* Fri Jun 5 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-12.fc11

- Use the correct QEMU machine type for ppc (bug #502862)
- Fix crash with TLS connections (bug #503066)
- Fix broken networking with newer qemu releases (bug #503275)
- Remove the qemu BuildRequires

.abignore

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-[suppress_function]
-symbol_version_regexp = LIBVIRT_PRIVATE.*
-soname_regexp = libvirt\\.so.*
-
-[suppress_function]
-symbol_version_regexp = LIBVIRT_ADMIN_PRIVATE.*
-soname_regexp = libvirt-admin\\.so.*
-
-[suppress_variable]
-symbol_version_regexp = LIBVIRT_PRIVATE.*
-soname_regexp = libvirt\\.so.*
-
-[suppress_variable]
-symbol_version_regexp = LIBVIRT_ADMIN_PRIVATE.*
-soname_regexp = libvirt-admin\\.so.*
-
-[suppress_function]
-symbol_version_regexp = .*
-soname_regexp = libvirt_storage_.*\\.so.*
-
-[suppress_variable]
-symbol_version_regexp = .*
-soname_regexp = libvirt_storage_.*\\.so.*
-
-[suppress_function]
-symbol_version_regexp = .*
-soname_regexp = libvirt_driver_.*\\.so.*
-
-[suppress_variable]
-symbol_version_regexp = .*
-soname_regexp = libvirt_driver_.*\\.so.*

.cvsignore

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+.build*.log
+*.rpm
+i686
+x86_64
+libvirt-*.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.0.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.1.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz

.gitignore

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-.build*.log
-*.rpm
-i686
-x86_64
-libvirt-*.tar.xz

0001-build-support-explicitly-disabling-netcf.patch

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 16:01:06 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] build: support explicitly disabling netcf
-
-placing "-Dnetcf=disabled" on the meson commandline was ignored,
-meaning that even with that option the build would get WITH_NETCF if
-the netcf-devel package was found - the only way to disable it was to
-uninstall netcf-devel.
-
-This patch adds the small bit of logic to check the netcf meson
-commandline option (in addition to whether netcf-devel is installed)
-before defining WITH_NETCF.
-
-Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <ngompa13@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 06169a115d46d8870a96d293c2faf6ea87e71020)
----
- meson.build | 10 ++++++----
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/meson.build b/meson.build
-index b5164f68ed..e9d6d9f82e 100644
---- a/meson.build
-+++ b/meson.build
-@@ -1155,8 +1155,10 @@ libm_dep = cc.find_library('m', required : false)
- 
- netcf_version = '0.1.8'
- netcf_dep = dependency('netcf', version: '>=' + netcf_version, required: get_option('netcf'))
--if netcf_dep.found()
--  conf.set('WITH_NETCF', 1)
-+if not get_option('netcf').disabled()
-+  if netcf_dep.found()
-+    conf.set('WITH_NETCF', 1)
-+  endif
- endif
- 
- have_gnu_gettext_tools = false
-@@ -1550,7 +1552,7 @@ elif get_option('driver_hyperv').enabled()
-   error('openwsman is required for the Hyper-V driver')
- endif
- 
--if not get_option('driver_interface').disabled() and conf.has('WITH_LIBVIRTD') and (udev_dep.found() or netcf_dep.found())
-+if not get_option('driver_interface').disabled() and conf.has('WITH_LIBVIRTD') and (udev_dep.found() or conf.has('WITH_NETCF'))
-   conf.set('WITH_INTERFACE', 1)
- elif get_option('driver_interface').enabled()
-   error('Requested the Interface driver without netcf or udev and libvirtd support')
-@@ -2362,7 +2364,7 @@ libs_summary = {
-   'libssh': libssh_dep.found(),
-   'libssh2': libssh2_dep.found(),
-   'libutil': libutil_dep.found(),
--  'netcf': netcf_dep.found(),
-+  'netcf': conf.has('WITH_NETCF'),
-   'NLS': have_gnu_gettext_tools,
-   'numactl': numactl_dep.found(),
-   'openwsman': openwsman_dep.found(),

0002-node_device_udev-Serialize-access-to-pci_get_strings.patch

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-From: wangjian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 11:21:16 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] node_device_udev: Serialize access to pci_get_strings)_
-
-Since the functions provided by libpciaccess are not thread-safe,
-when the udev-event and nodedev-init threads of libvirt call the
-pci_get_strings function provided by libpaciaccess at the same
-time the following can happen:
-
-nodedev-init thread:
-nodeStateInitializeEnumerate ->
-  udevEnumerateDevices->
-    udevProcessDeviceListEntry ->
-      udevAddOneDevice ->
-        udevGetDeviceDetails->
-          udevProcessPCI ->
-            udevTranslatePCIIds ->
-              pci_get_strings -> (libpciaccess)
-                find_device_name ->
-                  populate_vendor ->
-                    d = realloc( vend->devices, (vend->num_devices + 1), * sizeof( struct pci_device_leaf ) );
-                    vend->num_devices++;
-
-udev-event thread:
-udevEventHandleThread ->
-  udevHandleOneDevice ->
-    udevAddOneDevice->
-      udevGetDeviceDetails->
-        udevProcessPCI ->
-          udevTranslatePCIIds ->
-            pci_get_strings -> (libpciaccess)
-              find_device_name ->
-                populate_vendor ->
-                  d = realloc( vend->devices, (vend->num_devices + 1), * sizeof( struct pci_device_leaf ) );
-                  vend->num_devices++;
-
-Signed-off-by: WangJian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 59788a5caea5f292c86e07a31ee2b853d68db87e)
----
- src/node_device/node_device_udev.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c b/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
-index 55a2731681..6f0defe908 100644
---- a/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
-+++ b/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
-@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ udevGenerateDeviceName(struct udev_device *device,
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-+static virMutex pciaccessMutex = VIR_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
- 
- static int
- udevTranslatePCIIds(unsigned int vendor,
-@@ -346,12 +347,14 @@ udevTranslatePCIIds(unsigned int vendor,
-     m.device_class_mask = 0;
-     m.match_data = 0;
- 
--    /* pci_get_strings returns void */
-+    /* pci_get_strings returns void and unfortunately is not thread safe. */
-+    virMutexLock(&pciaccessMutex);
-     pci_get_strings(&m,
-                     &device_name,
-                     &vendor_name,
-                     NULL,
-                     NULL);
-+    virMutexUnlock(&pciaccessMutex);
- 
-     *vendor_string = g_strdup(vendor_name);
-     *product_string = g_strdup(device_name);

0003-virSetUIDGIDWithCaps-Don-t-drop-CAP_SETPCAP-right-aw.patch

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 16:58:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] virSetUIDGIDWithCaps: Don't drop CAP_SETPCAP right away
-
-There are few cases where we execute a virCommand with all caps
-cleared (virCommandClearCaps()). For instance
-dnsmasqCapsRefreshInternal() does just that. This means, that
-after fork() and before exec() the virSetUIDGIDWithCaps() is
-called. But since the caller did not want to change anything,
-just drop capabilities, these are the values of arguments:
-
-  virSetUIDGIDWithCaps (uid=-1, gid=-1, groups=0x0, ngroups=0,
-                        capBits=0, clearExistingCaps=true)
-
-This means that indeed all capabilities will be dropped,
-including CAP_SETPCAP. But this capability controls whether
-capabilities can be set, IOW whether capng_apply() succeeds.
-
-There are two calls of capng_apply() in the function. The
-CAP_SETPCAP is dropped after the first call and thus the other
-call (capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOUNDS);) fails.
-
-The solution is to keep the capability for as long as needed
-(just like CAP_SETGID and CAP_SETUID) and drop it only at the
-very end (just like CAP_SETGID and CAP_SETUID).
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1949388
-Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 438b50dda8a863fdc988e9ab612f097cc1626e8a)
----
- src/util/virutil.c | 6 ++----
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/util/virutil.c b/src/util/virutil.c
-index a0cd0f1bcd..7ae23a7061 100644
---- a/src/util/virutil.c
-+++ b/src/util/virutil.c
-@@ -1202,12 +1202,10 @@ virSetUIDGIDWithCaps(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, gid_t *groups, int ngroups,
-     }
- # ifdef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
-     /* If newer kernel, we need also need setpcap to change the bounding set */
--    if ((capBits || need_setgid || need_setuid) &&
--        !capng_have_capability(CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, CAP_SETPCAP)) {
-+    if (!capng_have_capability(CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, CAP_SETPCAP)) {
-         need_setpcap = true;
--    }
--    if (need_setpcap)
-         capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE|CAPNG_PERMITTED, CAP_SETPCAP);
-+    }
- # endif
- 
-     /* Tell system we want to keep caps across uid change */

0004-security-fix-SELinux-label-generation-logic.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 13:09:04 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] security: fix SELinux label generation logic
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-A process can access a file if the set of MCS categories
-for the file is equal-to *or* a subset-of, the set of
-MCS categories for the process.
-
-If there are two VMs:
-
-  a) svirt_t:s0:c117
-  b) svirt_t:s0:c117,c720
-
-Then VM (b) is able to access files labelled for VM (a).
-
-IOW, we must discard case where the categories are equal
-because that is a subset of many other valid category pairs.
-
-Fixes: https://gitlab.com/libvirt/libvirt/-/issues/153
-CVE-2021-3631
-Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 15073504dbb624d3f6c911e85557019d3620fdb2)
----
- src/security/security_selinux.c | 10 +++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-index 2fc6ef2616..61a871ec3d 100644
---- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-@@ -389,7 +389,15 @@ virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
-         VIR_DEBUG("Try cat %s:c%d,c%d", sens, c1 + catMin, c2 + catMin);
- 
-         if (c1 == c2) {
--            mcs = g_strdup_printf("%s:c%d", sens, catMin + c1);
-+            /*
-+             * A process can access a file if the set of MCS categories
-+             * for the file is equal-to *or* a subset-of, the set of
-+             * MCS categories for the process.
-+             *
-+             * IOW, we must discard case where the categories are equal
-+             * because that is a subset of other category pairs.
-+             */
-+            continue;
-         } else {
-             if (c1 > c2) {
-                 int t = c1;

0005-virSetUIDGIDWithCaps-Set-bounding-capabilities-only-.patch

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2021 14:26:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] virSetUIDGIDWithCaps: Set bounding capabilities only with
- CAP_SETPCAP
-
-In one of my previous patches I've tried to postpone dropping
-CAP_SETPCAP until the very end because it's needed for
-capng_apply(). What I did not realize back then was that we might
-not have the capability to begin with. Because of unknown reasons
-capng_apply() pollutes logs only for CAPNG_SELECT_BOUNDS and not
-for CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS.
-
-Reproducer is really simple: run libvirtd as a regular user.
-During its initialization, libvirtd will spawn some binaries
-(dnsmasq, qemu-*, etc.) and while doing so it will try to drop
-capabilities.
-
-Anyway, let's call capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOUNDS) only if we
-have the CAP_SETPCAP (which is tracked in need_setpcap variable).
-
-Fixes: 438b50dda8a863fdc988e9ab612f097cc1626e8a
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1924218
-Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit a2476f37a7789eb9315b77bb451f4754ef4ef15b)
----
- src/util/virutil.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/util/virutil.c b/src/util/virutil.c
-index 7ae23a7061..333f99e91d 100644
---- a/src/util/virutil.c
-+++ b/src/util/virutil.c
-@@ -1269,7 +1269,8 @@ virSetUIDGIDWithCaps(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, gid_t *groups, int ngroups,
-      * do this if we failed to get the capability above, so ignore the
-      * return value.
-      */
--    capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOUNDS);
-+    if (!need_setpcap)
-+        capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOUNDS);
- 
-     /* Drop the caps that allow setuid/gid (unless they were requested) */
-     if (need_setgid)

0006-qemu_firmware-don-t-error-out-for-unknown-firmware-f.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 10 May 2021 15:07:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] qemu_firmware: don't error out for unknown firmware features
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-When QEMU introduces new firmware features libvirt will fail until we
-list that feature in our code as well which doesn't sound right.
-
-We should simply ignore the new feature until we add a proper support
-for it.
-
-Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 61d95a1073833ec4323c1ef28e71e913c55aa7b9)
----
- src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c | 12 ++++++------
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c b/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c
-index 639cff7459..e602de22e3 100644
---- a/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c
-@@ -573,6 +573,7 @@ qemuFirmwareFeatureParse(const char *path,
-     virJSONValuePtr featuresJSON;
-     g_autoptr(qemuFirmwareFeature) features = NULL;
-     size_t nfeatures;
-+    size_t nparsed = 0;
-     size_t i;
- 
-     if (!(featuresJSON = virJSONValueObjectGetArray(doc, "features"))) {
-@@ -592,17 +593,16 @@ qemuFirmwareFeatureParse(const char *path,
-         int tmp;
- 
-         if ((tmp = qemuFirmwareFeatureTypeFromString(tmpStr)) <= 0) {
--            virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
--                           _("unknown feature %s"),
--                           tmpStr);
--            return -1;
-+            VIR_DEBUG("ignoring unknown QEMU firmware feature '%s'", tmpStr);
-+            continue;
-         }
- 
--        features[i] = tmp;
-+        features[nparsed] = tmp;
-+        nparsed++;
-     }
- 
-     fw->features = g_steal_pointer(&features);
--    fw->nfeatures = nfeatures;
-+    fw->nfeatures = nparsed;
-     return 0;
- }
- 

0007-storage_driver-Unlock-object-on-ACL-fail-in-storageP.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 11:22:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] storage_driver: Unlock object on ACL fail in
- storagePoolLookupByTargetPath
-
-'virStoragePoolObjListSearch' returns a locked and refed object, thus we
-must release it on ACL permission failure.
-
-Fixes: 7aa0e8c0cb8
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1984318
-Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 447f69dec47e1b0bd15ecd7cd49a9fd3b050fb87)
----
- src/storage/storage_driver.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/storage/storage_driver.c b/src/storage/storage_driver.c
-index 16bc53aa46..2787c1671b 100644
---- a/src/storage/storage_driver.c
-+++ b/src/storage/storage_driver.c
-@@ -1739,8 +1739,10 @@ storagePoolLookupByTargetPath(virConnectPtr conn,
-                                            storagePoolLookupByTargetPathCallback,
-                                            cleanpath))) {
-         def = virStoragePoolObjGetDef(obj);
--        if (virStoragePoolLookupByTargetPathEnsureACL(conn, def) < 0)
-+        if (virStoragePoolLookupByTargetPathEnsureACL(conn, def) < 0) {
-+            virStoragePoolObjEndAPI(&obj);
-             return NULL;
-+        }
- 
-         pool = virGetStoragePool(conn, def->name, def->uuid, NULL, NULL);
-         virStoragePoolObjEndAPI(&obj);

0008-wireshark-Switch-to-tvb_bytes_to_str.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 7e299ba649b1288d529c7595c0e6060c9ae0ff2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 09:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] wireshark: Switch to tvb_bytes_to_str()
-
-When the dissector sees a byte sequence that is either an opaque
-data (xdr_opaque) or a byte sequence (xdr_bytes) it formats the
-bytes as a hex numbers using our own implementation. But
-wireshark already provides a function for it: tvb_bytes_to_str().
-NB, the reason why it returns a const string is so that callers
-don't try to free it - the string is allocated using an allocator
-which will decide when to free it.
-
-The wireshark formatter was introduced in wireshark commit of
-v1.99.2~479 and thus is present in the version we require at
-least (2.6.0).
-
-Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
----
- tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c | 30 ++++++++--------------------
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c b/tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c
-index f43919b05d..cb922b8070 100644
---- a/tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c
-+++ b/tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c
-@@ -158,24 +158,6 @@ dissect_xdr_string(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, XDR *xdrs, int hf,
-     }
- }
- 
--static const gchar *
--format_xdr_bytes(guint8 *bytes, guint32 length)
--{
--    gchar *buf;
--    guint32 i;
--
--    if (length == 0)
--        return "";
--    buf = wmem_alloc(wmem_packet_scope(), length*2 + 1);
--    for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
--        /* We know that buf has enough size to contain
--           2 * length + '\0' characters. */
--        g_snprintf(buf, 2*(length - i) + 1, "%02x", bytes[i]);
--        buf += 2;
--    }
--    return buf - length*2;
--}
--
- static gboolean
- dissect_xdr_opaque(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, XDR *xdrs, int hf,
-                    guint32 size)
-@@ -187,8 +169,10 @@ dissect_xdr_opaque(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, XDR *xdrs, int hf,
-     val = g_malloc(size);
-     start = xdr_getpos(xdrs);
-     if ((rc = xdr_opaque(xdrs, (caddr_t)val, size))) {
--        proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value(tree, hf, tvb, start, xdr_getpos(xdrs) - start,
--                                          NULL, "%s", format_xdr_bytes(val, size));
-+        gint len = xdr_getpos(xdrs) - start;
-+        const char *s = tvb_bytes_to_str(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, start, len);
-+
-+        proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value(tree, hf, tvb, start, len, NULL, "%s", s);
-     } else {
-         proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_libvirt_unknown, tvb, start, -1, ENC_NA);
-     }
-@@ -207,8 +191,10 @@ dissect_xdr_bytes(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, XDR *xdrs, int hf,
- 
-     start = xdr_getpos(xdrs);
-     if (xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&val, &length, maxlen)) {
--        proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value(tree, hf, tvb, start, xdr_getpos(xdrs) - start,
--                                          NULL, "%s", format_xdr_bytes(val, length));
-+        gint len = xdr_getpos(xdrs) - start;
-+        const char *s = tvb_bytes_to_str(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, start, len);
-+
-+        proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value(tree, hf, tvb, start, len, NULL, "%s", s);
-         /* Seems I can't call xdr_free() for this case.
-            It will raises SEGV by referencing out of bounds call stack */
-         free(val);
--- 
-2.33.1
-

0009-wireshark-Drop-needless-comment-in-dissect_xdr_bytes.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 010613cfd8dae6d85602a84c5c95b2d441e1b3d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 10:20:05 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] wireshark: Drop needless comment in dissect_xdr_bytes()
-
-In the dissect_xdr_bytes() there's a comment that the string
-allocated by xdr_bytes() can't be freed using xdr_free(). Well,
-that is expected because xdr_bytes() used plain calloc() AND the
-string is not an XDR struct but plain 'char *' type. Passing it
-to xdr_free() must result in weird things happening.
-
-Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
----
- tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c | 2 --
- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c b/tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c
-index cb922b8070..eeacbcdf0e 100644
---- a/tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c
-+++ b/tools/wireshark/src/packet-libvirt.c
-@@ -195,8 +195,6 @@ dissect_xdr_bytes(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, XDR *xdrs, int hf,
-         const char *s = tvb_bytes_to_str(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, start, len);
- 
-         proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value(tree, hf, tvb, start, len, NULL, "%s", s);
--        /* Seems I can't call xdr_free() for this case.
--           It will raises SEGV by referencing out of bounds call stack */
-         free(val);
-         return TRUE;
-     } else {
--- 
-2.33.1
-

Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Makefile for source rpm: libvirt
+# $Id$
+NAME := libvirt
+SPECFILE = $(firstword $(wildcard *.spec))
+
+define find-makefile-common
+for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
+endef
+
+MAKEFILE_COMMON := $(shell $(find-makefile-common))
+
+ifeq ($(MAKEFILE_COMMON),)
+# attempt a checkout
+define checkout-makefile-common
+test -f CVS/Root && { cvs -Q -d $$(cat CVS/Root) checkout common && echo "common/Makefile.common" ; } || { echo "ERROR: I can't figure out how to checkout the 'common' module." ; exit -1 ; } >&2
+endef
+
+MAKEFILE_COMMON := $(shell $(checkout-makefile-common))
+endif
+
+include $(MAKEFILE_COMMON)

branch

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+F-11

libvirt-0.6.2-avoid-broken-networking-with-newer-qemu.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 934b71abf1b908f720811a44ad5411cfc1a4ca37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 13:15:57 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Avoid broken networking with new QEMU/KVM >= 86
+
+---
+ src/qemu_conf.c |    4 ++--
+ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
+index 93dc0b7..a04d216 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -658,8 +658,8 @@ qemudNetworkIfaceConnect(virConnectPtr conn,
+     }
+ 
+     snprintf(tapfdstr, sizeof(tapfdstr),
+-             "tap,fd=%d,script=,vlan=%d,ifname=%s",
+-             tapfd, vlan, net->ifname);
++             "tap,fd=%d,vlan=%d",
++             tapfd, vlan);
+ 
+     if (!(retval = strdup(tapfdstr)))
+         goto no_memory;
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-bring-up-ipless-bridge.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 4db7474b0c1907e877d7206edeb4d73962971096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 15:31:22 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] * src/network_driver.c: enable bridges which are not up
+   without an IP address, patch by Ludwig Nussel
+ Daniel
+
+---
+ src/network_driver.c |    9 +++------
+ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/network_driver.c b/src/network_driver.c
+index a17a769..a163b15 100644
+--- a/src/network_driver.c
++++ b/src/network_driver.c
+@@ -836,8 +836,7 @@ static int networkStartNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto err_delbr;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (network->def->ipAddress &&
+-        (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 1))) {
++    if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 1))) {
+         virReportSystemError(conn, err,
+                              _("failed to bring the bridge '%s' up"),
+                              network->def->bridge);
+@@ -878,8 +877,7 @@ static int networkStartNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+     networkRemoveIptablesRules(driver, network);
+ 
+  err_delbr1:
+-    if (network->def->ipAddress &&
+-        (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
++    if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
+         char ebuf[1024];
+         networkLog(NETWORK_WARN, _("Failed to bring down bridge '%s' : %s\n"),
+                  network->def->bridge, virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+@@ -920,8 +918,7 @@ static int networkShutdownNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+     networkRemoveIptablesRules(driver, network);
+ 
+     char ebuf[1024];
+-    if (network->def->ipAddress &&
+-        (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
++    if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
+         networkLog(NETWORK_WARN, _("Failed to bring down bridge '%s' : %s\n"),
+                  network->def->bridge, virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+     }
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-do-not-log-monitor-output.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+From fbd16cecc72494e8a9450f38197221f2f50c9d0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?utf-8?q?Guido=20G=C3=BCnther?= <agx@sigxcpu.org>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 15:56:27 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Don't log monitor output to domain log file.
+
+It's logged via the logging system already. Prefix monitor debug output with vm
+name.
+---
+ src/qemu_driver.c |   60 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 1 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 79ee072..f5b5fa5 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1710,27 +1710,11 @@ qemudMonitorCommandExtra(const virDomainObjPtr vm,
+             goto error;
+         }
+     }
+-
+-    /* Log, but ignore failures to write logfile for VM */
+-    if (safewrite(vm->logfile, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) {
+-        char ebuf[1024];
+-        VIR_WARN(_("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"),
+-                 virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+-    }
+-
+     *reply = buf;
+     return 0;
+ 
+  error:
+-    if (buf) {
+-        /* Log, but ignore failures to write logfile for VM */
+-        if (safewrite(vm->logfile, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) {
+-            char ebuf[1024];
+-            VIR_WARN(_("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"),
+-                     virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+-        }
+-        VIR_FREE(buf);
+-    }
++    VIR_FREE(buf);
+     return -1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2463,7 +2447,7 @@ static int qemudDomainGetMemoryBalloon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("balloon reply: '%s'", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: balloon reply: '%s'", vm->def->name, reply);
+     if ((offset = strstr(reply, BALLOON_PREFIX)) != NULL) {
+         unsigned int memMB;
+         char *end;
+@@ -2517,7 +2501,7 @@ static int qemudDomainSetMemoryBalloon(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     /* If the command failed qemu prints: 'unknown command'
+      * No message is printed on success it seems */
+-    DEBUG ("balloon reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: balloon reply: %s",vm->def->name,  reply);
+     if (strstr(reply, "\nunknown command:")) {
+         /* Don't set error - it is expected memory balloon fails on many qemu */
+         ret = 0;
+@@ -2812,7 +2796,7 @@ static int qemudDomainSave(virDomainPtr dom,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("migrate reply: %s", info);
++    DEBUG ("%s: migrate reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+ 
+     /* If the command isn't supported then qemu prints:
+      * unknown command: migrate" */
+@@ -3658,7 +3642,7 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(virConnectPtr conn,
+     /* If the command failed qemu prints:
+      * device not found, device is locked ...
+      * No message is printed on success it seems */
+-    DEBUG ("ejectable media change reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: ejectable media change reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
+     if (strstr(reply, "\ndevice ")) {
+         qemudReportError (conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
+                           _("changing cdrom media failed: %s"), reply);
+@@ -3719,7 +3703,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachPciDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("pci_add reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: pci_add reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
+     /* If the command succeeds qemu prints:
+      * OK bus 0... */
+ #define PCI_ATTACH_OK_MSG "OK bus 0, slot "
+@@ -3787,7 +3771,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachUsbMassstorageDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("attach_usb reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: attach_usb reply: %s",vm->def->name,  reply);
+     /* If the command failed qemu prints:
+      * Could not add ... */
+     if (strstr(reply, "Could not add ")) {
+@@ -3841,7 +3825,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachHostDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("attach_usb reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: attach_usb reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
+     /* If the command failed qemu prints:
+      * Could not add ... */
+     if (strstr(reply, "Could not add ")) {
+@@ -3980,7 +3964,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("pci_del reply: %s", reply);
++    DEBUG ("%s: pci_del reply: %s",vm->def->name,  reply);
+     /* If the command fails due to a wrong slot qemu prints: invalid slot,
+      * nothing is printed on success */
+     if (strstr(reply, "invalid slot")) {
+@@ -4210,7 +4194,7 @@ qemudDomainBlockStats (virDomainPtr dom,
+                           "%s", _("'info blockstats' command failed"));
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+-    DEBUG ("info blockstats reply: %s", info);
++    DEBUG ("%s: info blockstats reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+ 
+     /* If the command isn't supported then qemu prints the supported
+      * info commands, so the output starts "info ".  Since this is
+@@ -4251,21 +4235,25 @@ qemudDomainBlockStats (virDomainPtr dom,
+                 if (STRPREFIX (p, "rd_bytes=")) {
+                     p += 9;
+                     if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->rd_bytes) == -1)
+-                        DEBUG ("error reading rd_bytes: %s", p);
++                        DEBUG ("%s: error reading rd_bytes: %s",
++                               vm->def->name, p);
+                 } else if (STRPREFIX (p, "wr_bytes=")) {
+                     p += 9;
+                     if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->wr_bytes) == -1)
+-                        DEBUG ("error reading wr_bytes: %s", p);
++                        DEBUG ("%s: error reading wr_bytes: %s",
++                               vm->def->name, p);
+                 } else if (STRPREFIX (p, "rd_operations=")) {
+                     p += 14;
+                     if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->rd_req) == -1)
+-                        DEBUG ("error reading rd_req: %s", p);
++                        DEBUG ("%s: error reading rd_req: %s",
++                               vm->def->name, p);
+                 } else if (STRPREFIX (p, "wr_operations=")) {
+                     p += 14;
+                     if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->wr_req) == -1)
+-                        DEBUG ("error reading wr_req: %s", p);
++                        DEBUG ("%s: error reading wr_req: %s",
++                               vm->def->name, p);
+                 } else
+-                    DEBUG ("unknown block stat near %s", p);
++                    DEBUG ("%s: unknown block stat near %s", vm->def->name, p);
+ 
+                 /* Skip to next label. */
+                 p = strchr (p, ' ');
+@@ -4477,7 +4465,7 @@ qemudDomainMemoryPeek (virDomainPtr dom,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("memsave reply: %s", info);
++    DEBUG ("%s: memsave reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+ 
+     /* Read the memory file into buffer. */
+     if (saferead (fd, buffer, size) == (ssize_t) -1) {
+@@ -4794,7 +4782,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
+                              "%s", _("off-line migration specified, but suspend operation failed"));
+             goto cleanup;
+         }
+-        DEBUG ("stop reply: %s", info);
++        DEBUG ("%s: stop reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+         VIR_FREE(info);
+         paused = 1;
+ 
+@@ -4811,7 +4799,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
+         snprintf (cmd, sizeof cmd, "migrate_set_speed %lum", resource);
+         qemudMonitorCommand (vm, cmd, &info);
+ 
+-        DEBUG ("migrate_set_speed reply: %s", info);
++        DEBUG ("%s: migrate_set_speed reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+         VIR_FREE (info);
+     }
+ 
+@@ -4830,7 +4818,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    DEBUG ("migrate reply: %s", info);
++    DEBUG ("%s: migrate reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+ 
+     /* Now check for "fail" in the output string */
+     if (strstr(info, "fail") != NULL) {
+@@ -4869,7 +4857,7 @@ cleanup:
+                       vm->def->name);
+         }
+         else {
+-            DEBUG ("cont reply: %s", info);
++            DEBUG ("%s: cont reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
+             VIR_FREE(info);
+         }
+ 
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-enable-qemu-0-10-migration.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
+To: libvir-list@redhat.com
+Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2009 15:09:05 +0100
+Subject: [libvirt] PATCH: Enable migration with QEMU >= 0.10.0
+
+The KVM migration code was added to QEMU for the 0.10.0 release, so we 
+should enable this in libvirt now.
+
+Daniel
+
+diff -r be7993675e07 src/qemu_conf.c
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c	Thu Apr 30 14:49:27 2009 +0100
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c	Thu Apr 30 15:08:45 2009 +0100
+@@ -472,16 +472,13 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *
+ 
+     /*
+      * Handling of -incoming arg with varying features
+-     *  -incoming tcp    (kvm >= 79)
+-     *  -incoming exec   (kvm >= 80)
++     *  -incoming tcp    (kvm >= 79, qemu >= 0.10.0)
++     *  -incoming exec   (kvm >= 80, qemu >= 0.10.0)
+      *  -incoming stdio  (all earlier kvm)
+      *
+      * NB, there was a pre-kvm-79 'tcp' support, but it
+      * was broken, because it blocked the monitor console
+      * while waiting for data, so pretend it doesn't exist
+-     *
+-     * XXX when next QEMU release after 0.9.1 arrives,
+-     * we'll need to add MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP/EXEC here too
+      */
+     if (kvm_version >= 79) {
+         flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP;
+@@ -489,6 +486,9 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *
+             flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_EXEC;
+     } else if (kvm_version > 0) {
+         flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_KVM_STDIO;
++    } else if (version >= 10000) {
++        flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP;
++        flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_EXEC;
+     }
+ 
+     if (retversion)
+
+
+-- 

libvirt-0.6.2-event-handling-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From e7be6cc841a5652b73ddd2ccd3769c7f8bbad13d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 16:41:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix interrupting of main event thread & protect against accidental uniniitalized variables
+
+---
+ qemud/event.c |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/qemud/event.c b/qemud/event.c
+index 65f548e..754f2b1 100644
+--- a/qemud/event.c
++++ b/qemud/event.c
+@@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ struct virEventLoop {
+ static struct virEventLoop eventLoop;
+ 
+ /* Unique ID for the next FD watch to be registered */
+-static int nextWatch = 0;
++static int nextWatch = 1;
+ 
+ /* Unique ID for the next timer to be registered */
+-static int nextTimer = 0;
++static int nextTimer = 1;
+ 
+ static void virEventLock(void)
+ {
+@@ -143,15 +143,22 @@ int virEventAddHandleImpl(int fd, int events,
+ 
+ void virEventUpdateHandleImpl(int watch, int events) {
+     int i;
++    EVENT_DEBUG("Update handle w=%d e=%d", watch, events);
++
++    if (watch <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid update watch %d", watch);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].watch == watch) {
+             eventLoop.handles[i].events =
+                     virEventHandleTypeToPollEvent(events);
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -164,6 +171,12 @@ void virEventUpdateHandleImpl(int watch, int events) {
+ int virEventRemoveHandleImpl(int watch) {
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Remove handle %d", watch);
++
++    if (watch <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid remove watch %d", watch);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+@@ -172,11 +185,11 @@ int virEventRemoveHandleImpl(int watch) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].watch == watch) {
+             EVENT_DEBUG("mark delete %d %d", i, eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
+             eventLoop.handles[i].deleted = 1;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             virEventUnlock();
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+     return -1;
+ }
+@@ -232,6 +245,12 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+     struct timeval tv;
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Updating timer %d timeout with %d ms freq", timer, frequency);
++
++    if (timer <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid update timer %d", timer);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) < 0) {
+         return;
+     }
+@@ -244,10 +263,10 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+                 frequency >= 0 ? frequency +
+                 (((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec)*1000) +
+                 (((unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec)/1000) : 0;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -260,6 +279,12 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
+ int virEventRemoveTimeoutImpl(int timer) {
+     int i;
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Remove timer %d", timer);
++
++    if (timer <= 0) {
++        VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid remove timer %d", timer);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
+     virEventLock();
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.timeoutsCount ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted)
+@@ -267,11 +292,11 @@ int virEventRemoveTimeoutImpl(int timer) {
+ 
+         if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].timer == timer) {
+             eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted = 1;
++            virEventInterruptLocked();
+             virEventUnlock();
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+-    virEventInterruptLocked();
+     virEventUnlock();
+     return -1;
+ }
+@@ -617,9 +642,12 @@ static int virEventInterruptLocked(void)
+     char c = '\0';
+ 
+     if (!eventLoop.running ||
+-        pthread_self() == eventLoop.leader)
++        pthread_self() == eventLoop.leader) {
++        VIR_DEBUG("Skip interrupt, %d %d", eventLoop.running, (int)eventLoop.leader);
+         return 0;
++    }
+ 
++    VIR_DEBUG0("Interrupting");
+     if (safewrite(eventLoop.wakeupfd[1], &c, sizeof(c)) != sizeof(c))
+         return -1;
+     return 0;
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-event-handling-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+From 6483ee77ed12f037d68a6adc690624fa1b508dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 16:43:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix watch/timer event deletion
+
+---
+ qemud/event.c |  112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 1 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/qemud/event.c b/qemud/event.c
+index 754f2b1..a57d967 100644
+--- a/qemud/event.c
++++ b/qemud/event.c
+@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static int virEventCalculateTimeout(int *timeout) {
+     EVENT_DEBUG("Calculate expiry of %d timers", eventLoop.timeoutsCount);
+     /* Figure out if we need a timeout */
+     for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.timeoutsCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted || eventLoop.timeouts[i].frequency < 0)
++        if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].frequency < 0)
+             continue;
+ 
+         EVENT_DEBUG("Got a timeout scheduled for %llu", eventLoop.timeouts[i].expiresAt);
+@@ -350,32 +350,26 @@ static int virEventCalculateTimeout(int *timeout) {
+  * file handles. The caller must free the returned data struct
+  * returns: the pollfd array, or NULL on error
+  */
+-static int virEventMakePollFDs(struct pollfd **retfds) {
++static struct pollfd *virEventMakePollFDs(void) {
+     struct pollfd *fds;
+-    int i, nfds = 0;
++    int i;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+-            continue;
+-        nfds++;
+-    }
+-    *retfds = NULL;
+     /* Setup the poll file handle data structs */
+-    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(fds, nfds) < 0)
+-        return -1;
++    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(fds, eventLoop.handlesCount) < 0)
++        return NULL;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0, nfds = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+-        if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
+-            continue;
+-        fds[nfds].fd = eventLoop.handles[i].fd;
+-        fds[nfds].events = eventLoop.handles[i].events;
+-        fds[nfds].revents = 0;
++    for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
++        EVENT_DEBUG("Prepare n=%d w=%d, f=%d e=%d", i,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].fd,
++                    eventLoop.handles[i].events);
++        fds[i].fd = eventLoop.handles[i].fd;
++        fds[i].events = eventLoop.handles[i].events;
++        fds[i].revents = 0;
+         //EVENT_DEBUG("Wait for %d %d", eventLoop.handles[i].fd, eventLoop.handles[i].events);
+-        nfds++;
+     }
+ 
+-    *retfds = fds;
+-    return nfds;
++    return fds;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -435,26 +429,30 @@ static int virEventDispatchTimeouts(void) {
+  * Returns 0 upon success, -1 if an error occurred
+  */
+ static int virEventDispatchHandles(int nfds, struct pollfd *fds) {
+-    int i, n;
++    int i;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0, n = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount && n < nfds ; i++) {
++    /* NB, use nfds not eventLoop.handlesCount, because new
++     * fds might be added on end of list, and they're not
++     * in the fds array we've got */
++    for (i = 0 ; i < nfds ; i++) {
+         if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted) {
+-            EVENT_DEBUG("Skip deleted %d", eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
++            EVENT_DEBUG("Skip deleted n=%d w=%d f=%d", i,
++                        eventLoop.handles[i].watch, eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
+             continue;
+         }
+ 
+-        if (fds[n].revents) {
++        if (fds[i].revents) {
+             virEventHandleCallback cb = eventLoop.handles[i].cb;
+             void *opaque = eventLoop.handles[i].opaque;
+-            int hEvents = virPollEventToEventHandleType(fds[n].revents);
+-            EVENT_DEBUG("Dispatch %d %d %p", fds[n].fd,
+-                        fds[n].revents, eventLoop.handles[i].opaque);
++            int hEvents = virPollEventToEventHandleType(fds[i].revents);
++            EVENT_DEBUG("Dispatch n=%d f=%d w=%d e=%d %p", i,
++                        fds[i].fd, eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
++                        fds[i].revents, eventLoop.handles[i].opaque);
+             virEventUnlock();
+             (cb)(eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
+-                 fds[n].fd, hEvents, opaque);
++                 fds[i].fd, hEvents, opaque);
+             virEventLock();
+         }
+-        n++;
+     }
+ 
+     return 0;
+@@ -545,22 +543,21 @@ static int virEventCleanupHandles(void) {
+  * at least one file handle has an event, or a timer expires
+  */
+ int virEventRunOnce(void) {
+-    struct pollfd *fds;
++    struct pollfd *fds = NULL;
+     int ret, timeout, nfds;
+ 
+     virEventLock();
+     eventLoop.running = 1;
+     eventLoop.leader = pthread_self();
+-    if ((nfds = virEventMakePollFDs(&fds)) < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
+ 
+-    if (virEventCalculateTimeout(&timeout) < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0 ||
++        virEventCleanupHandles() < 0)
++        goto error;
++
++    if (!(fds = virEventMakePollFDs()) ||
++        virEventCalculateTimeout(&timeout) < 0)
++        goto error;
++    nfds = eventLoop.handlesCount;
+ 
+     virEventUnlock();
+ 
+@@ -572,38 +569,31 @@ int virEventRunOnce(void) {
+         if (errno == EINTR) {
+             goto retry;
+         }
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        return -1;
++        goto error_unlocked;
+     }
+ 
+     virEventLock();
+-    if (virEventDispatchTimeouts() < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventDispatchTimeouts() < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+     if (ret > 0 &&
+-        virEventDispatchHandles(nfds, fds) < 0) {
+-        VIR_FREE(fds);
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
+-    VIR_FREE(fds);
+-
+-    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++        virEventDispatchHandles(nfds, fds) < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+-    if (virEventCleanupHandles() < 0) {
+-        virEventUnlock();
+-        return -1;
+-    }
++    if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0 ||
++        virEventCleanupHandles() < 0)
++        goto error;
+ 
+     eventLoop.running = 0;
+     virEventUnlock();
++    VIR_FREE(fds);
+     return 0;
++
++error:
++    virEventUnlock();
++error_unlocked:
++    VIR_FREE(fds);
++    return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ static void virEventHandleWakeup(int watch ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-fix-nosource-label.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -rup libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c new/src/security_selinux.c
+--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-10 22:04:25.000000000 -0400
++++ new/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-10 22:06:09.000000000 -0400
+@@ -338,6 +338,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectP
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ 
++    if (!disk->src)
++        return 0;
++
+     if (disk->shared) {
+         return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
+     } else if (disk->readonly) {

libvirt-0.6.2-fix-qemu-argv-detection-with-kvm-85.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 2b3fcdc378e7bec5c1a78b81632756e92930fd24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 May 2009 15:14:24 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Fix QEMU ARGV detection with kvm >= 85
+
+---
+ src/qemu_conf.c   |   18 ++++++++++++++----
+ src/qemu_driver.c |   12 ++----------
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
+index 9cb71eb..a57d3ab 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -431,18 +431,28 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *qemu,
+         return -1;
+ 
+     char *help = NULL;
+-    enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 8192 };
++    enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 1024*64 };
+     int len = virFileReadLimFD(newstdout, MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE, &help);
+-    if (len < 0)
++    if (len < 0) {
++        virReportSystemError(NULL, errno, "%s",
++                             _("Unable to read QEMU help output"));
+         goto cleanup2;
++    }
+ 
+     if (sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u (kvm-%u)",
+                &major, &minor, &micro, &kvm_version) != 4)
+         kvm_version = 0;
+ 
+-    if (!kvm_version && sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u",
+-               &major, &minor, &micro) != 3)
++    if (!kvm_version &&
++        sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u",
++               &major, &minor, &micro) != 3) {
++        char *eol = strchr(help, '\n');
++        if (eol) *eol = '\0';
++        qemudReportError(NULL, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
++                         _("cannot parse QEMU version number in '%s'"),
++                         help);
+         goto cleanup2;
++    }
+ 
+     version = (major * 1000 * 1000) + (minor * 1000) + micro;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 30642d5..bd60b29 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1391,12 +1391,8 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator,
+                                 NULL,
+-                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
+-        qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+-                         _("Cannot determine QEMU argv syntax %s"),
+-                         emulator);
++                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+-    }
+ 
+     if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(conn, vm->def) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+@@ -3715,12 +3711,8 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(vm->def->emulator,
+                                 NULL,
+-                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
+-        qemudReportError(conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+-                         _("Cannot determine QEMU argv syntax %s"),
+-                         vm->def->emulator);
++                                &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
+         return -1;
+-    }
+ 
+     if (qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DRIVE) {
+         if (!(devname = qemudDiskDeviceName(conn, newdisk)))
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-libvirtd-double-free.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From c3b3f6005d45552d01823504925eb587889cf25a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 May 2009 14:34:35 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Avoid double-free in daemon client cleanup code
+
+---
+ qemud/qemud.c |   22 +++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/qemud/qemud.c b/qemud/qemud.c
+index 1375560..783dc69 100644
+--- a/qemud/qemud.c
++++ b/qemud/qemud.c
+@@ -1397,7 +1397,10 @@ static int qemudDispatchServer(struct qemud_server *server, struct qemud_socket
+  * jobs have finished, then clean it up elsehwere
+  */
+ void qemudDispatchClientFailure(struct qemud_client *client) {
+-    virEventRemoveHandleImpl(client->watch);
++    if (client->watch != -1) {
++        virEventRemoveHandleImpl(client->watch);
++        client->watch = -1;
++    }
+ 
+     /* Deregister event delivery callback */
+     if(client->conn) {
+@@ -1406,12 +1406,21 @@ void qemudDispatchClientFailure(struct qemud_client *client) {
+     }
+ 
+ #if HAVE_SASL
+-    if (client->saslconn) sasl_dispose(&client->saslconn);
++    if (client->saslconn) {
++        sasl_dispose(&client->saslconn);
++        client->saslconn = NULL;
++    }
+     free(client->saslUsername);
++    client->saslUsername = NULL;
+ #endif
+-    if (client->tlssession) gnutls_deinit (client->tlssession);
+-    close(client->fd);
+-    client->fd = -1;
++    if (client->tlssession) {
++        gnutls_deinit (client->tlssession);
++        client->tlssession = NULL;
++    }
++    if (client->fd != -1) {
++        close(client->fd);
++        client->fd = -1;
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-qemu-drive-format.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 0ae4c67ff5f1d24698c5cfc8a9719d333c892644 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 11:23:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] qemu -drive takes format= not fmt=
+
+Seems like a simple typo - it has been "format=" since the flag
+was introduced, but we added it as "fmt=".
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/qemu_conf.c                                    |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
+index f36c927..6f9e610 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr conn,
+                 disk->device == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_DISK)
+                 virBufferAddLit(&opt, ",boot=on");
+             if (disk->driverType)
+-                virBufferVSprintf(&opt, ",fmt=%s", disk->driverType);
++                virBufferVSprintf(&opt, ",format=%s", disk->driverType);
+ 
+             if (disk->cachemode) {
+                 const char *mode =

libvirt-0.6.2-qemu-ppc-machine-type.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From daf3db93457427c25325781af684758c0341a6aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 May 2009 13:32:06 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] PPC Qemu Machine Type update
+ * src/qemu_conf.c docs/schemas/domain.rng
+   tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml: PPC Qemu Machine Type
+   changed from g3bw to g3beige some time ago, patch by Thomas Baker
+ Daniel
+
+---
+ docs/schemas/domain.rng                      |    2 +-
+ src/qemu_conf.c                              |    2 +-
+ tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml |    2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/docs/schemas/domain.rng b/docs/schemas/domain.rng
+index 204c633..11cf04a 100644
+--- a/docs/schemas/domain.rng
++++ b/docs/schemas/domain.rng
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
+       </attribute>
+       <attribute name="machine">
+         <choice>
+-          <value>g3bw</value>
++          <value>g3beige</value>
+           <value>mac99</value>
+           <value>prep</value>
+         </choice>
+diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
+index 18156cd..d54f2ca 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static const char *const arch_info_hvm_sparc_machines[] = {
+     "sun4m"
+ };
+ static const char *const arch_info_hvm_ppc_machines[] = {
+-    "g3bw", "mac99", "prep"
++    "g3beige", "mac99", "prep"
+ };
+ 
+ static const char *const arch_info_xen_x86_machines[] = {
+diff --git a/tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml b/tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml
+index fd8523e..893f9ed 100644
+--- a/tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml
++++ b/tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
+     <arch name='ppc'>
+       <wordsize>32</wordsize>
+       <emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-ppc</emulator>
+-      <machine>g3bw</machine>
++      <machine>g3beige</machine>
+       <machine>mac99</machine>
+       <machine>prep</machine>
+       <domain type='qemu'>
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.2-shared-readonly-label.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+diff -rup libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c libvirt-0.6.2.new/src/security_selinux.c
+--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c	2009-04-03 15:36:56.000000000 +0100
++++ libvirt-0.6.2.new/src/security_selinux.c	2009-05-05 13:39:42.000000000 +0100
+@@ -24,11 +24,12 @@
+ #include "virterror_internal.h"
+ #include "util.h"
+ #include "memory.h"
+-
++#include "logging.h"
+ 
+ #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
+ 
+ static char default_domain_context[1024];
++static char default_content_context[1024];
+ static char default_image_context[1024];
+ #define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI       "0"
+ #define SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME "selinux"
+@@ -148,8 +149,13 @@ SELinuxInitialize(virConnectPtr conn)
+     close(fd);
+ 
+     ptr = strchrnul(default_image_context, '\n');
+-    *ptr = '\0';
+-
++    if (*ptr == '\n') {
++        *ptr = '\0';
++        strcpy(default_content_context, ptr+1);
++        ptr = strchrnul(default_content_context, '\n');
++        if (*ptr == '\n')
++            *ptr = '\0';
++    }
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -275,6 +281,8 @@ SELinuxSetFilecon(virConnectPtr conn, co
+ {
+     char ebuf[1024];
+ 
++    VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon);
++
+     if(setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
+         virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+                                _("%s: unable to set security context "
+@@ -299,6 +307,8 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virConn
+     char *newpath = NULL;
+     const char *path = disk->src;
+ 
++    /* Don't restore labels on readoly/shared disks, because
++     * other VMs may still be accessing these */
+     if (disk->readonly || disk->shared)
+         return 0;
+ 
+@@ -328,8 +338,13 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectP
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ 
+-    if (secdef->imagelabel)
++    if (disk->shared) {
++        return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
++    } else if (disk->readonly) {
++        return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_content_context);
++    } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+         return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
++    }
+ 
+     return 0;
+ }
+@@ -403,9 +418,6 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr co
+ 
+     if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+         for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
+-            if (vm->def->disks[i]->readonly ||
+-                vm->def->disks[i]->shared) continue;
+-
+             if (SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(conn, vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+                 return -1;
+         }

libvirt-0.6.2-svirt-sound.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+--- src/qemu_conf.c.orig	2009-04-02 11:50:10.000000000 +0200
++++ src/qemu_conf.c	2009-04-03 17:46:59.000000000 +0200
+@@ -779,6 +779,20 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr 
+     char domid[50];
+     char *pidfile;
+     const char *cpu = NULL;
++    int skipSound = 0;
++
++    if (driver->securityDriver &&
++        driver->securityDriver->name &&
++        STREQ(driver->securityDriver->name, "selinux") &&
++        getuid() == 0) {
++        static int soundWarned = 0; 
++        skipSound = 1;
++        if (vm->def->nsounds &&
++            !soundWarned) {
++            soundWarned = 1;
++            VIR_WARN0("Sound cards for VMs are disabled while SELinux security model is active");
++        }
++    }
+ 
+     uname_normalize(&ut);
+ 
+@@ -1425,7 +1439,8 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr 
+     }
+ 
+     /* Add sound hardware */
+-    if (vm->def->nsounds) {
++    if (vm->def->nsounds &&
++        !skipSound) {
+         int size = 100;
+         char *modstr;
+         if (VIR_ALLOC_N(modstr, size+1) < 0)

libvirt-0.6.2-xml-attribute-escaping.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 7f7a4403860f56d5a1ad65bfd16f5bf97a971d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 May 2009 16:19:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] * src/buf.c: avoid an XML attribute escaping bug #499791
+ daniel
+
+---
+ src/buf.c |   16 +++++++++++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/buf.c b/src/buf.c
+index cdcdac9..259175d 100644
+--- a/src/buf.c
++++ b/src/buf.c
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ virBufferEscapeString(const virBufferPtr buf, const char *format, const char *st
+         return;
+ 
+     len = strlen(str);
+-    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(escaped, 5 * len + 1) < 0) {
++    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(escaped, 6 * len + 1) < 0) {
+         virBufferNoMemory(buf);
+         return;
+     }
+@@ -290,6 +290,20 @@ virBufferEscapeString(const virBufferPtr buf, const char *format, const char *st
+             *out++ = 'm';
+             *out++ = 'p';
+             *out++ = ';';
++        } else if (*cur == '"') {
++            *out++ = '&';
++            *out++ = 'q';
++            *out++ = 'u';
++            *out++ = 'o';
++            *out++ = 't';
++            *out++ = ';';
++        } else if (*cur == '\'') {
++            *out++ = '&';
++            *out++ = 'a';
++            *out++ = 'p';
++            *out++ = 'o';
++            *out++ = 's';
++            *out++ = ';';
+         } else if ((*cur >= 0x20) || (*cur == '\n') || (*cur == '\t') ||
+                    (*cur == '\r')) {
+             /*
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.3-hostdev-managed.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 3d7771e0570e09096ad9391a857dad48b150bc0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 16:33:28 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix qemu driver's interpretation of <hostdev managed='yes'/>
+
+This change:
+
+  Tue Mar  3 08:55:13 GMT 2009 Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+
+       Don't try to detach & reset PCI devices while running test
+       suite for XML-> ARGV conversion.
+       * src/qemu_driver.c: Add qemuPrepareHostDevices() helper to
+       detach and reset PCI devices.
+       * src/qemu_conf.c: Don't detach & reset PCI devices while
+       building the command line argv
+
+accidentally did this:
+
+-            if (hostdev->managed) {
++        if (!hostdev->managed) {
+
+Which results in managed='yes' not causing the device to be
+detached when the guest is starting.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/qemu_driver.c |    2 +-
+ 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 5898026..59312c0 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static int qemuPrepareHostDevices(virConnectPtr conn,
+         if (hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI)
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if (!hostdev->managed) {
++        if (hostdev->managed) {
+             pciDevice *dev = pciGetDevice(conn,
+                                           hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci.domain,
+                                           hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci.bus,
+-- 
+1.6.0.6
+

libvirt-0.6.3-refresh-qemu-caps.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+commit 0e51348cb9aeafe5e2fd6469a4bde0baa1eb8720
+Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon May 4 15:06:03 2009 -0400
+
+    Refresh QEMU driver capabilities for each getCapabilities call.
+    
+    Also fix up a couple issues where caps are accessed without locking
+    the driver structure.
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 23ea961..790dac6 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1885,10 +1885,12 @@ static int qemudGetNodeInfo(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+ static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
+     struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
+-    char *xml;
++    char *xml = NULL;
+ 
+     qemuDriverLock(driver);
+-    if ((xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
++    virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
++    if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL ||
++        (xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
+         virReportOOMError(conn);
+     qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
+ 
+@@ -3169,20 +3171,26 @@ cleanup:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
++static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn,
++                                     virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+ {
+     struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData;
+     char *p;
++    int ret = 0;
+ 
+-    if (!driver->securityDriver)
+-        return -2;
++    qemuDriverLock(driver);
++    if (!driver->securityDriver) {
++        ret = -2;
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
+ 
+     p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model;
+     if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) {
+         qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          _("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                          VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1);
+-        return -1;
++        ret = -1;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+     strcpy(secmodel->model, p);
+ 
+@@ -3191,10 +3199,14 @@ static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr sec
+         qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          _("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                          VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1);
+-        return -1;
++        ret = -1;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+     strcpy(secmodel->doi, p);
+-    return 0;
++
++cleanup:
++    qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
++    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /* TODO: check seclabel restore */

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SHA512 (libvirt-7.0.0.tar.xz) = dd6db5ec4971cf4c6059795fd81d5a3a889b10740e34c3c92271eda1c683c99df2c8f923398065d8a7c4f987a20eb1da617d5297ba8ea5a31f154412af50c343
+3035b484861516a1cd425acef1e760e3  libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz