Rebased to version 1.2.18.4

CVE-2016-5008: Setting empty VNC password allows access to unauthorized users (bz #1351516)

.cvsignore

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-.build*.log
-*.rpm
-i686
-x86_64
-libvirt-*.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.6.0.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.6.1.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.6.3.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.6.4.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.6.5.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.7.0.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.7.1.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.7.2.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.7.3.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.7.4.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.7.5.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.7.6.tar.gz
-libvirt-0.7.7.tar.gz

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+.build*.log
+*.rpm
+i686
+x86_64
+libvirt-*.tar.gz

libvirt-0.7.7-fix-usb-product.patch

@@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
-From 3a441522017aa9c1b8b54d2ce4569d0f0d96fa72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 12:36:56 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Add some debugging at domain startup
-
----
- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-index f8ab545..040d645 100644
---- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-@@ -2695,6 +2695,8 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
- 
-     FD_ZERO(&keepfd);
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Beginning VM startup process");
-+
-     if (virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
-         qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID,
-                         "%s", _("VM is already active"));
-@@ -2703,22 +2705,27 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
- 
-     /* If you are using a SecurityDriver with dynamic labelling,
-        then generate a security label for isolation */
-+    DEBUG0("Generating domain security label (if required)");
-     if (driver->securityDriver &&
-         driver->securityDriver->domainGenSecurityLabel &&
-         driver->securityDriver->domainGenSecurityLabel(vm) < 0)
-         return -1;
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Generating setting domain security labels (if required)");
-     if (driver->securityDriver &&
-         driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityAllLabel &&
-         driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityAllLabel(vm) < 0)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
--    /* Ensure no historical cgroup for this VM is lieing around bogus settings */
-+    /* Ensure no historical cgroup for this VM is lying around bogus
-+     * settings */
-+    DEBUG0("Ensuring no historical cgroup is lying around");
-     qemuRemoveCgroup(driver, vm, 1);
- 
-     if ((vm->def->ngraphics == 1) &&
-         vm->def->graphics[0]->type == VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC &&
-         vm->def->graphics[0]->data.vnc.autoport) {
-+        DEBUG0("Determining VNC port");
-         int port = qemudNextFreeVNCPort(driver);
-         if (port < 0) {
-             qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-@@ -2735,6 +2742,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Creating domain log file");
-     if ((logfile = qemudLogFD(driver, vm->def->name)) < 0)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-@@ -2751,14 +2759,17 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Determing emulator version");
-     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator,
-                                 NULL,
-                                 &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Setting up domain cgroup (if required)");
-     if (qemuSetupCgroup(driver, vm) < 0)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Preparing host devices");
-     if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(driver, vm->def) < 0)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-@@ -2767,6 +2778,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Preparing monitor state");
-     if (qemuPrepareMonitorChr(driver, priv->monConfig, vm->def->name) < 0)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-@@ -2798,6 +2810,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-      * use in hotplug
-      */
-     if (qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DEVICE) {
-+        DEBUG0("Assigning domain PCI addresses");
-         /* Populate cache with current addresses */
-         if (priv->pciaddrs) {
-             qemuDomainPCIAddressSetFree(priv->pciaddrs);
-@@ -2816,6 +2829,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-         priv->persistentAddrs = 0;
-     }
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Building emulator command line");
-     vm->def->id = driver->nextvmid++;
-     if (qemudBuildCommandLine(conn, driver, vm->def, priv->monConfig,
-                               priv->monJSON, qemuCmdFlags, &argv, &progenv,
-@@ -2899,25 +2913,31 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-     if (ret == -1) /* The VM failed to start */
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Waiting for monitor to show up");
-     if (qemudWaitForMonitor(driver, vm, pos) < 0)
-         goto abort;
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Detecting VCPU PIDs");
-     if (qemuDetectVcpuPIDs(driver, vm) < 0)
-         goto abort;
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Setting CPU affinity");
-     if (qemudInitCpuAffinity(vm) < 0)
-         goto abort;
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Setting any required VM passwords");
-     if (qemuInitPasswords(conn, driver, vm, qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
-         goto abort;
- 
-     /* If we have -device, then addresses are assigned explicitly.
-      * If not, then we have to detect dynamic ones here */
-     if (!(qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DEVICE)) {
-+        DEBUG0("Determining domain device PCI addresses");
-         if (qemuInitPCIAddresses(driver, vm) < 0)
-             goto abort;
-     }
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Setting initial memory amount");
-     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
-     if (qemuMonitorSetBalloon(priv->mon, vm->def->memory) < 0) {
-         qemuDomainObjExitMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
-@@ -2925,6 +2945,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-     }
- 
-     if (migrateFrom == NULL) {
-+        DEBUG0("Starting domain CPUs");
-         /* Allow the CPUS to start executing */
-         if (qemuMonitorStartCPUs(priv->mon, conn) < 0) {
-             if (virGetLastError() == NULL)
-@@ -2937,6 +2958,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-     qemuDomainObjExitMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
- 
- 
-+    DEBUG0("Writing domain status to disk");
-     if (virDomainSaveStatus(driver->caps, driver->stateDir, vm) < 0)
-         goto abort;
- 
--- 
-1.6.6.1
-
-From 6d5c8a8f51db8ce97ab35ab6022dd5c94ab016b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 12:37:52 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Fix USB by product with security enabled
-
-We need to call PrepareHostdevs to determine the USB device path before
-any security calls. PrepareHostUSBDevices was also incorrectly skipping
-all USB devices.
----
- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c |   11 ++++++-----
- 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-index 040d645..b17d26d 100644
---- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-@@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ qemuPrepareHostUSBDevices(struct qemud_driver *driver ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
- 
-         if (hostdev->mode != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS)
-             continue;
--        if (hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI)
-+        if (hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_USB)
-             continue;
- 
-         /* Resolve a vendor/product to bus/device */
-@@ -2703,6 +2703,11 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-         return -1;
-     }
- 
-+    /* Must be run before security labelling */
-+    DEBUG0("Preparing host devices");
-+    if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(driver, vm->def) < 0)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-     /* If you are using a SecurityDriver with dynamic labelling,
-        then generate a security label for isolation */
-     DEBUG0("Generating domain security label (if required)");
-@@ -2769,10 +2774,6 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
-     if (qemuSetupCgroup(driver, vm) < 0)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
--    DEBUG0("Preparing host devices");
--    if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(driver, vm->def) < 0)
--        goto cleanup;
--
-     if (VIR_ALLOC(priv->monConfig) < 0) {
-         virReportOOMError();
-         goto cleanup;
--- 
-1.6.6.1
-
-From 65e97240e6e4606820dd1c42ac172319e0af4d8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 10:45:36 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] security: selinux: Fix crash when releasing non-existent label
-
-This can be triggered by the qemuStartVMDaemon cleanup path if a
-VM references a non-existent USB device (by product) in the XML.
-
-Signed-off-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
----
- src/security/security_selinux.c |    3 ++-
- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-index 975b315..6680e2d 100644
---- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-@@ -632,7 +632,8 @@ SELinuxReleaseSecurityLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
- {
-     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
- 
--    if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
-+    if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC ||
-+        secdef->label == NULL)
-         return 0;
- 
-     context_t con = context_new(secdef->label);
--- 
-1.6.6.1
-

libvirt-0.7.7-set-kernel-perms.patch

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From 3f1aa08af6580c215d973bc6bf57f505dbf8b926 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 13:38:39 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] security: Set permissions for kernel/initrd
-
-Fixes URL installs when running virt-install as root on Fedora.
----
- src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c    |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
- src/security/security_selinux.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-index 6911f48..1883fbe 100644
---- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-@@ -332,6 +332,15 @@ qemuSecurityDACRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
-                                                      vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
-             rc = -1;
-     }
-+
-+    if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
-+        qemuSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.kernel) < 0)
-+        rc = -1;
-+
-+    if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
-+        qemuSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.initrd) < 0)
-+        rc = -1;
-+
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-@@ -356,6 +365,18 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityAllLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
-             return -1;
-     }
- 
-+    if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
-+        qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(vm->def->os.kernel,
-+                                    driver->user,
-+                                    driver->group) < 0)
-+        return -1;
-+
-+    if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
-+        qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(vm->def->os.initrd,
-+                                    driver->user,
-+                                    driver->group) < 0)
-+        return -1;
-+
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-index b2c8581..975b315 100644
---- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-@@ -616,6 +616,14 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
-             rc = -1;
-     }
- 
-+    if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
-+        SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.kernel) < 0)
-+        rc = -1;
-+
-+    if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
-+        SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.initrd) < 0)
-+        rc = -1;
-+
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-@@ -736,6 +744,14 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
-             return -1;
-     }
- 
-+    if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
-+        SELinuxSetFilecon(vm->def->os.kernel, default_content_context) < 0)
-+        return -1;
-+
-+    if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
-+        SELinuxSetFilecon(vm->def->os.initrd, default_content_context) < 0)
-+        return -1;
-+
-     return 0;
- }
- 
--- 
-1.6.6.1
-

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-5f315b0bf20e3964f7657ba1e630cd67  libvirt-0.7.7.tar.gz
+8a027dfdde5fb36059e4d7e069708a56  libvirt-1.2.18.4.tar.gz