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13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mark McLoughlin 60e1b2cda5 * Fri Jul 3 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-13.fc11
- Fix libvirtd crash with bad capabilities data (bug #505635)
- Don't unnecessarily try to change a file context (bug #507555)
2009-07-03 10:05:41 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin c8361aee7d * Fri Jun 5 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-12.fc11
- Use the correct QEMU machine type for ppc (bug #502862)
- Fix crash with TLS connections (bug #503066)
- Fix broken networking with newer qemu releases (bug #503275)
- Remove the qemu BuildRequires
2009-06-05 11:47:31 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin bda88aaa38 * Mon May 25 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-11.fc11
- Bring up the bridge, even if it doesn't have an IP address (bug #501912)
2009-05-25 15:23:17 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin ca4d795c85 * Fri May 22 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-10.fc11
- Don't log monitor output to domain log file (bug #499584)
2009-05-22 09:24:30 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin e2e196d813 * Thu May 21 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-9.fc11
- Fix qemu argv detection with latest qemu (bug #501923)
- Fix XML attribute escaping (bug #499791)
- Fix serious event handling issues causing guests to be destroyed (bug #499698)
2009-05-21 12:07:19 +00:00
Cole Robinson a5a2a38a5e Don't try to label a disk with no path (e.g. empty cdrom) (bug #499569) 2009-05-11 02:28:23 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 30f098460c * Thu May 7 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-7.fc11
- Enable migration for qemu 0.10 (bug #499704)
2009-05-07 19:08:42 +00:00
Cole Robinson 7017c99a1e Refresh qemu caps when getCapabilities is called (bug #460649) 2009-05-06 16:32:34 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 1c41ce6f30 * Wed May 6 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-5.fc11
- Fix handling of <hostdev managed='yes'> (bug #499386)
2009-05-06 15:51:47 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange c6db79d97f Fix labelling of shared/readonly disks (rhbz #493692) 2009-05-05 13:01:15 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 7b7f8cc27f - Fix missing directories in spec (#496945 and gtk-doc)
Daniel
2009-04-28 10:57:59 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin a9cc41b082 * Thu Apr 16 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.2-2.fc11
- Fix qemu drive format specification (#496092)
2009-04-16 15:26:45 +00:00
Jesse Keating ce1593f88f Initialize branch F-11 for libvirt 2009-04-15 07:13:06 +00:00
45 changed files with 2234 additions and 4262 deletions
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
.build*.log
*.rpm
i686
x86_64
libvirt-*.tar.gz
libvirt-0.6.0.tar.gz
libvirt-0.6.1.tar.gz
libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
.build*.log
*.rpm
i686
x86_64
libvirt-*.tar.xz
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
From: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:41:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Allow creating ppc64 guests with graphics and no USB
mouse
The existing behavior for ppc64 guests is to always add a USB
keyboard and mouse combo if graphics are present; unfortunately,
this means any attempt to use a USB tablet will cause both pointing
devices to show up in the guest, which in turn will result in poor
user experience.
We can't just stop adding the USB mouse or start adding a USB tablet
instead, because existing applications and users might rely on the
current behavior; however, we can avoid adding the USB mouse if a USB
tablet is already present, thus allowing users and applications to
create guests that contain a single pointing device.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1683681
Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 186bb479d0f409dc75175bea48a760838c479a6c)
---
src/qemu/qemu_domain.c | 20 ++++++++
.../ppc64-pseries-graphics.ppc64-latest.args | 47 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/ppc64-pseries-graphics.ppc64-latest.args
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c b/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c
index f161cf6c84..764ffacb2e 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c
@@ -3384,6 +3384,26 @@ qemuDomainDefAddDefaultDevices(virDomainDefPtr def,
def->memballoon = memballoon;
}
+ if (addDefaultUSBMouse) {
+ bool hasUSBTablet = false;
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < def->ninputs; j++) {
+ if (def->inputs[j]->type == VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_TABLET &&
+ def->inputs[j]->bus == VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_BUS_USB) {
+ hasUSBTablet = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Historically, we have automatically added USB keyboard and
+ * mouse to some guests. While the former device is generally
+ * safe to have, adding the latter is undesiderable if a USB
+ * tablet is already present in the guest */
+ if (hasUSBTablet)
+ addDefaultUSBMouse = false;
+ }
+
if (addDefaultUSBKBD &&
def->ngraphics > 0 &&
virDomainDefMaybeAddInput(def,
diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/ppc64-pseries-graphics.ppc64-latest.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/ppc64-pseries-graphics.ppc64-latest.args
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b81648f078
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/ppc64-pseries-graphics.ppc64-latest.args
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+LC_ALL=C \
+PATH=/bin \
+HOME=/home/test \
+USER=test \
+LOGNAME=test \
+QEMU_AUDIO_DRV=none \
+/usr/bin/qemu-system-ppc64 \
+-name guest=guest,debug-threads=on \
+-S \
+-object secret,id=masterKey0,format=raw,\
+file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-guest/master-key.aes \
+-machine pseries,accel=tcg,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off \
+-m 4096 \
+-realtime mlock=off \
+-smp 4,sockets=4,cores=1,threads=1 \
+-uuid b35969f7-e7cf-4d90-a9a0-4dd9000f9824 \
+-no-user-config \
+-nodefaults \
+-chardev socket,id=charmonitor,fd=1729,server,nowait \
+-mon chardev=charmonitor,id=monitor,mode=control \
+-rtc base=utc \
+-no-shutdown \
+-boot strict=on \
+-device qemu-xhci,p2=15,p3=15,id=usb,bus=pci.0,addr=0x2 \
+-device virtio-serial-pci,id=virtio-serial0,bus=pci.0,addr=0x3 \
+-drive file=/var/lib/libvirt/images/guest.qcow2,format=qcow2,if=none,\
+id=drive-virtio-disk0 \
+-device virtio-blk-pci,scsi=off,bus=pci.0,addr=0x4,drive=drive-virtio-disk0,\
+id=virtio-disk0,bootindex=1 \
+-netdev user,id=hostnet0 \
+-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=hostnet0,id=net0,mac=52:54:00:a2:44:92,bus=pci.0,\
+addr=0x1 \
+-chardev pty,id=charserial0 \
+-device spapr-vty,chardev=charserial0,id=serial0,reg=0x30000000 \
+-chardev socket,id=charchannel0,fd=1729,server,nowait \
+-device virtserialport,bus=virtio-serial0.0,nr=1,chardev=charchannel0,\
+id=channel0,name=org.qemu.guest_agent.0 \
+-device usb-tablet,id=input0,bus=usb.0,port=1 \
+-device usb-kbd,id=input1,bus=usb.0,port=2 \
+-vnc 127.0.0.1:0 \
+-device VGA,id=video0,vgamem_mb=16,bus=pci.0,addr=0x7 \
+-device virtio-balloon-pci,id=balloon0,bus=pci.0,addr=0x5 \
+-object rng-random,id=objrng0,filename=/dev/urandom \
+-device virtio-rng-pci,rng=objrng0,id=rng0,bus=pci.0,addr=0x6 \
+-sandbox on,obsolete=deny,elevateprivileges=deny,spawn=deny,\
+resourcecontrol=deny \
+-msg timestamp=on
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 16:01:27 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Remove duplicated qemuAgentCheckError
Commit 5b3492fadb moved qemuAgentCheckError calls into
qemuAgentCommand for various reasons; however, subsequent
commit 0977b8aa0 adding a new command made call again
So let's just remove the duplicitous call from
qemuAgentGetInterfaces.
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
ACKed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9ed175fbc2deecfdaeabca7bc77c7e7ae33a3377)
---
src/qemu/qemu_agent.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c b/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
index bf08871f18..d235c058a5 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
@@ -1987,10 +1987,9 @@ qemuAgentGetInterfaces(qemuAgentPtr mon,
if (!(cmd = qemuAgentMakeCommand("guest-network-get-interfaces", NULL)))
goto cleanup;
- if (qemuAgentCommand(mon, cmd, &reply, false, VIR_DOMAIN_QEMU_AGENT_COMMAND_BLOCK) < 0 ||
- qemuAgentCheckError(cmd, reply) < 0) {
+ if (qemuAgentCommand(mon, cmd, &reply, false,
+ VIR_DOMAIN_QEMU_AGENT_COMMAND_BLOCK) < 0)
goto cleanup;
- }
if (!(ret_array = virJSONValueObjectGet(reply, "return"))) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 10:17:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] qemu: require reply from guest agent in
qemuAgentGetInterfaces
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Since its introduction in commit 0977b8aa071 (released in v1.2.14)
qemuAgentGetInterfaces calls qemuAgentCommand with needReply=false,
which allows qemuAgentCommand to return 0 even when it did not get
any reply from the agent.
Set needReply to true, since we dereference it right after.
This can be hit if libvirt is waiting for an event from the agent
(e.g. shutdown) and the agent cannot reply in time (e.g. due to
the guest being shut down), as reported in:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1663051
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7cfd1fbb1332ae5df678b9f41a62156cb2e88c73)
---
src/qemu/qemu_agent.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c b/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
index d235c058a5..af0c054f99 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
@@ -1987,7 +1987,7 @@ qemuAgentGetInterfaces(qemuAgentPtr mon,
if (!(cmd = qemuAgentMakeCommand("guest-network-get-interfaces", NULL)))
goto cleanup;
- if (qemuAgentCommand(mon, cmd, &reply, false,
+ if (qemuAgentCommand(mon, cmd, &reply, true,
VIR_DOMAIN_QEMU_AGENT_COMMAND_BLOCK) < 0)
goto cleanup;
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 11:33:32 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cpu_x86: Do not cache microcode version
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The microcode version checks are used to invalidate cached CPU data we
get from QEMU. To minimize /proc/cpuinfo parsing the microcode version
was only read when libvirtd started and cached for the daemon's
lifetime. However, the CPU microcode can change anytime (updating the
microcode package can automatically upload it to the CPU) and we need to
stop caching it to avoid using stale CPU model data.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit be46f613261d3b655a1f15afd635087e68a9c39b)
---
src/cpu/cpu_x86.c | 5 +----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/cpu/cpu_x86.c b/src/cpu/cpu_x86.c
index cb27550025..ce48ca6867 100644
--- a/src/cpu/cpu_x86.c
+++ b/src/cpu/cpu_x86.c
@@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ struct _virCPUx86Map {
};
static virCPUx86MapPtr cpuMap;
-static unsigned int microcodeVersion;
int virCPUx86DriverOnceInit(void);
VIR_ONCE_GLOBAL_INIT(virCPUx86Driver);
@@ -1331,8 +1330,6 @@ virCPUx86DriverOnceInit(void)
if (!(cpuMap = virCPUx86LoadMap()))
return -1;
- microcodeVersion = virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion();
-
return 0;
}
@@ -2372,7 +2369,7 @@ virCPUx86GetHost(virCPUDefPtr cpu,
goto cleanup;
ret = x86DecodeCPUData(cpu, cpuData, models);
- cpu->microcodeVersion = microcodeVersion;
+ cpu->microcodeVersion = virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion();
cleanup:
virCPUx86DataFree(cpuData);
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 21:21:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Don't cache microcode version
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
My earlier commit be46f61326 was incomplete. It removed caching of
microcode version in the CPU driver, which means the capabilities XML
will see the correct microcode version. But it is also cached in the
QEMU capabilities cache where it is used to detect whether we need to
reprobe QEMU. By missing the second place, the original commit
be46f61326 made the situation even worse since libvirt would report
correct microcode version while still using the old host CPU model
(visible in domain capabilities XML).
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 673c62a3b7855a0685d8f116e227c402720b9ee9)
Conflicts:
src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
- virQEMUCapsCacheLookupByArch refactoring (commits
7948ad4129a and 1a3de67001c) are missing
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 12 ++++++++----
src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 3 +--
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 9 +--------
tests/testutilsqemu.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
index a075677421..eaf369f5b1 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
@@ -4700,7 +4700,7 @@ virQEMUCapsNewData(const char *binary,
priv->libDir,
priv->runUid,
priv->runGid,
- priv->microcodeVersion,
+ virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion(),
priv->kernelVersion);
}
@@ -4783,8 +4783,7 @@ virFileCachePtr
virQEMUCapsCacheNew(const char *libDir,
const char *cacheDir,
uid_t runUid,
- gid_t runGid,
- unsigned int microcodeVersion)
+ gid_t runGid)
{
char *capsCacheDir = NULL;
virFileCachePtr cache = NULL;
@@ -4808,7 +4807,6 @@ virQEMUCapsCacheNew(const char *libDir,
priv->runUid = runUid;
priv->runGid = runGid;
- priv->microcodeVersion = microcodeVersion;
if (uname(&uts) == 0 &&
virAsprintf(&priv->kernelVersion, "%s %s", uts.release, uts.version) < 0)
@@ -4829,8 +4827,11 @@ virQEMUCapsPtr
virQEMUCapsCacheLookup(virFileCachePtr cache,
const char *binary)
{
+ virQEMUCapsCachePrivPtr priv = virFileCacheGetPriv(cache);
virQEMUCapsPtr ret = NULL;
+ priv->microcodeVersion = virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion();
+
ret = virFileCacheLookup(cache, binary);
VIR_DEBUG("Returning caps %p for %s", ret, binary);
@@ -4876,10 +4877,13 @@ virQEMUCapsPtr
virQEMUCapsCacheLookupByArch(virFileCachePtr cache,
virArch arch)
{
+ virQEMUCapsCachePrivPtr priv = virFileCacheGetPriv(cache);
virQEMUCapsPtr ret = NULL;
virArch target;
struct virQEMUCapsSearchData data = { .arch = arch };
+ priv->microcodeVersion = virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion();
+
ret = virFileCacheLookupByFunc(cache, virQEMUCapsCompareArch, &data);
if (!ret) {
/* If the first attempt at finding capabilities has failed, try
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h
index 3d3a978759..956babc7eb 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h
@@ -574,8 +574,7 @@ void virQEMUCapsFilterByMachineType(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps,
virFileCachePtr virQEMUCapsCacheNew(const char *libDir,
const char *cacheDir,
uid_t uid,
- gid_t gid,
- unsigned int microcodeVersion);
+ gid_t gid);
virQEMUCapsPtr virQEMUCapsCacheLookup(virFileCachePtr cache,
const char *binary);
virQEMUCapsPtr virQEMUCapsCacheLookupCopy(virFileCachePtr cache,
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index a0f7c71675..75f8699e7d 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -592,8 +592,6 @@ qemuStateInitialize(bool privileged,
char *hugepagePath = NULL;
char *memoryBackingPath = NULL;
size_t i;
- virCPUDefPtr hostCPU = NULL;
- unsigned int microcodeVersion = 0;
if (VIR_ALLOC(qemu_driver) < 0)
return -1;
@@ -813,15 +811,10 @@ qemuStateInitialize(bool privileged,
run_gid = cfg->group;
}
- if ((hostCPU = virCPUProbeHost(virArchFromHost())))
- microcodeVersion = hostCPU->microcodeVersion;
- virCPUDefFree(hostCPU);
-
qemu_driver->qemuCapsCache = virQEMUCapsCacheNew(cfg->libDir,
cfg->cacheDir,
run_uid,
- run_gid,
- microcodeVersion);
+ run_gid);
if (!qemu_driver->qemuCapsCache)
goto error;
diff --git a/tests/testutilsqemu.c b/tests/testutilsqemu.c
index 8438613f28..4e53f03f9e 100644
--- a/tests/testutilsqemu.c
+++ b/tests/testutilsqemu.c
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ int qemuTestDriverInit(virQEMUDriver *driver)
/* Using /dev/null for libDir and cacheDir automatically produces errors
* upon attempt to use any of them */
- driver->qemuCapsCache = virQEMUCapsCacheNew("/dev/null", "/dev/null", 0, 0, 0);
+ driver->qemuCapsCache = virQEMUCapsCacheNew("/dev/null", "/dev/null", 0, 0);
if (!driver->qemuCapsCache)
goto error;
@@ -1,880 +0,0 @@
From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 11:19:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cputest: Add data for Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v5
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5cd9db3ac11e88846cbcf95fad9f6fae9d880dee)
CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091
Conflicts:
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
- intel-pt feature is missing
- stibp feature is missing
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
tests/cputest.c | 1 +
.../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml | 7 +
.../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml | 8 +
.../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml | 26 +
.../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml | 27 +
.../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml | 10 +
.../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json | 652 ++++++++++++++++++
.../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig | 4 +
.../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml | 47 ++
9 files changed, 782 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml
create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json
create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig
create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml
diff --git a/tests/cputest.c b/tests/cputest.c
index baf2b3c648..fbb2a86af8 100644
--- a/tests/cputest.c
+++ b/tests/cputest.c
@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ mymain(void)
DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Phenom-B95", JSON_HOST);
DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Ryzen-7-1800X-Eight-Core", JSON_HOST);
DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-5110", JSON_NONE);
+ DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-E3-1225-v5", JSON_MODELS);
DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-E3-1245-v5", JSON_MODELS);
DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-E5-2609-v3", JSON_MODELS);
DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-E5-2623-v4", JSON_MODELS);
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce51903e53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+<!-- Features disabled by QEMU -->
+<cpudata arch='x86'>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x0800c1fc' edx='0xb0600000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x02000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x00000008' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000100'/>
+</cpudata>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0deca9fba6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+<!-- Features enabled by QEMU -->
+<cpudata arch='x86'>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0xf7fa3203' edx='0x0f8bfbff'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000006' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000004' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x009c4fbb' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x8c000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x00000007' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000121' edx='0x2c100800'/>
+</cpudata>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..993db80cc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<cpu mode='custom' match='exact'>
+ <model fallback='forbid'>Skylake-Client-IBRS</model>
+ <vendor>Intel</vendor>
+ <feature policy='require' name='ds'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='acpi'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='ss'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='ht'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='tm'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='pbe'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='dtes64'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='monitor'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='ds_cpl'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='vmx'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='smx'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='est'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='tm2'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='xtpr'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='pdcm'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='osxsave'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='tsc_adjust'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='clflushopt'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='ssbd'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='xsaves'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='pdpe1gb'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='invtsc'/>
+</cpu>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..074a39ba1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+<cpu>
+ <arch>x86_64</arch>
+ <model>Skylake-Client-IBRS</model>
+ <vendor>Intel</vendor>
+ <feature name='ds'/>
+ <feature name='acpi'/>
+ <feature name='ss'/>
+ <feature name='ht'/>
+ <feature name='tm'/>
+ <feature name='pbe'/>
+ <feature name='dtes64'/>
+ <feature name='monitor'/>
+ <feature name='ds_cpl'/>
+ <feature name='vmx'/>
+ <feature name='smx'/>
+ <feature name='est'/>
+ <feature name='tm2'/>
+ <feature name='xtpr'/>
+ <feature name='pdcm'/>
+ <feature name='osxsave'/>
+ <feature name='tsc_adjust'/>
+ <feature name='clflushopt'/>
+ <feature name='ssbd'/>
+ <feature name='xsaves'/>
+ <feature name='pdpe1gb'/>
+ <feature name='invtsc'/>
+</cpu>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1984bd4cf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<cpu mode='custom' match='exact'>
+ <model fallback='forbid'>Skylake-Client-IBRS</model>
+ <vendor>Intel</vendor>
+ <feature policy='require' name='ss'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='hypervisor'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='tsc_adjust'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='clflushopt'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='ssbd'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='pdpe1gb'/>
+</cpu>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..084747556b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json
@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
+{
+ "return": {
+ "model": {
+ "name": "base",
+ "props": {
+ "phys-bits": 0,
+ "core-id": -1,
+ "xlevel": 2147483656,
+ "cmov": true,
+ "ia64": false,
+ "aes": true,
+ "mmx": true,
+ "rdpid": false,
+ "arat": true,
+ "gfni": false,
+ "pause-filter": false,
+ "xsavec": true,
+ "intel-pt": false,
+ "osxsave": false,
+ "hv-frequencies": false,
+ "tsc-frequency": 0,
+ "xd": true,
+ "hv-vendor-id": "",
+ "kvm-asyncpf": true,
+ "kvm_asyncpf": true,
+ "perfctr_core": false,
+ "perfctr-core": false,
+ "mpx": true,
+ "pbe": false,
+ "decodeassists": false,
+ "avx512cd": false,
+ "sse4_1": true,
+ "sse4.1": true,
+ "sse4-1": true,
+ "family": 6,
+ "legacy-cache": true,
+ "vmware-cpuid-freq": true,
+ "avx512f": false,
+ "msr": true,
+ "mce": true,
+ "mca": true,
+ "hv-runtime": false,
+ "xcrypt": false,
+ "thread-id": -1,
+ "min-level": 13,
+ "xgetbv1": true,
+ "cid": false,
+ "hv-relaxed": false,
+ "hv-crash": false,
+ "ds": false,
+ "fxsr": true,
+ "xsaveopt": true,
+ "xtpr": false,
+ "avx512vl": false,
+ "avx512-vpopcntdq": false,
+ "phe": false,
+ "extapic": false,
+ "3dnowprefetch": true,
+ "avx512vbmi2": false,
+ "cr8legacy": false,
+ "stibp": true,
+ "cpuid-0xb": true,
+ "xcrypt-en": false,
+ "kvm_pv_eoi": true,
+ "apic-id": 4294967295,
+ "pn": false,
+ "dca": false,
+ "vendor": "GenuineIntel",
+ "pku": false,
+ "smx": false,
+ "cmp_legacy": false,
+ "cmp-legacy": false,
+ "node-id": -1,
+ "avx512-4fmaps": false,
+ "vmcb_clean": false,
+ "vmcb-clean": false,
+ "3dnowext": false,
+ "hle": true,
+ "npt": false,
+ "memory": "/machine/unattached/system[0]",
+ "clwb": false,
+ "lbrv": false,
+ "adx": true,
+ "ss": true,
+ "pni": true,
+ "svm_lock": false,
+ "svm-lock": false,
+ "pfthreshold": false,
+ "smep": true,
+ "smap": true,
+ "x2apic": true,
+ "avx512vbmi": false,
+ "avx512vnni": false,
+ "hv-stimer": false,
+ "i64": true,
+ "flushbyasid": false,
+ "f16c": true,
+ "ace2-en": false,
+ "pat": true,
+ "pae": true,
+ "sse": true,
+ "phe-en": false,
+ "kvm_nopiodelay": true,
+ "kvm-nopiodelay": true,
+ "tm": false,
+ "kvmclock-stable-bit": true,
+ "hypervisor": true,
+ "socket-id": -1,
+ "pcommit": false,
+ "syscall": true,
+ "level": 13,
+ "avx512dq": false,
+ "svm": false,
+ "full-cpuid-auto-level": true,
+ "hv-reset": false,
+ "invtsc": false,
+ "sse3": true,
+ "sse2": true,
+ "ssbd": true,
+ "est": false,
+ "avx512ifma": false,
+ "tm2": false,
+ "kvm-pv-eoi": true,
+ "cx8": true,
+ "kvm_mmu": false,
+ "kvm-mmu": false,
+ "sse4_2": true,
+ "sse4.2": true,
+ "sse4-2": true,
+ "pge": true,
+ "fill-mtrr-mask": true,
+ "avx512bitalg": false,
+ "nodeid_msr": false,
+ "pdcm": false,
+ "movbe": true,
+ "model": 94,
+ "nrip_save": false,
+ "nrip-save": false,
+ "kvm_pv_unhalt": true,
+ "ssse3": true,
+ "sse4a": false,
+ "invpcid": true,
+ "pdpe1gb": true,
+ "tsc-deadline": true,
+ "fma": true,
+ "cx16": true,
+ "de": true,
+ "enforce": false,
+ "stepping": 3,
+ "xsave": true,
+ "clflush": true,
+ "skinit": false,
+ "tsc": true,
+ "tce": false,
+ "fpu": true,
+ "ibs": false,
+ "ds_cpl": false,
+ "ds-cpl": false,
+ "host-phys-bits": true,
+ "fma4": false,
+ "la57": false,
+ "osvw": false,
+ "check": true,
+ "hv-spinlocks": -1,
+ "pmu": false,
+ "pmm": false,
+ "apic": true,
+ "spec-ctrl": true,
+ "min-xlevel2": 0,
+ "tsc-adjust": true,
+ "tsc_adjust": true,
+ "kvm-steal-time": true,
+ "kvm_steal_time": true,
+ "kvmclock": true,
+ "l3-cache": true,
+ "lwp": false,
+ "ibpb": false,
+ "xop": false,
+ "avx": true,
+ "ospke": false,
+ "ace2": false,
+ "avx512bw": false,
+ "acpi": false,
+ "hv-vapic": false,
+ "fsgsbase": true,
+ "ht": false,
+ "nx": true,
+ "pclmulqdq": true,
+ "mmxext": false,
+ "vaes": false,
+ "popcnt": true,
+ "xsaves": false,
+ "tcg-cpuid": true,
+ "lm": true,
+ "umip": false,
+ "pse": true,
+ "avx2": true,
+ "sep": true,
+ "pclmuldq": true,
+ "virt-ssbd": false,
+ "x-hv-max-vps": -1,
+ "nodeid-msr": false,
+ "md-clear": true,
+ "kvm": true,
+ "misalignsse": false,
+ "min-xlevel": 2147483656,
+ "kvm-pv-unhalt": true,
+ "bmi2": true,
+ "bmi1": true,
+ "realized": false,
+ "tsc_scale": false,
+ "tsc-scale": false,
+ "topoext": false,
+ "hv-vpindex": false,
+ "xlevel2": 0,
+ "clflushopt": true,
+ "kvm-no-smi-migration": false,
+ "monitor": false,
+ "avx512er": false,
+ "pmm-en": false,
+ "pcid": true,
+ "3dnow": false,
+ "erms": true,
+ "lahf-lm": true,
+ "lahf_lm": true,
+ "vpclmulqdq": false,
+ "fxsr-opt": false,
+ "hv-synic": false,
+ "xstore": false,
+ "fxsr_opt": false,
+ "kvm-hint-dedicated": false,
+ "rtm": true,
+ "lmce": true,
+ "hv-time": false,
+ "perfctr-nb": false,
+ "perfctr_nb": false,
+ "ffxsr": false,
+ "rdrand": true,
+ "rdseed": true,
+ "avx512-4vnniw": false,
+ "vmx": false,
+ "vme": true,
+ "dtes64": false,
+ "mtrr": true,
+ "rdtscp": true,
+ "pse36": true,
+ "kvm-pv-tlb-flush": false,
+ "tbm": false,
+ "wdt": false,
+ "pause_filter": false,
+ "sha-ni": false,
+ "model-id": "Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v5 @ 3.30GHz",
+ "abm": true,
+ "avx512pf": false,
+ "xstore-en": false
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ "id": "model-expansion"
+}
+
+{
+ "return": [
+ {
+ "name": "max",
+ "typename": "max-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": false
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "host",
+ "typename": "host-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": false
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "base",
+ "typename": "base-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": true,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "qemu64",
+ "typename": "qemu64-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "qemu32",
+ "typename": "qemu32-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "phenom",
+ "typename": "phenom-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "mmxext",
+ "fxsr-opt",
+ "3dnowext",
+ "3dnow",
+ "sse4a",
+ "npt"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "pentium3",
+ "typename": "pentium3-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "pentium2",
+ "typename": "pentium2-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "pentium",
+ "typename": "pentium-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "n270",
+ "typename": "n270-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "kvm64",
+ "typename": "kvm64-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "kvm32",
+ "typename": "kvm32-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "cpu64-rhel6",
+ "typename": "cpu64-rhel6-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "sse4a"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "coreduo",
+ "typename": "coreduo-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "core2duo",
+ "typename": "core2duo-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "athlon",
+ "typename": "athlon-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "mmxext",
+ "3dnowext",
+ "3dnow"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Westmere",
+ "typename": "Westmere-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Westmere-IBRS",
+ "typename": "Westmere-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Skylake-Server",
+ "typename": "Skylake-Server-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "avx512f",
+ "avx512dq",
+ "clwb",
+ "avx512cd",
+ "avx512bw",
+ "avx512vl",
+ "avx512f",
+ "avx512f",
+ "avx512f"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Skylake-Server-IBRS",
+ "typename": "Skylake-Server-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "avx512f",
+ "avx512dq",
+ "clwb",
+ "avx512cd",
+ "avx512bw",
+ "avx512vl",
+ "avx512f",
+ "avx512f",
+ "avx512f"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Skylake-Client",
+ "typename": "Skylake-Client-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Skylake-Client-IBRS",
+ "typename": "Skylake-Client-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "SandyBridge",
+ "typename": "SandyBridge-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "SandyBridge-IBRS",
+ "typename": "SandyBridge-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Penryn",
+ "typename": "Penryn-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Opteron_G5",
+ "typename": "Opteron_G5-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "sse4a",
+ "misalignsse",
+ "xop",
+ "fma4",
+ "tbm"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Opteron_G4",
+ "typename": "Opteron_G4-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "sse4a",
+ "misalignsse",
+ "xop",
+ "fma4"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Opteron_G3",
+ "typename": "Opteron_G3-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "sse4a",
+ "misalignsse"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Opteron_G2",
+ "typename": "Opteron_G2-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Opteron_G1",
+ "typename": "Opteron_G1-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Nehalem",
+ "typename": "Nehalem-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Nehalem-IBRS",
+ "typename": "Nehalem-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "IvyBridge",
+ "typename": "IvyBridge-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "IvyBridge-IBRS",
+ "typename": "IvyBridge-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Haswell",
+ "typename": "Haswell-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Haswell-noTSX",
+ "typename": "Haswell-noTSX-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Haswell-noTSX-IBRS",
+ "typename": "Haswell-noTSX-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Haswell-IBRS",
+ "typename": "Haswell-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "EPYC",
+ "typename": "EPYC-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "sha-ni",
+ "mmxext",
+ "fxsr-opt",
+ "cr8legacy",
+ "sse4a",
+ "misalignsse",
+ "osvw"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "EPYC-IBPB",
+ "typename": "EPYC-IBPB-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [
+ "sha-ni",
+ "mmxext",
+ "fxsr-opt",
+ "cr8legacy",
+ "sse4a",
+ "misalignsse",
+ "osvw",
+ "ibpb"
+ ],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Conroe",
+ "typename": "Conroe-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Broadwell",
+ "typename": "Broadwell-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Broadwell-noTSX",
+ "typename": "Broadwell-noTSX-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Broadwell-noTSX-IBRS",
+ "typename": "Broadwell-noTSX-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Broadwell-IBRS",
+ "typename": "Broadwell-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "486",
+ "typename": "486-x86_64-cpu",
+ "unavailable-features": [],
+ "static": false,
+ "migration-safe": true
+ }
+ ],
+ "id": "definitions"
+}
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7e57c2ded6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+0506e3
+family: 6 (0x06)
+model: 94 (0x5e)
+stepping: 3 (0x03)
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..437429d61d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+<!-- Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v5 @ 3.30GHz -->
+<cpudata arch='x86'>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000000' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000016' ebx='0x756e6547' ecx='0x6c65746e' edx='0x49656e69'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x000506e3' ebx='0x06100800' ecx='0x7ffafbff' edx='0xbfebfbff'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000002' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x76036301' ebx='0x00f0b6ff' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00c30000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000003' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000004' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x1c004121' ebx='0x01c0003f' ecx='0x0000003f' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000004' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x1c004122' ebx='0x01c0003f' ecx='0x0000003f' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000004' ecx_in='0x02' eax='0x1c004143' ebx='0x00c0003f' ecx='0x000003ff' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000004' ecx_in='0x03' eax='0x1c03c163' ebx='0x03c0003f' ecx='0x00001fff' edx='0x00000006'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000005' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000040' ebx='0x00000040' ecx='0x00000003' edx='0x00142120'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000006' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x000027f7' ebx='0x00000002' ecx='0x00000009' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x029c6fbf' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x9c002400'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000008' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000009' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000a' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x07300804' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000603'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000b' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000001' ebx='0x00000001' ecx='0x00000100' edx='0x00000006'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000b' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x00000004' ebx='0x00000004' ecx='0x00000201' edx='0x00000006'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000c' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x0000001f' ebx='0x00000440' ecx='0x00000440' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x0000000f' ebx='0x000003c0' ecx='0x00000100' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x02' eax='0x00000100' ebx='0x00000240' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x03' eax='0x00000040' ebx='0x000003c0' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x04' eax='0x00000040' ebx='0x00000400' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x08' eax='0x00000080' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000001' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000e' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000f' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000010' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000011' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000012' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000013' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000014' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000001' ebx='0x0000000f' ecx='0x00000007' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000014' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x02490002' ebx='0x003f3fff' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000015' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000002' ebx='0x00000114' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000016' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000ce4' ebx='0x00000e74' ecx='0x00000064' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000000' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x80000008' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000121' edx='0x2c100800'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000002' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x65746e49' ebx='0x2952286c' ecx='0x6f655820' edx='0x2952286e'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000003' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x55504320' ebx='0x2d334520' ecx='0x35323231' edx='0x20357620'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000004' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x2e332040' ebx='0x48473033' ecx='0x0000007a' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000005' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000006' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x01006040' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000100'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80000008' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00003027' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x80860000' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000ce4' ebx='0x00000e74' ecx='0x00000064' edx='0x00000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0xc0000000' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000ce4' ebx='0x00000e74' ecx='0x00000064' edx='0x00000000'/>
+</cpudata>
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 12:35:52 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cpu_map: Define md-clear CPUID bit
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091
The bit is set when microcode provides the mechanism to invoke a flush
of various exploitable CPU buffers by invoking the VERW instruction.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 538d873571d7a682852dc1d70e5f4478f4d64e85)
Conflicts:
src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml
- missing pconfig feature
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-Platinum-8268-guest.xml
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-Platinum-8268-host.xml
- test data missing downstream
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
- intel-pt feature is missing
- stibp feature is missing
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml | 3 +++
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml | 2 +-
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml | 1 +
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml | 1 +
tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml | 1 +
5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml b/src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml
index 109c653dbc..c8ae540ccc 100644
--- a/src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml
+++ b/src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml
@@ -290,6 +290,9 @@
<feature name='avx512-4fmaps'>
<cpuid eax_in='0x07' ecx_in='0x00' edx='0x00000008'/>
</feature>
+ <feature name='md-clear'> <!-- md_clear -->
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x07' ecx_in='0x00' edx='0x00000400'/>
+ </feature>
<feature name='spec-ctrl'>
<cpuid eax_in='0x07' ecx_in='0x00' edx='0x04000000'/>
</feature>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
index 0deca9fba6..74763a462b 100644
--- a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
<cpudata arch='x86'>
<cpuid eax_in='0x00000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0xf7fa3203' edx='0x0f8bfbff'/>
<cpuid eax_in='0x00000006' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000004' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
- <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x009c4fbb' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x8c000000'/>
+ <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x009c4fbb' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x8c000400'/>
<cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x00000007' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
<cpuid eax_in='0x80000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000121' edx='0x2c100800'/>
</cpudata>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
index 993db80cc9..29c1fdb80a 100644
--- a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
<feature policy='require' name='osxsave'/>
<feature policy='require' name='tsc_adjust'/>
<feature policy='require' name='clflushopt'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='md-clear'/>
<feature policy='require' name='ssbd'/>
<feature policy='require' name='xsaves'/>
<feature policy='require' name='pdpe1gb'/>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
index 074a39ba1d..2003ca9ef6 100644
--- a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
<feature name='osxsave'/>
<feature name='tsc_adjust'/>
<feature name='clflushopt'/>
+ <feature name='md-clear'/>
<feature name='ssbd'/>
<feature name='xsaves'/>
<feature name='pdpe1gb'/>
diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
index 1984bd4cf2..d6529c59a3 100644
--- a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
<feature policy='require' name='hypervisor'/>
<feature policy='require' name='tsc_adjust'/>
<feature policy='require' name='clflushopt'/>
+ <feature policy='require' name='md-clear'/>
<feature policy='require' name='ssbd'/>
<feature policy='require' name='pdpe1gb'/>
</cpu>
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 17:26:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] admin: reject clients unless their UID matches the current
UID
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The admin protocol RPC messages are only intended for use by the user
running the daemon. As such they should not be allowed for any client
UID that does not match the server UID.
Fixes CVE-2019-10132
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 96f41cd765c9e525fe28ee5abbfbf4a79b3720c7)
---
src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c b/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
index b78ff902c0..9f25813ae3 100644
--- a/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
+++ b/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
@@ -66,6 +66,28 @@ remoteAdmClientNew(virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
void *opaque)
{
struct daemonAdmClientPrivate *priv;
+ uid_t clientuid;
+ gid_t clientgid;
+ pid_t clientpid;
+ unsigned long long timestamp;
+
+ if (virNetServerClientGetUNIXIdentity(client,
+ &clientuid,
+ &clientgid,
+ &clientpid,
+ &timestamp) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ VIR_DEBUG("New client pid %lld uid %lld",
+ (long long)clientpid,
+ (long long)clientuid);
+
+ if (geteuid() != clientuid) {
+ virReportRestrictedError(_("Disallowing client %lld with uid %lld"),
+ (long long)clientpid,
+ (long long)clientuid);
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (VIR_ALLOC(priv) < 0)
return NULL;
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 16:51:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] locking: restrict sockets to mode 0600
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The virtlockd daemon's only intended client is the libvirtd daemon. As
such it should never allow clients from other user accounts to connect.
The code already enforces this and drops clients from other UIDs, but
we can get earlier (and thus stronger) protection against DoS by setting
the socket permissions to 0600
Fixes CVE-2019-10132
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f111e09468693909b1f067aa575efdafd9a262a1)
---
src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in | 1 +
src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in b/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
index 2a7500f3d0..f674c492f7 100644
--- a/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
+++ b/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlockd-admin-sock
Service=virtlockd.service
+SocketMode=0600
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target
diff --git a/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in b/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
index 45e0f20235..d701b27516 100644
--- a/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
+++ b/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlockd-sock
+SocketMode=0600
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 17:27:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] logging: restrict sockets to mode 0600
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The virtlogd daemon's only intended client is the libvirtd daemon. As
such it should never allow clients from other user accounts to connect.
The code already enforces this and drops clients from other UIDs, but
we can get earlier (and thus stronger) protection against DoS by setting
the socket permissions to 0600
Fixes CVE-2019-10132
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e37bd65f9948c1185456b2cdaa3bd6e875af680f)
---
src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in | 1 +
src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in b/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
index 595e6c4c4b..5c41dfeb7b 100644
--- a/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
+++ b/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlogd-admin-sock
Service=virtlogd.service
+SocketMode=0600
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target
diff --git a/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in b/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
index 22b9360c8d..ae48cdab9a 100644
--- a/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
+++ b/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlogd-sock
+SocketMode=0600
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:47:42 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc on read-only
connections
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc API is taking a path parameter,
which can point to any path on the system. This file will then be
read and parsed by libvirtd running with root privileges.
Forbid it on read-only connections.
Fixes: CVE-2019-10161
Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit aed6a032cead4386472afb24b16196579e239580)
---
src/libvirt-domain.c | 10 ++--------
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 2 +-
src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 3 +--
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
index ef460277f7..cda579180b 100644
--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
@@ -1073,8 +1073,7 @@ virDomainRestoreFlags(virConnectPtr conn, const char *from, const char *dxml,
* previously by virDomainSave() or virDomainSaveFlags().
*
* No security-sensitive data will be included unless @flags contains
- * VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE; this flag is rejected on read-only
- * connections. For this API, @flags should not contain either
+ * VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE
* VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE or VIR_DOMAIN_XML_UPDATE_CPU.
*
* Returns a 0 terminated UTF-8 encoded XML instance, or NULL in case of
@@ -1091,12 +1090,7 @@ virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *file,
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(file, error);
-
- if ((conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) && (flags & VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE)) {
- virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, "%s",
- _("virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc with secure flag"));
- goto error;
- }
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainSaveImageGetXMLDesc) {
char *ret;
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 75f8699e7d..933f71c7b8 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -6791,7 +6791,7 @@ qemuDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path,
if (fd < 0)
goto cleanup;
- if (virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDescEnsureACL(conn, def, flags) < 0)
+ if (virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDescEnsureACL(conn, def) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = qemuDomainDefFormatXML(driver, def, flags);
diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
index 28c8febabd..52b92334fa 100644
--- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
@@ -5226,8 +5226,7 @@ enum remote_procedure {
/**
* @generate: both
* @priority: high
- * @acl: domain:read
- * @acl: domain:read_secure:VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE
+ * @acl: domain:write
*/
REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_GET_XML_DESC = 235,
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:14:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML on read-only
connections
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML can be used to alter the domain's
config used for managedsave or even execute arbitrary emulator binaries.
Forbid it on read-only connections.
Fixes: CVE-2019-10166
Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit db0b78457f183e4c7ac45bc94de86044a1e2056a)
---
src/libvirt-domain.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
index cda579180b..4c0355180e 100644
--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
@@ -9483,6 +9483,7 @@ virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML(virDomainPtr domain, const char *dxml,
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainManagedSaveDefineXML) {
int ret;
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:16:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only
connections
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.
Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
---
src/libvirt-domain.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
index 4c0355180e..8ecb964381 100644
--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
@@ -11275,6 +11275,7 @@ virConnectGetDomainCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn,
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->connectGetDomainCapabilities) {
char *ret;
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:17:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only
connections
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.
Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
---
src/libvirt-host.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/libvirt-host.c b/src/libvirt-host.c
index e20d6ee250..2978825d22 100644
--- a/src/libvirt-host.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-host.c
@@ -1041,6 +1041,7 @@ virConnectCompareHypervisorCPU(virConnectPtr conn,
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, VIR_CPU_COMPARE_ERROR);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xmlCPU, error);
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->connectCompareHypervisorCPU) {
int ret;
@@ -1234,6 +1235,7 @@ virConnectBaselineHypervisorCPU(virConnectPtr conn,
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xmlCPUs, error);
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->connectBaselineHypervisorCPU) {
char *cpu;
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 10:59:58 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virDomainGetHostname for read-only connections
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The virDomainGetHostname API is fetching guest information and this may
involve use of an untrusted guest agent. As such its use must be
forbidden on a read-only connection to libvirt.
Fixes CVE-2019-3886
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2a07c990bd9143d7a0fe8d1b6b7c763c52185240)
---
src/libvirt-domain.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
index 8ecb964381..cc2f61275d 100644
--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
@@ -10940,6 +10940,8 @@ virDomainGetHostname(virDomainPtr domain, unsigned int flags)
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, NULL);
conn = domain->conn;
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(domain->conn->flags, error);
+
if (conn->driver->domainGetHostname) {
char *ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetHostname(domain, flags);
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 11:22:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] remote: enforce ACL write permission for getting guest time &
hostname
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Getting the guest time and hostname both require use of guest agent
commands. These must not be allowed for read-only users, so the
permissions check must validate "write" permission not "read".
Fixes CVE-2019-3886
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae076bb40e0e150aef41361b64001138d04d6c60)
---
src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
index 52b92334fa..58ab4ab039 100644
--- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
@@ -5496,7 +5496,7 @@ enum remote_procedure {
/**
* @generate: both
- * @acl: domain:read
+ * @acl: domain:write
*/
REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_HOSTNAME = 277,
@@ -5891,7 +5891,7 @@ enum remote_procedure {
/**
* @generate: none
- * @acl: domain:read
+ * @acl: domain:write
*/
REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_TIME = 337,
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
From: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 16:49:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "qemu: hotplug: Prepare disk source in
qemuDomainAttachDeviceDiskLive"
Preparing the storage source prior to assigning the alias will not work
as the names of the certain objects depend on the alias for the legacy
hotplug case as we generate the object names for the secrets based on
the alias.
This reverts commit 192fdaa614e3800255048a8a70c1292ccf18397a.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9ac196997839a29486029a02d8f519df54ae0186)
---
src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
index 4f290b5648..421cc2c174 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
@@ -781,6 +781,7 @@ qemuDomainAttachDiskGeneric(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
qemuHotplugDiskSourceDataPtr diskdata = NULL;
char *devstr = NULL;
+ virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
if (qemuHotplugPrepareDiskAccess(driver, vm, disk, NULL, false) < 0)
goto cleanup;
@@ -788,6 +789,9 @@ qemuDomainAttachDiskGeneric(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
if (qemuAssignDeviceDiskAlias(vm->def, disk, priv->qemuCaps) < 0)
goto error;
+ if (qemuDomainPrepareDiskSource(disk, priv, cfg) < 0)
+ goto error;
+
if (!(diskdata = qemuHotplugDiskSourceAttachPrepare(disk, priv->qemuCaps)))
goto error;
@@ -822,6 +826,7 @@ qemuDomainAttachDiskGeneric(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
qemuHotplugDiskSourceDataFree(diskdata);
qemuDomainSecretDiskDestroy(disk);
VIR_FREE(devstr);
+ virObjectUnref(cfg);
return ret;
exit_monitor:
@@ -1062,8 +1067,6 @@ qemuDomainAttachDeviceDiskLive(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
bool forceMediaChange)
{
size_t i;
- virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
- qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = dev->data.disk;
virDomainDiskDefPtr orig_disk = NULL;
int ret = -1;
@@ -1080,9 +1083,6 @@ qemuDomainAttachDeviceDiskLive(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
if (qemuDomainDetermineDiskChain(driver, vm, disk, true) < 0)
goto cleanup;
- if (qemuDomainPrepareDiskSource(disk, priv, cfg) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
-
switch ((virDomainDiskDevice) disk->device) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_CDROM:
case VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_FLOPPY:
@@ -1153,7 +1153,6 @@ qemuDomainAttachDeviceDiskLive(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
cleanup:
if (ret != 0)
ignore_value(qemuRemoveSharedDevice(driver, dev, vm->def->name));
- virObjectUnref(cfg);
return ret;
}
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
From: Radoslaw Biernacki <radoslaw.biernacki@linaro.org>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 12:26:15 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] util: Fixing invalid error checking from virPCIGetNetname()
The @linkdev is In/Out function parameter as second order
reference pointer so requires first order dereference for
checking NULL which can be the result of virPCIGetNetName().
Fixes: d6ee56d7237 (util: change virPCIGetNetName() to not return error if device has no net name)
Signed-off-by: Radoslaw Biernacki <radoslaw.biernacki@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com>
(cherry picked from commit 04983c3c6a821f67994b1c65d4d6175f3ac49d69)
---
src/util/virhostdev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/util/virhostdev.c b/src/util/virhostdev.c
index ca79c37787..d9a3711386 100644
--- a/src/util/virhostdev.c
+++ b/src/util/virhostdev.c
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ virHostdevNetDevice(virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev,
if (virPCIGetNetName(sysfs_path, 0, NULL, linkdev) < 0)
return -1;
- if (!linkdev) {
+ if (!(*linkdev)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("The device at %s has no network device name"),
sysfs_path);
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 1 May 2018 11:34:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tests: merge code for UNIX and TCP socket testing
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The test code for UNIX and TCP sockets will need to be rewritten and
extended later, and will benefit from code sharing.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9e2fad87b429060842a536de26d6af61ea3d96ea)
---
tests/virnetsockettest.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/virnetsockettest.c b/tests/virnetsockettest.c
index 9f9a243484..e463d432ff 100644
--- a/tests/virnetsockettest.c
+++ b/tests/virnetsockettest.c
@@ -116,38 +116,67 @@ checkProtocols(bool *hasIPv4, bool *hasIPv6,
}
-struct testTCPData {
+struct testSocketData {
const char *lnode;
int port;
const char *cnode;
};
-static int testSocketTCPAccept(const void *opaque)
+static int testSocketAccept(const void *opaque)
{
virNetSocketPtr *lsock = NULL; /* Listen socket */
size_t nlsock = 0, i;
virNetSocketPtr ssock = NULL; /* Server socket */
virNetSocketPtr csock = NULL; /* Client socket */
- const struct testTCPData *data = opaque;
+ const struct testSocketData *data = opaque;
int ret = -1;
char portstr[100];
+ char *tmpdir = NULL;
+ char *path = NULL;
+ char template[] = "/tmp/libvirt_XXXXXX";
- snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", data->port);
+ if (!data) {
+ virNetSocketPtr usock;
+ tmpdir = mkdtemp(template);
+ if (tmpdir == NULL) {
+ VIR_WARN("Failed to create temporary directory");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (virAsprintf(&path, "%s/test.sock", tmpdir) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
- if (virNetSocketNewListenTCP(data->lnode, portstr,
- AF_UNSPEC,
- &lsock, &nlsock) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
+ if (virNetSocketNewListenUNIX(path, 0700, -1, getegid(), &usock) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(lsock, 1) < 0) {
+ virObjectUnref(usock);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ lsock[0] = usock;
+ nlsock = 1;
+ } else {
+ snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", data->port);
+ if (virNetSocketNewListenTCP(data->lnode, portstr,
+ AF_UNSPEC,
+ &lsock, &nlsock) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < nlsock; i++) {
if (virNetSocketListen(lsock[i], 0) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
- if (virNetSocketNewConnectTCP(data->cnode, portstr,
- AF_UNSPEC,
- &csock) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
+ if (!data) {
+ if (virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(path, false, NULL, &csock) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ if (virNetSocketNewConnectTCP(data->cnode, portstr,
+ AF_UNSPEC,
+ &csock) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
virObjectUnref(csock);
@@ -171,62 +200,15 @@ static int testSocketTCPAccept(const void *opaque)
for (i = 0; i < nlsock; i++)
virObjectUnref(lsock[i]);
VIR_FREE(lsock);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
-
-#ifndef WIN32
-static int testSocketUNIXAccept(const void *data ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
-{
- virNetSocketPtr lsock = NULL; /* Listen socket */
- virNetSocketPtr ssock = NULL; /* Server socket */
- virNetSocketPtr csock = NULL; /* Client socket */
- int ret = -1;
-
- char *path = NULL;
- char *tmpdir;
- char template[] = "/tmp/libvirt_XXXXXX";
-
- tmpdir = mkdtemp(template);
- if (tmpdir == NULL) {
- VIR_WARN("Failed to create temporary directory");
- goto cleanup;
- }
- if (virAsprintf(&path, "%s/test.sock", tmpdir) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
-
- if (virNetSocketNewListenUNIX(path, 0700, -1, getegid(), &lsock) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
-
- if (virNetSocketListen(lsock, 0) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
-
- if (virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(path, false, NULL, &csock) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
-
- virObjectUnref(csock);
-
- if (virNetSocketAccept(lsock, &ssock) != -1) {
- char c = 'a';
- if (virNetSocketWrite(ssock, &c, 1) != -1) {
- VIR_DEBUG("Unexpected client socket present");
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 0;
-
- cleanup:
VIR_FREE(path);
- virObjectUnref(lsock);
- virObjectUnref(ssock);
if (tmpdir)
rmdir(tmpdir);
return ret;
}
+#endif
+#ifndef WIN32
static int testSocketUNIXAddrs(const void *data ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
virNetSocketPtr lsock = NULL; /* Listen socket */
@@ -456,28 +438,28 @@ mymain(void)
}
if (hasIPv4) {
- struct testTCPData tcpData = { "127.0.0.1", freePort, "127.0.0.1" };
- if (virTestRun("Socket TCP/IPv4 Accept", testSocketTCPAccept, &tcpData) < 0)
+ struct testSocketData tcpData = { "127.0.0.1", freePort, "127.0.0.1" };
+ if (virTestRun("Socket TCP/IPv4 Accept", testSocketAccept, &tcpData) < 0)
ret = -1;
}
if (hasIPv6) {
- struct testTCPData tcpData = { "::1", freePort, "::1" };
- if (virTestRun("Socket TCP/IPv6 Accept", testSocketTCPAccept, &tcpData) < 0)
+ struct testSocketData tcpData = { "::1", freePort, "::1" };
+ if (virTestRun("Socket TCP/IPv6 Accept", testSocketAccept, &tcpData) < 0)
ret = -1;
}
if (hasIPv6 && hasIPv4) {
- struct testTCPData tcpData = { NULL, freePort, "127.0.0.1" };
- if (virTestRun("Socket TCP/IPv4+IPv6 Accept", testSocketTCPAccept, &tcpData) < 0)
+ struct testSocketData tcpData = { NULL, freePort, "127.0.0.1" };
+ if (virTestRun("Socket TCP/IPv4+IPv6 Accept", testSocketAccept, &tcpData) < 0)
ret = -1;
tcpData.cnode = "::1";
- if (virTestRun("Socket TCP/IPv4+IPv6 Accept", testSocketTCPAccept, &tcpData) < 0)
+ if (virTestRun("Socket TCP/IPv4+IPv6 Accept", testSocketAccept, &tcpData) < 0)
ret = -1;
}
#endif
#ifndef WIN32
- if (virTestRun("Socket UNIX Accept", testSocketUNIXAccept, NULL) < 0)
+ if (virTestRun("Socket UNIX Accept", testSocketAccept, NULL) < 0)
ret = -1;
if (virTestRun("Socket UNIX Addrs", testSocketUNIXAddrs, NULL) < 0)
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 1 May 2018 11:55:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tests: rewrite socket to do something sensible and reliable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The current socket test is rather crazy in that it sets up a server
listening for sockets and then runs a client connect call, relying on
the fact that the kernel will accept this despite the application
not having called accept() yet. It then closes the client socket and
calls accept() on the server. On Linux accept() will always see that
the client has gone and so skip the rest of the code. On FreeBSD,
however, the accept sometimes succeeds, causing us to then go into
code that attempts to read and write to the client which will fail
aborting the test. The accept() never succeeds on FreeBSD guests
with a single CPU, but as you add more CPUs, accept() becomes more and
more likely to succeed, giving a 100% failure rate for the test when
using 8 CPUs.
This completely rewrites the test so that it is avoids this designed in
race condition. We simply spawn a background thread to act as the
client, which will read a byte from the server and write it back again.
The main thread can now properly listen and accept the client in a
synchronous manner avoiding any races.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 39015a6f3a0d4f9ca2041b9227094f0bcc2217e9)
---
tests/virnetsockettest.c | 141 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 120 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/virnetsockettest.c b/tests/virnetsockettest.c
index e463d432ff..cccb90d0be 100644
--- a/tests/virnetsockettest.c
+++ b/tests/virnetsockettest.c
@@ -115,6 +115,56 @@ checkProtocols(bool *hasIPv4, bool *hasIPv6,
return ret;
}
+struct testClientData {
+ const char *path;
+ const char *cnode;
+ const char *portstr;
+};
+
+static void
+testSocketClient(void *opaque)
+{
+ struct testClientData *data = opaque;
+ char c;
+ virNetSocketPtr csock = NULL;
+
+ if (data->path) {
+ if (virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(data->path, false,
+ NULL, &csock) < 0)
+ return;
+ } else {
+ if (virNetSocketNewConnectTCP(data->cnode, data->portstr,
+ AF_UNSPEC,
+ &csock) < 0)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ virNetSocketSetBlocking(csock, true);
+
+ if (virNetSocketRead(csock, &c, 1) != 1) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("Cannot read from server");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (virNetSocketWrite(csock, &c, 1) != 1) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("Cannot write to server");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ virObjectUnref(csock);
+}
+
+
+static void
+testSocketIncoming(virNetSocketPtr sock,
+ int events ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ void *opaque)
+{
+ virNetSocketPtr *retsock = opaque;
+ VIR_DEBUG("Incoming sock=%p events=%d\n", sock, events);
+ *retsock = sock;
+}
+
struct testSocketData {
const char *lnode;
@@ -122,18 +172,25 @@ struct testSocketData {
const char *cnode;
};
-static int testSocketAccept(const void *opaque)
+
+static int
+testSocketAccept(const void *opaque)
{
virNetSocketPtr *lsock = NULL; /* Listen socket */
size_t nlsock = 0, i;
virNetSocketPtr ssock = NULL; /* Server socket */
- virNetSocketPtr csock = NULL; /* Client socket */
+ virNetSocketPtr rsock = NULL; /* Incoming client socket */
const struct testSocketData *data = opaque;
int ret = -1;
char portstr[100];
char *tmpdir = NULL;
char *path = NULL;
char template[] = "/tmp/libvirt_XXXXXX";
+ virThread th;
+ struct testClientData cdata = { 0 };
+ bool goodsock = false;
+ char a = 'a';
+ char b = '\0';
if (!data) {
virNetSocketPtr usock;
@@ -155,50 +212,90 @@ static int testSocketAccept(const void *opaque)
lsock[0] = usock;
nlsock = 1;
+
+ cdata.path = path;
} else {
snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", data->port);
if (virNetSocketNewListenTCP(data->lnode, portstr,
AF_UNSPEC,
&lsock, &nlsock) < 0)
goto cleanup;
+
+ cdata.cnode = data->cnode;
+ cdata.portstr = portstr;
}
for (i = 0; i < nlsock; i++) {
if (virNetSocketListen(lsock[i], 0) < 0)
goto cleanup;
- }
- if (!data) {
- if (virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(path, false, NULL, &csock) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
- } else {
- if (virNetSocketNewConnectTCP(data->cnode, portstr,
- AF_UNSPEC,
- &csock) < 0)
+ if (virNetSocketAddIOCallback(lsock[i],
+ VIR_EVENT_HANDLE_READABLE,
+ testSocketIncoming,
+ &rsock,
+ NULL) < 0) {
goto cleanup;
+ }
}
- virObjectUnref(csock);
+ if (virThreadCreate(&th, true,
+ testSocketClient,
+ &cdata) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ while (rsock == NULL)
+ virEventRunDefaultImpl();
for (i = 0; i < nlsock; i++) {
- if (virNetSocketAccept(lsock[i], &ssock) != -1 && ssock) {
- char c = 'a';
- if (virNetSocketWrite(ssock, &c, 1) != -1 &&
- virNetSocketRead(ssock, &c, 1) != -1) {
- VIR_DEBUG("Unexpected client socket present");
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ if (lsock[i] == rsock) {
+ goodsock = true;
+ break;
}
- virObjectUnref(ssock);
- ssock = NULL;
}
+ if (!goodsock) {
+ virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+ "Unexpected server socket seen");
+ goto join;
+ }
+
+ if (virNetSocketAccept(rsock, &ssock) < 0)
+ goto join;
+
+ if (!ssock) {
+ virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+ "Client went away unexpectedly");
+ goto join;
+ }
+
+ virNetSocketSetBlocking(ssock, true);
+
+ if (virNetSocketWrite(ssock, &a, 1) < 0 ||
+ virNetSocketRead(ssock, &b, 1) < 0) {
+ goto join;
+ }
+
+ if (a != b) {
+ virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "Bad data received '%x' != '%x'", a, b);
+ goto join;
+ }
+
+ virObjectUnref(ssock);
+ ssock = NULL;
+
ret = 0;
+ join:
+ virThreadJoin(&th);
+
cleanup:
virObjectUnref(ssock);
- for (i = 0; i < nlsock; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < nlsock; i++) {
+ virNetSocketRemoveIOCallback(lsock[i]);
+ virNetSocketClose(lsock[i]);
virObjectUnref(lsock[i]);
+ }
VIR_FREE(lsock);
VIR_FREE(path);
if (tmpdir)
@@ -431,6 +528,8 @@ mymain(void)
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ virEventRegisterDefaultImpl();
+
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if (checkProtocols(&hasIPv4, &hasIPv6, &freePort) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot identify IPv4/6 availability\n");
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 08:20:15 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] test: Remove possible infinite loop in virnetsockettest
Commit 39015a6f3 modified the test to be more reliable/realistic,
but without checking the return status of virEventRunDefaultImpl
it's possible that the test could run infinitely.
Found by Coverity
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
ACKed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a0ba31c0069e89f178f064e724ddbc8540b64d32)
---
tests/virnetsockettest.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/virnetsockettest.c b/tests/virnetsockettest.c
index cccb90d0be..5927be1f80 100644
--- a/tests/virnetsockettest.c
+++ b/tests/virnetsockettest.c
@@ -243,8 +243,10 @@ testSocketAccept(const void *opaque)
&cdata) < 0)
goto cleanup;
- while (rsock == NULL)
- virEventRunDefaultImpl();
+ while (rsock == NULL) {
+ if (virEventRunDefaultImpl() < 0)
+ break;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < nlsock; i++) {
if (lsock[i] == rsock) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME := libvirt
SPECFILE = $(firstword $(wildcard *.spec))
define find-makefile-common
for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
endef
MAKEFILE_COMMON := $(shell $(find-makefile-common))
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
F-11
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
From 934b71abf1b908f720811a44ad5411cfc1a4ca37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 13:15:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Avoid broken networking with new QEMU/KVM >= 86
---
src/qemu_conf.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
index 93dc0b7..a04d216 100644
--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
+++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
@@ -658,8 +658,8 @@ qemudNetworkIfaceConnect(virConnectPtr conn,
}
snprintf(tapfdstr, sizeof(tapfdstr),
- "tap,fd=%d,script=,vlan=%d,ifname=%s",
- tapfd, vlan, net->ifname);
+ "tap,fd=%d,vlan=%d",
+ tapfd, vlan);
if (!(retval = strdup(tapfdstr)))
goto no_memory;
--
1.6.0.6
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 4db7474b0c1907e877d7206edeb4d73962971096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 15:31:22 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] * src/network_driver.c: enable bridges which are not up
without an IP address, patch by Ludwig Nussel
Daniel
---
src/network_driver.c | 9 +++------
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/network_driver.c b/src/network_driver.c
index a17a769..a163b15 100644
--- a/src/network_driver.c
+++ b/src/network_driver.c
@@ -836,8 +836,7 @@ static int networkStartNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
goto err_delbr;
}
- if (network->def->ipAddress &&
- (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 1))) {
+ if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 1))) {
virReportSystemError(conn, err,
_("failed to bring the bridge '%s' up"),
network->def->bridge);
@@ -878,8 +877,7 @@ static int networkStartNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
networkRemoveIptablesRules(driver, network);
err_delbr1:
- if (network->def->ipAddress &&
- (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
+ if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
char ebuf[1024];
networkLog(NETWORK_WARN, _("Failed to bring down bridge '%s' : %s\n"),
network->def->bridge, virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
@@ -920,8 +918,7 @@ static int networkShutdownNetworkDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
networkRemoveIptablesRules(driver, network);
char ebuf[1024];
- if (network->def->ipAddress &&
- (err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
+ if ((err = brSetInterfaceUp(driver->brctl, network->def->bridge, 0))) {
networkLog(NETWORK_WARN, _("Failed to bring down bridge '%s' : %s\n"),
network->def->bridge, virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
}
--
1.6.0.6
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
From fbd16cecc72494e8a9450f38197221f2f50c9d0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?utf-8?q?Guido=20G=C3=BCnther?= <agx@sigxcpu.org>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 15:56:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Don't log monitor output to domain log file.
It's logged via the logging system already. Prefix monitor debug output with vm
name.
---
src/qemu_driver.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
1 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
index 79ee072..f5b5fa5 100644
--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
@@ -1710,27 +1710,11 @@ qemudMonitorCommandExtra(const virDomainObjPtr vm,
goto error;
}
}
-
- /* Log, but ignore failures to write logfile for VM */
- if (safewrite(vm->logfile, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) {
- char ebuf[1024];
- VIR_WARN(_("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"),
- virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
- }
-
*reply = buf;
return 0;
error:
- if (buf) {
- /* Log, but ignore failures to write logfile for VM */
- if (safewrite(vm->logfile, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) {
- char ebuf[1024];
- VIR_WARN(_("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"),
- virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
- }
- VIR_FREE(buf);
- }
+ VIR_FREE(buf);
return -1;
}
@@ -2463,7 +2447,7 @@ static int qemudDomainGetMemoryBalloon(virConnectPtr conn,
goto cleanup;
}
- DEBUG ("balloon reply: '%s'", reply);
+ DEBUG ("%s: balloon reply: '%s'", vm->def->name, reply);
if ((offset = strstr(reply, BALLOON_PREFIX)) != NULL) {
unsigned int memMB;
char *end;
@@ -2517,7 +2501,7 @@ static int qemudDomainSetMemoryBalloon(virConnectPtr conn,
/* If the command failed qemu prints: 'unknown command'
* No message is printed on success it seems */
- DEBUG ("balloon reply: %s", reply);
+ DEBUG ("%s: balloon reply: %s",vm->def->name, reply);
if (strstr(reply, "\nunknown command:")) {
/* Don't set error - it is expected memory balloon fails on many qemu */
ret = 0;
@@ -2812,7 +2796,7 @@ static int qemudDomainSave(virDomainPtr dom,
goto cleanup;
}
- DEBUG ("migrate reply: %s", info);
+ DEBUG ("%s: migrate reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
/* If the command isn't supported then qemu prints:
* unknown command: migrate" */
@@ -3658,7 +3642,7 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(virConnectPtr conn,
/* If the command failed qemu prints:
* device not found, device is locked ...
* No message is printed on success it seems */
- DEBUG ("ejectable media change reply: %s", reply);
+ DEBUG ("%s: ejectable media change reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
if (strstr(reply, "\ndevice ")) {
qemudReportError (conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
_("changing cdrom media failed: %s"), reply);
@@ -3719,7 +3703,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachPciDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
return -1;
}
- DEBUG ("pci_add reply: %s", reply);
+ DEBUG ("%s: pci_add reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
/* If the command succeeds qemu prints:
* OK bus 0... */
#define PCI_ATTACH_OK_MSG "OK bus 0, slot "
@@ -3787,7 +3771,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachUsbMassstorageDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
return -1;
}
- DEBUG ("attach_usb reply: %s", reply);
+ DEBUG ("%s: attach_usb reply: %s",vm->def->name, reply);
/* If the command failed qemu prints:
* Could not add ... */
if (strstr(reply, "Could not add ")) {
@@ -3841,7 +3825,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachHostDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
return -1;
}
- DEBUG ("attach_usb reply: %s", reply);
+ DEBUG ("%s: attach_usb reply: %s", vm->def->name, reply);
/* If the command failed qemu prints:
* Could not add ... */
if (strstr(reply, "Could not add ")) {
@@ -3980,7 +3964,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
goto cleanup;
}
- DEBUG ("pci_del reply: %s", reply);
+ DEBUG ("%s: pci_del reply: %s",vm->def->name, reply);
/* If the command fails due to a wrong slot qemu prints: invalid slot,
* nothing is printed on success */
if (strstr(reply, "invalid slot")) {
@@ -4210,7 +4194,7 @@ qemudDomainBlockStats (virDomainPtr dom,
"%s", _("'info blockstats' command failed"));
goto cleanup;
}
- DEBUG ("info blockstats reply: %s", info);
+ DEBUG ("%s: info blockstats reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
/* If the command isn't supported then qemu prints the supported
* info commands, so the output starts "info ". Since this is
@@ -4251,21 +4235,25 @@ qemudDomainBlockStats (virDomainPtr dom,
if (STRPREFIX (p, "rd_bytes=")) {
p += 9;
if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->rd_bytes) == -1)
- DEBUG ("error reading rd_bytes: %s", p);
+ DEBUG ("%s: error reading rd_bytes: %s",
+ vm->def->name, p);
} else if (STRPREFIX (p, "wr_bytes=")) {
p += 9;
if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->wr_bytes) == -1)
- DEBUG ("error reading wr_bytes: %s", p);
+ DEBUG ("%s: error reading wr_bytes: %s",
+ vm->def->name, p);
} else if (STRPREFIX (p, "rd_operations=")) {
p += 14;
if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->rd_req) == -1)
- DEBUG ("error reading rd_req: %s", p);
+ DEBUG ("%s: error reading rd_req: %s",
+ vm->def->name, p);
} else if (STRPREFIX (p, "wr_operations=")) {
p += 14;
if (virStrToLong_ll (p, &dummy, 10, &stats->wr_req) == -1)
- DEBUG ("error reading wr_req: %s", p);
+ DEBUG ("%s: error reading wr_req: %s",
+ vm->def->name, p);
} else
- DEBUG ("unknown block stat near %s", p);
+ DEBUG ("%s: unknown block stat near %s", vm->def->name, p);
/* Skip to next label. */
p = strchr (p, ' ');
@@ -4477,7 +4465,7 @@ qemudDomainMemoryPeek (virDomainPtr dom,
goto cleanup;
}
- DEBUG ("memsave reply: %s", info);
+ DEBUG ("%s: memsave reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
/* Read the memory file into buffer. */
if (saferead (fd, buffer, size) == (ssize_t) -1) {
@@ -4794,7 +4782,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
"%s", _("off-line migration specified, but suspend operation failed"));
goto cleanup;
}
- DEBUG ("stop reply: %s", info);
+ DEBUG ("%s: stop reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
VIR_FREE(info);
paused = 1;
@@ -4811,7 +4799,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
snprintf (cmd, sizeof cmd, "migrate_set_speed %lum", resource);
qemudMonitorCommand (vm, cmd, &info);
- DEBUG ("migrate_set_speed reply: %s", info);
+ DEBUG ("%s: migrate_set_speed reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
VIR_FREE (info);
}
@@ -4830,7 +4818,7 @@ qemudDomainMigratePerform (virDomainPtr dom,
goto cleanup;
}
- DEBUG ("migrate reply: %s", info);
+ DEBUG ("%s: migrate reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
/* Now check for "fail" in the output string */
if (strstr(info, "fail") != NULL) {
@@ -4869,7 +4857,7 @@ cleanup:
vm->def->name);
}
else {
- DEBUG ("cont reply: %s", info);
+ DEBUG ("%s: cont reply: %s", vm->def->name, info);
VIR_FREE(info);
}
--
1.6.0.6
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From ae4523336ac06e3ff7cc7b416fad9e57998c6b54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Waugh <twaugh@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2009 10:29:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Don't unnecessarily try to change a file context
As pointed out by Tim Waugh here:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/507555
We shouldn't bother trying to set the context of a file if it already
matches what we want.
(Fixed to use STREQ() and not use tabs, as pointed out by danpb)
Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
---
src/security_selinux.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/security_selinux.c b/src/security_selinux.c
index db1c27d..c2015a1 100644
--- a/src/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security_selinux.c
@@ -280,10 +280,19 @@ static int
SELinuxSetFilecon(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path, char *tcon)
{
char ebuf[1024];
+ security_context_t econ;
VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon);
- if(setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
+ if (setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
+ if (getfilecon(path, &econ) >= 0) {
+ if (STREQ(tcon, econ)) {
+ freecon(econ);
+ /* It's alright, there's nothing to change anyway. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ freecon(econ);
+ }
virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
_("%s: unable to set security context "
"'\%s\' on %s: %s."), __func__,
--
1.6.2.5
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: libvir-list@redhat.com
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2009 15:09:05 +0100
Subject: [libvirt] PATCH: Enable migration with QEMU >= 0.10.0
The KVM migration code was added to QEMU for the 0.10.0 release, so we
should enable this in libvirt now.
Daniel
diff -r be7993675e07 src/qemu_conf.c
--- a/src/qemu_conf.c Thu Apr 30 14:49:27 2009 +0100
+++ b/src/qemu_conf.c Thu Apr 30 15:08:45 2009 +0100
@@ -472,16 +472,13 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *
/*
* Handling of -incoming arg with varying features
- * -incoming tcp (kvm >= 79)
- * -incoming exec (kvm >= 80)
+ * -incoming tcp (kvm >= 79, qemu >= 0.10.0)
+ * -incoming exec (kvm >= 80, qemu >= 0.10.0)
* -incoming stdio (all earlier kvm)
*
* NB, there was a pre-kvm-79 'tcp' support, but it
* was broken, because it blocked the monitor console
* while waiting for data, so pretend it doesn't exist
- *
- * XXX when next QEMU release after 0.9.1 arrives,
- * we'll need to add MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP/EXEC here too
*/
if (kvm_version >= 79) {
flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP;
@@ -489,6 +486,9 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *
flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_EXEC;
} else if (kvm_version > 0) {
flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_KVM_STDIO;
+ } else if (version >= 10000) {
+ flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_TCP;
+ flags |= QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_MIGRATE_QEMU_EXEC;
}
if (retversion)
--
+144
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
From e7be6cc841a5652b73ddd2ccd3769c7f8bbad13d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 16:41:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix interrupting of main event thread & protect against accidental uniniitalized variables
---
qemud/event.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/qemud/event.c b/qemud/event.c
index 65f548e..754f2b1 100644
--- a/qemud/event.c
+++ b/qemud/event.c
@@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ struct virEventLoop {
static struct virEventLoop eventLoop;
/* Unique ID for the next FD watch to be registered */
-static int nextWatch = 0;
+static int nextWatch = 1;
/* Unique ID for the next timer to be registered */
-static int nextTimer = 0;
+static int nextTimer = 1;
static void virEventLock(void)
{
@@ -143,15 +143,22 @@ int virEventAddHandleImpl(int fd, int events,
void virEventUpdateHandleImpl(int watch, int events) {
int i;
+ EVENT_DEBUG("Update handle w=%d e=%d", watch, events);
+
+ if (watch <= 0) {
+ VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid update watch %d", watch);
+ return;
+ }
+
virEventLock();
for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
if (eventLoop.handles[i].watch == watch) {
eventLoop.handles[i].events =
virEventHandleTypeToPollEvent(events);
+ virEventInterruptLocked();
break;
}
}
- virEventInterruptLocked();
virEventUnlock();
}
@@ -164,6 +171,12 @@ void virEventUpdateHandleImpl(int watch, int events) {
int virEventRemoveHandleImpl(int watch) {
int i;
EVENT_DEBUG("Remove handle %d", watch);
+
+ if (watch <= 0) {
+ VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid remove watch %d", watch);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
virEventLock();
for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
@@ -172,11 +185,11 @@ int virEventRemoveHandleImpl(int watch) {
if (eventLoop.handles[i].watch == watch) {
EVENT_DEBUG("mark delete %d %d", i, eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
eventLoop.handles[i].deleted = 1;
+ virEventInterruptLocked();
virEventUnlock();
return 0;
}
}
- virEventInterruptLocked();
virEventUnlock();
return -1;
}
@@ -232,6 +245,12 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
struct timeval tv;
int i;
EVENT_DEBUG("Updating timer %d timeout with %d ms freq", timer, frequency);
+
+ if (timer <= 0) {
+ VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid update timer %d", timer);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) < 0) {
return;
}
@@ -244,10 +263,10 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
frequency >= 0 ? frequency +
(((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec)*1000) +
(((unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec)/1000) : 0;
+ virEventInterruptLocked();
break;
}
}
- virEventInterruptLocked();
virEventUnlock();
}
@@ -260,6 +279,12 @@ void virEventUpdateTimeoutImpl(int timer, int frequency) {
int virEventRemoveTimeoutImpl(int timer) {
int i;
EVENT_DEBUG("Remove timer %d", timer);
+
+ if (timer <= 0) {
+ VIR_WARN("Ignoring invalid remove timer %d", timer);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
virEventLock();
for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.timeoutsCount ; i++) {
if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted)
@@ -267,11 +292,11 @@ int virEventRemoveTimeoutImpl(int timer) {
if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].timer == timer) {
eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted = 1;
+ virEventInterruptLocked();
virEventUnlock();
return 0;
}
}
- virEventInterruptLocked();
virEventUnlock();
return -1;
}
@@ -617,9 +642,12 @@ static int virEventInterruptLocked(void)
char c = '\0';
if (!eventLoop.running ||
- pthread_self() == eventLoop.leader)
+ pthread_self() == eventLoop.leader) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("Skip interrupt, %d %d", eventLoop.running, (int)eventLoop.leader);
return 0;
+ }
+ VIR_DEBUG0("Interrupting");
if (safewrite(eventLoop.wakeupfd[1], &c, sizeof(c)) != sizeof(c))
return -1;
return 0;
--
1.6.0.6
+197
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
From 6483ee77ed12f037d68a6adc690624fa1b508dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 16:43:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix watch/timer event deletion
---
qemud/event.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
1 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
diff --git a/qemud/event.c b/qemud/event.c
index 754f2b1..a57d967 100644
--- a/qemud/event.c
+++ b/qemud/event.c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static int virEventCalculateTimeout(int *timeout) {
EVENT_DEBUG("Calculate expiry of %d timers", eventLoop.timeoutsCount);
/* Figure out if we need a timeout */
for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.timeoutsCount ; i++) {
- if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].deleted || eventLoop.timeouts[i].frequency < 0)
+ if (eventLoop.timeouts[i].frequency < 0)
continue;
EVENT_DEBUG("Got a timeout scheduled for %llu", eventLoop.timeouts[i].expiresAt);
@@ -350,32 +350,26 @@ static int virEventCalculateTimeout(int *timeout) {
* file handles. The caller must free the returned data struct
* returns: the pollfd array, or NULL on error
*/
-static int virEventMakePollFDs(struct pollfd **retfds) {
+static struct pollfd *virEventMakePollFDs(void) {
struct pollfd *fds;
- int i, nfds = 0;
+ int i;
- for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
- if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
- continue;
- nfds++;
- }
- *retfds = NULL;
/* Setup the poll file handle data structs */
- if (VIR_ALLOC_N(fds, nfds) < 0)
- return -1;
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(fds, eventLoop.handlesCount) < 0)
+ return NULL;
- for (i = 0, nfds = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
- if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted)
- continue;
- fds[nfds].fd = eventLoop.handles[i].fd;
- fds[nfds].events = eventLoop.handles[i].events;
- fds[nfds].revents = 0;
+ for (i = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount ; i++) {
+ EVENT_DEBUG("Prepare n=%d w=%d, f=%d e=%d", i,
+ eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
+ eventLoop.handles[i].fd,
+ eventLoop.handles[i].events);
+ fds[i].fd = eventLoop.handles[i].fd;
+ fds[i].events = eventLoop.handles[i].events;
+ fds[i].revents = 0;
//EVENT_DEBUG("Wait for %d %d", eventLoop.handles[i].fd, eventLoop.handles[i].events);
- nfds++;
}
- *retfds = fds;
- return nfds;
+ return fds;
}
@@ -435,26 +429,30 @@ static int virEventDispatchTimeouts(void) {
* Returns 0 upon success, -1 if an error occurred
*/
static int virEventDispatchHandles(int nfds, struct pollfd *fds) {
- int i, n;
+ int i;
- for (i = 0, n = 0 ; i < eventLoop.handlesCount && n < nfds ; i++) {
+ /* NB, use nfds not eventLoop.handlesCount, because new
+ * fds might be added on end of list, and they're not
+ * in the fds array we've got */
+ for (i = 0 ; i < nfds ; i++) {
if (eventLoop.handles[i].deleted) {
- EVENT_DEBUG("Skip deleted %d", eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
+ EVENT_DEBUG("Skip deleted n=%d w=%d f=%d", i,
+ eventLoop.handles[i].watch, eventLoop.handles[i].fd);
continue;
}
- if (fds[n].revents) {
+ if (fds[i].revents) {
virEventHandleCallback cb = eventLoop.handles[i].cb;
void *opaque = eventLoop.handles[i].opaque;
- int hEvents = virPollEventToEventHandleType(fds[n].revents);
- EVENT_DEBUG("Dispatch %d %d %p", fds[n].fd,
- fds[n].revents, eventLoop.handles[i].opaque);
+ int hEvents = virPollEventToEventHandleType(fds[i].revents);
+ EVENT_DEBUG("Dispatch n=%d f=%d w=%d e=%d %p", i,
+ fds[i].fd, eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
+ fds[i].revents, eventLoop.handles[i].opaque);
virEventUnlock();
(cb)(eventLoop.handles[i].watch,
- fds[n].fd, hEvents, opaque);
+ fds[i].fd, hEvents, opaque);
virEventLock();
}
- n++;
}
return 0;
@@ -545,22 +543,21 @@ static int virEventCleanupHandles(void) {
* at least one file handle has an event, or a timer expires
*/
int virEventRunOnce(void) {
- struct pollfd *fds;
+ struct pollfd *fds = NULL;
int ret, timeout, nfds;
virEventLock();
eventLoop.running = 1;
eventLoop.leader = pthread_self();
- if ((nfds = virEventMakePollFDs(&fds)) < 0) {
- virEventUnlock();
- return -1;
- }
- if (virEventCalculateTimeout(&timeout) < 0) {
- VIR_FREE(fds);
- virEventUnlock();
- return -1;
- }
+ if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0 ||
+ virEventCleanupHandles() < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!(fds = virEventMakePollFDs()) ||
+ virEventCalculateTimeout(&timeout) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ nfds = eventLoop.handlesCount;
virEventUnlock();
@@ -572,38 +569,31 @@ int virEventRunOnce(void) {
if (errno == EINTR) {
goto retry;
}
- VIR_FREE(fds);
- return -1;
+ goto error_unlocked;
}
virEventLock();
- if (virEventDispatchTimeouts() < 0) {
- VIR_FREE(fds);
- virEventUnlock();
- return -1;
- }
+ if (virEventDispatchTimeouts() < 0)
+ goto error;
if (ret > 0 &&
- virEventDispatchHandles(nfds, fds) < 0) {
- VIR_FREE(fds);
- virEventUnlock();
- return -1;
- }
- VIR_FREE(fds);
-
- if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0) {
- virEventUnlock();
- return -1;
- }
+ virEventDispatchHandles(nfds, fds) < 0)
+ goto error;
- if (virEventCleanupHandles() < 0) {
- virEventUnlock();
- return -1;
- }
+ if (virEventCleanupTimeouts() < 0 ||
+ virEventCleanupHandles() < 0)
+ goto error;
eventLoop.running = 0;
virEventUnlock();
+ VIR_FREE(fds);
return 0;
+
+error:
+ virEventUnlock();
+error_unlocked:
+ VIR_FREE(fds);
+ return -1;
}
static void virEventHandleWakeup(int watch ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
--
1.6.0.6
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
From 80965bff6d46dea1808c8bbf02f50f0e289a0e65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2009 10:41:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash in QEMU driver with bad capabilities data
---
src/qemu_driver.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff -up libvirt-0.6.2/src/qemu_driver.c.bad-caps libvirt-0.6.2/src/qemu_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/qemu_driver.c.bad-caps 2009-07-03 10:07:03.275252815 +0100
+++ libvirt-0.6.2/src/qemu_driver.c 2009-07-03 10:08:52.143502961 +0100
@@ -360,12 +360,43 @@ next:
return 0;
}
+
+static int
+qemudSecurityCapsInit(virSecurityDriverPtr secdrv,
+ virCapsPtr caps)
+{
+ const char *doi, *model;
+
+ doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(secdrv);
+ model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(secdrv);
+
+ caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model);
+ if (!caps->host.secModel.model) {
+ char ebuf[1024];
+ VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to copy secModel model: %s"),
+ virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi);
+ if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) {
+ char ebuf[1024];
+ VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to copy secModel DOI: %s"),
+ virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ VIR_DEBUG("Initialized caps for security driver \"%s\" with "
+ "DOI \"%s\"", model, doi);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
static int
qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
{
int ret;
- const char *doi, *model;
- virCapsPtr caps;
virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv,
@@ -381,36 +412,17 @@ qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *q
}
qemud_drv->securityDriver = security_drv;
- doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(security_drv);
- model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(security_drv);
- VIR_DEBUG("Initialized security driver \"%s\" with "
- "DOI \"%s\"", model, doi);
+ VIR_INFO("Initialized security driver %s", security_drv->name);
/*
* Add security policy host caps now that the security driver is
* initialized.
*/
- caps = qemud_drv->caps;
-
- caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model);
- if (!caps->host.secModel.model) {
- char ebuf[1024];
- VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to copy secModel model: %s"),
- virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
- return -1;
- }
+ return qemudSecurityCapsInit(security_drv, qemud_drv->caps);
+}
- caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi);
- if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) {
- char ebuf[1024];
- VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to copy secModel DOI: %s"),
- virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
/**
* qemudStartup:
@@ -1852,13 +1864,29 @@ static int qemudGetNodeInfo(virConnectPt
static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
+ virCapsPtr caps;
char *xml = NULL;
qemuDriverLock(driver);
+ if ((caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL) {
+ virReportOOMError(conn);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (qemu_driver->securityDriver &&
+ qemudSecurityCapsInit(qemu_driver->securityDriver, caps) < 0) {
+ virCapabilitiesFree(caps);
+ virReportOOMError(conn);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
- if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL ||
- (xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
+ qemu_driver->caps = caps;
+
+ if ((xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
virReportOOMError(conn);
+
+cleanup:
qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
return xml;
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff -rup libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c new/src/security_selinux.c
--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c 2009-05-10 22:04:25.000000000 -0400
+++ new/src/security_selinux.c 2009-05-10 22:06:09.000000000 -0400
@@ -338,6 +338,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectP
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ if (!disk->src)
+ return 0;
+
if (disk->shared) {
return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
} else if (disk->readonly) {
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From 2b3fcdc378e7bec5c1a78b81632756e92930fd24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2009 15:14:24 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Fix QEMU ARGV detection with kvm >= 85
---
src/qemu_conf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
src/qemu_driver.c | 12 ++----------
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
index 9cb71eb..a57d3ab 100644
--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
+++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
@@ -431,18 +431,28 @@ int qemudExtractVersionInfo(const char *qemu,
return -1;
char *help = NULL;
- enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 8192 };
+ enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 1024*64 };
int len = virFileReadLimFD(newstdout, MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE, &help);
- if (len < 0)
+ if (len < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(NULL, errno, "%s",
+ _("Unable to read QEMU help output"));
goto cleanup2;
+ }
if (sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u (kvm-%u)",
&major, &minor, &micro, &kvm_version) != 4)
kvm_version = 0;
- if (!kvm_version && sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u",
- &major, &minor, &micro) != 3)
+ if (!kvm_version &&
+ sscanf(help, "QEMU PC emulator version %u.%u.%u",
+ &major, &minor, &micro) != 3) {
+ char *eol = strchr(help, '\n');
+ if (eol) *eol = '\0';
+ qemudReportError(NULL, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("cannot parse QEMU version number in '%s'"),
+ help);
goto cleanup2;
+ }
version = (major * 1000 * 1000) + (minor * 1000) + micro;
diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
index 30642d5..bd60b29 100644
--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
@@ -1391,12 +1391,8 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator,
NULL,
- &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
- qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- _("Cannot determine QEMU argv syntax %s"),
- emulator);
+ &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
goto cleanup;
- }
if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(conn, vm->def) < 0)
goto cleanup;
@@ -3715,12 +3711,8 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(virConnectPtr conn,
if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(vm->def->emulator,
NULL,
- &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
- qemudReportError(conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- _("Cannot determine QEMU argv syntax %s"),
- vm->def->emulator);
+ &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
return -1;
- }
if (qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DRIVE) {
if (!(devname = qemudDiskDeviceName(conn, newdisk)))
--
1.6.0.6
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
From c3b3f6005d45552d01823504925eb587889cf25a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 29 May 2009 14:34:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Avoid double-free in daemon client cleanup code
---
qemud/qemud.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/qemud/qemud.c b/qemud/qemud.c
index 1375560..783dc69 100644
--- a/qemud/qemud.c
+++ b/qemud/qemud.c
@@ -1397,7 +1397,10 @@ static int qemudDispatchServer(struct qemud_server *server, struct qemud_socket
* jobs have finished, then clean it up elsehwere
*/
void qemudDispatchClientFailure(struct qemud_client *client) {
- virEventRemoveHandleImpl(client->watch);
+ if (client->watch != -1) {
+ virEventRemoveHandleImpl(client->watch);
+ client->watch = -1;
+ }
/* Deregister event delivery callback */
if(client->conn) {
@@ -1406,12 +1406,21 @@ void qemudDispatchClientFailure(struct qemud_client *client) {
}
#if HAVE_SASL
- if (client->saslconn) sasl_dispose(&client->saslconn);
+ if (client->saslconn) {
+ sasl_dispose(&client->saslconn);
+ client->saslconn = NULL;
+ }
free(client->saslUsername);
+ client->saslUsername = NULL;
#endif
- if (client->tlssession) gnutls_deinit (client->tlssession);
- close(client->fd);
- client->fd = -1;
+ if (client->tlssession) {
+ gnutls_deinit (client->tlssession);
+ client->tlssession = NULL;
+ }
+ if (client->fd != -1) {
+ close(client->fd);
+ client->fd = -1;
+ }
}
--
1.6.0.6
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
From 0ae4c67ff5f1d24698c5cfc8a9719d333c892644 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 11:23:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] qemu -drive takes format= not fmt=
Seems like a simple typo - it has been "format=" since the flag
was introduced, but we added it as "fmt=".
Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
---
src/qemu_conf.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
index f36c927..6f9e610 100644
--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
+++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr conn,
disk->device == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_DISK)
virBufferAddLit(&opt, ",boot=on");
if (disk->driverType)
- virBufferVSprintf(&opt, ",fmt=%s", disk->driverType);
+ virBufferVSprintf(&opt, ",format=%s", disk->driverType);
if (disk->cachemode) {
const char *mode =
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From daf3db93457427c25325781af684758c0341a6aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 29 May 2009 13:32:06 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] PPC Qemu Machine Type update
* src/qemu_conf.c docs/schemas/domain.rng
tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml: PPC Qemu Machine Type
changed from g3bw to g3beige some time ago, patch by Thomas Baker
Daniel
---
docs/schemas/domain.rng | 2 +-
src/qemu_conf.c | 2 +-
tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/schemas/domain.rng b/docs/schemas/domain.rng
index 204c633..11cf04a 100644
--- a/docs/schemas/domain.rng
+++ b/docs/schemas/domain.rng
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
</attribute>
<attribute name="machine">
<choice>
- <value>g3bw</value>
+ <value>g3beige</value>
<value>mac99</value>
<value>prep</value>
</choice>
diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c
index 18156cd..d54f2ca 100644
--- a/src/qemu_conf.c
+++ b/src/qemu_conf.c
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static const char *const arch_info_hvm_sparc_machines[] = {
"sun4m"
};
static const char *const arch_info_hvm_ppc_machines[] = {
- "g3bw", "mac99", "prep"
+ "g3beige", "mac99", "prep"
};
static const char *const arch_info_xen_x86_machines[] = {
diff --git a/tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml b/tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml
index fd8523e..893f9ed 100644
--- a/tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml
+++ b/tests/capabilityschemadata/caps-qemu-kvm.xml
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
<arch name='ppc'>
<wordsize>32</wordsize>
<emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-ppc</emulator>
- <machine>g3bw</machine>
+ <machine>g3beige</machine>
<machine>mac99</machine>
<machine>prep</machine>
<domain type='qemu'>
--
1.6.0.6
+76
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
diff -rup libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c libvirt-0.6.2.new/src/security_selinux.c
--- libvirt-0.6.2/src/security_selinux.c 2009-04-03 15:36:56.000000000 +0100
+++ libvirt-0.6.2.new/src/security_selinux.c 2009-05-05 13:39:42.000000000 +0100
@@ -24,11 +24,12 @@
#include "virterror_internal.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "memory.h"
-
+#include "logging.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
static char default_domain_context[1024];
+static char default_content_context[1024];
static char default_image_context[1024];
#define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI "0"
#define SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME "selinux"
@@ -148,8 +149,13 @@ SELinuxInitialize(virConnectPtr conn)
close(fd);
ptr = strchrnul(default_image_context, '\n');
- *ptr = '\0';
-
+ if (*ptr == '\n') {
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ strcpy(default_content_context, ptr+1);
+ ptr = strchrnul(default_content_context, '\n');
+ if (*ptr == '\n')
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -275,6 +281,8 @@ SELinuxSetFilecon(virConnectPtr conn, co
{
char ebuf[1024];
+ VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon);
+
if(setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
_("%s: unable to set security context "
@@ -299,6 +307,8 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virConn
char *newpath = NULL;
const char *path = disk->src;
+ /* Don't restore labels on readoly/shared disks, because
+ * other VMs may still be accessing these */
if (disk->readonly || disk->shared)
return 0;
@@ -328,8 +338,13 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectP
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
- if (secdef->imagelabel)
+ if (disk->shared) {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
+ } else if (disk->readonly) {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_content_context);
+ } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -403,9 +418,6 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr co
if (secdef->imagelabel) {
for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
- if (vm->def->disks[i]->readonly ||
- vm->def->disks[i]->shared) continue;
-
if (SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(conn, vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
return -1;
}
+33
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
--- src/qemu_conf.c.orig 2009-04-02 11:50:10.000000000 +0200
+++ src/qemu_conf.c 2009-04-03 17:46:59.000000000 +0200
@@ -779,6 +779,20 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr
char domid[50];
char *pidfile;
const char *cpu = NULL;
+ int skipSound = 0;
+
+ if (driver->securityDriver &&
+ driver->securityDriver->name &&
+ STREQ(driver->securityDriver->name, "selinux") &&
+ getuid() == 0) {
+ static int soundWarned = 0;
+ skipSound = 1;
+ if (vm->def->nsounds &&
+ !soundWarned) {
+ soundWarned = 1;
+ VIR_WARN0("Sound cards for VMs are disabled while SELinux security model is active");
+ }
+ }
uname_normalize(&ut);
@@ -1425,7 +1439,8 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr
}
/* Add sound hardware */
- if (vm->def->nsounds) {
+ if (vm->def->nsounds &&
+ !skipSound) {
int size = 100;
char *modstr;
if (VIR_ALLOC_N(modstr, size+1) < 0)
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 7f7a4403860f56d5a1ad65bfd16f5bf97a971d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 13 May 2009 16:19:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] * src/buf.c: avoid an XML attribute escaping bug #499791
daniel
---
src/buf.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/buf.c b/src/buf.c
index cdcdac9..259175d 100644
--- a/src/buf.c
+++ b/src/buf.c
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ virBufferEscapeString(const virBufferPtr buf, const char *format, const char *st
return;
len = strlen(str);
- if (VIR_ALLOC_N(escaped, 5 * len + 1) < 0) {
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(escaped, 6 * len + 1) < 0) {
virBufferNoMemory(buf);
return;
}
@@ -290,6 +290,20 @@ virBufferEscapeString(const virBufferPtr buf, const char *format, const char *st
*out++ = 'm';
*out++ = 'p';
*out++ = ';';
+ } else if (*cur == '"') {
+ *out++ = '&';
+ *out++ = 'q';
+ *out++ = 'u';
+ *out++ = 'o';
+ *out++ = 't';
+ *out++ = ';';
+ } else if (*cur == '\'') {
+ *out++ = '&';
+ *out++ = 'a';
+ *out++ = 'p';
+ *out++ = 'o';
+ *out++ = 's';
+ *out++ = ';';
} else if ((*cur >= 0x20) || (*cur == '\n') || (*cur == '\t') ||
(*cur == '\r')) {
/*
--
1.6.0.6
+45
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 3d7771e0570e09096ad9391a857dad48b150bc0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 16:33:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix qemu driver's interpretation of <hostdev managed='yes'/>
This change:
Tue Mar 3 08:55:13 GMT 2009 Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Don't try to detach & reset PCI devices while running test
suite for XML-> ARGV conversion.
* src/qemu_driver.c: Add qemuPrepareHostDevices() helper to
detach and reset PCI devices.
* src/qemu_conf.c: Don't detach & reset PCI devices while
building the command line argv
accidentally did this:
- if (hostdev->managed) {
+ if (!hostdev->managed) {
Which results in managed='yes' not causing the device to be
detached when the guest is starting.
Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
---
src/qemu_driver.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
index 5898026..59312c0 100644
--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static int qemuPrepareHostDevices(virConnectPtr conn,
if (hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI)
continue;
- if (!hostdev->managed) {
+ if (hostdev->managed) {
pciDevice *dev = pciGetDevice(conn,
hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci.domain,
hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci.bus,
--
1.6.0.6
+76
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@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
commit 0e51348cb9aeafe5e2fd6469a4bde0baa1eb8720
Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Mon May 4 15:06:03 2009 -0400
Refresh QEMU driver capabilities for each getCapabilities call.
Also fix up a couple issues where caps are accessed without locking
the driver structure.
diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
index 23ea961..790dac6 100644
--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
@@ -1885,10 +1885,12 @@ static int qemudGetNodeInfo(virConnectPtr conn,
static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
- char *xml;
+ char *xml = NULL;
qemuDriverLock(driver);
- if ((xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
+ virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
+ if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL ||
+ (xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
virReportOOMError(conn);
qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
@@ -3169,20 +3171,26 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
-static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
{
struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData;
char *p;
+ int ret = 0;
- if (!driver->securityDriver)
- return -2;
+ qemuDriverLock(driver);
+ if (!driver->securityDriver) {
+ ret = -2;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model;
if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) {
qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"),
VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1);
- return -1;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
}
strcpy(secmodel->model, p);
@@ -3191,10 +3199,14 @@ static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr sec
qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"),
VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1);
- return -1;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
}
strcpy(secmodel->doi, p);
- return 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
+ return ret;
}
/* TODO: check seclabel restore */
+872 -1902
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+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
SHA512 (libvirt-4.7.0.tar.xz) = a4b320460b923508d9519c65c8be18b5013eb7ed4d581984cc5edf0d3476c34f959d69ad4ca7a0e257dac91351e11718785efc3f201d4b58fa999dbca1daac47
3035b484861516a1cd425acef1e760e3 libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz