Xen compat */
+
+        if ((format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(formatStr)) < 0) {
+            virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                 _("unknown disk format '%s' for %s"),
+                                 disk->driverType, disk->src);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (allowProbing) {
+            format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+        } else {
+            virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                 _("no disk format for %s and probing is disabled"),
+                                 disk->src);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    paths = virHashCreate(5);
+
+    do {
+        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+        const char *path = nextpath ? nextpath : disk->src;
+        int fd;
+
+        if (iter(disk, path, depth, opaque) < 0)
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        if (virHashLookup(paths, path)) {
+            virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                 _("backing store for %s is self-referential"),
+                                 disk->src);
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+
+        if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+            if (ignoreOpenFailure) {
+                char ebuf[1024];
+                VIR_WARN("Ignoring open failure on %s: %s", path,
+                         virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
+                break;
+            } else {
+                virReportSystemError(errno,
+                                     _("unable to open disk path %s"),
+                                     path);
+                goto cleanup;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, format, &meta) < 0) {
+            close(fd);
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+        close(fd);
+
+        if (virHashAddEntry(paths, path, (void*)0x1) < 0) {
+            virReportOOMError();
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+
+        depth++;
+        nextpath = meta.backingStore;
+
+        format = meta.backingStoreFormat;
+
+        if (format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO &&
+            !allowProbing)
+            format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW; /* Stops further recursion */
+    } while (nextpath);
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    virHashFree(paths, NULL);
+    VIR_FREE(nextpath);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+ #endif /* ! PROXY */
+diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h
+index 01da17e..d46869e 100644
+--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h
+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h
+@@ -1079,6 +1079,17 @@ int virDomainChrDefForeach(virDomainDefPtr def,
+                            void *opaque);
+ 
+ 
+typedef int (*virDomainDiskDefPathIterator)(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+                                            const char *path,
+                                            size_t depth,
+                                            void *opaque);
+
+int virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+                                bool allowProbing,
+                                bool ignoreOpenFailure,
+                                virDomainDiskDefPathIterator iter,
+                                void *opaque);
+
+ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainVirt)
+ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainBoot)
+ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainFeature)
+diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms
+index 4607f49..b5f3695 100644
+--- a/src/libvirt_private.syms
+++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms
+@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ virDomainSnapshotDefFormat;
+ virDomainSnapshotAssignDef;
+ virDomainObjAssignDef;
+ virDomainChrDefForeach;
+virDomainDiskDefForeachPath;
+ 
+ 
+ # domain_event.h
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+From 54c1bb731d2b19a46a594cf9682c022f1e1114d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:40:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 06/11] Convert all disk backing store loops to shared helper API
+
+Update the QEMU cgroups code, QEMU DAC security driver, SELinux
+and AppArmour security drivers over to use the shared helper API
+virDomainDiskDefForeachPath().
+
+* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
+  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
+  Convert over to use virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c          |  161 ++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c    |   47 ++++--------
+ src/security/security_selinux.c |   67 +++++++----------
+ src/security/virt-aa-helper.c   |   71 ++++++++----------
+ 4 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 97f2990..99aeffa 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -3040,107 +3040,82 @@ static const char *const defaultDeviceACL[] = {
+ #define DEVICE_PTY_MAJOR 136
+ #define DEVICE_SND_MAJOR 116
+ 
+-static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+-                               virDomainObjPtr vm,
+-                               virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+-{
+-    char *path = disk->src;
+-    int ret = -1;
+ 
+-    while (path != NULL) {
+-        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+-        int rc;
+static int qemuSetupDiskPathAllow(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                  const char *path,
+                                  size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                  void *opaque)
+{
+    virCgroupPtr cgroup = opaque;
+    int rc;
+ 
+-        VIR_DEBUG("Process path '%s' for disk", path);
+-        rc = virCgroupAllowDevicePath(cgroup, path);
+-        if (rc != 0) {
+-            /* Get this for non-block devices */
+-            if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+-                VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
+-            } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
+-                VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
+-            } else {
+-                virReportSystemError(-rc,
+-                                     _("Unable to allow device %s for %s"),
+-                                     path, vm->def->name);
+-                if (path != disk->src)
+-                    VIR_FREE(path);
+-                goto cleanup;
+-            }
+    VIR_DEBUG("Process path %s for disk", path);
+    /* XXX RO vs RW */
+    rc = virCgroupAllowDevicePath(cgroup, path);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        /* Get this for non-block devices */
+        if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+            VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
+        } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
+            VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
+        } else {
+            virReportSystemError(-rc,
+                                 _("Unable to allow access for disk path %s"),
+                                 path);
+            return -1;
+         }
+-
+-        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+-                                       VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+-                                       &meta);
+-        if (rc < 0)
+-            VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
+-
+-        if (path != disk->src)
+-            VIR_FREE(path);
+-        path = NULL;
+-
+-        if (rc < 0)
+-            break; /* Treating as non fatal */
+-
+-        path = meta.backingStore;
+     }
+    return 0;
+}
+ 
+-    ret = 0;
+ 
+-cleanup:
+-    return ret;
+static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+                               virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+{
+    return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+                                       true,
+                                       true,
+                                       qemuSetupDiskPathAllow,
+                                       cgroup);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+-                                  virDomainObjPtr vm,
+-                                  virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+static int qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                    const char *path,
+                                    size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                    void *opaque)
+ {
+-    char *path = disk->src;
+-    int ret = -1;
+-
+-    while (path != NULL) {
+-        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+-        int rc;
+    virCgroupPtr cgroup = opaque;
+    int rc;
+ 
+-        VIR_DEBUG("Process path '%s' for disk", path);
+-        rc = virCgroupDenyDevicePath(cgroup, path);
+-        if (rc != 0) {
+-            /* Get this for non-block devices */
+-            if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+-                VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
+-            } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
+-                VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
+-            } else {
+-                virReportSystemError(-rc,
+-                                     _("Unable to deny device %s for %s"),
+-                                     path, vm->def->name);
+-                if (path != disk->src)
+-                    VIR_FREE(path);
+-                goto cleanup;
+-            }
+    VIR_DEBUG("Process path %s for disk", path);
+    /* XXX RO vs RW */
+    rc = virCgroupDenyDevicePath(cgroup, path);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        /* Get this for non-block devices */
+        if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+            VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
+        } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
+            VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
+        } else {
+            virReportSystemError(-rc,
+                                 _("Unable to allow access for disk path %s"),
+                                 path);
+            return -1;
+         }
+-
+-        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+-                                       VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+-                                       &meta);
+-        if (rc < 0)
+-            VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
+-
+-        if (path != disk->src)
+-            VIR_FREE(path);
+-        path = NULL;
+-
+-        if (rc < 0)
+-            break; /* Treating as non fatal */
+-
+-        path = meta.backingStore;
+     }
+    return 0;
+}
+ 
+-    ret = 0;
+ 
+-cleanup:
+-    return ret;
+static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+                                  virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+{
+    return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+                                       true,
+                                       true,
+                                       qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny,
+                                       cgroup);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -3204,7 +3179,7 @@ static int qemuSetupCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+         }
+ 
+         for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
+-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+                 goto cleanup;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -8035,7 +8010,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
+                                 vm->def->name);
+                 goto endjob;
+             }
+-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+                 goto endjob;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -8080,7 +8055,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
+             /* Fallthrough */
+         }
+         if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
+-            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+                 VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
+                          NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
+         }
+@@ -8280,7 +8255,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
+                                 vm->def->name);
+                 goto endjob;
+             }
+-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+                 goto endjob;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -8303,7 +8278,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
+         }
+ 
+         if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
+-            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+                 VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
+                          NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
+         }
+@@ -8430,7 +8405,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+         VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
+ 
+     if (cgroup != NULL) {
+-        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+             VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
+                      NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
+     }
+@@ -8493,7 +8468,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachSCSIDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+         VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
+ 
+     if (cgroup != NULL) {
+-        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+             VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
+                      NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
+     }
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+index acfe48e..770010d 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+@@ -98,45 +98,28 @@ err:
+ 
+ 
+ static int
+qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                    const char *path,
+                                    size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                    void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+{
+    return qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(path, driver->user, driver->group);
+}
+
+
+static int
+ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                      virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+ 
+ {
+-    const char *path;
+-
+     if (!driver->privileged || !driver->dynamicOwnership)
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    if (!disk->src)
+-        return 0;
+-
+-    path = disk->src;
+-    do {
+-        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+-        int ret;
+-
+-        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+-                                        VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+-                                        &meta);
+-
+-        if (path != disk->src)
+-            VIR_FREE(path);
+-        path = NULL;
+-
+-        if (ret < 0)
+-            return -1;
+-
+-        if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
+-            qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(meta.backingStore,
+-                                        driver->user, driver->group) < 0) {
+-            VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
+-            return -1;
+-        }
+-
+-        path = meta.backingStore;
+-    } while (path != NULL);
+-
+-    return qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(disk->src, driver->user, driver->group);
+    return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+                                       true,
+                                       false,
+                                       qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel,
+                                       NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+index 5c0f002..d191118 100644
+--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+@@ -439,54 +439,43 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
+ 
+ 
+ static int
+SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+                            const char *path,
+                            size_t depth,
+                            void *opaque)
+{
+    const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = opaque;
+
+    if (depth == 0) {
+        if (disk->shared) {
+            return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_image_context);
+        } else if (disk->readonly) {
+            return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
+        } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+            return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, secdef->imagelabel);
+        } else {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else {
+        return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
+                              virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+ 
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+-    const char *path;
+ 
+     if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    if (!disk->src)
+-        return 0;
+-
+-    path = disk->src;
+-    do {
+-        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+-        int ret;
+-
+-        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+-                                        VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+-                                        &meta);
+-
+-        if (path != disk->src)
+-            VIR_FREE(path);
+-        path = NULL;
+-
+-        if (ret < 0)
+-           break;
+-
+-        if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
+-            SELinuxSetFilecon(meta.backingStore,
+-                              default_content_context) < 0) {
+-            VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
+-            return -1;
+-        }
+-
+-        path = meta.backingStore;
+-    } while (path != NULL);
+-
+-    if (disk->shared) {
+-        return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, default_image_context);
+-    } else if (disk->readonly) {
+-        return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, default_content_context);
+-    } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+-        return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
+-    }
+-
+-    return 0;
+    return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+                                       true,
+                                       false,
+                                       SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
+                                       secdef);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+index 2c045e6..9ed0cd3 100644
+--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
+ #include "uuid.h"
+ #include "hostusb.h"
+ #include "pci.h"
+-#include "storage_file.h"
+ 
+ static char *progname;
+ 
+@@ -801,6 +800,28 @@ file_iterate_pci_cb(pciDevice *dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+add_file_path(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+              const char *path,
+              size_t depth,
+              void *opaque)
+{
+    virBufferPtr buf = opaque;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (depth == 0) {
+        if (disk->readonly)
+            ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "r");
+        else
+            ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "rw");
+    } else {
+        ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "r");
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int
+ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
+ {
+     virBuffer buf = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER;
+@@ -821,45 +842,15 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
+         goto clean;
+     }
+ 
+-    for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++)
+-        if (ctl->def->disks[i] && ctl->def->disks[i]->src) {
+-            int ret;
+-            const char *path;
+-
+-            path = ctl->def->disks[i]->src;
+-            do {
+-                virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+-
+-                ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+-                                                VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+-                                                &meta);
+-
+-                if (path != ctl->def->disks[i]->src)
+-                    VIR_FREE(path);
+-                path = NULL;
+-
+-                if (ret < 0) {
+-                    vah_warning("could not open path, skipping");
+-                    continue;
+-                }
+-
+-                if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
+-                    (ret = vah_add_file(&buf, meta.backingStore, "rw")) != 0) {
+-                    VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
+-                    goto clean;
+-                }
+-
+-                path = meta.backingStore;
+-            } while (path != NULL);
+-
+-            if (ctl->def->disks[i]->readonly)
+-                ret = vah_add_file(&buf, ctl->def->disks[i]->src, "r");
+-            else
+-                ret = vah_add_file(&buf, ctl->def->disks[i]->src, "rw");
+-
+-            if (ret != 0)
+-                goto clean;
+-        }
+    for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++) {
+        int ret = virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(ctl->def->disks[i],
+                                              true,
+                                              false,
+                                              add_file_path,
+                                              &buf);
+        if (ret != 0)
+            goto clean;
+    }
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->nserials; i++)
+         if (ctl->def->serials[i] && ctl->def->serials[i]->data.file.path)
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+From dac2b936e77f6c76c11f162e4b175492e4803acb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:58:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Disable all disk probing in QEMU driver & add config option to re-enable
+
+Disk format probing is now disabled by default. A new config
+option in /etc/qemu/qemu.conf will re-enable it for existing
+deployments where this causes trouble
+---
+ src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug       |    1 +
+ src/qemu/qemu.conf               |   12 ++++++++++++
+ src/qemu/qemu_conf.c             |    4 ++++
+ src/qemu/qemu_conf.h             |    1 +
+ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c           |   36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c     |    2 +-
+ src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug  |    4 ++++
+ src/security/security_apparmor.c |   12 ++++++++----
+ src/security/security_driver.c   |   16 ++++++++++++++--
+ src/security/security_driver.h   |   10 ++++++++--
+ src/security/security_selinux.c  |    9 ++++++---
+ src/security/virt-aa-helper.c    |   10 +++++++++-
+ tests/seclabeltest.c             |    2 +-
+ 13 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug b/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
+index 7c9f271..47d0525 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
+++ b/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ module Libvirtd_qemu =
+                  | bool_entry "relaxed_acs_check"
+                  | bool_entry "vnc_allow_host_audio"
+                  | bool_entry "clear_emulator_capabilities"
+                 | bool_entry "allow_disk_format_probing"
+ 
+    (* Each enty in the config is one of the following three ... *)
+    let entry = vnc_entry
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu.conf b/src/qemu/qemu.conf
+index 93934f3..dc8eb83 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu.conf
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu.conf
+@@ -187,3 +187,15 @@
+ # exploit the privileges and possibly do damage to the host.
+ #
+ # clear_emulator_capabilities = 1
+
+
+
+# If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk
+# images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise
+# specified in the XML. This is disabled by default.
+#
+# WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all
+# deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their
+# guest XML <disk> elements to include  <driver type='XXXX'/>
+# elements instead of enabling this option.
+# allow_disk_format_probing = 1
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
+index 988220b..3ba48bf 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -365,6 +365,10 @@ int qemudLoadDriverConfig(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+     CHECK_TYPE ("clear_emulator_capabilities", VIR_CONF_LONG);
+     if (p) driver->clearEmulatorCapabilities = p->l;
+ 
+    p = virConfGetValue (conf, "allow_disk_format_probing");
+    CHECK_TYPE ("allow_disk_format_probing", VIR_CONF_LONG);
+    if (p) driver->allowDiskFormatProbing = p->l;
+
+     virConfFree (conf);
+     return 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
+index ab5f158..30e9f20 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
+@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ struct qemud_driver {
+     unsigned int relaxedACS : 1;
+     unsigned int vncAllowHostAudio : 1;
+     unsigned int clearEmulatorCapabilities : 1;
+    unsigned int allowDiskFormatProbing : 1;
+ 
+     virCapsPtr caps;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 616547c..3c479c5 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1322,7 +1322,8 @@ qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
+     qemuSecurityDACSetDriver(qemud_drv);
+ 
+     ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv,
+-                                   qemud_drv->securityDriverName);
+                                   qemud_drv->securityDriverName,
+                                   qemud_drv->allowDiskFormatProbing);
+     if (ret == -1) {
+         VIR_ERROR0(_("Failed to start security driver"));
+         return -1;
+@@ -3070,11 +3071,12 @@ static int qemuSetupDiskPathAllow(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+                               virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+                                virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+ {
+     return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+-                                       true,
+                                       driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
+                                        true,
+                                        qemuSetupDiskPathAllow,
+                                        cgroup);
+@@ -3109,11 +3111,12 @@ static int qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+                                  virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+                                   virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+ {
+     return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+-                                       true,
+                                       driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
+                                        true,
+                                        qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny,
+                                        cgroup);
+@@ -3180,7 +3183,7 @@ static int qemuSetupCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+         }
+ 
+         for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
+-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+                 goto cleanup;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -8033,7 +8036,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
+                                 vm->def->name);
+                 goto endjob;
+             }
+-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+                 goto endjob;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -8078,7 +8081,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
+             /* Fallthrough */
+         }
+         if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
+-            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+                 VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
+                          NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
+         }
+@@ -8278,7 +8281,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
+                                 vm->def->name);
+                 goto endjob;
+             }
+-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+                 goto endjob;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -8301,7 +8304,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
+         }
+ 
+         if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
+-            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+                 VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
+                          NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
+         }
+@@ -8429,7 +8432,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+         VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
+ 
+     if (cgroup != NULL) {
+-        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+             VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
+                      NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
+     }
+@@ -8493,7 +8496,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachSCSIDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+         VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
+ 
+     if (cgroup != NULL) {
+-        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+             VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
+                      NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
+     }
+@@ -9672,8 +9675,15 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
+             goto cleanup;
+         }
+     } else {
+-        if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+        if (driver->allowDiskFormatProbing) {
+            if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+                goto cleanup;
+        } else {
+            qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                            _("no disk format for %s and probing is disabled"),
+                            disk->src);
+             goto cleanup;
+        }
+     }
+ 
+     if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd,
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+index 0bbcf69..55dc0c6 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+         return 0;
+ 
+     return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+-                                       true,
+                                       driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
+                                        false,
+                                        qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel,
+                                        NULL);
+diff --git a/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug b/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
+index 3326cc5..f0c4a0d 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
+++ b/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
+@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ relaxed_acs_check = 1
+ vnc_allow_host_audio = 1
+ 
+ clear_emulator_capabilities = 0
+
+allow_disk_format_probing = 1
+ "
+ 
+    test Libvirtd_qemu.lns get conf =
+@@ -212,3 +214,5 @@ clear_emulator_capabilities = 0
+ { "vnc_allow_host_audio" = "1" }
+ { "#empty" }
+ { "clear_emulator_capabilities" = "0" }
+{ "#empty" }
+{ "allow_disk_format_probing" = "1" }
+diff --git a/src/security/security_apparmor.c b/src/security/security_apparmor.c
+index cb5c739..c5f9829 100644
+--- a/src/security/security_apparmor.c
+++ b/src/security/security_apparmor.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ load_profile(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+     char *xml = NULL;
+     int pipefd[2];
+     pid_t child;
+    const char *probe = virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv)
+        ? "1" : "0";
+ 
+     if (pipe(pipefd) < -1) {
+         virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("unable to create pipe"));
+@@ -172,19 +174,19 @@ load_profile(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ 
+     if (create) {
+         const char *const argv[] = {
+-            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-c", "-u", profile, NULL
+            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-c", "-u", profile, NULL
+         };
+         ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
+                       pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
+     } else if (fn) {
+         const char *const argv[] = {
+-            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-r", "-u", profile, "-f", fn, NULL
+            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-r", "-u", profile, "-f", fn, NULL
+         };
+         ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
+                       pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
+     } else {
+         const char *const argv[] = {
+-            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-r", "-u", profile, NULL
+            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-r", "-u", profile, NULL
+         };
+         ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
+                       pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
+@@ -347,9 +349,11 @@ AppArmorSecurityDriverProbe(void)
+  * currently not used.
+  */
+ static int
+-AppArmorSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+AppArmorSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                           bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
+ {
+     virSecurityDriverSetDOI(drv, SECURITY_APPARMOR_VOID_DOI);
+    virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv, allowDiskFormatProbing);
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/security/security_driver.c b/src/security/security_driver.c
+index aac9f78..9e32fa4 100644
+--- a/src/security/security_driver.c
+++ b/src/security/security_driver.c
+@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def)
+ 
+ int
+ virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
+-                         const char *name)
+                         const char *name,
+                         bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
+ {
+     unsigned int i;
+ 
+@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
+         switch (tmp->probe()) {
+         case SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE:
+             virSecurityDriverInit(tmp);
+-            if (tmp->open(tmp) == -1) {
+            if (tmp->open(tmp, allowDiskFormatProbing) == -1) {
+                 return -1;
+             } else {
+                 *drv = tmp;
+@@ -125,3 +126,14 @@ virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+ {
+     return drv->name;
+ }
+
+void virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                                                bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
+{
+    drv->_private.allowDiskFormatProbing = allowDiskFormatProbing;
+}
+
+bool virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+    return drv->_private.allowDiskFormatProbing;
+}
+diff --git a/src/security/security_driver.h b/src/security/security_driver.h
+index 61c9eb0..d768f32 100644
+--- a/src/security/security_driver.h
+++ b/src/security/security_driver.h
+@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ typedef struct _virSecurityDriverState virSecurityDriverState;
+ typedef virSecurityDriverState *virSecurityDriverStatePtr;
+ 
+ typedef virSecurityDriverStatus (*virSecurityDriverProbe) (void);
+-typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                                      bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
+ typedef int (*virSecurityDomainRestoreImageLabel) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                                                    virDomainObjPtr vm,
+                                                    virDomainDiskDefPtr disk);
+@@ -102,12 +103,14 @@ struct _virSecurityDriver {
+      */
+     struct {
+         char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN];
+        bool allowDiskFormatProbing;
+     } _private;
+ };
+ 
+ /* Global methods */
+ int virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
+-                             const char *name);
+                             const char *name,
+                             bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
+ 
+ int
+ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def);
+@@ -120,7 +123,10 @@ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def);
+ void virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+ int virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                             const char *doi);
+void virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                                                bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
+ const char *virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+ const char *virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+bool virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+ 
+ #endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_H__ */
+diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+index cc3812b..a9dd836 100644
+--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+@@ -266,13 +266,15 @@ SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                          bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
+ {
+     /*
+      * Where will the DOI come from?  SELinux configuration, or qemu
+      * configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0".
+      */
+     virSecurityDriverSetDOI(drv, SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI);
+    virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv, allowDiskFormatProbing);
+     return SELinuxInitialize();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -467,18 +469,19 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                              virDomainObjPtr vm,
+                              virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+ 
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+    bool allowDiskFormatProbing = virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv);
+ 
+     if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
+         return 0;
+ 
+     return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+-                                       true,
+                                       allowDiskFormatProbing,
+                                        false,
+                                        SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
+                                        secdef);
+diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+index 9ed0cd3..521545d 100644
+--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ static char *progname;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+    bool allowDiskFormatProbing;
+     char uuid[PROFILE_NAME_SIZE];       /* UUID of vm */
+     bool dryrun;                /* dry run */
+     char cmd;                   /* 'c'   create
+@@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++) {
+         int ret = virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(ctl->def->disks[i],
+-                                              true,
+                                              ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing,
+                                               false,
+                                               add_file_path,
+                                               &buf);
+@@ -943,6 +944,7 @@ vahParseArgv(vahControl * ctl, int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+     int arg, idx = 0;
+     struct option opt[] = {
+        {"probing", 1, 0, 'p' },
+         {"add", 0, 0, 'a'},
+         {"create", 0, 0, 'c'},
+         {"dryrun", 0, 0, 'd'},
+@@ -991,6 +993,12 @@ vahParseArgv(vahControl * ctl, int argc, char **argv)
+                     PROFILE_NAME_SIZE) == NULL)
+                     vah_error(ctl, 1, "error copying UUID");
+                 break;
+            case 'p':
+                if (STREQ(optarg, "1"))
+                    ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing = true;
+                else
+                    ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing = false;
+                break;
+             default:
+                 vah_error(ctl, 1, "unsupported option");
+                 break;
+diff --git a/tests/seclabeltest.c b/tests/seclabeltest.c
+index 26d1f86..ef3f026 100644
+--- a/tests/seclabeltest.c
+++ b/tests/seclabeltest.c
+@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ main (int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char **argv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+     const char *doi, *model;
+     virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
+ 
+-    ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "selinux");
+    ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "selinux", false);
+     if (ret == -1)
+     {
+         fprintf (stderr, "Failed to start security driver");
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From 3534cd47a57ee9cf7041472511444784f14d6939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 16:08:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 09/11] Add ability to set a default driver name/type when parsing disks
+
+Record a default driver name/type in capabilities struct. Use this
+when parsing disks if value is not set in XML config.
+
+* src/conf/capabilities.h: Record default driver name/type for disks
+* src/conf/domain_conf.c: Fallback to default driver name/type
+  when parsing disks
+* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Set default driver name/type to raw
+---
+ src/conf/capabilities.h |    2 ++
+ src/conf/domain_conf.c  |   16 +++++++++++++++-
+ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c  |    8 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/conf/capabilities.h b/src/conf/capabilities.h
+index 9290c82..f676eb8 100644
+--- a/src/conf/capabilities.h
+++ b/src/conf/capabilities.h
+@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ struct _virCaps {
+     virCapsGuestPtr *guests;
+     unsigned char macPrefix[VIR_MAC_PREFIX_BUFLEN];
+     unsigned int emulatorRequired : 1;
+    const char *defaultDiskDriverName;
+    const char *defaultDiskDriverType;
+     void *(*privateDataAllocFunc)(void);
+     void (*privateDataFreeFunc)(void *);
+     int (*privateDataXMLFormat)(virBufferPtr, void *);
+diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+index b20ca97..f3b8cfa 100644
+--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+@@ -1639,6 +1639,16 @@ virDomainDiskDefParseXML(virCapsPtr caps,
+     def->serial = serial;
+     serial = NULL;
+ 
+    if (!def->driverType &&
+        caps->defaultDiskDriverType &&
+        !(def->driverType = strdup(caps->defaultDiskDriverType)))
+        goto no_memory;
+
+    if (!def->driverName &&
+        caps->defaultDiskDriverName &&
+        !(def->driverName = strdup(caps->defaultDiskDriverName)))
+        goto no_memory;
+
+     if (def->info.type == VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_ADDRESS_TYPE_NONE
+         && virDomainDiskDefAssignAddress(caps, def) < 0)
+         goto error;
+@@ -1659,6 +1669,9 @@ cleanup:
+ 
+     return def;
+ 
+no_memory:
+    virReportOOMError();
+
+  error:
+     virDomainDiskDefFree(def);
+     def = NULL;
+@@ -4275,7 +4288,8 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParseXML(virCapsPtr caps,
+     if (n && VIR_ALLOC_N(def->disks, n) < 0)
+         goto no_memory;
+     for (i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
+-        virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(caps, nodes[i],
+        virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(caps,
+                                                            nodes[i],
+                                                             flags);
+         if (!disk)
+             goto error;
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 3c479c5..14b790e 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1357,6 +1357,14 @@ qemuCreateCapabilities(virCapsPtr oldcaps,
+         return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+    if (driver->allowDiskFormatProbing) {
+        caps->defaultDiskDriverName = NULL;
+        caps->defaultDiskDriverType = NULL;
+    } else {
+        caps->defaultDiskDriverName = "qemu";
+        caps->defaultDiskDriverType = "raw";
+    }
+
+     /* Domain XML parser hooks */
+     caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
+     caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+From 2ba8625d6d148fa489586efabdfaf2ef20903762 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2010 14:14:05 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 10/11] Rewrite qemu-img backing store format handling
+
+When creating qcow2 files with a backing store, it is important
+to set an explicit format to prevent QEMU probing. The storage
+backend was only doing this if it found a 'kvm-img' binary. This
+is wrong because plenty of kvm-img binaries don't support an
+explicit format, and plenty of 'qemu-img' binaries do support
+a format. The result was that most qcow2 files were not getting
+a backing store format.
+
+This patch runs 'qemu-img -h' to check for the two support
+argument formats
+
+  '-o backing_format=raw'
+  '-F raw'
+
+and use whichever option it finds
+
+* src/storage/storage_backend.c: Query binary to determine
+  how to set the backing store format
+---
+ src/storage/storage_backend.c |  214 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend.c b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
+index aba8937..c185693 100644
+--- a/src/storage/storage_backend.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
+@@ -561,6 +561,69 @@ static int virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(virStoragePoolObjPtr pool,
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+enum {
+    QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_NONE = 0,
+    QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG,
+    QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS,
+};
+
+static int virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat(const char *qemuimg)
+{
+    const char *const qemuarg[] = { qemuimg, "-h", NULL };
+    const char *const qemuenv[] = { "LC_ALL=C", NULL };
+    pid_t child = 0;
+    int status;
+    int newstdout = -1;
+    char *help = NULL;
+    enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 1024*8 };
+    int len;
+    char *start;
+    char *end;
+    char *tmp;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (virExec(qemuarg, qemuenv, NULL,
+                &child, -1, &newstdout, NULL, VIR_EXEC_CLEAR_CAPS) < 0)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if ((len = virFileReadLimFD(newstdout, MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE, &help)) < 0) {
+        virReportSystemError(errno,
+                             _("Unable to read '%s -h' output"),
+                             qemuimg);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    start = strstr(help, " create ");
+    end = strstr(start, "\n");
+    if ((tmp = strstr(start, "-F fmt")) && tmp < end)
+        ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG;
+    else if ((tmp = strstr(start, "[-o options]")) && tmp < end)
+        ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS;
+    else
+        ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_NONE;
+
+cleanup:
+    VIR_FREE(help);
+    close(newstdout);
+rewait:
+    if (child) {
+        if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child) {
+            if (errno == EINTR)
+                goto rewait;
+
+            VIR_ERROR(_("Unexpected exit status from qemu %d pid %lu"),
+                      WEXITSTATUS(status), (unsigned long)child);
+        }
+        if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+            VIR_WARN("Unexpected exit status '%d', qemu probably failed",
+                     WEXITSTATUS(status));
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
+ static int
+ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
+                                virStoragePoolObjPtr pool,
+@@ -568,10 +631,9 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
+                                virStorageVolDefPtr inputvol,
+                                unsigned int flags ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+ {
+-    int ret;
+    int ret = -1;
+     char size[100];
+     char *create_tool;
+-    short use_kvmimg;
+ 
+     const char *type = virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(vol->target.format);
+     const char *backingType = vol->backingStore.path ?
+@@ -582,41 +644,10 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
+     const char *inputPath = inputvol ? inputvol->target.path : NULL;
+     /* Treat input block devices as 'raw' format */
+     const char *inputType = inputPath ?
+-                            virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(inputvol->type == VIR_STORAGE_VOL_BLOCK ? VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW : inputvol->target.format) :
+-                            NULL;
+-
+-    const char **imgargv;
+-    /* The extra NULL field is for indicating encryption (-e). */
+-    const char *imgargvnormal[] = {
+-        NULL, "create",
+-        "-f", type,
+-        vol->target.path,
+-        size,
+-        NULL,
+-        NULL
+-    };
+-    /* Extra NULL fields are for including "backingType" when using
+-     * kvm-img (-F backingType), and for indicating encryption (-e).
+-     */
+-    const char *imgargvbacking[] = {
+-        NULL, "create",
+-        "-f", type,
+-        "-b", vol->backingStore.path,
+-        vol->target.path,
+-        size,
+-        NULL,
+-        NULL,
+-        NULL,
+-        NULL
+-    };
+-    const char *convargv[] = {
+-        NULL, "convert",
+-        "-f", inputType,
+-        "-O", type,
+-        inputPath,
+-        vol->target.path,
+-        NULL,
+-    };
+        virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(inputvol->type == VIR_STORAGE_VOL_BLOCK ?
+                                         VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW :
+                                         inputvol->target.format) :
+        NULL;
+ 
+     if (type == NULL) {
+         virStorageReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+@@ -690,44 +721,103 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if ((create_tool = virFindFileInPath("kvm-img")) != NULL)
+-        use_kvmimg = 1;
+-    else if ((create_tool = virFindFileInPath("qemu-img")) != NULL)
+-        use_kvmimg = 0;
+-    else {
+    /* Size in KB */
+    snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "%lluK", vol->capacity/1024);
+
+    /* KVM is usually ahead of qemu on features, so try that first */
+    create_tool = virFindFileInPath("kvm-img");
+    if (!create_tool)
+        create_tool = virFindFileInPath("qemu-img");
+
+    if (!create_tool) {
+         virStorageReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                               "%s", _("unable to find kvm-img or qemu-img"));
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+     if (inputvol) {
+-        convargv[0] = create_tool;
+-        imgargv = convargv;
+        const char *imgargv[] = {
+            create_tool,
+            "convert",
+            "-f", inputType,
+            "-O", type,
+            inputPath,
+            vol->target.path,
+            NULL,
+        };
+
+        ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
+     } else if (vol->backingStore.path) {
+-        imgargvbacking[0] = create_tool;
+-        if (use_kvmimg) {
+-            imgargvbacking[6] = "-F";
+-            imgargvbacking[7] = backingType;
+-            imgargvbacking[8] = vol->target.path;
+-            imgargvbacking[9] = size;
+        const char *imgargv[] = {
+            create_tool,
+            "create",
+            "-f", type,
+            "-b", vol->backingStore.path,
+            NULL,
+            NULL,
+            NULL,
+            NULL,
+            NULL,
+            NULL
+        };
+        int imgformat = virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat(create_tool);
+        char *optflag = NULL;
+        if (imgformat < 0)
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        switch (imgformat) {
+        case QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG:
+            imgargv[6] = "-F";
+            imgargv[7] = backingType;
+            imgargv[8] = vol->target.path;
+            imgargv[9] = size;
+            if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+                imgargv[10] = "-e";
+            break;
+
+        case QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS:
+            if (virAsprintf(&optflag, "backing_fmt=%s", backingType) < 0) {
+                virReportOOMError();
+                goto cleanup;
+            }
+            imgargv[6] = "-o";
+            imgargv[7] = optflag;
+            imgargv[8] = vol->target.path;
+            imgargv[9] = size;
+             if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+-                imgargvbacking[10] = "-e";
+-        } else if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+-            imgargvbacking[8] = "-e";
+-        imgargv = imgargvbacking;
+                imgargv[10] = "-e";
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            VIR_INFO("Unable to set backing store format for %s with %s",
+                     vol->target.path, create_tool);
+            imgargv[6] = vol->target.path;
+            imgargv[7] = size;
+            if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+                imgargv[8] = "-e";
+        }
+
+        ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
+        VIR_FREE(optflag);
+     } else {
+-        imgargvnormal[0] = create_tool;
+-        imgargv = imgargvnormal;
+        /* The extra NULL field is for indicating encryption (-e). */
+        const char *imgargv[] = {
+            create_tool,
+            "create",
+            "-f", type,
+            vol->target.path,
+            size,
+            NULL,
+            NULL
+        };
+         if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+             imgargv[6] = "-e";
+-    }
+ 
+        ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
+    }
+ 
+-    /* Size in KB */
+-    snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "%lluK", vol->capacity/1024);
+-
+-    ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
+-    VIR_FREE(imgargv[0]);
+    cleanup:
+    VIR_FREE(create_tool);
+ 
+     return ret;
+ }
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+From d33f44c2e74de28c89b64cdc2c0a6564662e075c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2010 11:28:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 11/11] Use the extract backing store format in storage volume lookup
+
+The storage volume lookup code was probing for the backing store
+format, instead of using the format extracted from the file
+itself. This meant it could report in accurate information. If
+a format is included in the file, then use that in preference,
+with probing as a fallback.
+
+* src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c: Use extracted backing store
+  format
+---
+ src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c |   80 +++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+index d3ac0fe..ffb0071 100644
+--- a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ static int
+ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
+                              char **backingStore,
+                             int *backingStoreFormat,
+                              unsigned long long *allocation,
+                              unsigned long long *capacity,
+                              virStorageEncryptionPtr *encryption)
+@@ -58,6 +59,10 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
+     int fd, ret;
+     virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+ 
+    if (backingStore)
+        *backingStore = NULL;
+    if (backingStoreFormat)
+        *backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+     if (encryption)
+         *encryption = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -89,22 +94,30 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
+ 
+     close(fd);
+ 
+-    if (backingStore) {
+-        *backingStore = meta.backingStore;
+-        meta.backingStore = NULL;
+    if (meta.backingStore) {
+        if (backingStore) {
+            *backingStore = meta.backingStore;
+            meta.backingStore = NULL;
+            if (meta.backingStoreFormat == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO) {
+                if ((*backingStoreFormat = virStorageFileProbeFormat(*backingStore)) < 0) {
+                    close(fd);
+                    goto cleanup;
+                }
+            } else {
+                *backingStoreFormat = meta.backingStoreFormat;
+            }
+        } else {
+            VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
+        }
+     }
+ 
+-    VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
+-
+     if (capacity && meta.capacity)
+         *capacity = meta.capacity;
+ 
+     if (encryption != NULL && meta.encrypted) {
+         if (VIR_ALLOC(*encryption) < 0) {
+             virReportOOMError();
+-            if (backingStore)
+-                VIR_FREE(*backingStore);
+-            return -1;
+            goto cleanup;
+         }
+ 
+         switch (target->format) {
+@@ -124,6 +137,11 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
+     }
+ 
+     return 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    if (backingStore)
+        VIR_FREE(*backingStore);
+    return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ #if WITH_STORAGE_FS
+@@ -585,6 +603,7 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+     while ((ent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
+         int ret;
+         char *backingStore;
+        int backingStoreFormat;
+ 
+         if (VIR_ALLOC(vol) < 0)
+             goto no_memory;
+@@ -604,6 +623,7 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ 
+         if ((ret = virStorageBackendProbeTarget(&vol->target,
+                                                 &backingStore,
+                                                &backingStoreFormat,
+                                                 &vol->allocation,
+                                                 &vol->capacity,
+                                                 &vol->target.encryption)) < 0) {
+@@ -619,46 +639,18 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+         }
+ 
+         if (backingStore != NULL) {
+-            if (vol->target.format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2 &&
+-                STRPREFIX("fmt:", backingStore)) {
+-                char *fmtstr = backingStore + 4;
+-                char *path = strchr(fmtstr, ':');
+-                if (!path) {
+-                    VIR_FREE(backingStore);
+-                } else {
+-                    *path = '\0';
+-                    if ((vol->backingStore.format =
+-                         virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(fmtstr)) < 0) {
+-                        VIR_FREE(backingStore);
+-                    } else {
+-                        memmove(backingStore, path, strlen(path) + 1);
+-                        vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
+-
+-                        if (virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfo(&vol->backingStore,
+-                                                                 NULL,
+-                                                                 NULL) < 0)
+-                            VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore);
+-                    }
+-                }
+-            } else {
+-                vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
+-
+-                if ((ret = virStorageBackendProbeTarget(&vol->backingStore,
+-                                                        NULL, NULL, NULL,
+-                                                        NULL)) < 0) {
+-                    if (ret == -1)
+-                        goto cleanup;
+-                    else {
+-                        /* Silently ignore non-regular files,
+-                         * eg '.' '..', 'lost+found' */
+-                        VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore);
+-                    }
+-                }
+            vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
+            vol->backingStore.format = backingStoreFormat;
+
+            if (virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfo(&vol->backingStore,
+                                                     NULL,
+                                                     NULL) < 0) {
+                VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore.path);
+                goto cleanup;
+             }
+         }
+ 
+ 
+-
+         if (VIR_REALLOC_N(pool->volumes.objs,
+                           pool->volumes.count+1) < 0)
+             goto no_memory;
+-- 
+1.7.1.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+From 112a309bc7839e95c558b535143f855ce89cca8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2010 12:50:38 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2010-2242 Apply a source port mapping to virtual network masquerading
+
+IPtables will seek to preserve the source port unchanged when
+doing masquerading, if possible. NFS has a pseudo-security
+option where it checks for the source port <= 1023 before
+allowing a mount request. If an admin has used this to make the
+host OS trusted for mounts, the default iptables behaviour will
+potentially allow NAT'd guests access too. This needs to be
+stopped.
+
+With this change, the iptables -t nat -L -n -v rules for the
+default network will be
+
+Chain POSTROUTING (policy ACCEPT 95 packets, 9163 bytes)
+ pkts bytes target     prot opt in     out     source               destination
+   14   840 MASQUERADE  tcp  --  *      *       192.168.122.0/24    !192.168.122.0/24    masq ports: 1024-65535
+   75  5752 MASQUERADE  udp  --  *      *       192.168.122.0/24    !192.168.122.0/24    masq ports: 1024-65535
+    0     0 MASQUERADE  all  --  *      *       192.168.122.0/24    !192.168.122.0/24
+
+* src/network/bridge_driver.c: Add masquerade rules for TCP
+  and UDP protocols
+* src/util/iptables.c, src/util/iptables.c: Add source port
+  mappings for TCP & UDP protocols when masquerading.
+---
+ src/network/bridge_driver.c |   73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/util/iptables.c         |   70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ src/util/iptables.h         |    6 ++-
+ 3 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver.c b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+index 72255c1..80ed57a 100644
+--- a/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+@@ -638,18 +638,74 @@ networkAddMasqueradingIptablesRules(struct network_driver *driver,
+         goto masqerr2;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* enable masquerading */
+    /*
+     * Enable masquerading.
+     *
+     * We need to end up with 3 rules in the table in this order
+     *
+     *  1. protocol=tcp with sport mapping restricton
+     *  2. protocol=udp with sport mapping restricton
+     *  3. generic any protocol
+     *
+     * The sport mappings are required, because default IPtables
+     * MASQUERADE is maintain port number unchanged where possible.
+     *
+     * NFS can be configured to only "trust" port numbers < 1023.
+     *
+     * Guests using NAT thus need to be prevented from having port
+     * numbers < 1023, otherwise they can bypass the NFS "security"
+     * check on the source port number.
+     *
+     * Since we use '--insert' to add rules to the header of the
+     * chain, we actually need to add them in the reverse of the
+     * order just mentioned !
+     */
+
+    /* First the generic masquerade rule for other protocols */
+     if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+                                             network->def->network,
+-                                            network->def->forwardDev))) {
+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
+                                            NULL))) {
+         virReportSystemError(err,
+                              _("failed to add iptables rule to enable masquerading to '%s'"),
+                              network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
+         goto masqerr3;
+     }
+ 
+    /* UDP with a source port restriction */
+    if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+                                            network->def->network,
+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
+                                            "udp"))) {
+        virReportSystemError(err,
+                             _("failed to add iptables rule to enable UDP masquerading to '%s'"),
+                             network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
+        goto masqerr4;
+    }
+
+    /* TCP with a source port restriction */
+    if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+                                            network->def->network,
+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
+                                            "tcp"))) {
+        virReportSystemError(err,
+                             _("failed to add iptables rule to enable TCP masquerading to '%s'"),
+                             network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
+        goto masqerr5;
+    }
+
+     return 1;
+ 
+ masqerr5:
+    iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+                                    network->def->network,
+                                    network->def->forwardDev,
+                                    "udp");
+ masqerr4:
+    iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+                                    network->def->network,
+                                    network->def->forwardDev,
+                                    NULL);
+  masqerr3:
+     iptablesRemoveForwardAllowRelatedIn(driver->iptables,
+                                  network->def->network,
+@@ -814,8 +870,17 @@ networkRemoveIptablesRules(struct network_driver *driver,
+     if (network->def->forwardType != VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NONE) {
+         if (network->def->forwardType == VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NAT) {
+             iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+-                                                network->def->network,
+-                                                network->def->forwardDev);
+                                            network->def->network,
+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
+                                            "tcp");
+            iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+                                            network->def->network,
+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
+                                            "udp");
+            iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+                                            network->def->network,
+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
+                                            NULL);
+             iptablesRemoveForwardAllowRelatedIn(driver->iptables,
+                                                 network->def->network,
+                                                 network->def->bridge,
+diff --git a/src/util/iptables.c b/src/util/iptables.c
+index d06b857..f63e8c6 100644
+--- a/src/util/iptables.c
+++ b/src/util/iptables.c
+@@ -692,25 +692,49 @@ iptablesRemoveForwardRejectIn(iptablesContext *ctx,
+  */
+ static int
+ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
+-                       const char *network,
+-                       const char *physdev,
+-                       int action)
+                          const char *network,
+                          const char *physdev,
+                          const char *protocol,
+                          int action)
+ {
+-    if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
+-        return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+-                                     action,
+-                                     "--source", network,
+-                                     "!", "--destination", network,
+-                                     "--out-interface", physdev,
+-                                     "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+-                                     NULL);
+    if (protocol && protocol[0]) {
+        if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
+            return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+                                         action,
+                                         "--source", network,
+                                         "-p", protocol,
+                                         "!", "--destination", network,
+                                         "--out-interface", physdev,
+                                         "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+                                         "--to-ports", "1024-65535",
+                                         NULL);
+        } else {
+            return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+                                         action,
+                                         "--source", network,
+                                         "-p", protocol,
+                                         "!", "--destination", network,
+                                         "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+                                         "--to-ports", "1024-65535",
+                                         NULL);
+        }
+     } else {
+-        return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+-                                     action,
+-                                     "--source", network,
+-                                     "!", "--destination", network,
+-                                     "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+-                                     NULL);
+        if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
+            return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+                                         action,
+                                         "--source", network,
+                                         "!", "--destination", network,
+                                         "--out-interface", physdev,
+                                         "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+                                         NULL);
+        } else {
+            return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+                                         action,
+                                         "--source", network,
+                                         "!", "--destination", network,
+                                         "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+                                         NULL);
+        }
+     }
+ }
+ 
+@@ -719,6 +743,7 @@ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
+  * @ctx: pointer to the IP table context
+  * @network: the source network name
+  * @physdev: the physical input device or NULL
+ * @protocol: the network protocol or NULL
+  *
+  * Add rules to the IP table context to allow masquerading
+  * network @network on @physdev. This allow the bridge to
+@@ -729,9 +754,10 @@ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
+ int
+ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
+                              const char *network,
+-                             const char *physdev)
+                             const char *physdev,
+                             const char *protocol)
+ {
+-    return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, ADD);
+    return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, protocol, ADD);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -739,6 +765,7 @@ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
+  * @ctx: pointer to the IP table context
+  * @network: the source network name
+  * @physdev: the physical input device or NULL
+ * @protocol: the network protocol or NULL
+  *
+  * Remove rules from the IP table context to stop masquerading
+  * network @network on @physdev. This stops the bridge from
+@@ -749,7 +776,8 @@ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
+ int
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
+                                 const char *network,
+-                                const char *physdev)
+                                const char *physdev,
+                                const char *protocol)
+ {
+-    return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, REMOVE);
+    return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, protocol, REMOVE);
+ }
+diff --git a/src/util/iptables.h b/src/util/iptables.h
+index 7d55a6d..b47d854 100644
+--- a/src/util/iptables.h
+++ b/src/util/iptables.h
+@@ -85,9 +85,11 @@ int              iptablesRemoveForwardRejectIn   (iptablesContext *ctx,
+ 
+ int              iptablesAddForwardMasquerade    (iptablesContext *ctx,
+                                                   const char *network,
+-                                                  const char *physdev);
+                                                  const char *physdev,
+                                                  const char *protocol);
+ int              iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade (iptablesContext *ctx,
+                                                   const char *network,
+-                                                  const char *physdev);
+                                                  const char *physdev,
+                                                  const char *protocol);
+ 
+ #endif /* __QEMUD_IPTABLES_H__ */
+-- 
+1.6.6.1
+
@@ -1 +1 @@
-05f461cd499c628ef07822dd607c340a  libvirt-1.2.13.2.tar.gz
+14164638fe0e7f65e425acc85dabc517  libvirt-0.8.2.tar.gz
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Daniel P. Berrange	90784d2b79	Disable broken nwfilterxml2xmltest on ppc	2010-07-12 15:30:24 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange	e865884872	Ensure %with_libnl is defined on PPC	2010-07-12 14:22:15 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange	d150192fd8	Update to 0.8.2 release. Fix CVE-2010-2237, CVE-2010-2238, CVE-2010-2239, CVE-2010-2242	2010-07-12 14:13:54 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange	14695477a0	Update to 0.8.2 release. Fix CVE-2010-2237, CVE-2010-2238, CVE-2010-2239, CVE-2010-2242	2010-07-12 14:13:51 +00:00
Cole Robinson	96c8a1c6b6	Bump spec for rebuild after applying all patches	2010-06-17 16:20:59 +00:00
Cole Robinson	efdae0e168	Actually apply all committed packages	2010-06-17 15:53:20 +00:00
Cole Robinson	e942243cd0	Fix attach-device crash on cgroup cleanup (bz 556791) Fix crash on bad LXC URI (bz 554191) Add qemu.conf options for audio workaround Fix permissions of storage backing stores (bz 579067) Fix parsing certain USB sysfs files (bz 598272) Improve migration error reporting (bz 499750) Sanitize pool target paths (bz 494005) Add qemu.conf for clear emulator capabilities	2010-06-17 15:39:42 +00:00
Cole Robinson	4f371cb8c3	Fix crash with invalid QEmu URI (bz 566070) Fix VNC TLS crash (bz 544305) Fix USB devices with high bus/addr values (bz 542639) Fix save/restore with non-root guests (bz 534143, bz 532654) Fix USB devices attached via virt-manager (bz 537227)	2010-05-18 16:42:36 +00:00
Bill Nottingham	29768222f1	Fix typo that causes a failure to update the common directory. (releng #2781 )	2009-11-26 01:55:06 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	68c271bad8	* Thu Oct 29 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-15 - Avoid compressing small log files (#531030)	2009-10-29 17:26:12 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	21a9f1ec41	* Thu Oct 29 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-14 - Fix xen driver recounting (#531429) - Fix crash on virsh error (#531429) - Fix segfault where XML parsing fails in qemu disk hotplug - Fix segfault where interface target device name is ommitted (#523418)	2009-10-29 10:40:45 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	39bacac57d	* Thu Oct 29 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-14 - Make libvirt-devel require libvirt-client, not libvirt	2009-10-29 10:14:00 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	7d9775ba12	* Mon Oct 19 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-13 - Misc fixes to qemu machine types handling - A couple of XML formatting fixes	2009-10-19 10:14:07 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	3cfccddffa	Add the second patch for #523158	2009-10-13 15:43:51 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	1bc3776fdb	* Tue Oct 13 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-12 - Fix restore of qemu guest using raw save format (#523158)	2009-10-13 15:34:19 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	3a44160f46	* Fri Oct 9 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-11 - Fix libvirtd memory leak during error reply sending (#528162) - Add several PCI hot-unplug typo fixes from upstream	2009-10-09 14:55:28 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	5e8ea6c64c	* Tue Oct 6 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-10 - Create /var/log/libvirt/{lxc,uml} dirs for logrotate - Make libvirt-python dependon on libvirt-client - Sync misc minor changes from upstream spec	2009-10-06 12:42:16 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	00ce651fb8	* Tue Oct 6 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-9 - Change logrotate config to weekly (#526769)	2009-10-06 09:43:52 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	3c684a55ed	- Re-label qcow2 backing files (#497131 )	2009-10-01 15:17:32 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	b1ea570e48	* Thu Oct 1 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-8 - Disable sound backend, even when selinux is disabled (#524499)	2009-10-01 08:35:16 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin	6ccf4c1a0c	* Wed Sep 30 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-7 - Fix USB device passthrough (#522683)	2009-09-30 17:57:50 +00:00
Jesse Keating	dbaa6786af	Initialize branch F-12 for libvirt	2009-09-29 05:24:04 +00:00