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10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel P. Berrange 576c952d6c Pull in all bug fixes from rawhide 2008-04-04 15:52:04 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 6cba2d7c9e Forgot to bump the release, daniel 2008-03-11 10:29:48 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 824ac1932d Fix from danpb to fix the iptables startup error, Daniel 2008-03-11 10:28:30 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 2457ff7037 wrong release number, Daniel 2008-03-06 10:17:31 +00:00
Daniel Veillard d8ce9b00e6 Update to 0.4.1, Daniel 2008-03-06 09:52:14 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 5238691972 Fix remote SSH tunnelling bug 2008-01-17 15:21:08 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 49bd0fe0f6 Fix crash when no auth callback 2008-01-14 04:08:08 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange f57c13f43b Fixed auth callback crash and config file reading 2008-01-02 21:47:05 +00:00
Daniel Veillard b4531a6202 Update to 0.4.0, remove old patches not needed anymore, Daniel 2007-12-18 11:02:18 +00:00
Jesse Keating 0685aa3535 Initialize branch F-8 for libvirt 2007-10-21 00:04:39 +00:00
27 changed files with 1185 additions and 3643 deletions
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
libvirt-0.0.3.tar.gz
libvirt-0.0.4.tar.gz
libvirt-0.0.5.tar.gz
libvirt-0.0.6.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.0.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.2.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.1.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.3.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.4.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.5.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.6.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.7.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.8.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.9.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.10.tar.gz
libvirt-0.1.11.tar.gz
libvirt-0.2.0.tar.gz
libvirt-0.2.1.tar.gz
libvirt-0.2.2.tar.gz
libvirt-0.2.3.tar.gz
libvirt-0.3.0.tar.gz
libvirt-0.3.1.tar.gz
libvirt-0.3.2.tar.gz
libvirt-0.3.3.tar.gz
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
.build*.log
*.rpm
i686
x86_64
libvirt-*.tar.gz
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:43:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] schema: interleave domain name and uuid with other elements
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Allow <name> and <uuid> anywhere under <domain>, not just at the top:
error:XML document failed to validate against schema: Unable to validate
doc against /usr/share/libvirt/schemas/domain.rng
Expecting an element name, got nothing
Invalid sequence in interleave
Element domain failed to validate content
Introduced with the first RelaxNG schema in commit c642103.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1292131
(cherry picked from commit b4e0549febe416ffefc16f389423740d6d65fa74)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
---
docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
index b252a17..48610ce 100644
--- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
+++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
<define name="domain">
<element name="domain">
<ref name="hvs"/>
- <ref name="ids"/>
<interleave>
+ <ref name="ids"/>
<optional>
<ref name="title"/>
</optional>
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:31:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] leaseshelper: fix crash when no mac is specified
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
If dnsmasq specified DNSMASQ_IAID (so we're dealing with an IPv6
lease) but no DNSMASQ_MAC, we skip creation of the new lease object.
Also skip adding it to the leases array.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1202350
(cherry picked from commit df9fe124d650bc438c531673492569da87523d20)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
---
src/network/leaseshelper.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/network/leaseshelper.c b/src/network/leaseshelper.c
index 2d528f7..6930310 100644
--- a/src/network/leaseshelper.c
+++ b/src/network/leaseshelper.c
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
case VIR_LEASE_ACTION_OLD:
case VIR_LEASE_ACTION_ADD:
- if (virJSONValueArrayAppend(leases_array_new, lease_new) < 0) {
+ if (lease_new && virJSONValueArrayAppend(leases_array_new, lease_new) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("failed to create json"));
goto cleanup;
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:19:56 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] build: predictably generate systemtap tapsets (bz 1173641)
The generated output is dependent on perl hashtable ordering, which
gives different results for i686 and x86_64. Fix this by sorting
the hash keys before iterating over them
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1173641
(cherry picked from commit a1edb05c6028470aa24b74aa0f8d5fb5a181128a)
---
src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl b/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
index 2467300..7b80fbf 100755
--- a/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
+++ b/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_auth_name(type, verbose)
{
EOF
my $first = 1;
-foreach my $type (keys %auth) {
+foreach my $type (sort(keys %auth)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (type == ", $type, ") {\n";
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_type_name(type, verbose)
{
EOF
$first = 1;
-foreach my $type (keys %type) {
+foreach my $type (sort(keys %type)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (type == ", $type, ") {\n";
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_status_name(status, verbose)
{
EOF
$first = 1;
-foreach my $status (keys %status) {
+foreach my $status (sort(keys %status)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (status == ", $status, ") {\n";
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_program_name(program, verbose)
{
EOF
$first = 1;
-foreach my $prog (keys %funcs) {
+foreach my $prog (sort(keys %funcs)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (program == ", $funcs{$prog}->{id}, ") {\n";
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_procedure_name(program, version, proc, verbose)
{
EOF
$first = 1;
-foreach my $prog (keys %funcs) {
+foreach my $prog (sort(keys %funcs)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (program == ", $funcs{$prog}->{id}, " && version == ", $funcs{$prog}->{version}, ") {\n";
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 16:51:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: ensure daemon is spawn even if dead socket exists
The auto-spawn code would originally attempt to spawn the
daemon for both ENOENT and ECONNREFUSED errors from connect().
The various refactorings eventually lost this so we only
spawn the daemon on ENOENT. The result is if the daemon exits
uncleanly, so that the socket is left in the filesystem, we
will never be able to auto-spawn the daemon again.
(cherry picked from commit 406ee8c226d2197ba1aaecb9cf3ad2b6df31ae44)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index 51f94d4..6153e0e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
while (retries &&
connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) < 0) {
- if (!(spawnDaemon && errno == ENOENT)) {
+ if (!(spawnDaemon && (errno == ENOENT ||
+ errno == ECONNREFUSED))) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
path);
goto cleanup;
-48
View File
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:01:24 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Minor cleanups
- Add some debugging
- Make the loop dependent only on retries
- Make it explicit that connect(2) success exits the loop
- Invert the error checking logic
(cherry picked from commit f102c7146ed7f6e04af0ad3bce302476239f2502)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index 6153e0e..dcff69e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -548,6 +548,9 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
char *rundir = NULL;
int ret = -1;
+ VIR_DEBUG("path=%s spawnDaemon=%d binary=%s", path, spawnDaemon,
+ NULLSTR(binary));
+
memset(&localAddr, 0, sizeof(localAddr));
memset(&remoteAddr, 0, sizeof(remoteAddr));
@@ -608,10 +611,15 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
if (remoteAddr.data.un.sun_path[0] == '@')
remoteAddr.data.un.sun_path[0] = '\0';
- while (retries &&
- connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) < 0) {
- if (!(spawnDaemon && (errno == ENOENT ||
- errno == ECONNREFUSED))) {
+ while (retries) {
+ if (connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) == 0) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("connect() succeeded");
+ break;
+ }
+ VIR_DEBUG("connect() failed: retries=%d errno=%d", retries, errno);
+
+ if (!spawnDaemon ||
+ (errno != ENOENT && errno != ECONNREFUSED)) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
path);
goto cleanup;
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:08:45 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Explicitly error if we exceed retry count
When we autolaunch libvirtd for session URIs, we spin in a retry
loop waiting for the daemon to start and the connect(2) to succeed.
However if we exceed the retry count, we don't explicitly raise an
error, which can yield a slew of different error messages elsewhere
in the code.
Explicitly raise the last connect(2) failure if we run out of retries.
(cherry picked from commit 8da02d528068942303923fc4f935e77cccac9c7c)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index dcff69e..90951be 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -618,7 +618,9 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
}
VIR_DEBUG("connect() failed: retries=%d errno=%d", retries, errno);
+ retries--;
if (!spawnDaemon ||
+ retries == 0 ||
(errno != ENOENT && errno != ECONNREFUSED)) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
path);
@@ -628,7 +630,6 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
goto cleanup;
- retries--;
usleep(5000);
}
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:13:38 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Don't repeatedly attempt to launch daemon
On every socket connect(2) attempt we were re-launching session
libvirtd, up to 100 times in 5 seconds.
This understandably caused some weird load races and intermittent
qemu:///session startup failures
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1271183
(cherry picked from commit 2eb7a975756d05a5b54ab4acf60083beb6161ac6)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index 90951be..2ee4b6e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
virSocketAddr remoteAddr;
char *rundir = NULL;
int ret = -1;
+ bool daemonLaunched = false;
VIR_DEBUG("path=%s spawnDaemon=%d binary=%s", path, spawnDaemon,
NULLSTR(binary));
@@ -627,8 +628,12 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
goto cleanup;
}
- if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
+ if (!daemonLaunched) {
+ if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ daemonLaunched = true;
+ }
usleep(5000);
}
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 10:55:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] security: Do not restore kernel and initrd labels
Kernel/initrd files are essentially read-only shareable images and thus
should be handled in the same way. We already use the appropriate label
for kernel/initrd files when starting a domain, but when a domain gets
destroyed we would remove the labels which would make other running
domains using the same files very unhappy.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=921135
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 68acc701bd449481e3206723c25b18fcd3d261b7)
---
src/security/security_dac.c | 8 --------
src/security/security_selinux.c | 8 --------
2 files changed, 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/security/security_dac.c b/src/security/security_dac.c
index deb6980..d01215f 100644
--- a/src/security/security_dac.c
+++ b/src/security/security_dac.c
@@ -971,14 +971,6 @@ virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.loader->nvram) < 0)
rc = -1;
- if (def->os.kernel &&
- virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.kernel) < 0)
- rc = -1;
-
- if (def->os.initrd &&
- virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.initrd) < 0)
- rc = -1;
-
if (def->os.dtb &&
virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.dtb) < 0)
rc = -1;
diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
index 6e67a86..2475a80 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -1953,14 +1953,6 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.loader->nvram) < 0)
rc = -1;
- if (def->os.kernel &&
- virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.kernel) < 0)
- rc = -1;
-
- if (def->os.initrd &&
- virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.initrd) < 0)
- rc = -1;
-
if (def->os.dtb &&
virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.dtb) < 0)
rc = -1;
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2016 17:04:32 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: wait longer for session daemon to start up
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1271183
We only wait 0.5 seconds for the session daemon to start up and present
its socket, which isn't sufficient for many users. Bump up the sleep
interval and retry amount so we wait for a total of 5.0 seconds.
(cherry picked from commit ca0c06f4008154de55e0b3109885facd0bf02d32)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index 2ee4b6e..275f1f5 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
char *lockpath = NULL;
int lockfd = -1;
int fd = -1;
- int retries = 100;
+ int retries = 500;
virSocketAddr localAddr;
virSocketAddr remoteAddr;
char *rundir = NULL;
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
daemonLaunched = true;
}
- usleep(5000);
+ usleep(10000);
}
localAddr.len = sizeof(localAddr.data);
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
From: Jovanka Gulicoska <jovanka.gulicoska@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 20:02:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] driver: log missing modules as INFO, not WARN
Missing modules is a common expected scenario for most libvirt usage on
RPM distributions like Fedora, so it doesn't really warrant logging at
WARN level. Use INFO instead
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1274849
(cherry picked from commit 9a0c7f5f834185db9017c34aabc03ad99cf37bed)
---
src/driver.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/driver.c b/src/driver.c
index db03438..f926fe4 100644
--- a/src/driver.c
+++ b/src/driver.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ virDriverLoadModule(const char *name)
return NULL;
if (access(modfile, R_OK) < 0) {
- VIR_WARN("Module %s not accessible", modfile);
+ VIR_INFO("Module %s not accessible", modfile);
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:38:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] polkit: Allow password-less access for 'libvirt' group
Many users, who admin their own machines, want to be able to access
system libvirtd via tools like virt-manager without having to enter
a root password. Just google 'virt-manager without password' and
you'll find many hits. I've read at least 5 blog posts over the years
describing slightly different ways of achieving this goal.
Let's finally add official support for this.
Install a polkit-1 rules file granting password-less auth for any user
in the new 'libvirt' group. Create the group on RPM install
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=957300
(cherry picked from commit e94979e901517af9fdde358d7b7c92cc055dd50c)
---
daemon/Makefile.am | 13 +++++++++++++
daemon/libvirt.rules | 9 +++++++++
libvirt.spec.in | 15 +++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 daemon/libvirt.rules
diff --git a/daemon/Makefile.am b/daemon/Makefile.am
index b95a79d..9c5ea37 100644
--- a/daemon/Makefile.am
+++ b/daemon/Makefile.am
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
libvirtd.init.in \
libvirtd.upstart \
libvirtd.policy.in \
+ libvirt.rules \
libvirtd.sasl \
libvirtd.service.in \
libvirtd.socket.in \
@@ -233,6 +234,8 @@ policyauth = auth_admin_keep_session
else ! WITH_POLKIT0
policydir = $(datadir)/polkit-1/actions
policyauth = auth_admin_keep
+rulesdir = $(datadir)/polkit-1/rules.d
+rulesfile = libvirt.rules
endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
endif WITH_POLKIT
@@ -263,9 +266,19 @@ if WITH_POLKIT
install-data-polkit::
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)
$(INSTALL_DATA) libvirtd.policy $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)/org.libvirt.unix.policy
+if ! WITH_POLKIT0
+ $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$(rulesfile) $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)/50-libvirt.rules
+endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
+
uninstall-data-polkit::
rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)/org.libvirt.unix.policy
rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(policydir) || :
+if ! WITH_POLKIT0
+ rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)/50-libvirt.rules
+ rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir) || :
+endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
+
else ! WITH_POLKIT
install-data-polkit::
uninstall-data-polkit::
diff --git a/daemon/libvirt.rules b/daemon/libvirt.rules
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01a15fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/daemon/libvirt.rules
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// Allow any user in the 'libvirt' group to connect to system libvirtd
+// without entering a password.
+
+polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
+ if (action.id == "org.libvirt.unix.manage" &&
+ subject.isInGroup("libvirt")) {
+ return polkit.Result.YES;
+ }
+});
diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in
index dc327a2..a23629d 100644
--- a/libvirt.spec.in
+++ b/libvirt.spec.in
@@ -1631,9 +1631,9 @@ then
fi
%if %{with_libvirtd}
+%pre daemon
%if ! %{with_driver_modules}
%if %{with_qemu}
-%pre daemon
%if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
# We want soft static allocation of well-known ids, as disk images
# are commonly shared across NFS mounts by id rather than name; see
@@ -1647,11 +1647,21 @@ if ! getent passwd qemu >/dev/null; then
useradd -r -g qemu -G kvm -d / -s /sbin/nologin -c "qemu user" qemu
fi
fi
-exit 0
%endif
%endif
%endif
+ %if %{with_polkit}
+ %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
+# 'libvirt' group is just to allow password-less polkit access to
+# libvirtd. The uid number is irrelevant, so we use dynamic allocation
+# described at the above link.
+getent group libvirt >/dev/null || groupadd -r libvirt
+ %endif
+ %endif
+
+exit 0
+
%post daemon
%if %{with_systemd}
@@ -1925,6 +1935,7 @@ exit 0
%if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
%{_datadir}/polkit-1/actions/org.libvirt.unix.policy
%{_datadir}/polkit-1/actions/org.libvirt.api.policy
+%{_datadir}/polkit-1/rules.d/50-libvirt.rules
%else
%{_datadir}/PolicyKit/policy/org.libvirt.unix.policy
%endif
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME := libvirt
SPECFILE = $(firstword $(wildcard *.spec))
define find-makefile-common
for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
endef
MAKEFILE_COMMON := $(shell $(find-makefile-common))
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
F-8
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
diff -rup libvirt-0.4.1.orig/qemud/qemud.c libvirt-0.4.1.new/qemud/qemud.c
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/qemud/qemud.c 2008-03-10 17:31:09.000000000 -0400
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/qemud/qemud.c 2008-03-10 17:31:36.000000000 -0400
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static int qemudGoDaemon(void) {
case -1:
return -1;
default:
- return nextpid;
+ _exit(0);
}
cleanup:
@@ -418,8 +418,7 @@ static int qemudGoDaemon(void) {
status != 0) {
return -1;
}
-
- return pid;
+ _exit(0);
}
}
}
@@ -2116,16 +2115,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
goto error1;
if (godaemon) {
- int pid;
openlog("libvirtd", 0, 0);
- pid = qemudGoDaemon();
- if (pid < 0) {
+ if (qemudGoDaemon() < 0) {
qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to fork as daemon: %s"),
strerror(errno));
goto error1;
}
- if (pid > 0)
- goto out;
/* Choose the name of the PID file. */
if (!pid_file) {
@@ -2172,7 +2167,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
if (godaemon)
closelog();
- out:
ret = 0;
error2:
+400
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
diff -rup libvirt-0.4.1.orig/configure.in libvirt-0.4.1.new/configure.in
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/configure.in 2008-03-03 09:14:19.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/configure.in 2008-04-03 15:37:49.000000000 -0400
@@ -450,10 +450,6 @@ if test "x$with_polkit" = "xyes" -o "x$w
CFLAGS="$old_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$old_LDFLAGS"
- AC_PATH_PROG(POLKIT_GRANT, polkit-grant)
- if test "x$POLKIT_GRANT" != "x"; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([POLKIT_GRANT],["$POLKIT_GRANT"],[Location of polkit-grant program])
- fi
AC_PATH_PROG(POLKIT_AUTH, polkit-auth)
if test "x$POLKIT_AUTH" != "x"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([POLKIT_AUTH],["$POLKIT_AUTH"],[Location of polkit-auth program])
diff -rup libvirt-0.4.1.orig/qemud/internal.h libvirt-0.4.1.new/qemud/internal.h
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/qemud/internal.h 2008-01-24 12:07:43.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/qemud/internal.h 2008-04-03 15:38:03.000000000 -0400
@@ -179,6 +179,9 @@ void qemudLog(int priority, const char *
void remoteDispatchClientRequest (struct qemud_server *server,
struct qemud_client *client);
+#if HAVE_POLKIT
+int qemudGetSocketIdentity(int fd, uid_t *uid, pid_t *pid);
+#endif
#endif
diff -rup libvirt-0.4.1.orig/qemud/qemud.c libvirt-0.4.1.new/qemud/qemud.c
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/qemud/qemud.c 2008-04-03 15:39:15.000000000 -0400
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/qemud/qemud.c 2008-04-03 15:38:03.000000000 -0400
@@ -1040,6 +1040,28 @@ remoteCheckAccess (struct qemud_client *
return 0;
}
+#if HAVE_POLKIT
+int qemudGetSocketIdentity(int fd, uid_t *uid, pid_t *pid) {
+#ifdef SO_PEERCRED
+ struct ucred cr;
+ unsigned int cr_len = sizeof (cr);
+
+ if (getsockopt (fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cr, &cr_len) < 0) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to verify client credentials: %s"),
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *pid = cr.pid;
+ *uid = cr.uid;
+#else
+ /* XXX Many more OS support UNIX socket credentials we could port to. See dbus ....*/
+#error "UNIX socket credentials not supported/implemented on this platform yet..."
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
static int qemudDispatchServer(struct qemud_server *server, struct qemud_socket *sock) {
int fd;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
@@ -1075,6 +1097,26 @@ static int qemudDispatchServer(struct qe
memcpy (&client->addr, &addr, sizeof addr);
client->addrlen = addrlen;
+#if HAVE_POLKIT
+ /* Only do policy checks for non-root - allow root user
+ through with no checks, as a fail-safe - root can easily
+ change policykit policy anyway, so its pointless trying
+ to restrict root */
+ if (client->auth == REMOTE_AUTH_POLKIT) {
+ uid_t uid;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (qemudGetSocketIdentity(client->fd, &uid, &pid) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Cient is running as root, so disable auth */
+ if (uid == 0) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_INFO, _("Turn off polkit auth for privileged client %d"), pid);
+ client->auth = REMOTE_AUTH_NONE;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
if (client->type != QEMUD_SOCK_TYPE_TLS) {
client->mode = QEMUD_MODE_RX_HEADER;
client->bufferLength = REMOTE_MESSAGE_HEADER_XDR_LEN;
diff -rup libvirt-0.4.1.orig/qemud/remote.c libvirt-0.4.1.new/qemud/remote.c
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/qemud/remote.c 2008-02-29 11:23:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/qemud/remote.c 2008-04-03 15:38:03.000000000 -0400
@@ -2564,27 +2564,6 @@ remoteDispatchAuthSaslStep (struct qemud
#if HAVE_POLKIT
-static int qemudGetSocketIdentity(int fd, uid_t *uid, pid_t *pid) {
-#ifdef SO_PEERCRED
- struct ucred cr;
- unsigned int cr_len = sizeof (cr);
-
- if (getsockopt (fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cr, &cr_len) < 0) {
- qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to verify client credentials: %s"),
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- *pid = cr.pid;
- *uid = cr.uid;
-#else
- /* XXX Many more OS support UNIX socket credentials we could port to. See dbus ....*/
-#error "UNIX socket credentials not supported/implemented on this platform yet..."
-#endif
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static int
remoteDispatchAuthPolkit (struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
struct qemud_client *client,
@@ -2594,6 +2573,15 @@ remoteDispatchAuthPolkit (struct qemud_s
{
pid_t callerPid;
uid_t callerUid;
+ PolKitCaller *pkcaller = NULL;
+ PolKitAction *pkaction = NULL;
+ PolKitContext *pkcontext = NULL;
+ PolKitError *pkerr = NULL;
+ PolKitResult pkresult;
+ DBusError err;
+ const char *action = client->readonly ?
+ "org.libvirt.unix.monitor" :
+ "org.libvirt.unix.manage";
REMOTE_DEBUG("Start PolicyKit auth %d", client->fd);
if (client->auth != REMOTE_AUTH_POLKIT) {
@@ -2609,98 +2597,78 @@ remoteDispatchAuthPolkit (struct qemud_s
return -2;
}
- /* Only do policy checks for non-root - allow root user
- through with no checks, as a fail-safe - root can easily
- change policykit policy anyway, so its pointless trying
- to restrict root */
- if (callerUid == 0) {
- qemudLog(QEMUD_INFO, _("Allowing PID %d running as root"), callerPid);
- ret->complete = 1;
- client->auth = REMOTE_AUTH_NONE;
- } else {
- PolKitCaller *pkcaller = NULL;
- PolKitAction *pkaction = NULL;
- PolKitContext *pkcontext = NULL;
- PolKitError *pkerr = NULL;
- PolKitResult pkresult;
- DBusError err;
- const char *action = client->readonly ?
- "org.libvirt.unix.monitor" :
- "org.libvirt.unix.manage";
-
- qemudLog(QEMUD_INFO, _("Checking PID %d running as %d"),
- callerPid, callerUid);
- dbus_error_init(&err);
- if (!(pkcaller = polkit_caller_new_from_pid(server->sysbus,
- callerPid, &err))) {
- qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to lookup policy kit caller: %s"),
- err.message);
- dbus_error_free(&err);
- remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
- return -2;
- }
-
- if (!(pkaction = polkit_action_new())) {
- qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to create polkit action %s\n"),
- strerror(errno));
- polkit_caller_unref(pkcaller);
- remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
- return -2;
- }
- polkit_action_set_action_id(pkaction, action);
-
- if (!(pkcontext = polkit_context_new()) ||
- !polkit_context_init(pkcontext, &pkerr)) {
- qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to create polkit context %s\n"),
- (pkerr ? polkit_error_get_error_message(pkerr)
- : strerror(errno)));
- if (pkerr)
- polkit_error_free(pkerr);
- polkit_caller_unref(pkcaller);
- polkit_action_unref(pkaction);
- dbus_error_free(&err);
- remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
- return -2;
- }
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_INFO, _("Checking PID %d running as %d"),
+ callerPid, callerUid);
+ dbus_error_init(&err);
+ if (!(pkcaller = polkit_caller_new_from_pid(server->sysbus,
+ callerPid, &err))) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to lookup policy kit caller: %s"),
+ err.message);
+ dbus_error_free(&err);
+ remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ if (!(pkaction = polkit_action_new())) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to create polkit action %s\n"),
+ strerror(errno));
+ polkit_caller_unref(pkcaller);
+ remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ polkit_action_set_action_id(pkaction, action);
+
+ if (!(pkcontext = polkit_context_new()) ||
+ !polkit_context_init(pkcontext, &pkerr)) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to create polkit context %s\n"),
+ (pkerr ? polkit_error_get_error_message(pkerr)
+ : strerror(errno)));
+ if (pkerr)
+ polkit_error_free(pkerr);
+ polkit_caller_unref(pkcaller);
+ polkit_action_unref(pkaction);
+ dbus_error_free(&err);
+ remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
+ return -2;
+ }
#if HAVE_POLKIT_CONTEXT_IS_CALLER_AUTHORIZED
- pkresult = polkit_context_is_caller_authorized(pkcontext,
- pkaction,
- pkcaller,
- 0,
- &pkerr);
- if (pkerr && polkit_error_is_set(pkerr)) {
- qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR,
- _("Policy kit failed to check authorization %d %s"),
- polkit_error_get_error_code(pkerr),
- polkit_error_get_error_message(pkerr));
- remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
- return -2;
- }
+ pkresult = polkit_context_is_caller_authorized(pkcontext,
+ pkaction,
+ pkcaller,
+ 0,
+ &pkerr);
+ if (pkerr && polkit_error_is_set(pkerr)) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR,
+ _("Policy kit failed to check authorization %d %s"),
+ polkit_error_get_error_code(pkerr),
+ polkit_error_get_error_message(pkerr));
+ remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
+ return -2;
+ }
#else
- pkresult = polkit_context_can_caller_do_action(pkcontext,
- pkaction,
- pkcaller);
+ pkresult = polkit_context_can_caller_do_action(pkcontext,
+ pkaction,
+ pkcaller);
#endif
- polkit_context_unref(pkcontext);
- polkit_caller_unref(pkcaller);
- polkit_action_unref(pkaction);
- if (pkresult != POLKIT_RESULT_YES) {
- qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR,
- _("Policy kit denied action %s from pid %d, uid %d,"
- " result: %s\n"),
- action, callerPid, callerUid,
- polkit_result_to_string_representation(pkresult));
- remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
- return -2;
- }
- qemudLog(QEMUD_INFO,
- _("Policy allowed action %s from pid %d, uid %d, result %s"),
+ polkit_context_unref(pkcontext);
+ polkit_caller_unref(pkcaller);
+ polkit_action_unref(pkaction);
+ if (pkresult != POLKIT_RESULT_YES) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR,
+ _("Policy kit denied action %s from pid %d, uid %d,"
+ " result: %s\n"),
action, callerPid, callerUid,
polkit_result_to_string_representation(pkresult));
- ret->complete = 1;
- client->auth = REMOTE_AUTH_NONE;
+ remoteDispatchFailAuth(client, req);
+ return -2;
}
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_INFO,
+ _("Policy allowed action %s from pid %d, uid %d, result %s"),
+ action, callerPid, callerUid,
+ polkit_result_to_string_representation(pkresult));
+ ret->complete = 1;
+ client->auth = REMOTE_AUTH_NONE;
return 0;
}
diff -rup libvirt-0.4.1.orig/src/libvirt.c libvirt-0.4.1.new/src/libvirt.c
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/src/libvirt.c 2008-02-26 10:37:43.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/src/libvirt.c 2008-04-03 15:38:47.000000000 -0400
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <assert.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#endif
#include <libxml/parser.h>
#include <libxml/xpath.h>
@@ -66,6 +69,39 @@ static int initialized = 0;
int debugFlag = 0;
#endif
+#if defined(POLKIT_AUTH)
+static int virConnectAuthGainPolkit(const char *privilege) {
+ const char *const args[] = {
+ POLKIT_AUTH, "--obtain", privilege, NULL
+ };
+ int childpid, status, ret;
+
+ /* Root has all rights */
+ if (getuid() == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((childpid = fork()) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!childpid) {
+ execvp(args[0], (char **)args);
+ _exit(-1);
+ }
+
+ while ((ret = waitpid(childpid, &status, 0) == -1) && errno == EINTR);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status) ||
+ (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0 && WEXITSTATUS(status) != 1)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
static int virConnectAuthCallbackDefault(virConnectCredentialPtr cred,
unsigned int ncred,
void *cbdata ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
@@ -77,28 +113,25 @@ static int virConnectAuthCallbackDefault
size_t len;
switch (cred[i].type) {
-#if defined(POLKIT_GRANT) || defined(POLKIT_AUTH)
case VIR_CRED_EXTERNAL: {
int ret;
- const char *const args[] = {
-#if defined(POLKIT_GRANT)
- POLKIT_GRANT, "--gain", cred[i].prompt, NULL
-#else
- POLKIT_AUTH, "--obtain", cred[i].prompt, NULL
-#endif
- };
-
if (STRNEQ(cred[i].challenge, "PolicyKit"))
return -1;
- if (virRun(NULL, (char **) args, &ret) < 0)
- return -1;
- if (!WIFEXITED(ret) ||
- (WEXITSTATUS(ret) != 0 && WEXITSTATUS(ret) != 1))
+#if defined(POLKIT_AUTH)
+ if (virConnectAuthGainPolkit(cred[i].prompt) < 0)
return -1;
+#else
+ /*
+ * Ignore & carry on. Although we can't auth
+ * directly, the user may have authenticated
+ * themselves already outside context of libvirt
+ */
+#endif
+
break;
}
-#endif
+
case VIR_CRED_USERNAME:
case VIR_CRED_AUTHNAME:
case VIR_CRED_ECHOPROMPT:
@@ -158,9 +191,7 @@ static int virConnectCredTypeDefault[] =
VIR_CRED_REALM,
VIR_CRED_PASSPHRASE,
VIR_CRED_NOECHOPROMPT,
-#if defined(POLKIT_AUTH) || defined(POLKIT_GRANT)
VIR_CRED_EXTERNAL,
-#endif
};
static virConnectAuth virConnectAuthDefault = {
+128
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
commit 570fd656d1b67e5d02f52e107946930257e811a7
Author: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
Date: Thu Mar 13 09:17:45 2008 +0000
* src/qemu_conf.c src/qemu_driver.c: patch from Cole Robinson
fixing CD Rom change on live QEmu/KVM domains.
Daniel
diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
index e54da5b..ebbd251 100644
--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
+++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
@@ -594,9 +594,16 @@ static int qemudParseDiskXML(virConnectPtr conn,
}
if (source == NULL) {
- qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_NO_SOURCE, target ? "%s" : NULL, target);
- goto error;
+ /* There is a case without the source
+ * to the CD-ROM device
+ */
+ if (!device || STRNEQ((const char *) device, "cdrom")) {
+ qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_NO_SOURCE,
+ target ? "%s" : NULL, target);
+ goto error;
+ }
}
+
if (target == NULL) {
qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_NO_TARGET, source ? "%s" : NULL, source);
goto error;
@@ -630,7 +637,7 @@ static int qemudParseDiskXML(virConnectPtr conn,
goto error;
}
- strncpy(disk->src, (const char *)source, NAME_MAX-1);
+ strncpy(disk->src, (source ? (const char *) source : "\0"), NAME_MAX-1);
disk->src[NAME_MAX-1] = '\0';
strncpy(disk->dst, (const char *)target, NAME_MAX-1);
@@ -1747,9 +1754,15 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr conn,
char dev[NAME_MAX];
char file[PATH_MAX];
if (!strcmp(disk->dst, "hdc") &&
- disk->device == QEMUD_DISK_CDROM)
- snprintf(dev, NAME_MAX, "-%s", "cdrom");
- else
+ disk->device == QEMUD_DISK_CDROM) {
+ if (disk->src[0])
+ snprintf(dev, NAME_MAX, "-%s", "cdrom");
+ else {
+ /* Don't put anything on the cmdline for an empty cdrom*/
+ disk = disk->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else
snprintf(dev, NAME_MAX, "-%s", disk->dst);
snprintf(file, PATH_MAX, "%s", disk->src);
@@ -2906,8 +2919,10 @@ char *qemudGenerateXML(virConnectPtr conn,
types[disk->type], devices[disk->device]) < 0)
goto no_memory;
- if (virBufferVSprintf(buf, " <source %s='%s'/>\n", typeAttrs[disk->type], disk->src) < 0)
- goto no_memory;
+ if (disk->src[0])
+ if (virBufferVSprintf(buf, " <source %s='%s'/>\n",
+ typeAttrs[disk->type], disk->src) < 0)
+ goto no_memory;
if (virBufferVSprintf(buf, " <target dev='%s'/>\n", disk->dst) < 0)
goto no_memory;
diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
index 21f0fed..2b4c2a6 100644
--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
@@ -2223,23 +2223,29 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeCDROM(virDomainPtr dom,
struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)dom->conn->privateData;
char *cmd, *reply, *safe_path;
- /* Migrate to file */
- safe_path = qemudEscapeMonitorArg(newdisk->src);
- if (!safe_path) {
- qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
- "out of memory");
- return -1;
- }
- if (asprintf (&cmd, "change %s \"%s\"",
- /* XXX qemu may support multiple CDROM in future */
- /* olddisk->dst */ "cdrom",
- safe_path) == -1) {
+ if (newdisk->src[0]) {
+ safe_path = qemudEscapeMonitorArg(newdisk->src);
+ if (!safe_path) {
+ qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
+ "out of memory");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (asprintf (&cmd, "change %s \"%s\"",
+ /* XXX qemu may support multiple CDROM in future */
+ /* olddisk->dst */ "cdrom",
+ safe_path) == -1) {
+ qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
+ "out of memory");
+ free(safe_path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ free(safe_path);
+
+ } else if (asprintf(&cmd, "eject cdrom") == -1) {
qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
"out of memory");
- free(safe_path);
return -1;
}
- free(safe_path);
if (qemudMonitorCommand(driver, vm, cmd, &reply) < 0) {
qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED, "cannot change cdrom media");
@@ -2248,7 +2254,7 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeCDROM(virDomainPtr dom,
}
free(reply);
free(cmd);
- strcpy(olddisk->dst, newdisk->dst);
+ strcpy(olddisk->src, newdisk->src);
olddisk->type = newdisk->type;
return 0;
}
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
Avoid segfault upon early libvirtd failure.
* qemud/qemud.c (main): Don't call qemudCleanup on an
uninitialized pointer.
By the way, even though this evoked a warning from gcc,
"make distcheck" passes. Obviously, that means the distcheck
rule is inadequate. I'll fix it so that it turns on -Werror
for the final build.
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyering <meyering@redhat.com>
---
qemud/qemud.c | 5 +++--
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/qemud/qemud.c b/qemud/qemud.c
index 96fdf32..b6b82ed 100644
--- a/qemud/qemud.c
+++ b/qemud/qemud.c
@@ -2025,7 +2025,7 @@ libvirt management daemon:\n\
#define MAX_LISTEN 5
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- struct qemud_server *server;
+ struct qemud_server *server = NULL;
struct sigaction sig_action;
int sigpipe[2];
const char *pid_file = NULL;
@@ -2180,7 +2180,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unlink (pid_file);
error1:
- qemudCleanup(server);
+ if (server)
+ qemudCleanup(server);
return ret;
}
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
Don't use first byte of string as a pointer.
* src/qemu_conf.c (qemudReportError): Use the pointer, errorMessage,
not its first byte, errorMessage[0].
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyering <meyering@redhat.com>
---
src/qemu_conf.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
index eead0bc..e54da5b 100644
--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
+++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void qemudReportError(virConnectPtr conn,
errorMessage[0] = '\0';
}
- virerr = __virErrorMsg(code, (errorMessage[0] ? errorMessage[0] : NULL));
+ virerr = __virErrorMsg(code, (errorMessage[0] ? errorMessage : NULL));
__virRaiseError(conn, dom, net, VIR_FROM_QEMU, code, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
virerr, errorMessage, NULL, -1, -1, virerr, errorMessage);
}
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
diff -rupN libvirt-0.4.1.orig/src/bridge.c libvirt-0.4.1.new/src/bridge.c
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/src/bridge.c 2008-02-28 06:16:21.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/src/bridge.c 2008-03-13 11:25:12.000000000 -0400
@@ -313,7 +313,6 @@ brDeleteInterface(brControl *ctl ATTRIBU
int
brAddTap(brControl *ctl,
const char *bridge,
- unsigned char *macaddr,
char *ifname,
int maxlen,
int *tapfd)
@@ -357,18 +356,6 @@ brAddTap(brControl *ctl,
}
if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &try) == 0) {
- struct ifreq addr;
- memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
- memcpy(addr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, macaddr, 6);
- addr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_family = ARPHRD_ETHER;
-
- /* Device actually starts in 'UP' state, but it
- * needs to be down to set the MAC addr
- */
- if ((errno = brSetInterfaceUp(ctl, try.ifr_name, 0)))
- goto error;
- if (ioctl(fd, SIOCSIFHWADDR, &addr) != 0)
- goto error;
if ((errno = brAddInterface(ctl, bridge, try.ifr_name)))
goto error;
if ((errno = brSetInterfaceUp(ctl, try.ifr_name, 1)))
diff -rupN libvirt-0.4.1.orig/src/bridge.h libvirt-0.4.1.new/src/bridge.h
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/src/bridge.h 2008-02-28 06:16:21.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/src/bridge.h 2008-03-13 11:25:12.000000000 -0400
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ int brDeleteInterface (brContr
int brAddTap (brControl *ctl,
const char *bridge,
- unsigned char *mac,
char *ifname,
int maxlen,
int *tapfd);
diff -rupN libvirt-0.4.1.orig/src/qemu_conf.c libvirt-0.4.1.new/src/qemu_conf.c
--- libvirt-0.4.1.orig/src/qemu_conf.c 2008-03-13 11:24:39.000000000 -0400
+++ libvirt-0.4.1.new/src/qemu_conf.c 2008-03-13 11:25:12.000000000 -0400
@@ -1540,7 +1540,6 @@ qemudNetworkIfaceConnect(virConnectPtr c
}
if ((err = brAddTap(driver->brctl, brname,
- net->mac,
ifname, BR_IFNAME_MAXLEN, &tapfd))) {
qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Failed to add tap interface '%s' to bridge '%s' : %s",
@@ -1548,7 +1547,9 @@ qemudNetworkIfaceConnect(virConnectPtr c
goto error;
}
- snprintf(tapfdstr, sizeof(tapfdstr), "tap,fd=%d,script=,vlan=%d", tapfd, vlan);
+ snprintf(tapfdstr, sizeof(tapfdstr),
+ "tap,fd=%d,script=,vlan=%d,ifname=%s",
+ tapfd, vlan, ifname);
if (!(retval = strdup(tapfdstr)))
goto no_memory;
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
commit 2bcf35336cd649e58c08d7cf3452a8d4353bcf85
Author: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Mar 7 09:23:30 2008 +0000
* src/xend_internal.c: applied patch from Cole Robinson to not
loose the boot tag when defining a fully virtualized xen domain
Daniel
diff --git a/src/xend_internal.c b/src/xend_internal.c
index 8bbc28f..fef54f8 100644
--- a/src/xend_internal.c
+++ b/src/xend_internal.c
@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ xend_parse_sexp_desc_os(virConnectPtr xend, struct sexpr *node, virBufferPtr buf
if (hvm)
virBufferVSprintf(buf, " <loader>%s</loader>\n", loader);
- if (kernel) {
+ if ((kernel) && ((!loader) || (STRNEQ(kernel, loader)))) {
virBufferVSprintf(buf, " <kernel>%s</kernel>\n", kernel);
if (initrd && initrd[0])
virBufferVSprintf(buf, " <initrd>%s</initrd>\n", initrd);
+146
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
--- a/src/storage_backend_iscsi.c 4 Mar 2008 20:02:34 -0000 1.3
+++ b/src/storage_backend_iscsi.c 26 Mar 2008 22:07:05 -0000
@@ -170,20 +170,91 @@
virStorageBackendISCSIMakeLUN(virConnectPtr conn,
virStoragePoolObjPtr pool,
char **const groups,
- void *data ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+ void *data)
{
virStorageVolDefPtr vol;
int fd = -1;
+ unsigned int target, channel, id, lun;
char lunid[100];
- char *dev = groups[4];
int opentries = 0;
char *devpath = NULL;
+ char *session = data;
+ char sysfs_path[PATH_MAX];
+ char *dev = NULL;
+ DIR *sysdir;
+ struct dirent *block_dirent;
+ struct stat sbuf;
+ int len;
+
+ if ((virStrToLong_ui(groups[0], NULL, 10, &target) < 0) ||
+ (virStrToLong_ui(groups[1], NULL, 10, &channel) < 0) ||
+ (virStrToLong_ui(groups[2], NULL, 10, &id) < 0) ||
+ (virStrToLong_ui(groups[3], NULL, 10, &lun) < 0)) {
+ virStorageReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+ _("Failed parsing iscsiadm commands"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (lun == 0) {
+ /* the 0'th LUN isn't a real LUN, it's just a control LUN; skip it */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ snprintf(sysfs_path, PATH_MAX,
+ "/sys/class/iscsi_session/session%s/device/"
+ "target%d:%d:%d/%d:%d:%d:%d/block",
+ session, target, channel, id, target, channel, id, lun);
+
+ if (stat(sysfs_path, &sbuf) < 0) {
+ /* block path in subdir didn't exist; this is unexpected, so fail */
+ virStorageReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("Failed to find the sysfs path for %d:%d:%d:%d: %s"),
+ target, channel, id, lun, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ sysdir = opendir(sysfs_path);
+ if (sysdir == NULL) {
+ /* we failed for some reason; return an error */
+ virStorageReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("Failed to opendir sysfs path %s: %s"),
+ sysfs_path, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ while ((block_dirent = readdir(sysdir)) != NULL) {
+ len = strlen(block_dirent->d_name);
+ if ((len == 1 && block_dirent->d_name[0] == '.') ||
+ (len == 2 && block_dirent->d_name[0] == '.' && block_dirent->d_name[1] == '.')) {
+ /* the . and .. directories; just skip them */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* OK, not . or ..; let's see if it is a SCSI device */
+ if (len > 2 &&
+ block_dirent->d_name[0] == 's' &&
+ block_dirent->d_name[1] == 'd') {
+ /* looks like a scsi device, smells like scsi device; it must be
+ a scsi device */
+ dev = strdup(block_dirent->d_name);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ closedir(sysdir);
+
+ if (dev == NULL) {
+ /* we didn't find the sd? device we were looking for; fail */
+ virStorageReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("Failed to find SCSI device for %d:%d:%d:%d: %s"),
+ target, channel, id, lun, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
snprintf(lunid, sizeof(lunid)-1, "lun-%s", groups[3]);
if ((vol = calloc(1, sizeof(virStorageVolDef))) == NULL) {
virStorageReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_MEMORY, "%s", _("volume"));
- return -1;
+ goto cleanup;
}
if ((vol->name = strdup(lunid)) == NULL) {
@@ -197,6 +268,8 @@
}
strcpy(devpath, "/dev/");
strcat(devpath, dev);
+ free(dev);
+ dev = NULL;
/* It can take a little while between logging into the ISCSI
* server and udev creating the /dev nodes, so if we get ENOENT
* we must retry a few times - they should eventually appear.
@@ -258,6 +331,7 @@
if (fd != -1) close(fd);
free(devpath);
virStorageVolDefFree(vol);
+ free(dev);
return -1;
}
@@ -281,14 +355,13 @@
* scsi1 Channel 00 Id 0 Lun: 5
* Attached scsi disk sdg State: running
*
- * Need 2 regex to match alternating lines
+ * Need a regex to match the Channel:Id:Lun lines
*/
const char *regexes[] = {
- "^\\s*scsi(\\S+)\\s+Channel\\s+(\\S+)\\s+Id\\s+(\\S+)\\s+Lun:\\s+(\\S+)\\s*$",
- "^\\s*Attached\\s+scsi\\s+disk\\s+(\\S+)\\s+State:\\s+running\\s*$"
+ "^\\s*scsi(\\S+)\\s+Channel\\s+(\\S+)\\s+Id\\s+(\\S+)\\s+Lun:\\s+(\\S+)\\s*$"
};
int vars[] = {
- 4, 1
+ 4
};
const char *prog[] = {
ISCSIADM, "--mode", "session", "-r", session, "-P", "3", NULL,
@@ -296,11 +369,11 @@
return virStorageBackendRunProgRegex(conn, pool,
prog,
- 2,
+ 1,
regexes,
vars,
virStorageBackendISCSIMakeLUN,
- NULL);
+ (void *)session);
}
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
Index: src/storage_conf.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/storage_conf.c,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -r1.3 -r1.4
--- a/src/storage_conf.c 27 Feb 2008 10:37:19 -0000 1.3
+++ b/src/storage_conf.c 28 Mar 2008 17:56:44 -0000 1.4
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
}
if ((options->flags & VIR_STORAGE_BACKEND_POOL_SOURCE_DIR) &&
def->source.dir &&
- virBufferVSprintf(buf," <directory path='%s'/>\n", def->source.dir) < 0)
+ virBufferVSprintf(buf," <dir path='%s'/>\n", def->source.dir) < 0)
goto no_memory;
if ((options->flags & VIR_STORAGE_BACKEND_POOL_SOURCE_ADAPTER) &&
def->source.adapter &&
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
--- /home/boston/clalance/devel/libvirt--devel/src/storage_backend_iscsi.c 2008-02-13 13:48:32.497466000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.4.0/src/storage_backend_iscsi.c 2008-02-11 17:19:35.000000000 -0500
@@ -143,6 +143,14 @@ static int virStorageBackendISCSIConnect
"--targetname", pool->def->source.devices[0].path, action, NULL
};
+ const char *cmdsendtarget[] = {
+ ISCSIADM, "--mode", "discovery", "--type", "sendtargets",
+ "--portal", portal, NULL
+ };
+
+ if (virRun(conn, (char **)cmdsendtarget, NULL) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
if (virRun(conn, (char **)cmdargv, NULL) < 0)
return -1;
+257 -3095
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
05f461cd499c628ef07822dd607c340a libvirt-1.2.13.2.tar.gz
4dfe45869f082393cfd09f4690454c12 libvirt-0.4.1.tar.gz