* Mon May 25 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-11.fc11

- Bring up the bridge, even if it doesn't have an IP address (bug #501912)

.cvsignore

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+.build*.log
+*.rpm
+i686
+x86_64
+libvirt-*.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.0.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.1.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz

.gitignore

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-.build*.log
-*.rpm
-i686
-x86_64
-libvirt-*.tar.gz

0001-schema-interleave-domain-name-and-uuid-with-other-el.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:43:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] schema: interleave domain name and uuid with other elements
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Allow <name> and <uuid> anywhere under <domain>, not just at the top:
-
-error:XML document failed to validate against schema: Unable to validate
-doc against /usr/share/libvirt/schemas/domain.rng
-Expecting an element name, got nothing
-Invalid sequence in interleave
-Element domain failed to validate content
-
-Introduced with the first RelaxNG schema in commit c642103.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1292131
-(cherry picked from commit b4e0549febe416ffefc16f389423740d6d65fa74)
-Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
----
- docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-index b252a17..48610ce 100644
---- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-+++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
-@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
-   <define name="domain">
-     <element name="domain">
-       <ref name="hvs"/>
--      <ref name="ids"/>
-       <interleave>
-+        <ref name="ids"/>
-         <optional>
-           <ref name="title"/>
-         </optional>

0002-leaseshelper-fix-crash-when-no-mac-is-specified.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:31:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] leaseshelper: fix crash when no mac is specified
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-If dnsmasq specified DNSMASQ_IAID (so we're dealing with an IPv6
-lease) but no DNSMASQ_MAC, we skip creation of the new lease object.
-
-Also skip adding it to the leases array.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1202350
-(cherry picked from commit df9fe124d650bc438c531673492569da87523d20)
-Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
----
- src/network/leaseshelper.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/network/leaseshelper.c b/src/network/leaseshelper.c
-index 2d528f7..6930310 100644
---- a/src/network/leaseshelper.c
-+++ b/src/network/leaseshelper.c
-@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 
-     case VIR_LEASE_ACTION_OLD:
-     case VIR_LEASE_ACTION_ADD:
--        if (virJSONValueArrayAppend(leases_array_new, lease_new) < 0) {
-+        if (lease_new && virJSONValueArrayAppend(leases_array_new, lease_new) < 0) {
-             virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
-                            _("failed to create json"));
-             goto cleanup;

0003-build-predictably-generate-systemtap-tapsets-bz-1173.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:19:56 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] build: predictably generate systemtap tapsets (bz 1173641)
-
-The generated output is dependent on perl hashtable ordering, which
-gives different results for i686 and x86_64. Fix this by sorting
-the hash keys before iterating over them
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1173641
-(cherry picked from commit a1edb05c6028470aa24b74aa0f8d5fb5a181128a)
----
- src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl b/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
-index 2467300..7b80fbf 100755
---- a/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
-+++ b/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
-@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_auth_name(type, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- my $first = 1;
--foreach my $type (keys %auth) {
-+foreach my $type (sort(keys %auth)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (type == ", $type, ") {\n";
-@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_type_name(type, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- $first = 1;
--foreach my $type (keys %type) {
-+foreach my $type (sort(keys %type)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (type == ", $type, ") {\n";
-@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_status_name(status, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- $first = 1;
--foreach my $status (keys %status) {
-+foreach my $status (sort(keys %status)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (status == ", $status, ") {\n";
-@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_program_name(program, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- $first = 1;
--foreach my $prog (keys %funcs) {
-+foreach my $prog (sort(keys %funcs)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (program == ", $funcs{$prog}->{id}, ") {\n";
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_procedure_name(program, version, proc, verbose)
- {
- EOF
- $first = 1;
--foreach my $prog (keys %funcs) {
-+foreach my $prog (sort(keys %funcs)) {
-     my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
-     $first = 0;
-     print "  $cond (program == ", $funcs{$prog}->{id}, " && version == ", $funcs{$prog}->{version}, ") {\n";

0004-rpc-ensure-daemon-is-spawn-even-if-dead-socket-exist.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 16:51:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: ensure daemon is spawn even if dead socket exists
-
-The auto-spawn code would originally attempt to spawn the
-daemon for both ENOENT and ECONNREFUSED errors from connect().
-The various refactorings eventually lost this so we only
-spawn the daemon on ENOENT. The result is if the daemon exits
-uncleanly, so that the socket is left in the filesystem, we
-will never be able to auto-spawn the daemon again.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 406ee8c226d2197ba1aaecb9cf3ad2b6df31ae44)
----
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index 51f94d4..6153e0e 100644
---- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
- 
-     while (retries &&
-            connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) < 0) {
--        if (!(spawnDaemon && errno == ENOENT)) {
-+        if (!(spawnDaemon && (errno == ENOENT ||
-+                              errno == ECONNREFUSED))) {
-             virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
-                                  path);
-             goto cleanup;

0005-rpc-socket-Minor-cleanups.patch

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:01:24 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Minor cleanups
-
-- Add some debugging
-- Make the loop dependent only on retries
-- Make it explicit that connect(2) success exits the loop
-- Invert the error checking logic
-
-(cherry picked from commit f102c7146ed7f6e04af0ad3bce302476239f2502)
----
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index 6153e0e..dcff69e 100644
---- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -548,6 +548,9 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-     char *rundir = NULL;
-     int ret = -1;
- 
-+    VIR_DEBUG("path=%s spawnDaemon=%d binary=%s", path, spawnDaemon,
-+        NULLSTR(binary));
-+
-     memset(&localAddr, 0, sizeof(localAddr));
-     memset(&remoteAddr, 0, sizeof(remoteAddr));
- 
-@@ -608,10 +611,15 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-     if (remoteAddr.data.un.sun_path[0] == '@')
-         remoteAddr.data.un.sun_path[0] = '\0';
- 
--    while (retries &&
--           connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) < 0) {
--        if (!(spawnDaemon && (errno == ENOENT ||
--                              errno == ECONNREFUSED))) {
-+    while (retries) {
-+        if (connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) == 0) {
-+            VIR_DEBUG("connect() succeeded");
-+            break;
-+        }
-+        VIR_DEBUG("connect() failed: retries=%d errno=%d", retries, errno);
-+
-+        if (!spawnDaemon ||
-+            (errno != ENOENT && errno != ECONNREFUSED)) {
-             virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
-                                  path);
-             goto cleanup;

0006-rpc-socket-Explicitly-error-if-we-exceed-retry-count.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:08:45 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Explicitly error if we exceed retry count
-
-When we autolaunch libvirtd for session URIs, we spin in a retry
-loop waiting for the daemon to start and the connect(2) to succeed.
-
-However if we exceed the retry count, we don't explicitly raise an
-error, which can yield a slew of different error messages elsewhere
-in the code.
-
-Explicitly raise the last connect(2) failure if we run out of retries.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 8da02d528068942303923fc4f935e77cccac9c7c)
----
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index dcff69e..90951be 100644
---- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -618,7 +618,9 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-         }
-         VIR_DEBUG("connect() failed: retries=%d errno=%d", retries, errno);
- 
-+        retries--;
-         if (!spawnDaemon ||
-+            retries == 0 ||
-             (errno != ENOENT && errno != ECONNREFUSED)) {
-             virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
-                                  path);
-@@ -628,7 +630,6 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-         if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
-             goto cleanup;
- 
--        retries--;
-         usleep(5000);
-     }
- 

0007-rpc-socket-Don-t-repeatedly-attempt-to-launch-daemon.patch

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:13:38 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Don't repeatedly attempt to launch daemon
-
-On every socket connect(2) attempt we were re-launching session
-libvirtd, up to 100 times in 5 seconds.
-
-This understandably caused some weird load races and intermittent
-qemu:///session startup failures
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1271183
-(cherry picked from commit 2eb7a975756d05a5b54ab4acf60083beb6161ac6)
----
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 9 +++++++--
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index 90951be..2ee4b6e 100644
---- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-     virSocketAddr remoteAddr;
-     char *rundir = NULL;
-     int ret = -1;
-+    bool daemonLaunched = false;
- 
-     VIR_DEBUG("path=%s spawnDaemon=%d binary=%s", path, spawnDaemon,
-         NULLSTR(binary));
-@@ -627,8 +628,12 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-             goto cleanup;
-         }
- 
--        if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
--            goto cleanup;
-+        if (!daemonLaunched) {
-+            if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
-+                goto cleanup;
-+
-+            daemonLaunched = true;
-+        }
- 
-         usleep(5000);
-     }

0008-security-Do-not-restore-kernel-and-initrd-labels.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 10:55:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] security: Do not restore kernel and initrd labels
-
-Kernel/initrd files are essentially read-only shareable images and thus
-should be handled in the same way. We already use the appropriate label
-for kernel/initrd files when starting a domain, but when a domain gets
-destroyed we would remove the labels which would make other running
-domains using the same files very unhappy.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=921135
-
-Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 68acc701bd449481e3206723c25b18fcd3d261b7)
----
- src/security/security_dac.c     | 8 --------
- src/security/security_selinux.c | 8 --------
- 2 files changed, 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/security/security_dac.c b/src/security/security_dac.c
-index deb6980..d01215f 100644
---- a/src/security/security_dac.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_dac.c
-@@ -971,14 +971,6 @@ virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
-         virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.loader->nvram) < 0)
-         rc = -1;
- 
--    if (def->os.kernel &&
--        virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.kernel) < 0)
--        rc = -1;
--
--    if (def->os.initrd &&
--        virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.initrd) < 0)
--        rc = -1;
--
-     if (def->os.dtb &&
-         virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.dtb) < 0)
-         rc = -1;
-diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-index 6e67a86..2475a80 100644
---- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-@@ -1953,14 +1953,6 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
-         virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.loader->nvram) < 0)
-         rc = -1;
- 
--    if (def->os.kernel &&
--        virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.kernel) < 0)
--        rc = -1;
--
--    if (def->os.initrd &&
--        virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.initrd) < 0)
--        rc = -1;
--
-     if (def->os.dtb &&
-         virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.dtb) < 0)
-         rc = -1;

0009-rpc-wait-longer-for-session-daemon-to-start-up.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2016 17:04:32 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] rpc: wait longer for session daemon to start up
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1271183
-
-We only wait 0.5 seconds for the session daemon to start up and present
-its socket, which isn't sufficient for many users. Bump up the sleep
-interval and retry amount so we wait for a total of 5.0 seconds.
-
-(cherry picked from commit ca0c06f4008154de55e0b3109885facd0bf02d32)
----
- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-index 2ee4b6e..275f1f5 100644
---- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
-@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-     char *lockpath = NULL;
-     int lockfd = -1;
-     int fd = -1;
--    int retries = 100;
-+    int retries = 500;
-     virSocketAddr localAddr;
-     virSocketAddr remoteAddr;
-     char *rundir = NULL;
-@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
-             daemonLaunched = true;
-         }
- 
--        usleep(5000);
-+        usleep(10000);
-     }
- 
-     localAddr.len = sizeof(localAddr.data);

0010-driver-log-missing-modules-as-INFO-not-WARN.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From: Jovanka Gulicoska <jovanka.gulicoska@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 20:02:20 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] driver: log missing modules as INFO, not WARN
-
-Missing modules is a common expected scenario for most libvirt usage on
-RPM distributions like Fedora, so it doesn't really warrant logging at
-WARN level. Use INFO instead
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1274849
-(cherry picked from commit 9a0c7f5f834185db9017c34aabc03ad99cf37bed)
----
- src/driver.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/driver.c b/src/driver.c
-index db03438..f926fe4 100644
---- a/src/driver.c
-+++ b/src/driver.c
-@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ virDriverLoadModule(const char *name)
-         return NULL;
- 
-     if (access(modfile, R_OK) < 0) {
--        VIR_WARN("Module %s not accessible", modfile);
-+        VIR_INFO("Module %s not accessible", modfile);
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 

0011-polkit-Allow-password-less-access-for-libvirt-group.patch

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:38:00 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] polkit: Allow password-less access for 'libvirt' group
-
-Many users, who admin their own machines, want to be able to access
-system libvirtd via tools like virt-manager without having to enter
-a root password. Just google 'virt-manager without password' and
-you'll find many hits. I've read at least 5 blog posts over the years
-describing slightly different ways of achieving this goal.
-
-Let's finally add official support for this.
-
-Install a polkit-1 rules file granting password-less auth for any user
-in the new 'libvirt' group. Create the group on RPM install
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=957300
-(cherry picked from commit e94979e901517af9fdde358d7b7c92cc055dd50c)
----
- daemon/Makefile.am   | 13 +++++++++++++
- daemon/libvirt.rules |  9 +++++++++
- libvirt.spec.in      | 15 +++++++++++++--
- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 daemon/libvirt.rules
-
-diff --git a/daemon/Makefile.am b/daemon/Makefile.am
-index b95a79d..9c5ea37 100644
---- a/daemon/Makefile.am
-+++ b/daemon/Makefile.am
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST =						\
- 	libvirtd.init.in				\
- 	libvirtd.upstart				\
- 	libvirtd.policy.in				\
-+	libvirt.rules					\
- 	libvirtd.sasl					\
- 	libvirtd.service.in				\
- 	libvirtd.socket.in				\
-@@ -233,6 +234,8 @@ policyauth = auth_admin_keep_session
- else ! WITH_POLKIT0
- policydir = $(datadir)/polkit-1/actions
- policyauth = auth_admin_keep
-+rulesdir = $(datadir)/polkit-1/rules.d
-+rulesfile = libvirt.rules
- endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
- endif WITH_POLKIT
- 
-@@ -263,9 +266,19 @@ if WITH_POLKIT
- install-data-polkit::
- 	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)
- 	$(INSTALL_DATA) libvirtd.policy $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)/org.libvirt.unix.policy
-+if ! WITH_POLKIT0
-+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)
-+	$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$(rulesfile) $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)/50-libvirt.rules
-+endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
-+
- uninstall-data-polkit::
- 	rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)/org.libvirt.unix.policy
- 	rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(policydir) || :
-+if ! WITH_POLKIT0
-+	rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)/50-libvirt.rules
-+	rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir) || :
-+endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
-+
- else ! WITH_POLKIT
- install-data-polkit::
- uninstall-data-polkit::
-diff --git a/daemon/libvirt.rules b/daemon/libvirt.rules
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..01a15fa
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/daemon/libvirt.rules
-@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
-+// Allow any user in the 'libvirt' group to connect to system libvirtd
-+// without entering a password.
-+
-+polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
-+    if (action.id == "org.libvirt.unix.manage" &&
-+        subject.isInGroup("libvirt")) {
-+        return polkit.Result.YES;
-+    }
-+});
-diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in
-index dc327a2..a23629d 100644
---- a/libvirt.spec.in
-+++ b/libvirt.spec.in
-@@ -1631,9 +1631,9 @@ then
- fi
- 
- %if %{with_libvirtd}
-+%pre daemon
-     %if ! %{with_driver_modules}
-         %if %{with_qemu}
--%pre daemon
-             %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
- # We want soft static allocation of well-known ids, as disk images
- # are commonly shared across NFS mounts by id rather than name; see
-@@ -1647,11 +1647,21 @@ if ! getent passwd qemu >/dev/null; then
-     useradd -r -g qemu -G kvm -d / -s /sbin/nologin -c "qemu user" qemu
-   fi
- fi
--exit 0
-             %endif
-         %endif
-     %endif
- 
-+    %if %{with_polkit}
-+        %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
-+# 'libvirt' group is just to allow password-less polkit access to
-+# libvirtd. The uid number is irrelevant, so we use dynamic allocation
-+# described at the above link.
-+getent group libvirt >/dev/null || groupadd -r libvirt
-+        %endif
-+    %endif
-+
-+exit 0
-+
- %post daemon
- 
-     %if %{with_systemd}
-@@ -1925,6 +1935,7 @@ exit 0
-         %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
- %{_datadir}/polkit-1/actions/org.libvirt.unix.policy
- %{_datadir}/polkit-1/actions/org.libvirt.api.policy
-+%{_datadir}/polkit-1/rules.d/50-libvirt.rules
-         %else
- %{_datadir}/PolicyKit/policy/org.libvirt.unix.policy
-         %endif

Makefile

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME := libvirt
 SPECFILE = $(firstword $(wildcard *.spec))
 
 define find-makefile-common
-for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
+for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
 endef
 
 MAKEFILE_COMMON := $(shell $(find-makefile-common))

branch

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+F-11

libvirt-0.6.2-bring-up-ipless-bridge.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 4db7474b0c1907e877d7206edeb4d73962971096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 15:31:22 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] * src/network_driver.c: enable bridges which are not up
+   without an IP address, patch by Ludwig Nussel
+ Daniel
+
+---
+ src/network_driver.c |    9 +++------
+ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/network_driver.c b/src/network_driver.c
+index a17a769..a163b15 100644
+--- a/src/network_driver.c
++++ b/src/network_driver.c
+@@ -836,8 +836,7 @@ static int networkStartNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto err_delbr;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (network->def->ipAddress &&
+-        (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 1))) {
++    if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 1))) {
+         virReportSystemError(conn, err,
+                              _("failed to bring the bridge '%s' up"),
+                              network->def->bridge);
+@@ -878,8 +877,7 @@ static int networkStartNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+     networkRemoveIptablesRules(driver, network);
+ 
+  err_delbr1:
+-    if (network->def->ipAddress &&
+-        (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
++    if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
+         char ebuf[1024];
+         networkLog(NETWORK_WARN, _("Failed to bring down bridge '%s' : %s\n"),
+                  network->def->bridge, virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+@@ -920,8 +918,7 @@ static int networkShutdownNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+     networkRemoveIptablesRules(driver, network);
+ 
+     char ebuf[1024];
+-    if (network->def->ipAddress &&
+-        (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
++    if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
+         networkLog(NETWORK_WARN, _("Failed to bring down bridge '%s' : %s\n"),
+                  network->def->bridge, virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+     }
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-do-not-log-monitor-output.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+From fbd16cecc72494e8a9450f38197221f2f50c9d0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?utf-8?q?Guido=20G=C3=BCnther?= <agx@sigxcpu.org>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 15:56:27 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Don't log monitor output to domain log file.
+
+It's logged via the logging system already. Prefix monitor debug output with vm
+name.
+---
+ src/qemu_driver.c |   60 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 1 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 79ee072..f5b5fa5 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1710,27 +1710,11 @@ qemudMonitorCommandExtra(const virDomainObjPtr vm,
+             goto error;
+         }
+     }
+-
+-    /* Log, but ignore failures to write logfile for VM */
+-    if (safewrite(vm->logfile, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) {
+-        char ebuf[1024];
+-        VIR_WARN(_("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"),
+-                 virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+-    }
+-
+     *reply = buf;
+     return 0;
+ 
+  error:
+-    if (buf) {
+-        /* Log, but ignore failures to write logfile for VM */
+-        if (safewrite(vm->logfile, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) {
+-            char ebuf[1024];
+-            VIR_WARN(_("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"),
+-                     virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+-        }
+-        VIR_FREE(buf);
+-    }
++    VIR_FREE(buf);
+     return -1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2463,7 +2447,7 @@ static int qemudDomainGetMemoryBalloon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("balloon reply: '%s'", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: balloon reply: '%s'", vm->def->name, reply);
+     if ((offset = strstr(reply, BALLOON_PREFIX)) != NULL) {
+         unsigned int memMB;
+         char *end;
+@@ -2517,7 +2501,7 @@ static int qemudDomainSetMemoryBalloon(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     /* If the command failed qemu prints: 'unknown command'
+      * No message is printed on success it seems */
+-    DEBUG ("balloon reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: balloon reply: %s",vm->def->name,  reply);
+     if (strstr(reply, "\nunknown command:")) {
+         /* Don't set error - it is expected memory balloon fails on many qemu */
+         ret = 0;
+@@ -2812,7 +2796,7 @@ static int qemudDomainSave(virDomainPtr dom,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("migrate reply: %s", info);
++    DEBUG ("%s: migrate reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+ 
+     /* If the command isn't supported then qemu prints:
+      * unknown command: migrate" */
+@@ -3658,7 +3642,7 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(virConnectPtr conn,
+     /* If the command failed qemu prints:
+      * device not found, device is locked ...
+      * No message is printed on success it seems */
+-    DEBUG ("ejectable media change reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: ejectable media change reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
+     if (strstr(reply, "\ndevice ")) {
+         qemudReportError (conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
+                           _("changing cdrom media failed: %s"), reply);
+@@ -3719,7 +3703,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachPciDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("pci_add reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: pci_add reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
+     /* If the command succeeds qemu prints:
+      * OK bus 0... */
+ #define PCI_ATTACH_OK_MSG "OK bus 0, slot "
+@@ -3787,7 +3771,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachUsbMassstorageDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("attach_usb reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: attach_usb reply: %s",vm->def->name,  reply);
+     /* If the command failed qemu prints:
+      * Could not add ... */
+     if (strstr(reply, "Could not add ")) {
+@@ -3841,7 +3825,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachHostDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("attach_usb reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: attach_usb reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
+     /* If the command failed qemu prints:
+      * Could not add ... */
+     if (strstr(reply, "Could not add ")) {
+@@ -3980,7 +3964,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("pci_del reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: pci_del reply: %s",vm->def->name,  reply);
+     /* If the command fails due to a wrong slot qemu prints: invalid slot,
+      * nothing is printed on success */
+     if (strstr(reply, "invalid slot")) {
+@@ -4210,7 +4194,7 @@ qemudDomainBlockStats (virDomainPtr dom,
+                           "%s", _("'info blockstats' command failed"));
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+-    DEBUG ("info blockstats reply: %s", info);
++    DEBUG ("%s: info blockstats reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+ 
+     /* If the command isn't supported then qemu prints the supported
+      * info commands, so the output starts "info ".  Since this is
+@@ -4251,21 +4235,25 @@ qemudDomainBlockStats (virDomainPtr dom,
+                 if (STRPREFIX (p, "rd_bytes=")) {
+                     p += 9;
+                     if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->rd_bytes) == -1)
+-                        DEBUG ("error reading rd_bytes: %s", p);
++                        DEBUG ("%s: error reading rd_bytes: %s",
++                               vm->def->name, p);
+                 } else if (STRPREFIX (p, "wr_bytes=")) {
+                     p += 9;
+                     if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->wr_bytes) == -1)
+-                        DEBUG ("error reading wr_bytes: %s", p);
++                        DEBUG ("%s: error reading wr_bytes: %s",
++                               vm->def->name, p);
+                 } else if (STRPREFIX (p, "rd_operations=")) {
+                     p += 14;
+                     if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->rd_req) == -1)
+-                        DEBUG ("error reading rd_req: %s", p);
++                        DEBUG ("%s: error reading rd_req: %s",
++                               vm->def->name, p);
+                 } else if (STRPREFIX (p, "wr_operations=")) {
+                     p += 14;
+                     if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->wr_req) == -1)
+-                        DEBUG ("error reading wr_req: %s", p);
++                        DEBUG ("%s: error reading wr_req: %s",
++                               vm->def->name, p);
+                 } else
+-                    DEBUG ("unknown block stat near %s", p);
++                    DEBUG ("%s: unknown block stat near %s", vm->def->name, p);
+ 
+                 /* Skip to next label. */
+                 p = strchr (p, ' ');
+@@ -4477,7 +4465,7 @@ qemudDomainMemoryPeek (virDomainPtr dom,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("memsave reply: %s", info);
++    DEBUG ("%s: memsave reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+ 
+     /* Read the memory file into buffer. */
+     if (saferead (fd, buffer, size) == (ssize_t) -1) {
+@@ -4794,7 +4782,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
+                              "%s", _("off-line migration specified, but suspend operation failed"));
+             goto cleanup;
+         }
+-        DEBUG ("stop reply: %s", info);
++        DEBUG ("%s: stop reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+         VIR_FREE(info);
+         paused = 1;
+ 
+@@ -4811,7 +4799,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
+         snprintf (cmd, sizeof cmd, "migrate_set_speed %lum", resource);
+         qemudMonitorCommand (vm, cmd, &info);
+ 
+-        DEBUG ("migrate_set_speed reply: %s", info);
++        DEBUG ("%s: migrate_set_speed reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+         VIR_FREE (info);
+     }
+ 
+@@ -4830,7 +4818,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("migrate reply: %s", info);
++    DEBUG ("%s: migrate reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+ 
+     /* Now check for "fail" in the output string */
+     if (strstr(info, "fail") != NULL) {
+@@ -4869,7 +4857,7 @@ cleanup:
+                       vm->def->name);
+         }
+         else {
+-            DEBUG ("cont reply: %s", info);
++            DEBUG ("%s: cont reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+             VIR_FREE(info);
+         }
+ 
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-enable-qemu-0-10-migration.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
+To: libvir-list@redhat.com
+Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2009 15:09:05 +0100
+Subject: [libvirt] PATCH: Enable migration with QEMU >= 0.10.0
+
+The KVM migration code was added to QEMU for the 0.10.0 release, so we 
+should enable this in libvirt now.
+
+Daniel
+
+diff -r be7993675e07 src/qemu_conf.c
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c	Thu Apr 30 14:49:27 2009 +0100
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c	Thu Apr 30 15:08:45 2009 +0100
+@@ -472,16 +472,13 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *
+ 
+     /*
+      * Handling of -incoming arg with varying features
+-     *  -incoming tcp    (kvm >= 79)
+-     *  -incoming exec   (kvm >= 80)
++     *  -incoming tcp    (kvm >= 79, qemu >= 0.10.0)
++     *  -incoming exec   (kvm >= 80, qemu >= 0.10.0)
+      *  -incoming stdio  (all earlier kvm)
+      *
+      * NB, there was a pre-kvm-79 'tcp' support, but it
+      * was broken, because it blocked the monitor console
+      * while waiting for data, so pretend it doesn't exist
+-     *
+-     * XXX when next QEMU release after 0.9.1 arrives,
+-     * we'll need to add MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP/EXEC here too
+      */
+     if (kvm_version >= 79) {
+         flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP;
+@@ -489,6 +486,9 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *
+             flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_EXEC;
+     } else if (kvm_version > 0) {
+         flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_KVM_STDIO;
++    } else if (version >= 10000) {
++        flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP;
++        flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_EXEC;
+     }
+ 
+     if (retversion)
+
+
+-- 

libvirt-0.6.2-event-handling-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From e7be6cc841a5652b73ddd2ccd3769c7f8bbad13d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 16:41:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix interrupting of main event thread & protect against accidental uniniitalized variables
+
+---
+ qemud/event.c |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/qemud/event.c b/qemud/event.c
+index 65f548e..754f2b1 100644
+--- a/qemud/event.c
++++ b/qemud/event.c
+@@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ struct virEventLoop {
+ static struct virEventLoop eventLoop;
+ 
+ /* Unique ID for the next FD watch to be registered */
+-static int nextWatch = 0;
++static int nextWatch = 1;
+ 
+ /* Unique ID for the next timer to be registered */
+-static int nextTimer = 0;
++static int nextTimer = 1;
+ 
+ static void virEventLock(void)
+ {
+@@ -143,15 +143,22 @@ int virEventAddHandleImpl(int fd, int events,
+ 
+ void virEventUpdateHandleImpl(int watch, int events) {
+     int i;
++    EVENT_DEBUG("Update handle w=%d e=%d", watch, events);
++
++    if (watch <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid update watch %d", watch);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].watch == watch) {
+             eventLoop.handles[i].events =
+                     virEventHandleTypeToPollEvent(events);
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -164,6 +171,12 @@ void virEventUpdateHandleImpl(int watch, int events) {
+ int virEventRemoveHandleImpl(int watch) {
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Remove handle %d", watch);
++
++    if (watch <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid remove watch %d", watch);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+@@ -172,11 +185,11 @@ int virEventRemoveHandleImpl(int watch) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].watch == watch) {
+             EVENT_DEBUG("mark delete %d %d", i, eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
+             eventLoop.handles[i].deleted = 1;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             virEventUnlock();
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+     return -1;
+ }
+@@ -232,6 +245,12 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+     struct timeval tv;
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Updating timer %d timeout with %d ms freq", timer, frequency);
++
++    if (timer <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid update timer %d", timer);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) < 0) {
+         return;
+     }
+@@ -244,10 +263,10 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+                 frequency >= 0 ? frequency +
+                 (((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec)*1000) +
+                 (((unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec)/1000) : 0;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -260,6 +279,12 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+ int virEventRemoveTimeoutImpl(int timer) {
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Remove timer %d", timer);
++
++    if (timer <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid remove timer %d", timer);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.timeoutsCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted)
+@@ -267,11 +292,11 @@ int virEventRemoveTimeoutImpl(int timer) {
+ 
+         if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].timer == timer) {
+             eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted = 1;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             virEventUnlock();
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+     return -1;
+ }
+@@ -617,9 +642,12 @@ static int virEventInterruptLocked(void)
+     char c = '\0';
+ 
+     if (!eventLoop.running ||
+-        pthread_self() == eventLoop.leader)
++        pthread_self() == eventLoop.leader) {
++        VIR_DEBUG("Skip interrupt, %d %d", eventLoop.running, (int)eventLoop.leader);
+         return 0;
++    }
+ 
++    VIR_DEBUG0("Interrupting");
+     if (safewrite(eventLoop.wakeupfd[1], &c, sizeof(c)) != sizeof(c))
+         return -1;
+     return 0;
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-event-handling-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+From 6483ee77ed12f037d68a6adc690624fa1b508dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 16:43:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix watch/timer event deletion
+
+---
+ qemud/event.c |  112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 1 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/qemud/event.c b/qemud/event.c
+index 754f2b1..a57d967 100644
+--- a/qemud/event.c
++++ b/qemud/event.c
+@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static int virEventCalculateTimeout(int *timeout) {
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Calculate expiry of %d timers", eventLoop.timeoutsCount);
+     /* Figure out if we need a timeout */
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.timeoutsCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted || eventLoop.timeouts[i].frequency < 0)
++        if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].frequency < 0)
+             continue;
+ 
+         EVENT_DEBUG("Got a timeout scheduled for %llu", eventLoop.timeouts[i].expiresAt);
+@@ -350,32 +350,26 @@ static int virEventCalculateTimeout(int *timeout) {
+  * file handles. The caller must free the returned data struct
+  * returns: the pollfd array, or NULL on error
+  */
+-static int virEventMakePollFDs(struct pollfd **retfds) {
++static struct pollfd *virEventMakePollFDs(void) {
+     struct pollfd *fds;
+-    int i, nfds = 0;
++    int i;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+-            continue;
+-        nfds++;
+-    }
+-    *retfds = NULL;
+     /* Setup the poll file handle data structs */
+-    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(fds, nfds) < 0)
+-        return -1;
++    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(fds, eventLoop.handlesCount) < 0)
++        return NULL;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0, nfds = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+-            continue;
+-        fds[nfds].fd = eventLoop.handles[i].fd;
+-        fds[nfds].events = eventLoop.handles[i].events;
+-        fds[nfds].revents = 0;
++    for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
++        EVENT_DEBUG("Prepare n=%d w=%d, f=%d e=%d", i,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].fd,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].events);
++        fds[i].fd = eventLoop.handles[i].fd;
++        fds[i].events = eventLoop.handles[i].events;
++        fds[i].revents = 0;
+         //EVENT_DEBUG("Wait for %d %d", eventLoop.handles[i].fd, eventLoop.handles[i].events);
+-        nfds++;
+     }
+ 
+-    *retfds = fds;
+-    return nfds;
++    return fds;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -435,26 +429,30 @@ static int virEventDispatchTimeouts(void) {
+  * Returns 0 upon success, -1 if an error occurred
+  */
+ static int virEventDispatchHandles(int nfds, struct pollfd *fds) {
+-    int i, n;
++    int i;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0, n = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount && n < nfds ; i++) {
++    /* NB, use nfds not eventLoop.handlesCount, because new
++     * fds might be added on end of list, and they're not
++     * in the fds array we've got */
++    for (i = 0 ; i < nfds ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted) {
+-            EVENT_DEBUG("Skip deleted %d", eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
++            EVENT_DEBUG("Skip deleted n=%d w=%d f=%d", i,
++                        eventLoop.handles[i].watch, eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
+             continue;
+         }
+ 
+-        if (fds[n].revents) {
++        if (fds[i].revents) {
+             virEventHandleCallback cb = eventLoop.handles[i].cb;
+             void *opaque = eventLoop.handles[i].opaque;
+-            int hEvents = virPollEventToEventHandleType(fds[n].revents);
+-            EVENT_DEBUG("Dispatch %d %d %p", fds[n].fd,
+-                        fds[n].revents, eventLoop.handles[i].opaque);
++            int hEvents = virPollEventToEventHandleType(fds[i].revents);
++            EVENT_DEBUG("Dispatch n=%d f=%d w=%d e=%d %p", i,
++                        fds[i].fd, eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
++                        fds[i].revents, eventLoop.handles[i].opaque);
+             virEventUnlock();
+             (cb)(eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
+-                 fds[n].fd, hEvents, opaque);
++                 fds[i].fd, hEvents, opaque);
+             virEventLock();
+         }
+-        n++;
+     }
+ 
+     return 0;
+@@ -545,22 +543,21 @@ static int virEventCleanupHandles(void) {
+  * at least one file handle has an event, or a timer expires
+  */
+ int virEventRunOnce(void) {
+-    struct pollfd *fds;
++    struct pollfd *fds = NULL;
+     int ret, timeout, nfds;
+ 
+     virEventLock();
+     eventLoop.running = 1;
+     eventLoop.leader = pthread_self();
+-    if ((nfds = virEventMakePollFDs(&fds)) < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
+ 
+-    if (virEventCalculateTimeout(&timeout) < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0 ||
++        virEventCleanupHandles() < 0)
++        goto error;
++
++    if (!(fds = virEventMakePollFDs()) ||
++        virEventCalculateTimeout(&timeout) < 0)
++        goto error;
++    nfds = eventLoop.handlesCount;
+ 
+     virEventUnlock();
+ 
+@@ -572,38 +569,31 @@ int virEventRunOnce(void) {
+         if (errno == EINTR) {
+             goto retry;
+         }
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        return -1;
++        goto error_unlocked;
+     }
+ 
+     virEventLock();
+-    if (virEventDispatchTimeouts() < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventDispatchTimeouts() < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+     if (ret > 0 &&
+-        virEventDispatchHandles(nfds, fds) < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
+-    VIR_FREE(fds);
+-
+-    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++        virEventDispatchHandles(nfds, fds) < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+-    if (virEventCleanupHandles() < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0 ||
++        virEventCleanupHandles() < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+     eventLoop.running = 0;
+     virEventUnlock();
++    VIR_FREE(fds);
+     return 0;
++
++error:
++    virEventUnlock();
++error_unlocked:
++    VIR_FREE(fds);
++    return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ static void virEventHandleWakeup(int watch ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-fix-nosource-label.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -rup libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c new/src/security_selinux.c
+--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-10 22:04:25.000000000 -0400
++++ new/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-10 22:06:09.000000000 -0400
+@@ -338,6 +338,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectP
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ 
++    if (!disk->src)
++        return 0;
++
+     if (disk->shared) {
+         return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
+     } else if (disk->readonly) {

libvirt-0.6.2-fix-qemu-argv-detection-with-kvm-85.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 2b3fcdc378e7bec5c1a78b81632756e92930fd24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 May 2009 15:14:24 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Fix QEMU ARGV detection with kvm >= 85
+
+---
+ src/qemu_conf.c   |   18 ++++++++++++++----
+ src/qemu_driver.c |   12 ++----------
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
+index 9cb71eb..a57d3ab 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -431,18 +431,28 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *qemu,
+         return -1;
+ 
+     char *help = NULL;
+-    enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 8192 };
++    enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 1024*64 };
+     int len = virFileReadLimFD(newstdout, MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE, &help);
+-    if (len < 0)
++    if (len < 0) {
++        virReportSystemError(NULL, errno, "%s",
++                             _("Unable to read QEMU help output"));
+         goto cleanup2;
++    }
+ 
+     if (sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u (kvm-%u)",
+                &major, &minor, &micro, &kvm_version) != 4)
+         kvm_version = 0;
+ 
+-    if (!kvm_version && sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u",
+-               &major, &minor, &micro) != 3)
++    if (!kvm_version &&
++        sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u",
++               &major, &minor, &micro) != 3) {
++        char *eol = strchr(help, '\n');
++        if (eol) *eol = '\0';
++        qemudReportError(NULL, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
++                         _("cannot parse QEMU version number in '%s'"),
++                         help);
+         goto cleanup2;
++    }
+ 
+     version = (major * 1000 * 1000) + (minor * 1000) + micro;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 30642d5..bd60b29 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1391,12 +1391,8 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator,
+                                 NULL,
+-                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
+-        qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+-                         _("Cannot determine QEMU argv syntax %s"),
+-                         emulator);
++                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+-    }
+ 
+     if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(conn, vm->def) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+@@ -3715,12 +3711,8 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(vm->def->emulator,
+                                 NULL,
+-                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
+-        qemudReportError(conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+-                         _("Cannot determine QEMU argv syntax %s"),
+-                         vm->def->emulator);
++                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
+         return -1;
+-    }
+ 
+     if (qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DRIVE) {
+         if (!(devname = qemudDiskDeviceName(conn, newdisk)))
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-qemu-drive-format.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 0ae4c67ff5f1d24698c5cfc8a9719d333c892644 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 11:23:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] qemu -drive takes format= not fmt=
+
+Seems like a simple typo - it has been "format=" since the flag
+was introduced, but we added it as "fmt=".
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/qemu_conf.c                                    |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
+index f36c927..6f9e610 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr conn,
+                 disk->device == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_DISK)
+                 virBufferAddLit(&opt, ",boot=on");
+             if (disk->driverType)
+-                virBufferVSprintf(&opt, ",fmt=%s", disk->driverType);
++                virBufferVSprintf(&opt, ",format=%s", disk->driverType);
+ 
+             if (disk->cachemode) {
+                 const char *mode =

libvirt-0.6.2-shared-readonly-label.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+diff -rup libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c libvirt-0.6.2.new/src/security_selinux.c
+--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c	2009-04-03 15:36:56.000000000 +0100
++++ libvirt-0.6.2.new/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-05 13:39:42.000000000 +0100
+@@ -24,11 +24,12 @@
+ #include "virterror_internal.h"
+ #include "util.h"
+ #include "memory.h"
+-
++#include "logging.h"
+ 
+ #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
+ 
+ static char default_domain_context[1024];
++static char default_content_context[1024];
+ static char default_image_context[1024];
+ #define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI       "0"
+ #define SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME "selinux"
+@@ -148,8 +149,13 @@ SELinuxInitialize(virConnectPtr conn)
+     close(fd);
+ 
+     ptr = strchrnul(default_image_context, '\n');
+-    *ptr = '\0';
+-
++    if (*ptr == '\n') {
++        *ptr = '\0';
++        strcpy(default_content_context, ptr+1);
++        ptr = strchrnul(default_content_context, '\n');
++        if (*ptr == '\n')
++            *ptr = '\0';
++    }
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -275,6 +281,8 @@ SELinuxSetFilecon(virConnectPtr conn, co
+ {
+     char ebuf[1024];
+ 
++    VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon);
++
+     if(setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
+         virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+                                _("%s: unable to set security context "
+@@ -299,6 +307,8 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virConn
+     char *newpath = NULL;
+     const char *path = disk->src;
+ 
++    /* Don't restore labels on readoly/shared disks, because
++     * other VMs may still be accessing these */
+     if (disk->readonly || disk->shared)
+         return 0;
+ 
+@@ -328,8 +338,13 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectP
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ 
+-    if (secdef->imagelabel)
++    if (disk->shared) {
++        return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
++    } else if (disk->readonly) {
++        return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_content_context);
++    } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+         return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
++    }
+ 
+     return 0;
+ }
+@@ -403,9 +418,6 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr co
+ 
+     if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+         for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
+-            if (vm->def->disks[i]->readonly ||
+-                vm->def->disks[i]->shared) continue;
+-
+             if (SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(conn, vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+                 return -1;
+         }

libvirt-0.6.2-svirt-sound.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+--- src/qemu_conf.c.orig	2009-04-02 11:50:10.000000000 +0200
++++ src/qemu_conf.c	2009-04-03 17:46:59.000000000 +0200
+@@ -779,6 +779,20 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr 
+     char domid[50];
+     char *pidfile;
+     const char *cpu = NULL;
++    int skipSound = 0;
++
++    if (driver->securityDriver &&
++        driver->securityDriver->name &&
++        STREQ(driver->securityDriver->name, "selinux") &&
++        getuid() == 0) {
++        static int soundWarned = 0; 
++        skipSound = 1;
++        if (vm->def->nsounds &&
++            !soundWarned) {
++            soundWarned = 1;
++            VIR_WARN0("Sound cards for VMs are disabled while SELinux security model is active");
++        }
++    }
+ 
+     uname_normalize(&ut);
+ 
+@@ -1425,7 +1439,8 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr 
+     }
+ 
+     /* Add sound hardware */
+-    if (vm->def->nsounds) {
++    if (vm->def->nsounds &&
++        !skipSound) {
+         int size = 100;
+         char *modstr;
+         if (VIR_ALLOC_N(modstr, size+1) < 0)

libvirt-0.6.2-xml-attribute-escaping.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 7f7a4403860f56d5a1ad65bfd16f5bf97a971d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 May 2009 16:19:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] * src/buf.c: avoid an XML attribute escaping bug #499791
+ daniel
+
+---
+ src/buf.c |   16 +++++++++++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/buf.c b/src/buf.c
+index cdcdac9..259175d 100644
+--- a/src/buf.c
++++ b/src/buf.c
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ virBufferEscapeString(const virBufferPtr buf, const char *format, const char *st
+         return;
+ 
+     len = strlen(str);
+-    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(escaped, 5 * len + 1) < 0) {
++    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(escaped, 6 * len + 1) < 0) {
+         virBufferNoMemory(buf);
+         return;
+     }
+@@ -290,6 +290,20 @@ virBufferEscapeString(const virBufferPtr buf, const char *format, const char *st
+             *out++ = 'm';
+             *out++ = 'p';
+             *out++ = ';';
++        } else if (*cur == '"') {
++            *out++ = '&';
++            *out++ = 'q';
++            *out++ = 'u';
++            *out++ = 'o';
++            *out++ = 't';
++            *out++ = ';';
++        } else if (*cur == '\'') {
++            *out++ = '&';
++            *out++ = 'a';
++            *out++ = 'p';
++            *out++ = 'o';
++            *out++ = 's';
++            *out++ = ';';
+         } else if ((*cur >= 0x20) || (*cur == '\n') || (*cur == '\t') ||
+                    (*cur == '\r')) {
+             /*
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.3-hostdev-managed.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 3d7771e0570e09096ad9391a857dad48b150bc0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 16:33:28 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix qemu driver's interpretation of <hostdev managed='yes'/>
+
+This change:
+
+  Tue Mar  3 08:55:13 GMT 2009 Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+
+       Don't try to detach & reset PCI devices while running test
+       suite for XML-> ARGV conversion.
+       * src/qemu_driver.c: Add qemuPrepareHostDevices() helper to
+       detach and reset PCI devices.
+       * src/qemu_conf.c: Don't detach & reset PCI devices while
+       building the command line argv
+
+accidentally did this:
+
+-            if (hostdev->managed) {
++        if (!hostdev->managed) {
+
+Which results in managed='yes' not causing the device to be
+detached when the guest is starting.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/qemu_driver.c |    2 +-
+ 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 5898026..59312c0 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static int qemuPrepareHostDevices(virConnectPtr conn,
+         if (hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI)
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if (!hostdev->managed) {
++        if (hostdev->managed) {
+             pciDevice *dev = pciGetDevice(conn,
+                                           hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci.domain,
+                                           hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci.bus,
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.3-refresh-qemu-caps.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+commit 0e51348cb9aeafe5e2fd6469a4bde0baa1eb8720
+Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon May 4 15:06:03 2009 -0400
+
+    Refresh QEMU driver capabilities for each getCapabilities call.
+    
+    Also fix up a couple issues where caps are accessed without locking
+    the driver structure.
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 23ea961..790dac6 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1885,10 +1885,12 @@ static int qemudGetNodeInfo(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+ static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
+     struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
+-    char *xml;
++    char *xml = NULL;
+ 
+     qemuDriverLock(driver);
+-    if ((xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
++    virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
++    if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL ||
++        (xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
+         virReportOOMError(conn);
+     qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
+ 
+@@ -3169,20 +3171,26 @@ cleanup:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
++static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn,
++                                     virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+ {
+     struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData;
+     char *p;
++    int ret = 0;
+ 
+-    if (!driver->securityDriver)
+-        return -2;
++    qemuDriverLock(driver);
++    if (!driver->securityDriver) {
++        ret = -2;
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
+ 
+     p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model;
+     if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) {
+         qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          _("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                          VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1);
+-        return -1;
++        ret = -1;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+     strcpy(secmodel->model, p);
+ 
+@@ -3191,10 +3199,14 @@ static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr sec
+         qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          _("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                          VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1);
+-        return -1;
++        ret = -1;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+     strcpy(secmodel->doi, p);
+-    return 0;
++
++cleanup:
++    qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
++    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /* TODO: check seclabel restore */

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-05f461cd499c628ef07822dd607c340a  libvirt-1.2.13.2.tar.gz
+3035b484861516a1cd425acef1e760e3  libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz