libvirt-5.1.0-9.fc30

CVE-2019-10161: arbitrary file read/exec via virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc API (bz #1722463, bz #1720115) CVE-2019-10166: virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML API exposed to readonly clients (bz #1722462, bz #1720114) CVE-2019-10167: arbitrary command execution via virConnectGetDomainCapabilities API (bz #1722464, bz #1720117) CVE-2019-10168: arbitrary command execution via virConnectBaselineHypervisorCPU and virConnectCompareHypervisorCPU APIs (bz #1722466, bz #1720118) CVE-2019-3886: virsh domhostname command discloses guest hostname in readonly mode [fedora-rawhide Cannot start VM with a CBR 2.0 TPM device (bz #1712556) libvirtd does not update VM .xml configurations after virsh snapshot/blockcommit (bz #1722348)
Change the %post fix to match upstream
2019-06-20 12:40:47 -04:00 · 2019-05-31 08:54:40 -07:00 · 2019-05-31 08:13:41 -07:00 · 2019-05-29 12:05:17 -07:00 · 2019-05-29 11:58:54 -07:00 · 2019-05-21 17:06:01 +01:00
45 changed files with 4237 additions and 6925 deletions
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
 *.rpm
 i686
 x86_64
-libvirt-*.tar.gz
+libvirt-*.tar.xz
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:58:48 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] storage: split off code for calling rbd_list
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The rbd_list method has a quite unpleasant signature returning an
+array of strings in a single buffer instead of an array. It is
+being deprecated in favour of rbd_list2. To maintain clarity of
+code when supporting both APIs in parallel, split the rbd_list
+code out into a separate method.
+
+In splitting this we now honour the rbd_list failures.
+
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 28c8403ed07896d6d7e06d7726ed904027206719)
+---
+ src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c
+index 2b7af1db23..0865163756 100644
+--- a/src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c
+@@ -565,19 +565,68 @@ volStorageBackendRBDRefreshVolInfo(virStorageVolDefPtr vol,
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+
+static char **
+virStorageBackendRBDGetVolNames(virStorageBackendRBDStatePtr ptr)
+{
+    char **names = NULL;
+    size_t nnames = 0;
+    int rc;
+    size_t max_size = 1024;
+    VIR_AUTOFREE(char *) namebuf = NULL;
+    const char *name;
+
+    while (true) {
+        if (VIR_ALLOC_N(namebuf, max_size) < 0)
+            goto error;
+
+        rc = rbd_list(ptr->ioctx, namebuf, &max_size);
+        if (rc >= 0)
+            break;
+        if (rc != -ERANGE) {
+            virReportSystemError(-rc, "%s", _("Unable to list RBD images"));
+            goto error;
+        }
+        VIR_FREE(namebuf);
+    }
+
+    for (name = namebuf; name < namebuf + max_size;) {
+        VIR_AUTOFREE(char *) namedup = NULL;
+
+        if (STREQ(name, ""))
+            break;
+
+        if (VIR_STRDUP(namedup, name) < 0)
+            goto error;
+
+        if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(names, nnames, namedup) < 0)
+            goto error;
+
+        name += strlen(name) + 1;
+    }
+
+    if (VIR_EXPAND_N(names, nnames, 1) < 0)
+        goto error;
+
+    return names;
+
+ error:
+    virStringListFreeCount(names, nnames);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+ static int
+ virStorageBackendRBDRefreshPool(virStoragePoolObjPtr pool)
+ {
+-    size_t max_size = 1024;
+     int ret = -1;
+-    int len = -1;
+     int r = 0;
+-    char *name;
+     virStoragePoolDefPtr def = virStoragePoolObjGetDef(pool);
+     virStorageBackendRBDStatePtr ptr = NULL;
+     struct rados_cluster_stat_t clusterstat;
+     struct rados_pool_stat_t poolstat;
+-    VIR_AUTOFREE(char *) names = NULL;
+    char **names = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+ 
+     if (!(ptr = virStorageBackendRBDNewState(pool)))
+         goto cleanup;
+@@ -602,33 +651,16 @@ virStorageBackendRBDRefreshPool(virStoragePoolObjPtr pool)
+               def->source.name, clusterstat.kb, clusterstat.kb_avail,
+               poolstat.num_bytes);
+ 
+-    while (true) {
+-        if (VIR_ALLOC_N(names, max_size) < 0)
+-            goto cleanup;
+-
+-        len = rbd_list(ptr->ioctx, names, &max_size);
+-        if (len >= 0)
+-            break;
+-        if (len != -ERANGE) {
+-            VIR_WARN("%s", "A problem occurred while listing RBD images");
+-            goto cleanup;
+-        }
+-        VIR_FREE(names);
+-    }
+    if (!(names = virStorageBackendRBDGetVolNames(ptr)))
+        goto cleanup;
+ 
+-    for (name = names; name < names + max_size;) {
+    for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++) {
+         VIR_AUTOPTR(virStorageVolDef) vol = NULL;
+ 
+-        if (STREQ(name, ""))
+-            break;
+-
+         if (VIR_ALLOC(vol) < 0)
+             goto cleanup;
+ 
+-        if (VIR_STRDUP(vol->name, name) < 0)
+-            goto cleanup;
+-
+-        name += strlen(name) + 1;
+        VIR_STEAL_PTR(vol->name, names[i]);
+ 
+         r = volStorageBackendRBDRefreshVolInfo(vol, pool, ptr);
+ 
+@@ -661,6 +693,7 @@ virStorageBackendRBDRefreshPool(virStoragePoolObjPtr pool)
+     ret = 0;
+ 
+  cleanup:
+    virStringListFree(names);
+     virStorageBackendRBDFreeState(&ptr);
+     return ret;
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:11:38 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] storage: add support for new rbd_list2 method
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The rbd_list method has been deprecated in Ceph >= 14.0.0
+in favour of the new rbd_list2 method which populates an
+array of structs.
+
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3aa190f2a43a632b542a6ba751a6c3ab4d51f1dd)
+---
+ m4/virt-storage-rbd.m4            |  1 +
+ src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/m4/virt-storage-rbd.m4 b/m4/virt-storage-rbd.m4
+index 17e2115309..f3d9d04908 100644
+--- a/m4/virt-storage-rbd.m4
+++ b/m4/virt-storage-rbd.m4
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([LIBVIRT_STORAGE_CHECK_RBD], [
+       old_LIBS="$LIBS"
+       LIBS="$LIBS $LIBRBD_LIBS"
+       AC_CHECK_FUNCS([rbd_get_features],[],[LIBRBD_FOUND=no])
+      AC_CHECK_FUNCS([rbd_list2])
+       LIBS="$old_LIBS"
+     fi
+ 
+diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c
+index 0865163756..bfc3419f9c 100644
+--- a/src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c
+@@ -566,6 +566,48 @@ volStorageBackendRBDRefreshVolInfo(virStorageVolDefPtr vol,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_RBD_LIST2
+static char **
+virStorageBackendRBDGetVolNames(virStorageBackendRBDStatePtr ptr)
+{
+    char **names = NULL;
+    size_t nnames = 0;
+    int rc;
+    rbd_image_spec_t *images = NULL;
+    size_t nimages = 16;
+    size_t i;
+
+    while (true) {
+        if (VIR_ALLOC_N(images, nimages) < 0)
+            goto error;
+
+        rc = rbd_list2(ptr->ioctx, images, &nimages);
+        if (rc >= 0)
+            break;
+        if (rc != -ERANGE) {
+            virReportSystemError(-rc, "%s", _("Unable to list RBD images"));
+            goto error;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(names, nimages + 1) < 0)
+        goto error;
+    nnames = nimages;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < nimages; i++)
+        VIR_STEAL_PTR(names[i], images->name);
+
+    return names;
+
+ error:
+    virStringListFreeCount(names, nnames);
+    rbd_image_spec_list_cleanup(images, nimages);
+    VIR_FREE(images);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#else /* ! HAVE_RBD_LIST2 */
+
+ static char **
+ virStorageBackendRBDGetVolNames(virStorageBackendRBDStatePtr ptr)
+ {
+@@ -614,6 +656,7 @@ virStorageBackendRBDGetVolNames(virStorageBackendRBDStatePtr ptr)
+     virStringListFreeCount(names, nnames);
+     return NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* ! HAVE_RBD_LIST2 */
+ 
+ 
+ static int
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 17:31:21 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] network: improve error report when firewall chain creation
+ fails
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+During startup we create some top level chains in which all
+virtual network firewall rules will be placed. The upfront
+creation is done to avoid slowing down creation of individual
+virtual networks by checking for chain existance every time.
+
+There are some factors which can cause this upfront creation
+to fail and while a message will get into the libvirtd log
+this won't be seen by users who later try to start a virtual
+network. Instead they'll just get a message saying that the
+libvirt top level chain does not exist. This message is
+accurate, but unhelpful for solving the root cause.
+
+This patch thus saves any error during daemon startup and
+reports it when trying to create a virtual network later.
+
+Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 9f4e35dc73ec9e940aa61bc7c140c2b800218ef3)
+---
+ src/network/bridge_driver.c          |  3 +--
+ src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c    | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c      |  3 +--
+ src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver.c b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+index b3ca5b8a15..1da60f0a21 100644
+--- a/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+@@ -2108,8 +2108,7 @@ static void
+ networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup)
+ {
+     VIR_INFO("Reloading iptables rules");
+-    if (networkPreReloadFirewallRules(startup) < 0)
+-        return;
+    networkPreReloadFirewallRules(startup);
+     virNetworkObjListForEach(driver->networks,
+                              networkReloadFirewallRulesHelper,
+                              NULL);
+diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
+index b10d0a6c4d..c899f4b6d0 100644
+--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
+@@ -35,11 +35,25 @@ VIR_LOG_INIT("network.bridge_driver_linux");
+ 
+ #define PROC_NET_ROUTE "/proc/net/route"
+ 
+-int networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup)
+static virErrorPtr errInit;
+
+void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup)
+ {
+-    int ret = iptablesSetupPrivateChains();
+-    if (ret < 0)
+-        return -1;
+    int rc;
+
+    /* We create global rules upfront as we don't want
+     * the perf hit of conditionally figuring out whether
+     * to create them each time a network is started.
+     *
+     * Any errors here are saved to be reported at time
+     * of starting the network though as that makes them
+     * more likely to be seen by a human
+     */
+    rc = iptablesSetupPrivateChains();
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        errInit = virSaveLastError();
+        virResetLastError();
+    }
+ 
+     /*
+      * If this is initial startup, and we just created the
+@@ -54,10 +68,8 @@ int networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup)
+      * rules will be present. Thus we can safely just tell it
+      * to always delete from the builin chain
+      */
+-    if (startup && ret == 1)
+    if (startup && rc == 1)
+         iptablesSetDeletePrivate(false);
+-
+-    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -671,6 +683,11 @@ int networkAddFirewallRules(virNetworkDefPtr def)
+     virFirewallPtr fw = NULL;
+     int ret = -1;
+ 
+    if (errInit) {
+        virSetError(errInit);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+     if (def->bridgeZone) {
+ 
+         /* if a firewalld zone has been specified, fail/log an error
+diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
+index a0e57012f9..ea9db338cb 100644
+--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
+@@ -19,9 +19,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <config.h>
+ 
+-int networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+ {
+-    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h b/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
+index baeb22bc3e..95fd64bdc7 100644
+--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct _virNetworkDriverState {
+ typedef struct _virNetworkDriverState virNetworkDriverState;
+ typedef virNetworkDriverState *virNetworkDriverStatePtr;
+ 
+-int networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup);
+void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup);
+ void networkPostReloadFirewallRules(bool startup);
+ 
+ int networkCheckRouteCollision(virNetworkDefPtr def);
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 16:49:32 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] network: split setup of ipv4 and ipv6 top level chains
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+During startup libvirtd creates top level chains for both ipv4
+and ipv6 protocols. If this fails for any reason then startup
+of virtual networks is blocked.
+
+The default virtual network, however, only requires use of ipv4
+and some servers have ipv6 disabled so it is expected that ipv6
+chain creation will fail. There could equally be servers with
+no ipv4, only ipv6.
+
+This patch thus makes error reporting a little more fine grained
+so that it works more sensibly when either ipv4 or ipv6 is
+disabled on the server. Only the protocols that are actually
+used by the virtual network have errors reported.
+
+Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 686803a1a2e1e0641916b1c9e2c7e3910fe598d4)
+---
+ src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ src/util/viriptables.c            | 14 ++++---------
+ src/util/viriptables.h            |  2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
+index c899f4b6d0..50fc197134 100644
+--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
+@@ -35,10 +35,12 @@ VIR_LOG_INIT("network.bridge_driver_linux");
+ 
+ #define PROC_NET_ROUTE "/proc/net/route"
+ 
+-static virErrorPtr errInit;
+static virErrorPtr errInitV4;
+static virErrorPtr errInitV6;
+ 
+ void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup)
+ {
+    bool created = false;
+     int rc;
+ 
+     /* We create global rules upfront as we don't want
+@@ -49,11 +51,21 @@ void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup)
+      * of starting the network though as that makes them
+      * more likely to be seen by a human
+      */
+-    rc = iptablesSetupPrivateChains();
+    rc = iptablesSetupPrivateChains(VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV4);
+     if (rc < 0) {
+-        errInit = virSaveLastError();
+        errInitV4 = virSaveLastError();
+         virResetLastError();
+     }
+    if (rc)
+        created = true;
+
+    rc = iptablesSetupPrivateChains(VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV6);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        errInitV6 = virSaveLastError();
+        virResetLastError();
+    }
+    if (rc)
+        created = true;
+ 
+     /*
+      * If this is initial startup, and we just created the
+@@ -68,7 +80,7 @@ void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(bool startup)
+      * rules will be present. Thus we can safely just tell it
+      * to always delete from the builin chain
+      */
+-    if (startup && rc == 1)
+    if (startup && created)
+         iptablesSetDeletePrivate(false);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -683,8 +695,18 @@ int networkAddFirewallRules(virNetworkDefPtr def)
+     virFirewallPtr fw = NULL;
+     int ret = -1;
+ 
+-    if (errInit) {
+-        virSetError(errInit);
+    if (errInitV4 &&
+        (virNetworkDefGetIPByIndex(def, AF_INET, 0) ||
+         virNetworkDefGetRouteByIndex(def, AF_INET, 0))) {
+        virSetError(errInitV4);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (errInitV6 &&
+        (virNetworkDefGetIPByIndex(def, AF_INET6, 0) ||
+         virNetworkDefGetRouteByIndex(def, AF_INET6, 0) ||
+         def->ipv6nogw)) {
+        virSetError(errInitV6);
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/util/viriptables.c b/src/util/viriptables.c
+index d67b640a3b..0e3c0ad73a 100644
+--- a/src/util/viriptables.c
+++ b/src/util/viriptables.c
+@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ iptablesPrivateChainCreate(virFirewallPtr fw,
+ 
+ 
+ int
+-iptablesSetupPrivateChains(void)
+iptablesSetupPrivateChains(virFirewallLayer layer)
+ {
+     virFirewallPtr fw = NULL;
+     int ret = -1;
+@@ -143,17 +143,11 @@ iptablesSetupPrivateChains(void)
+     };
+     bool changed = false;
+     iptablesGlobalChainData data[] = {
+-        { VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV4, "filter",
+        { layer, "filter",
+           filter_chains, ARRAY_CARDINALITY(filter_chains), &changed },
+-        { VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV4, "nat",
+        { layer, "nat",
+           natmangle_chains, ARRAY_CARDINALITY(natmangle_chains), &changed },
+-        { VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV4, "mangle",
+-          natmangle_chains, ARRAY_CARDINALITY(natmangle_chains), &changed },
+-        { VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV6, "filter",
+-          filter_chains, ARRAY_CARDINALITY(filter_chains), &changed },
+-        { VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV6, "nat",
+-          natmangle_chains, ARRAY_CARDINALITY(natmangle_chains), &changed },
+-        { VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV6, "mangle",
+        { layer, "mangle",
+           natmangle_chains, ARRAY_CARDINALITY(natmangle_chains), &changed },
+     };
+     size_t i;
+diff --git a/src/util/viriptables.h b/src/util/viriptables.h
+index 903f390f89..e680407ec8 100644
+--- a/src/util/viriptables.h
+++ b/src/util/viriptables.h
+@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
+ # include "virsocketaddr.h"
+ # include "virfirewall.h"
+ 
+-int              iptablesSetupPrivateChains      (void);
+int              iptablesSetupPrivateChains      (virFirewallLayer layer);
+ 
+ void             iptablesSetDeletePrivate        (bool pvt);
+ 
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 16:21:15 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] network: avoid trying to create global firewall rules if
+ unprivileged
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The unprivileged libvirtd does not have permission to create firewall
+rules, or bridge devices, or do anything to the host network in
+general. Historically we still activate the network driver though and
+let the network start API call fail.
+
+The startup code path which reloads firewall rules on active networks
+would thus effectively be a no-op when unprivileged as it is impossible
+for there to be any active networks
+
+With the change to use a global set of firewall chains, however, we now
+have code that is run unconditionally.
+
+Ideally we would not register the network driver at all when
+unprivileged, but the entanglement with the virt drivers currently makes
+that impractical. As a temporary hack, we just make the firewall reload
+into a no-op.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5d010c3df6152cf5fb00f1f67d22151241f4a8a2)
+---
+ src/network/bridge_driver.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver.c b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+index 1da60f0a21..0e1d5efd8e 100644
+--- a/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+@@ -2108,6 +2108,10 @@ static void
+ networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup)
+ {
+     VIR_INFO("Reloading iptables rules");
+    /* Ideally we'd not even register the driver when unprivilegd
+     * but until we untangle the virt driver that's not viable */
+    if (!driver->privileged)
+        return;
+     networkPreReloadFirewallRules(startup);
+     virNetworkObjListForEach(driver->networks,
+                              networkReloadFirewallRulesHelper,
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:41:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Allow creating ppc64 guests with graphics and no USB
+ mouse
+
+The existing behavior for ppc64 guests is to always add a USB
+keyboard and mouse combo if graphics are present; unfortunately,
+this means any attempt to use a USB tablet will cause both pointing
+devices to show up in the guest, which in turn will result in poor
+user experience.
+
+We can't just stop adding the USB mouse or start adding a USB tablet
+instead, because existing applications and users might rely on the
+current behavior; however, we can avoid adding the USB mouse if a USB
+tablet is already present, thus allowing users and applications to
+create guests that contain a single pointing device.
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1683681
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 186bb479d0f409dc75175bea48a760838c479a6c)
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_domain.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c b/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c
+index 59fe1eb401..915795ab84 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c
+@@ -3476,6 +3476,26 @@ qemuDomainDefAddDefaultDevices(virDomainDefPtr def,
+         virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_VIRTIO_S390) && def->memballoon)
+         def->memballoon->model = VIR_DOMAIN_MEMBALLOON_MODEL_NONE;
+ 
+    if (addDefaultUSBMouse) {
+        bool hasUSBTablet = false;
+        size_t j;
+
+        for (j = 0; j < def->ninputs; j++) {
+            if (def->inputs[j]->type == VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_TABLET &&
+                def->inputs[j]->bus == VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_BUS_USB) {
+                hasUSBTablet = true;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* Historically, we have automatically added USB keyboard and
+         * mouse to some guests. While the former device is generally
+         * safe to have, adding the latter is undesiderable if a USB
+         * tablet is already present in the guest */
+        if (hasUSBTablet)
+            addDefaultUSBMouse = false;
+    }
+
+     if (addDefaultUSBKBD &&
+         def->ngraphics > 0 &&
+         virDomainDefMaybeAddInput(def,
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 15:42:51 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] util: implement virCgroupV2(Set|Get)CpusetMems
+
+Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 74e7da060543a87610b42fc6ba26a45b0a6e3974)
+---
+ src/util/vircgroupv2.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+index e0fa8e1cc0..4cfbd52f2d 100644
+--- a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+++ b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+@@ -1561,6 +1561,28 @@ virCgroupV2GetCpuacctStat(virCgroupPtr group,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+static int
+virCgroupV2SetCpusetMems(virCgroupPtr group,
+                         const char *mems)
+{
+    return virCgroupSetValueStr(group,
+                                VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET,
+                                "cpuset.mems",
+                                mems);
+}
+
+
+static int
+virCgroupV2GetCpusetMems(virCgroupPtr group,
+                         char **mems)
+{
+    return virCgroupGetValueStr(group,
+                                VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET,
+                                "cpuset.mems",
+                                mems);
+}
+
+
+ virCgroupBackend virCgroupV2Backend = {
+     .type = VIR_CGROUP_BACKEND_TYPE_V2,
+ 
+@@ -1620,6 +1642,9 @@ virCgroupBackend virCgroupV2Backend = {
+ 
+     .getCpuacctUsage = virCgroupV2GetCpuacctUsage,
+     .getCpuacctStat = virCgroupV2GetCpuacctStat,
+
+    .setCpusetMems = virCgroupV2SetCpusetMems,
+    .getCpusetMems = virCgroupV2GetCpusetMems,
+ };
+ 
+ 
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 15:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] util: implement virCgroupV2(Set|Get)CpusetMemoryMigrate
+
+Cgroups v2 don't have memory_migrate interface and the migration is
+enabled by default.
+
+Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 77c1cf4da2f761a91756c09fa4fd37ae1802e650)
+---
+ src/util/vircgroupv2.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+index 4cfbd52f2d..f3aa6ebc48 100644
+--- a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+++ b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+@@ -1583,6 +1583,23 @@ virCgroupV2GetCpusetMems(virCgroupPtr group,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+static int
+virCgroupV2SetCpusetMemoryMigrate(virCgroupPtr group ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                  bool migrate ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+virCgroupV2GetCpusetMemoryMigrate(virCgroupPtr group ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                  bool *migrate)
+{
+    *migrate = true;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+ virCgroupBackend virCgroupV2Backend = {
+     .type = VIR_CGROUP_BACKEND_TYPE_V2,
+ 
+@@ -1645,6 +1662,8 @@ virCgroupBackend virCgroupV2Backend = {
+ 
+     .setCpusetMems = virCgroupV2SetCpusetMems,
+     .getCpusetMems = virCgroupV2GetCpusetMems,
+    .setCpusetMemoryMigrate = virCgroupV2SetCpusetMemoryMigrate,
+    .getCpusetMemoryMigrate = virCgroupV2GetCpusetMemoryMigrate,
+ };
+ 
+ 
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 15:55:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] util: implement virCgroupV2(Set|Get)CpusetCpus
+
+Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3b72c84ff1c1b8b393ba9c2ccb004f8eb1ebda95)
+---
+ src/util/vircgroupv2.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+index f3aa6ebc48..25afab1cad 100644
+--- a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+++ b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+@@ -1600,6 +1600,28 @@ virCgroupV2GetCpusetMemoryMigrate(virCgroupPtr group ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+static int
+virCgroupV2SetCpusetCpus(virCgroupPtr group,
+                         const char *cpus)
+{
+    return virCgroupSetValueStr(group,
+                                VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET,
+                                "cpuset.cpus",
+                                cpus);
+}
+
+
+static int
+virCgroupV2GetCpusetCpus(virCgroupPtr group,
+                         char **cpus)
+{
+    return virCgroupGetValueStr(group,
+                                VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET,
+                                "cpuset.cpus",
+                                cpus);
+}
+
+
+ virCgroupBackend virCgroupV2Backend = {
+     .type = VIR_CGROUP_BACKEND_TYPE_V2,
+ 
+@@ -1664,6 +1686,8 @@ virCgroupBackend virCgroupV2Backend = {
+     .getCpusetMems = virCgroupV2GetCpusetMems,
+     .setCpusetMemoryMigrate = virCgroupV2SetCpusetMemoryMigrate,
+     .getCpusetMemoryMigrate = virCgroupV2GetCpusetMemoryMigrate,
+    .setCpusetCpus = virCgroupV2SetCpusetCpus,
+    .getCpusetCpus = virCgroupV2GetCpusetCpus,
+ };
+ 
+ 
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:50:23 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] util: enable cgroups v2 cpuset controller for threads
+
+When we create cgroup for qemu threads we need to enable cpuset
+controller in order to use it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a6aedcf39bd3212a3cd624b765bb724fd36d6a8a)
+---
+ src/util/vircgroupv2.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+index 25afab1cad..4084929c5a 100644
+--- a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+++ b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c
+@@ -400,6 +400,12 @@ virCgroupV2MakeGroup(virCgroupPtr parent ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                             VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPU) < 0) {
+                 return -1;
+             }
+
+            if (virCgroupV2HasController(parent, VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET) &&
+                virCgroupV2EnableController(parent,
+                                            VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET) < 0) {
+                return -1;
+            }
+         } else {
+             size_t i;
+             for (i = 0; i < VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_LAST; i++) {
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 11:33:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cpu_x86: Do not cache microcode version
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The microcode version checks are used to invalidate cached CPU data we
+get from QEMU. To minimize /proc/cpuinfo parsing the microcode version
+was only read when libvirtd started and cached for the daemon's
+lifetime. However, the CPU microcode can change anytime (updating the
+microcode package can automatically upload it to the CPU) and we need to
+stop caching it to avoid using stale CPU model data.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit be46f613261d3b655a1f15afd635087e68a9c39b)
+---
+ src/cpu/cpu_x86.c | 5 +----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/cpu/cpu_x86.c b/src/cpu/cpu_x86.c
+index d3a88da21d..470de83a87 100644
+--- a/src/cpu/cpu_x86.c
+++ b/src/cpu/cpu_x86.c
+@@ -165,7 +165,6 @@ struct _virCPUx86Map {
+ };
+ 
+ static virCPUx86MapPtr cpuMap;
+-static unsigned int microcodeVersion;
+ 
+ int virCPUx86DriverOnceInit(void);
+ VIR_ONCE_GLOBAL_INIT(virCPUx86Driver);
+@@ -1332,8 +1331,6 @@ virCPUx86DriverOnceInit(void)
+     if (!(cpuMap = virCPUx86LoadMap()))
+         return -1;
+ 
+-    microcodeVersion = virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion();
+-
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2373,7 +2370,7 @@ virCPUx86GetHost(virCPUDefPtr cpu,
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+     ret = x86DecodeCPUData(cpu, cpuData, models);
+-    cpu->microcodeVersion = microcodeVersion;
+    cpu->microcodeVersion = virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion();
+ 
+  cleanup:
+     virCPUx86DataFree(cpuData);
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 21:21:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Don't cache microcode version
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+My earlier commit be46f61326 was incomplete. It removed caching of
+microcode version in the CPU driver, which means the capabilities XML
+will see the correct microcode version. But it is also cached in the
+QEMU capabilities cache where it is used to detect whether we need to
+reprobe QEMU. By missing the second place, the original commit
+be46f61326 made the situation even worse since libvirt would report
+correct microcode version while still using the old host CPU model
+(visible in domain capabilities XML).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 673c62a3b7855a0685d8f116e227c402720b9ee9)
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 12 ++++++++----
+ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h |  3 +--
+ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c       |  9 +--------
+ tests/testutilsqemu.c        |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
+index b48bcbebee..e5b1c90253 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
+@@ -4487,7 +4487,7 @@ virQEMUCapsNewData(const char *binary,
+                                            priv->libDir,
+                                            priv->runUid,
+                                            priv->runGid,
+-                                           priv->microcodeVersion,
+                                           virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion(),
+                                            priv->kernelVersion);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -4570,8 +4570,7 @@ virFileCachePtr
+ virQEMUCapsCacheNew(const char *libDir,
+                     const char *cacheDir,
+                     uid_t runUid,
+-                    gid_t runGid,
+-                    unsigned int microcodeVersion)
+                    gid_t runGid)
+ {
+     char *capsCacheDir = NULL;
+     virFileCachePtr cache = NULL;
+@@ -4595,7 +4594,6 @@ virQEMUCapsCacheNew(const char *libDir,
+ 
+     priv->runUid = runUid;
+     priv->runGid = runGid;
+-    priv->microcodeVersion = microcodeVersion;
+     priv->kvmUsable = VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_ABSENT;
+ 
+     if (uname(&uts) == 0 &&
+@@ -4617,8 +4615,11 @@ virQEMUCapsPtr
+ virQEMUCapsCacheLookup(virFileCachePtr cache,
+                        const char *binary)
+ {
+    virQEMUCapsCachePrivPtr priv = virFileCacheGetPriv(cache);
+     virQEMUCapsPtr ret = NULL;
+ 
+    priv->microcodeVersion = virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion();
+
+     ret = virFileCacheLookup(cache, binary);
+ 
+     VIR_DEBUG("Returning caps %p for %s", ret, binary);
+@@ -4672,6 +4673,7 @@ virQEMUCapsPtr
+ virQEMUCapsCacheLookupByArch(virFileCachePtr cache,
+                              virArch arch)
+ {
+    virQEMUCapsCachePrivPtr priv = virFileCacheGetPriv(cache);
+     virQEMUCapsPtr ret = NULL;
+     const char *binaryFilters[] = {
+         "qemu-system-",
+@@ -4684,6 +4686,8 @@ virQEMUCapsCacheLookupByArch(virFileCachePtr cache,
+     size_t i;
+     size_t j;
+ 
+    priv->microcodeVersion = virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion();
+
+     for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(binaryFilters); i++) {
+         for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(archs); j++) {
+             struct virQEMUCapsSearchData data = {
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h
+index ba84052bca..a6a655ac0f 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h
+@@ -587,8 +587,7 @@ void virQEMUCapsFilterByMachineType(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps,
+ virFileCachePtr virQEMUCapsCacheNew(const char *libDir,
+                                     const char *cacheDir,
+                                     uid_t uid,
+-                                    gid_t gid,
+-                                    unsigned int microcodeVersion);
+                                    gid_t gid);
+ virQEMUCapsPtr virQEMUCapsCacheLookup(virFileCachePtr cache,
+                                       const char *binary);
+ virQEMUCapsPtr virQEMUCapsCacheLookupCopy(virFileCachePtr cache,
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 36426cd65a..75d31efd14 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -585,8 +585,6 @@ qemuStateInitialize(bool privileged,
+     char *hugepagePath = NULL;
+     char *memoryBackingPath = NULL;
+     size_t i;
+-    virCPUDefPtr hostCPU = NULL;
+-    unsigned int microcodeVersion = 0;
+ 
+     if (VIR_ALLOC(qemu_driver) < 0)
+         return -1;
+@@ -809,15 +807,10 @@ qemuStateInitialize(bool privileged,
+         run_gid = cfg->group;
+     }
+ 
+-    if ((hostCPU = virCPUProbeHost(virArchFromHost())))
+-        microcodeVersion = hostCPU->microcodeVersion;
+-    virCPUDefFree(hostCPU);
+-
+     qemu_driver->qemuCapsCache = virQEMUCapsCacheNew(cfg->libDir,
+                                                      cfg->cacheDir,
+                                                      run_uid,
+-                                                     run_gid,
+-                                                     microcodeVersion);
+                                                     run_gid);
+     if (!qemu_driver->qemuCapsCache)
+         goto error;
+ 
+diff --git a/tests/testutilsqemu.c b/tests/testutilsqemu.c
+index 1736bad032..e30c0599ad 100644
+--- a/tests/testutilsqemu.c
+++ b/tests/testutilsqemu.c
+@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ int qemuTestDriverInit(virQEMUDriver *driver)
+ 
+     /* Using /dev/null for libDir and cacheDir automatically produces errors
+      * upon attempt to use any of them */
+-    driver->qemuCapsCache = virQEMUCapsCacheNew("/dev/null", "/dev/null", 0, 0, 0);
+    driver->qemuCapsCache = virQEMUCapsCacheNew("/dev/null", "/dev/null", 0, 0);
+     if (!driver->qemuCapsCache)
+         goto error;
+ 
@@ -0,0 +1,876 @@
+From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 12:35:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cputest: Add data for Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v5
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5cd9db3ac11e88846cbcf95fad9f6fae9d880dee)
+---
+ tests/cputest.c                               |   1 +
+ .../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml |   7 +
+ .../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml  |   8 +
+ .../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml    |  28 +
+ .../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml     |  29 +
+ .../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml     |  11 +
+ .../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json         | 652 ++++++++++++++++++
+ .../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig          |   4 +
+ .../x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml          |  47 ++
+ 9 files changed, 787 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml
+ create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
+ create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
+ create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
+ create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
+ create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json
+ create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig
+ create mode 100644 tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml
+
+diff --git a/tests/cputest.c b/tests/cputest.c
+index b75d864d8e..5866ca9edb 100644
+--- a/tests/cputest.c
+++ b/tests/cputest.c
+@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@ mymain(void)
+     DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Phenom-B95", JSON_HOST);
+     DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Ryzen-7-1800X-Eight-Core", JSON_HOST);
+     DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-5110", JSON_NONE);
+    DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-E3-1225-v5", JSON_MODELS);
+     DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-E3-1245-v5", JSON_MODELS);
+     DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-E5-2609-v3", JSON_MODELS);
+     DO_TEST_CPUID(VIR_ARCH_X86_64, "Xeon-E5-2623-v4", JSON_MODELS);
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..ce51903e53
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-disabled.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+<!-- Features disabled by QEMU -->
+<cpudata arch='x86'>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x0800c1fc' edx='0xb0600000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x02000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x00000008' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000100'/>
+</cpudata>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..0deca9fba6
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+<!-- Features enabled by QEMU -->
+<cpudata arch='x86'>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0xf7fa3203' edx='0x0f8bfbff'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000006' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000004' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x009c4fbb' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x8c000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x00000007' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000121' edx='0x2c100800'/>
+</cpudata>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..70a0fc3286
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+<cpu mode='custom' match='exact'>
+  <model fallback='forbid'>Skylake-Client-IBRS</model>
+  <vendor>Intel</vendor>
+  <feature policy='require' name='ds'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='acpi'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='ss'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='ht'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='tm'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='pbe'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='dtes64'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='monitor'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='ds_cpl'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='vmx'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='smx'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='est'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='tm2'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='xtpr'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='pdcm'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='osxsave'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='tsc_adjust'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='clflushopt'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='intel-pt'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='stibp'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='ssbd'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='xsaves'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='pdpe1gb'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='invtsc'/>
+</cpu>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..bbdfb6aa61
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+<cpu>
+  <arch>x86_64</arch>
+  <model>Skylake-Client-IBRS</model>
+  <vendor>Intel</vendor>
+  <feature name='ds'/>
+  <feature name='acpi'/>
+  <feature name='ss'/>
+  <feature name='ht'/>
+  <feature name='tm'/>
+  <feature name='pbe'/>
+  <feature name='dtes64'/>
+  <feature name='monitor'/>
+  <feature name='ds_cpl'/>
+  <feature name='vmx'/>
+  <feature name='smx'/>
+  <feature name='est'/>
+  <feature name='tm2'/>
+  <feature name='xtpr'/>
+  <feature name='pdcm'/>
+  <feature name='osxsave'/>
+  <feature name='tsc_adjust'/>
+  <feature name='clflushopt'/>
+  <feature name='intel-pt'/>
+  <feature name='stibp'/>
+  <feature name='ssbd'/>
+  <feature name='xsaves'/>
+  <feature name='pdpe1gb'/>
+  <feature name='invtsc'/>
+</cpu>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..1f321db273
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<cpu mode='custom' match='exact'>
+  <model fallback='forbid'>Skylake-Client-IBRS</model>
+  <vendor>Intel</vendor>
+  <feature policy='require' name='ss'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='hypervisor'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='tsc_adjust'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='clflushopt'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='stibp'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='ssbd'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='pdpe1gb'/>
+</cpu>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..084747556b
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.json
+@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
+{
+  "return": {
+    "model": {
+      "name": "base",
+      "props": {
+        "phys-bits": 0,
+        "core-id": -1,
+        "xlevel": 2147483656,
+        "cmov": true,
+        "ia64": false,
+        "aes": true,
+        "mmx": true,
+        "rdpid": false,
+        "arat": true,
+        "gfni": false,
+        "pause-filter": false,
+        "xsavec": true,
+        "intel-pt": false,
+        "osxsave": false,
+        "hv-frequencies": false,
+        "tsc-frequency": 0,
+        "xd": true,
+        "hv-vendor-id": "",
+        "kvm-asyncpf": true,
+        "kvm_asyncpf": true,
+        "perfctr_core": false,
+        "perfctr-core": false,
+        "mpx": true,
+        "pbe": false,
+        "decodeassists": false,
+        "avx512cd": false,
+        "sse4_1": true,
+        "sse4.1": true,
+        "sse4-1": true,
+        "family": 6,
+        "legacy-cache": true,
+        "vmware-cpuid-freq": true,
+        "avx512f": false,
+        "msr": true,
+        "mce": true,
+        "mca": true,
+        "hv-runtime": false,
+        "xcrypt": false,
+        "thread-id": -1,
+        "min-level": 13,
+        "xgetbv1": true,
+        "cid": false,
+        "hv-relaxed": false,
+        "hv-crash": false,
+        "ds": false,
+        "fxsr": true,
+        "xsaveopt": true,
+        "xtpr": false,
+        "avx512vl": false,
+        "avx512-vpopcntdq": false,
+        "phe": false,
+        "extapic": false,
+        "3dnowprefetch": true,
+        "avx512vbmi2": false,
+        "cr8legacy": false,
+        "stibp": true,
+        "cpuid-0xb": true,
+        "xcrypt-en": false,
+        "kvm_pv_eoi": true,
+        "apic-id": 4294967295,
+        "pn": false,
+        "dca": false,
+        "vendor": "GenuineIntel",
+        "pku": false,
+        "smx": false,
+        "cmp_legacy": false,
+        "cmp-legacy": false,
+        "node-id": -1,
+        "avx512-4fmaps": false,
+        "vmcb_clean": false,
+        "vmcb-clean": false,
+        "3dnowext": false,
+        "hle": true,
+        "npt": false,
+        "memory": "/machine/unattached/system[0]",
+        "clwb": false,
+        "lbrv": false,
+        "adx": true,
+        "ss": true,
+        "pni": true,
+        "svm_lock": false,
+        "svm-lock": false,
+        "pfthreshold": false,
+        "smep": true,
+        "smap": true,
+        "x2apic": true,
+        "avx512vbmi": false,
+        "avx512vnni": false,
+        "hv-stimer": false,
+        "i64": true,
+        "flushbyasid": false,
+        "f16c": true,
+        "ace2-en": false,
+        "pat": true,
+        "pae": true,
+        "sse": true,
+        "phe-en": false,
+        "kvm_nopiodelay": true,
+        "kvm-nopiodelay": true,
+        "tm": false,
+        "kvmclock-stable-bit": true,
+        "hypervisor": true,
+        "socket-id": -1,
+        "pcommit": false,
+        "syscall": true,
+        "level": 13,
+        "avx512dq": false,
+        "svm": false,
+        "full-cpuid-auto-level": true,
+        "hv-reset": false,
+        "invtsc": false,
+        "sse3": true,
+        "sse2": true,
+        "ssbd": true,
+        "est": false,
+        "avx512ifma": false,
+        "tm2": false,
+        "kvm-pv-eoi": true,
+        "cx8": true,
+        "kvm_mmu": false,
+        "kvm-mmu": false,
+        "sse4_2": true,
+        "sse4.2": true,
+        "sse4-2": true,
+        "pge": true,
+        "fill-mtrr-mask": true,
+        "avx512bitalg": false,
+        "nodeid_msr": false,
+        "pdcm": false,
+        "movbe": true,
+        "model": 94,
+        "nrip_save": false,
+        "nrip-save": false,
+        "kvm_pv_unhalt": true,
+        "ssse3": true,
+        "sse4a": false,
+        "invpcid": true,
+        "pdpe1gb": true,
+        "tsc-deadline": true,
+        "fma": true,
+        "cx16": true,
+        "de": true,
+        "enforce": false,
+        "stepping": 3,
+        "xsave": true,
+        "clflush": true,
+        "skinit": false,
+        "tsc": true,
+        "tce": false,
+        "fpu": true,
+        "ibs": false,
+        "ds_cpl": false,
+        "ds-cpl": false,
+        "host-phys-bits": true,
+        "fma4": false,
+        "la57": false,
+        "osvw": false,
+        "check": true,
+        "hv-spinlocks": -1,
+        "pmu": false,
+        "pmm": false,
+        "apic": true,
+        "spec-ctrl": true,
+        "min-xlevel2": 0,
+        "tsc-adjust": true,
+        "tsc_adjust": true,
+        "kvm-steal-time": true,
+        "kvm_steal_time": true,
+        "kvmclock": true,
+        "l3-cache": true,
+        "lwp": false,
+        "ibpb": false,
+        "xop": false,
+        "avx": true,
+        "ospke": false,
+        "ace2": false,
+        "avx512bw": false,
+        "acpi": false,
+        "hv-vapic": false,
+        "fsgsbase": true,
+        "ht": false,
+        "nx": true,
+        "pclmulqdq": true,
+        "mmxext": false,
+        "vaes": false,
+        "popcnt": true,
+        "xsaves": false,
+        "tcg-cpuid": true,
+        "lm": true,
+        "umip": false,
+        "pse": true,
+        "avx2": true,
+        "sep": true,
+        "pclmuldq": true,
+        "virt-ssbd": false,
+        "x-hv-max-vps": -1,
+        "nodeid-msr": false,
+        "md-clear": true,
+        "kvm": true,
+        "misalignsse": false,
+        "min-xlevel": 2147483656,
+        "kvm-pv-unhalt": true,
+        "bmi2": true,
+        "bmi1": true,
+        "realized": false,
+        "tsc_scale": false,
+        "tsc-scale": false,
+        "topoext": false,
+        "hv-vpindex": false,
+        "xlevel2": 0,
+        "clflushopt": true,
+        "kvm-no-smi-migration": false,
+        "monitor": false,
+        "avx512er": false,
+        "pmm-en": false,
+        "pcid": true,
+        "3dnow": false,
+        "erms": true,
+        "lahf-lm": true,
+        "lahf_lm": true,
+        "vpclmulqdq": false,
+        "fxsr-opt": false,
+        "hv-synic": false,
+        "xstore": false,
+        "fxsr_opt": false,
+        "kvm-hint-dedicated": false,
+        "rtm": true,
+        "lmce": true,
+        "hv-time": false,
+        "perfctr-nb": false,
+        "perfctr_nb": false,
+        "ffxsr": false,
+        "rdrand": true,
+        "rdseed": true,
+        "avx512-4vnniw": false,
+        "vmx": false,
+        "vme": true,
+        "dtes64": false,
+        "mtrr": true,
+        "rdtscp": true,
+        "pse36": true,
+        "kvm-pv-tlb-flush": false,
+        "tbm": false,
+        "wdt": false,
+        "pause_filter": false,
+        "sha-ni": false,
+        "model-id": "Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v5 @ 3.30GHz",
+        "abm": true,
+        "avx512pf": false,
+        "xstore-en": false
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "id": "model-expansion"
+}
+
+{
+  "return": [
+    {
+      "name": "max",
+      "typename": "max-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": false
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "host",
+      "typename": "host-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": false
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "base",
+      "typename": "base-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": true,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "qemu64",
+      "typename": "qemu64-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "qemu32",
+      "typename": "qemu32-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "phenom",
+      "typename": "phenom-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "mmxext",
+        "fxsr-opt",
+        "3dnowext",
+        "3dnow",
+        "sse4a",
+        "npt"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "pentium3",
+      "typename": "pentium3-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "pentium2",
+      "typename": "pentium2-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "pentium",
+      "typename": "pentium-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "n270",
+      "typename": "n270-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "kvm64",
+      "typename": "kvm64-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "kvm32",
+      "typename": "kvm32-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "cpu64-rhel6",
+      "typename": "cpu64-rhel6-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "sse4a"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "coreduo",
+      "typename": "coreduo-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "core2duo",
+      "typename": "core2duo-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "athlon",
+      "typename": "athlon-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "mmxext",
+        "3dnowext",
+        "3dnow"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Westmere",
+      "typename": "Westmere-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Westmere-IBRS",
+      "typename": "Westmere-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Skylake-Server",
+      "typename": "Skylake-Server-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "avx512f",
+        "avx512dq",
+        "clwb",
+        "avx512cd",
+        "avx512bw",
+        "avx512vl",
+        "avx512f",
+        "avx512f",
+        "avx512f"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Skylake-Server-IBRS",
+      "typename": "Skylake-Server-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "avx512f",
+        "avx512dq",
+        "clwb",
+        "avx512cd",
+        "avx512bw",
+        "avx512vl",
+        "avx512f",
+        "avx512f",
+        "avx512f"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Skylake-Client",
+      "typename": "Skylake-Client-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Skylake-Client-IBRS",
+      "typename": "Skylake-Client-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "SandyBridge",
+      "typename": "SandyBridge-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "SandyBridge-IBRS",
+      "typename": "SandyBridge-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Penryn",
+      "typename": "Penryn-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Opteron_G5",
+      "typename": "Opteron_G5-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "sse4a",
+        "misalignsse",
+        "xop",
+        "fma4",
+        "tbm"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Opteron_G4",
+      "typename": "Opteron_G4-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "sse4a",
+        "misalignsse",
+        "xop",
+        "fma4"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Opteron_G3",
+      "typename": "Opteron_G3-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "sse4a",
+        "misalignsse"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Opteron_G2",
+      "typename": "Opteron_G2-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Opteron_G1",
+      "typename": "Opteron_G1-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Nehalem",
+      "typename": "Nehalem-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Nehalem-IBRS",
+      "typename": "Nehalem-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "IvyBridge",
+      "typename": "IvyBridge-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "IvyBridge-IBRS",
+      "typename": "IvyBridge-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Haswell",
+      "typename": "Haswell-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Haswell-noTSX",
+      "typename": "Haswell-noTSX-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Haswell-noTSX-IBRS",
+      "typename": "Haswell-noTSX-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Haswell-IBRS",
+      "typename": "Haswell-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "EPYC",
+      "typename": "EPYC-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "sha-ni",
+        "mmxext",
+        "fxsr-opt",
+        "cr8legacy",
+        "sse4a",
+        "misalignsse",
+        "osvw"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "EPYC-IBPB",
+      "typename": "EPYC-IBPB-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [
+        "sha-ni",
+        "mmxext",
+        "fxsr-opt",
+        "cr8legacy",
+        "sse4a",
+        "misalignsse",
+        "osvw",
+        "ibpb"
+      ],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Conroe",
+      "typename": "Conroe-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Broadwell",
+      "typename": "Broadwell-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Broadwell-noTSX",
+      "typename": "Broadwell-noTSX-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Broadwell-noTSX-IBRS",
+      "typename": "Broadwell-noTSX-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "Broadwell-IBRS",
+      "typename": "Broadwell-IBRS-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "486",
+      "typename": "486-x86_64-cpu",
+      "unavailable-features": [],
+      "static": false,
+      "migration-safe": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "id": "definitions"
+}
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..7e57c2ded6
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.sig
+@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+0506e3
+family:     6 (0x06)
+model:     94 (0x5e)
+stepping:   3 (0x03)
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..437429d61d
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+<!-- Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v5 @ 3.30GHz -->
+<cpudata arch='x86'>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000000' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000016' ebx='0x756e6547' ecx='0x6c65746e' edx='0x49656e69'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x000506e3' ebx='0x06100800' ecx='0x7ffafbff' edx='0xbfebfbff'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000002' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x76036301' ebx='0x00f0b6ff' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00c30000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000003' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000004' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x1c004121' ebx='0x01c0003f' ecx='0x0000003f' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000004' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x1c004122' ebx='0x01c0003f' ecx='0x0000003f' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000004' ecx_in='0x02' eax='0x1c004143' ebx='0x00c0003f' ecx='0x000003ff' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000004' ecx_in='0x03' eax='0x1c03c163' ebx='0x03c0003f' ecx='0x00001fff' edx='0x00000006'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000005' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000040' ebx='0x00000040' ecx='0x00000003' edx='0x00142120'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000006' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x000027f7' ebx='0x00000002' ecx='0x00000009' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x029c6fbf' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x9c002400'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000008' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000009' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000a' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x07300804' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000603'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000b' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000001' ebx='0x00000001' ecx='0x00000100' edx='0x00000006'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000b' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x00000004' ebx='0x00000004' ecx='0x00000201' edx='0x00000006'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000c' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x0000001f' ebx='0x00000440' ecx='0x00000440' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x0000000f' ebx='0x000003c0' ecx='0x00000100' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x02' eax='0x00000100' ebx='0x00000240' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x03' eax='0x00000040' ebx='0x000003c0' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x04' eax='0x00000040' ebx='0x00000400' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x08' eax='0x00000080' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000001' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000e' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000f' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000010' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000011' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000012' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000013' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000014' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000001' ebx='0x0000000f' ecx='0x00000007' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000014' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x02490002' ebx='0x003f3fff' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000015' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000002' ebx='0x00000114' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000016' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000ce4' ebx='0x00000e74' ecx='0x00000064' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000000' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x80000008' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000121' edx='0x2c100800'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000002' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x65746e49' ebx='0x2952286c' ecx='0x6f655820' edx='0x2952286e'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000003' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x55504320' ebx='0x2d334520' ecx='0x35323231' edx='0x20357620'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000004' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x2e332040' ebx='0x48473033' ecx='0x0000007a' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000005' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000006' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x01006040' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000100'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80000008' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00003027' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x80860000' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000ce4' ebx='0x00000e74' ecx='0x00000064' edx='0x00000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0xc0000000' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000ce4' ebx='0x00000e74' ecx='0x00000064' edx='0x00000000'/>
+</cpudata>
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 12:35:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cpu_map: Define md-clear CPUID bit
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091
+
+The bit is set when microcode provides the mechanism to invoke a flush
+of various exploitable CPU buffers by invoking the VERW instruction.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 538d873571d7a682852dc1d70e5f4478f4d64e85)
+
+Conflicts:
+        tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-Platinum-8268-guest.xml
+        tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-Platinum-8268-host.xml
+            - test data missing downstream
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml                               | 3 +++
+ tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml | 2 +-
+ tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml   | 1 +
+ tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml    | 1 +
+ tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml    | 1 +
+ 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml b/src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml
+index 02431bea29..11479f0433 100644
+--- a/src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml
+++ b/src/cpu_map/x86_features.xml
+@@ -317,6 +317,9 @@
+   <feature name='avx512-4fmaps'>
+     <cpuid eax_in='0x07' ecx_in='0x00' edx='0x00000008'/>
+   </feature>
+  <feature name='md-clear'> <!-- md_clear -->
+    <cpuid eax_in='0x07' ecx_in='0x00' edx='0x00000400'/>
+  </feature>
+   <feature name='pconfig'>
+     <cpuid eax_in='0x07' ecx_in='0x00' edx='0x00040000'/>
+   </feature>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
+index 0deca9fba6..74763a462b 100644
+--- a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-enabled.xml
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+ <cpudata arch='x86'>
+   <cpuid eax_in='0x00000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0xf7fa3203' edx='0x0f8bfbff'/>
+   <cpuid eax_in='0x00000006' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000004' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+-  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x009c4fbb' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x8c000000'/>
+  <cpuid eax_in='0x00000007' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x009c4fbb' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x8c000400'/>
+   <cpuid eax_in='0x0000000d' ecx_in='0x01' eax='0x00000007' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000000' edx='0x00000000'/>
+   <cpuid eax_in='0x80000001' ecx_in='0x00' eax='0x00000000' ebx='0x00000000' ecx='0x00000121' edx='0x2c100800'/>
+ </cpudata>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
+index 70a0fc3286..867970d2c7 100644
+--- a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-guest.xml
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+   <feature policy='require' name='tsc_adjust'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='clflushopt'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='intel-pt'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='md-clear'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='stibp'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='ssbd'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='xsaves'/>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
+index bbdfb6aa61..e7ced42797 100644
+--- a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-host.xml
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+   <feature name='tsc_adjust'/>
+   <feature name='clflushopt'/>
+   <feature name='intel-pt'/>
+  <feature name='md-clear'/>
+   <feature name='stibp'/>
+   <feature name='ssbd'/>
+   <feature name='xsaves'/>
+diff --git a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
+index 1f321db273..a5591278df 100644
+--- a/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
+++ b/tests/cputestdata/x86_64-cpuid-Xeon-E3-1225-v5-json.xml
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
+   <feature policy='require' name='hypervisor'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='tsc_adjust'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='clflushopt'/>
+  <feature policy='require' name='md-clear'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='stibp'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='ssbd'/>
+   <feature policy='require' name='pdpe1gb'/>
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 17:26:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] admin: reject clients unless their UID matches the current
+ UID
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The admin protocol RPC messages are only intended for use by the user
+running the daemon. As such they should not be allowed for any client
+UID that does not match the server UID.
+
+Fixes CVE-2019-10132
+
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 96f41cd765c9e525fe28ee5abbfbf4a79b3720c7)
+---
+ src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c b/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
+index 85e693d76c..6e3b99f97d 100644
+--- a/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
+++ b/src/admin/admin_server_dispatch.c
+@@ -64,6 +64,28 @@ remoteAdmClientNew(virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                    void *opaque)
+ {
+     struct daemonAdmClientPrivate *priv;
+    uid_t clientuid;
+    gid_t clientgid;
+    pid_t clientpid;
+    unsigned long long timestamp;
+
+    if (virNetServerClientGetUNIXIdentity(client,
+                                          &clientuid,
+                                          &clientgid,
+                                          &clientpid,
+                                          &timestamp) < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    VIR_DEBUG("New client pid %lld uid %lld",
+              (long long)clientpid,
+              (long long)clientuid);
+
+    if (geteuid() != clientuid) {
+        virReportRestrictedError(_("Disallowing client %lld with uid %lld"),
+                                 (long long)clientpid,
+                                 (long long)clientuid);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+ 
+     if (VIR_ALLOC(priv) < 0)
+         return NULL;
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 16:51:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] locking: restrict sockets to mode 0600
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The virtlockd daemon's only intended client is the libvirtd daemon. As
+such it should never allow clients from other user accounts to connect.
+The code already enforces this and drops clients from other UIDs, but
+we can get earlier (and thus stronger) protection against DoS by setting
+the socket permissions to 0600
+
+Fixes CVE-2019-10132
+
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f111e09468693909b1f067aa575efdafd9a262a1)
+---
+ src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in | 1 +
+ src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in       | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in b/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
+index 2a7500f3d0..f674c492f7 100644
+--- a/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
+++ b/src/locking/virtlockd-admin.socket.in
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
+ [Socket]
+ ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlockd-admin-sock
+ Service=virtlockd.service
+SocketMode=0600
+ 
+ [Install]
+ WantedBy=sockets.target
+diff --git a/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in b/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
+index 45e0f20235..d701b27516 100644
+--- a/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
+++ b/src/locking/virtlockd.socket.in
+@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
+ 
+ [Socket]
+ ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlockd-sock
+SocketMode=0600
+ 
+ [Install]
+ WantedBy=sockets.target
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 17:27:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] logging: restrict sockets to mode 0600
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The virtlogd daemon's only intended client is the libvirtd daemon. As
+such it should never allow clients from other user accounts to connect.
+The code already enforces this and drops clients from other UIDs, but
+we can get earlier (and thus stronger) protection against DoS by setting
+the socket permissions to 0600
+
+Fixes CVE-2019-10132
+
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit e37bd65f9948c1185456b2cdaa3bd6e875af680f)
+---
+ src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in | 1 +
+ src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in       | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in b/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
+index 595e6c4c4b..5c41dfeb7b 100644
+--- a/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
+++ b/src/logging/virtlogd-admin.socket.in
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
+ [Socket]
+ ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlogd-admin-sock
+ Service=virtlogd.service
+SocketMode=0600
+ 
+ [Install]
+ WantedBy=sockets.target
+diff --git a/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in b/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
+index 22b9360c8d..ae48cdab9a 100644
+--- a/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
+++ b/src/logging/virtlogd.socket.in
+@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
+ 
+ [Socket]
+ ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlogd-sock
+SocketMode=0600
+ 
+ [Install]
+ WantedBy=sockets.target
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:47:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc on read-only
+ connections
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc API is taking a path parameter,
+which can point to any path on the system. This file will then be
+read and parsed by libvirtd running with root privileges.
+
+Forbid it on read-only connections.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2019-10161
+Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit aed6a032cead4386472afb24b16196579e239580)
+---
+ src/libvirt-domain.c         | 11 ++---------
+ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c       |  2 +-
+ src/remote/remote_protocol.x |  3 +--
+ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
+index 072b92b717..ba0aaccdc1 100644
+--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
+@@ -1073,8 +1073,7 @@ virDomainRestoreFlags(virConnectPtr conn, const char *from, const char *dxml,
+  * previously by virDomainSave() or virDomainSaveFlags().
+  *
+  * No security-sensitive data will be included unless @flags contains
+- * VIR_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_XML_SECURE; this flag is rejected on read-only
+- * connections.
+ * VIR_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_XML_SECURE.
+  *
+  * Returns a 0 terminated UTF-8 encoded XML instance, or NULL in case of
+  * error.  The caller must free() the returned value.
+@@ -1090,13 +1089,7 @@ virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *file,
+ 
+     virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
+     virCheckNonNullArgGoto(file, error);
+-
+-    if ((conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) &&
+-        (flags & VIR_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_XML_SECURE)) {
+-        virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, "%s",
+-                       _("virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc with secure flag"));
+-        goto error;
+-    }
+    virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
+ 
+     if (conn->driver->domainSaveImageGetXMLDesc) {
+         char *ret;
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 75d31efd14..b4a52f87a9 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -7083,7 +7083,7 @@ qemuDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path,
+     if (fd < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+-    if (virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDescEnsureACL(conn, def, flags) < 0)
+    if (virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDescEnsureACL(conn, def) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+     ret = qemuDomainDefFormatXML(driver, def, flags);
+diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+index 60cc40e04a..a67aba6131 100644
+--- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+@@ -5234,8 +5234,7 @@ enum remote_procedure {
+     /**
+      * @generate: both
+      * @priority: high
+-     * @acl: domain:read
+-     * @acl: domain:read_secure:VIR_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_XML_SECURE
+     * @acl: domain:write
+      */
+     REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_GET_XML_DESC = 235,
+ 
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:14:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML on read-only
+ connections
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML can be used to alter the domain's
+config used for managedsave or even execute arbitrary emulator binaries.
+Forbid it on read-only connections.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2019-10166
+Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit db0b78457f183e4c7ac45bc94de86044a1e2056a)
+---
+ src/libvirt-domain.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
+index ba0aaccdc1..ac7c4708b9 100644
+--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
+@@ -9565,6 +9565,7 @@ virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML(virDomainPtr domain, const char *dxml,
+ 
+     virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
+     conn = domain->conn;
+    virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
+ 
+     if (conn->driver->domainManagedSaveDefineXML) {
+         int ret;
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:16:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only
+ connections
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
+Forbid it on read-only connections.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
+Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
+---
+ src/libvirt-domain.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
+index ac7c4708b9..f7b834dfa6 100644
+--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
+@@ -11360,6 +11360,7 @@ virConnectGetDomainCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn,
+     virResetLastError();
+ 
+     virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
+    virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
+ 
+     if (conn->driver->connectGetDomainCapabilities) {
+         char *ret;
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:17:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only
+ connections
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
+Forbid them on read-only connections.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
+Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
+---
+ src/libvirt-host.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libvirt-host.c b/src/libvirt-host.c
+index e20d6ee250..2978825d22 100644
+--- a/src/libvirt-host.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-host.c
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,7 @@ virConnectCompareHypervisorCPU(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     virCheckConnectReturn(conn, VIR_CPU_COMPARE_ERROR);
+     virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xmlCPU, error);
+    virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
+ 
+     if (conn->driver->connectCompareHypervisorCPU) {
+         int ret;
+@@ -1234,6 +1235,7 @@ virConnectBaselineHypervisorCPU(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
+     virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xmlCPUs, error);
+    virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
+ 
+     if (conn->driver->connectBaselineHypervisorCPU) {
+         char *cpu;
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 10:59:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] api: disallow virDomainGetHostname for read-only connections
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The virDomainGetHostname API is fetching guest information and this may
+involve use of an untrusted guest agent. As such its use must be
+forbidden on a read-only connection to libvirt.
+
+Fixes CVE-2019-3886
+Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 2a07c990bd9143d7a0fe8d1b6b7c763c52185240)
+---
+ src/libvirt-domain.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
+index f7b834dfa6..c9bff31af5 100644
+--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
+@@ -11025,6 +11025,8 @@ virDomainGetHostname(virDomainPtr domain, unsigned int flags)
+     virCheckDomainReturn(domain, NULL);
+     conn = domain->conn;
+ 
+    virCheckReadOnlyGoto(domain->conn->flags, error);
+
+     if (conn->driver->domainGetHostname) {
+         char *ret;
+         ret = conn->driver->domainGetHostname(domain, flags);
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 11:22:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] remote: enforce ACL write permission for getting guest time &
+ hostname
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Getting the guest time and hostname both require use of guest agent
+commands. These must not be allowed for read-only users, so the
+permissions check must validate "write" permission not "read".
+
+Fixes CVE-2019-3886
+Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ae076bb40e0e150aef41361b64001138d04d6c60)
+---
+ src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+index a67aba6131..ff9e34a852 100644
+--- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+@@ -5504,7 +5504,7 @@ enum remote_procedure {
+ 
+     /**
+      * @generate: both
+-     * @acl: domain:read
+     * @acl: domain:write
+      */
+     REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_HOSTNAME = 277,
+ 
+@@ -5899,7 +5899,7 @@ enum remote_procedure {
+ 
+     /**
+      * @generate: none
+-     * @acl: domain:read
+     * @acl: domain:write
+      */
+     REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_TIME = 337,
+ 
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:14:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Set up EMULATOR thread and cpuset.mems before
+ exec()-ing qemu
+
+It's funny how this went unnoticed for such a long time. Long
+story short, if a domain is configured with
+VIR_DOMAIN_NUMATUNE_MEM_STRICT libvirt doesn't really honour
+that. This is because of 7e72ac787848 after which libvirt allowed
+qemu to allocate memory just anywhere and only after that it used
+some magic involving cpuset.memory_migrate and cpuset.mems to
+move the memory to desired NUMA nodes. This was done in order to
+work around some KVM bug where KVM would fail if there wasn't a
+DMA zone available on the NUMA node. Well, while the work around
+might stopped libvirt tickling the KVM bug it also caused a bug
+on libvirt side: if there is not enough memory on configured NUMA
+node(s) then any attempt to start a domain must fail. Because of
+the way we play with guest memory domains can start just happily.
+
+The solution is to move the child we've just forked into emulator
+cgroup, set up cpuset.mems and exec() qemu only after that.
+
+This basically reverts 7e72ac787848b7434c9 which was a workaround
+for kernel bug. This bug was apparently fixed because I've tested
+this successfully with recent kernel.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 0eaa4716e1b8f6eb59d77049aed3735c3b5fbdd6)
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c
+index 68c670d3f2..3bcc2ebd71 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c
+@@ -6636,6 +6636,10 @@ qemuProcessLaunch(virConnectPtr conn,
+     if (qemuProcessInitCpuAffinity(vm) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+    VIR_DEBUG("Setting emulator tuning/settings");
+    if (qemuProcessSetupEmulator(vm) < 0)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+     VIR_DEBUG("Setting cgroup for external devices (if required)");
+     if (qemuSetupCgroupForExtDevices(vm, driver) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+@@ -6727,10 +6731,6 @@ qemuProcessLaunch(virConnectPtr conn,
+     if (qemuProcessDetectIOThreadPIDs(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+-    VIR_DEBUG("Setting emulator tuning/settings");
+-    if (qemuProcessSetupEmulator(vm) < 0)
+-        goto cleanup;
+-
+     VIR_DEBUG("Setting global CPU cgroup (if required)");
+     if (qemuSetupGlobalCpuCgroup(vm) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:15:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] qemu: blockjob: Fix saving of inactive XML after completed
+ legacy blockjob
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Commit c257352797 introduced a logic bug where we will never save the
+inactive XML after a blockjob as the variable which was determining
+whether to do so is cleared right before. Thus even if we correctly
+modify the inactive state it will be rolled back when libvirtd is
+restarted.
+
+Reported-by: Thomas Stein <hello@himbee.re>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4d8cc5a07a0dcc0ac99377f66a4649d219705452)
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_blockjob.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_blockjob.c b/src/qemu/qemu_blockjob.c
+index fa7e4c8625..f105632a09 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_blockjob.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_blockjob.c
+@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ qemuBlockJobEventProcessLegacy(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
+     if (virDomainSaveStatus(driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir, vm, driver->caps) < 0)
+         VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after block job", vm->def->name);
+ 
+-    if (job->newstate == VIR_DOMAIN_BLOCK_JOB_COMPLETED && vm->newDef) {
+    if (job->state == VIR_DOMAIN_BLOCK_JOB_COMPLETED && vm->newDef) {
+         if (virDomainSaveConfig(cfg->configDir, driver->caps, vm->newDef) < 0)
+             VIR_WARN("Unable to update persistent definition on vm %s "
+                      "after block job", vm->def->name);
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-F-13
@@ -1,356 +0,0 @@
-From 953440bd12608a20007ee5da5ab69fbbe910bd28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 15:53:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Extract the backing store format as well as name, if available
-
-When QEMU opens a backing store for a QCow2 file, it will
-normally auto-probe for the format of the backing store,
-rather than assuming it has the same format as the referencing
-file. There is a QCow2 extension that allows an explicit format
-for the backing store to be embedded in the referencing file.
-This closes the auto-probing security hole in QEMU.
-
-This backing store format can be useful for libvirt users
-of virStorageFileGetMetadata, so extract this data and report
-it.
-
-QEMU does not require disk image backing store files to be in
-the same format the file linkee. It will auto-probe the disk
-format for the backing store when opening it. If the backing
-store was intended to be a raw file this could be a security
-hole, because a guest may have written data into its disk that
-then makes the backing store look like a qcow2 file. If it can
-trick QEMU into thinking the raw file is a qcow2 file, it can
-access arbitrary files on the host by adding further backing
-store links.
-
-To address this, callers of virStorageFileGetMeta need to be
-told of the backing store format. If no format is declared,
-they can make a decision whether to allow format probing or
-not.
---
- src/util/storage_file.c |  206 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- src/util/storage_file.h |    2 +
- 2 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
-index 0adea40..80f743e 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
-+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
-@@ -78,12 +78,33 @@ struct FileTypeInfo {
-     int qcowCryptOffset;  /* Byte offset from start of file
-                            * where to find encryption mode,
-                            * -1 if encryption is not used */
-    int (*getBackingStore)(char **res, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_size);
-+    int (*getBackingStore)(char **res, int *format,
-+                           const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_size);
- };
- 
-static int cowGetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
-static int qcowXGetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
-static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
-+static int cowGetBackingStore(char **, int *,
-+                              const unsigned char *, size_t);
-+static int qcow1GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
-+                                const unsigned char *, size_t);
-+static int qcow2GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
-+                                const unsigned char *, size_t);
-+static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
-+                                const unsigned char *, size_t);
-+
-+#define QCOWX_HDR_VERSION (4)
-+#define QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET (QCOWX_HDR_VERSION+4)
-+#define QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE (QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+8)
-+#define QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE (QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+4+4)
-+
-+#define QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT (QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE+8+1+1)
-+#define QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT (QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE+8)
-+
-+#define QCOW1_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE (QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT+4+8)
-+#define QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE (QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT+4+4+8+8+4+4+8)
-+
-+#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END 0
-+#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT 0xE2792ACA
-+
- 
- 
- static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
-@@ -119,11 +140,11 @@ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
-     /* QCow */
-     { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW, "QFI", NULL,
-       LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
-      4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8+1+1+2, qcowXGetBackingStore },
-+      QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore },
-     /* QCow 2 */
-     { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2, "QFI", NULL,
-       LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
-      4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8, qcowXGetBackingStore },
-+      QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore },
-     /* VMDK 3 */
-     /* XXX Untested
-     { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "COWD", NULL,
-@@ -142,11 +163,14 @@ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
- 
- static int
- cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
-+                   int *format,
-                    const unsigned char *buf,
-                    size_t buf_size)
- {
- #define COW_FILENAME_MAXLEN 1024
-     *res = NULL;
-+    *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
-+
-     if (buf_size < 4+4+ COW_FILENAME_MAXLEN)
-         return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
-     if (buf[4+4] == '\0') /* cow_header_v2.backing_file[0] */
-@@ -160,31 +184,98 @@ cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
-     return BACKING_STORE_OK;
- }
- 
-+
-+static int
-+qcow2GetBackingStoreFormat(int *format,
-+                           const unsigned char *buf,
-+                           size_t buf_size,
-+                           size_t extension_start,
-+                           size_t extension_end)
-+{
-+    size_t offset = extension_start;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * The extensions take format of
-+     *
-+     * int32: magic
-+     * int32: length
-+     * byte[length]: payload
-+     *
-+     * Unknown extensions can be ignored by skipping
-+     * over "length" bytes in the data stream.
-+     */
-+    while (offset < (buf_size-8) &&
-+           offset < (extension_end-8)) {
-+        unsigned int magic =
-+            (buf[offset] << 24) +
-+            (buf[offset+1] << 16) +
-+            (buf[offset+2] << 8) +
-+            (buf[offset+3]);
-+        unsigned int len =
-+            (buf[offset+4] << 24) +
-+            (buf[offset+5] << 16) +
-+            (buf[offset+6] << 8) +
-+            (buf[offset+7]);
-+
-+        offset += 8;
-+
-+        if ((offset + len) < offset)
-+            break;
-+
-+        if ((offset + len) > buf_size)
-+            break;
-+
-+        switch (magic) {
-+        case QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END:
-+            goto done;
-+
-+        case QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT:
-+            if (buf[offset+len] != '\0')
-+                break;
-+            *format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(
-+                ((const char *)buf)+offset);
-+            break;
-+        }
-+
-+        offset += len;
-+    }
-+
-+done:
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- static int
- qcowXGetBackingStore(char **res,
-+                     int *format,
-                      const unsigned char *buf,
-                     size_t buf_size)
-+                     size_t buf_size,
-+                     bool isQCow2)
- {
-     unsigned long long offset;
-     unsigned long size;
- 
-     *res = NULL;
-    if (buf_size < 4+4+8+4)
-+    if (format)
-+        *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
-+
-+    if (buf_size < QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+8+4)
-         return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
-    offset = (((unsigned long long)buf[4+4] << 56)
-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+1] << 48)
-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+2] << 40)
-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+3] << 32)
-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+4] << 24)
-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+5] << 16)
-              | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+6] << 8)
-              | buf[4+4+7]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_offset */
-+    offset = (((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET] << 56)
-+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+1] << 48)
-+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+2] << 40)
-+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+3] << 32)
-+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+4] << 24)
-+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+5] << 16)
-+              | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+6] << 8)
-+              | buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+7]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_offset */
-     if (offset > buf_size)
-         return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
-    size = ((buf[4+4+8] << 24)
-            | (buf[4+4+8+1] << 16)
-            | (buf[4+4+8+2] << 8)
-            | buf[4+4+8+3]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_size */
-+    size = ((buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE] << 24)
-+            | (buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+1] << 16)
-+            | (buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+2] << 8)
-+            | buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+3]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_size */
-     if (size == 0)
-         return BACKING_STORE_OK;
-     if (offset + size > buf_size || offset + size < offset)
-@@ -197,12 +288,63 @@ qcowXGetBackingStore(char **res,
-     }
-     memcpy(*res, buf + offset, size);
-     (*res)[size] = '\0';
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Traditionally QCow2 files had a layout of
-+     *
-+     * [header]
-+     * [backingStoreName]
-+     *
-+     * Although the backingStoreName typically followed
-+     * the header immediately, this was not required by
-+     * the format. By specifying a higher byte offset for
-+     * the backing file offset in the header, it was
-+     * possible to leave space between the header and
-+     * start of backingStore.
-+     *
-+     * This hack is now used to store extensions to the
-+     * qcow2 format:
-+     *
-+     * [header]
-+     * [extensions]
-+     * [backingStoreName]
-+     *
-+     * Thus the file region to search for extensions is
-+     * between the end of the header (QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE)
-+     * and the start of the backingStoreName (offset)
-+     */
-+    if (isQCow2)
-+        qcow2GetBackingStoreFormat(format, buf, buf_size, QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE, offset);
-+
-     return BACKING_STORE_OK;
- }
- 
- 
- static int
-+qcow1GetBackingStore(char **res,
-+                     int *format,
-+                     const unsigned char *buf,
-+                     size_t buf_size)
-+{
-+    /* QCow1 doesn't have the extensions capability
-+     * used to store backing format */
-+    *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
-+    return qcowXGetBackingStore(res, NULL, buf, buf_size, false);
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+qcow2GetBackingStore(char **res,
-+                     int *format,
-+                     const unsigned char *buf,
-+                     size_t buf_size)
-+{
-+    return qcowXGetBackingStore(res, format, buf, buf_size, true);
-+}
-+
-+
-+static int
- vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
-+                     int *format,
-                      const unsigned char *buf,
-                      size_t buf_size)
- {
-@@ -212,6 +354,14 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
-     size_t len;
- 
-     *res = NULL;
-+    /*
-+     * Technically this should have been VMDK, since
-+     * VMDK spec / VMWare impl only support VMDK backed
-+     * by VMDK. QEMU isn't following this though and
-+     * does probing on VMDK backing files, hence we set
-+     * AUTO
-+     */
-+    *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
- 
-     if (buf_size <= 0x200)
-         return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
-@@ -358,9 +508,12 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-         /* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
-         meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
-         if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
-            char *base;
-+            char *backing;
-+            int backingFormat;
- 
-            switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&base, head, len)) {
-+            switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&backing,
-+                                                    &backingFormat,
-+                                                    head, len)) {
-             case BACKING_STORE_OK:
-                 break;
- 
-@@ -370,13 +523,16 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-             case BACKING_STORE_ERROR:
-                 return -1;
-             }
-            if (base != NULL) {
-                meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, base);
-                VIR_FREE(base);
-+            if (backing != NULL) {
-+                meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
-+                VIR_FREE(backing);
-                 if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
-                     virReportOOMError();
-                     return -1;
-                 }
-+                meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
-+            } else {
-+                meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
-             }
-         }
-         return 0;
-diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
-index 58533ee..6328ba7 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
-+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- # include <stdbool.h>
- 
- enum virStorageFileFormat {
-+    VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO = -1,
-     VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW = 0,
-     VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR,
-     VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS,
-@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virStorageFileFormat);
- typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
-     int format;
-     char *backingStore;
-+    int backingStoreFormat;
-     unsigned long long capacity;
-     bool encrypted;
- } virStorageFileMetadata;
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
-From cab428b1d4d432965cee6f5afb67265557706715 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 16:39:32 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 02/11] Remove 'type' field from FileTypeInfo struct
-
-Instead of including a field in FileTypeInfo struct for the
-disk format, rely on the array index matching the format.
-Use verify() to assert the correct number of elements in the
-array.
-
-* src/util/storage_file.c: remove type field from FileTypeInfo
---
- src/util/storage_file.c |  108 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
- 1 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
-index 80f743e..df0e3a1 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
-+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
-@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ enum {
- 
- /* Either 'magic' or 'extension' *must* be provided */
- struct FileTypeInfo {
-    int type;           /* One of the constants above */
-     const char *magic;  /* Optional string of file magic
-                          * to check at head of file */
-     const char *extension; /* Optional file extension to check */
-@@ -108,58 +107,59 @@ static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
- 
- 
- static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
-    /* Bochs */
-    /* XXX Untested
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS, "Bochs Virtual HD Image", NULL,
-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 64, 0x20000,
-      32+16+16+4+4+4+4+4, 8, 1, -1, NULL },*/
-    /* CLoop */
-    /* XXX Untested
-    { VIR_STORAGE_VOL_CLOOP, "#!/bin/sh\n#V2.0 Format\nmodprobe cloop file=$0 && mount -r -t iso9660 /dev/cloop $1\n", NULL,
-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
-      -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL }, */
-    /* Cow */
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_COW, "OOOM", NULL,
-      LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
-      4+4+1024+4, 8, 1, -1, cowGetBackingStore },
-    /* DMG */
-    /* XXX QEMU says there's no magic for dmg, but we should check... */
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DMG, NULL, ".dmg",
-      0, -1, 0,
-      -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL },
-    /* XXX there's probably some magic for iso we can validate too... */
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_ISO, NULL, ".iso",
-      0, -1, 0,
-      -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL },
-    /* Parallels */
-    /* XXX Untested
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_PARALLELS, "WithoutFreeSpace", NULL,
-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 16, 2,
-      16+4+4+4+4, 4, 512, -1, NULL },
-    */
-    /* QCow */
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW, "QFI", NULL,
-      LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
-      QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore },
-    /* QCow 2 */
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2, "QFI", NULL,
-      LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
-      QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore },
-    /* VMDK 3 */
-    /* XXX Untested
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "COWD", NULL,
-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
-      4+4+4, 4, 512, -1, NULL },
-    */
-    /* VMDK 4 */
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "KDMV", NULL,
-      LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
-      4+4+4, 8, 512, -1, vmdk4GetBackingStore },
-    /* Connectix / VirtualPC */
-    { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VPC, "conectix", NULL,
-      LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 12, 0x10000,
-      8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 4, 8, 1, -1, NULL},
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS] = {
-+        /*"Bochs Virtual HD Image", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
-+        NULL,
-+        LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 64, 0x20000,
-+        32+16+16+4+4+4+4+4, 8, 1, -1, NULL
-+    },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_CLOOP] = {
-+        /*"#!/bin/sh\n#V2.0 Format\nmodprobe cloop file=$0 && mount -r -t iso9660 /dev/cloop $1\n", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
-+        NULL,
-+        LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
-+        -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
-+    },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_COW] = {
-+        "OOOM", NULL,
-+        LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
-+        4+4+1024+4, 8, 1, -1, cowGetBackingStore
-+    },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DMG] = {
-+        NULL, /* XXX QEMU says there's no magic for dmg, but we should check... */
-+        ".dmg",
-+        0, -1, 0,
-+        -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
-+    },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_ISO] = {
-+        NULL, /* XXX there's probably some magic for iso we can validate too... */
-+        ".iso",
-+        0, -1, 0,
-+        -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
-+    },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW] = {
-+        "QFI", NULL,
-+        LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
-+        QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore,
-+    },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2] = {
-+        "QFI", NULL,
-+        LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
-+        QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore,
-+    },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK] = {
-+        "KDMV", NULL,
-+        LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
-+        4+4+4, 8, 512, -1, vmdk4GetBackingStore
-+    },
-+    [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VPC] = {
-+        "conectix", NULL,
-+        LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 12, 0x10000,
-+        8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 4, 8, 1, -1, NULL
-+    },
- };
-+verify(ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST);
- 
- static int
- cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
-@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-         }
- 
-         /* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
-        meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
-+        meta->format = i;
-         if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
-             char *backing;
-             int backingFormat;
-@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-         if (!virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[i].extension))
-             continue;
- 
-        meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
-+        meta->format = i;
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,585 +0,0 @@
-From 57482ca0be29e9e92e242c9acb577e0b770c01d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 14:58:10 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 03/11] Refactor virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD to separate functionality
-
-The virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD did two jobs in one. First
-it probed for storage type, then it extracted metadata for the
-type. It is desirable to be able to separate these jobs, allowing
-probing without querying metadata, and querying metadata without
-probing.
-
-To prepare for this, split out probing code into a new pair of
-methods
-
-  virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD
-  virStorageFileProbeFormat
-
-* src/util/storage_file.c, src/util/storage_file.h,
-  src/libvirt_private.syms: Introduce virStorageFileProbeFormat
-  and virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD
---
- src/libvirt_private.syms |    2 +
- src/util/storage_file.c  |  460 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- src/util/storage_file.h  |    4 +
- 3 files changed, 335 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms
-index 778ceb1..4607f49 100644
--- a/src/libvirt_private.syms
-+++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms
-@@ -628,6 +628,8 @@ virStorageGenerateQcowPassphrase;
- # storage_file.h
- virStorageFileFormatTypeToString;
- virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString;
-+virStorageFileProbeFormat;
-+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD;
- virStorageFileGetMetadata;
- virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD;
- virStorageFileIsSharedFS;
-diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
-index df0e3a1..221268b 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
-+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
-@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
- #define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END 0
- #define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT 0xE2792ACA
- 
-+/* VMDK needs at least this to find backing store,
-+ * other formats are less */
-+#define STORAGE_MAX_HEAD (20*512)
- 
- 
- static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
-@@ -349,9 +352,14 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
-                      size_t buf_size)
- {
-     static const char prefix[] = "parentFileNameHint=\"";
-
-    char desc[20*512 + 1], *start, *end;
-+    char *desc, *start, *end;
-     size_t len;
-+    int ret = BACKING_STORE_ERROR;
-+
-+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(desc, STORAGE_MAX_HEAD + 1) < 0) {
-+        virReportOOMError();
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
- 
-     *res = NULL;
-     /*
-@@ -363,29 +371,42 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
-      */
-     *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
- 
-    if (buf_size <= 0x200)
-        return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
-+    if (buf_size <= 0x200) {
-+        ret = BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-     len = buf_size - 0x200;
-    if (len > sizeof(desc) - 1)
-        len = sizeof(desc) - 1;
-+    if (len > STORAGE_MAX_HEAD)
-+        len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
-     memcpy(desc, buf + 0x200, len);
-     desc[len] = '\0';
-     start = strstr(desc, prefix);
-    if (start == NULL)
-        return BACKING_STORE_OK;
-+    if (start == NULL) {
-+        ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-     start += strlen(prefix);
-     end = strchr(start, '"');
-    if (end == NULL)
-        return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
-    if (end == start)
-        return BACKING_STORE_OK;
-+    if (end == NULL) {
-+        ret = BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+    if (end == start) {
-+        ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-     *end = '\0';
-     *res = strdup(start);
-     if (*res == NULL) {
-         virReportOOMError();
-        return BACKING_STORE_ERROR;
-+        goto cleanup;
-     }
-    return BACKING_STORE_OK;
-+
-+    ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    VIR_FREE(desc);
-+    return ret;
- }
- 
- /**
-@@ -411,148 +432,325 @@ absolutePathFromBaseFile(const char *base_file, const char *path)
-     return res;
- }
- 
-/**
- * Probe the header of a file to determine what type of disk image
- * it is, and info about its capacity if available.
- */
-int
-virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-                                int fd,
-                                virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
-+
-+static bool
-+virStorageFileMatchesMagic(int format,
-+                           unsigned char *buf,
-+                           size_t buflen)
- {
-    unsigned char head[20*512]; /* vmdk4GetBackingStore needs this much. */
-    int len, i;
-+    int mlen;
- 
-    memset(meta, 0, sizeof (*meta));
-+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].magic == NULL)
-+        return false;
- 
-    /* If all else fails, call it a raw file */
-    meta->format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW;
-+    /* Validate magic data */
-+    mlen = strlen(fileTypeInfo[format].magic);
-+    if (mlen > buflen)
-+        return false;
- 
-    if ((len = read(fd, head, sizeof(head))) < 0) {
-        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
-        return -1;
-+    if (memcmp(buf, fileTypeInfo[format].magic, mlen) != 0)
-+        return false;
-+
-+    return true;
-+}
-+
-+
-+static bool
-+virStorageFileMatchesExtension(int format,
-+                               const char *path)
-+{
-+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].extension == NULL)
-+        return false;
-+
-+    if (virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[format].extension))
-+        return true;
-+
-+    return false;
-+}
-+
-+
-+static bool
-+virStorageFileMatchesVersion(int format,
-+                             unsigned char *buf,
-+                             size_t buflen)
-+{
-+    int version;
-+
-+    /* Validate version number info */
-+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset == -1)
-+        return false;
-+
-+    if ((fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset + 4) > buflen)
-+        return false;
-+
-+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
-+        version =
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+3] << 24) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+2] << 16) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+1] << 8) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset]);
-+    } else {
-+        version =
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset] << 24) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+1] << 16) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+2] << 8) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+3]);
-     }
-+    if (version != fileTypeInfo[format].versionNumber)
-+        return false;
- 
-    /* First check file magic */
-    for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) ; i++) {
-        int mlen;
-
-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].magic == NULL)
-            continue;
-
-        /* Validate magic data */
-        mlen = strlen(fileTypeInfo[i].magic);
-        if (mlen > len)
-            continue;
-        if (memcmp(head, fileTypeInfo[i].magic, mlen) != 0)
-            continue;
-
-        /* Validate version number info */
-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].versionNumber != -1) {
-            int version;
-
-            if (fileTypeInfo[i].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
-                version = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+3] << 24) |
-                    (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+2] << 16) |
-                    (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+1] << 8) |
-                    head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset];
-            } else {
-                version = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset] << 24) |
-                    (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+1] << 16) |
-                    (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+2] << 8) |
-                    head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+3];
-            }
-            if (version != fileTypeInfo[i].versionNumber)
-                continue;
-        }
-+    return true;
-+}
- 
-        /* Optionally extract capacity from file */
-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset != -1) {
-            if (fileTypeInfo[i].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
-                meta->capacity =
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+7] << 56) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+6] << 48) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+5] << 40) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+4] << 32) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+3] << 24) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+2] << 16) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+1] << 8) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset]);
-            } else {
-                meta->capacity =
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset] << 56) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+1] << 48) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+2] << 40) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+3] << 32) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+4] << 24) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+5] << 16) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+6] << 8) |
-                    ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+7]);
-            }
-            /* Avoid unlikely, but theoretically possible overflow */
-            if (meta->capacity > (ULLONG_MAX / fileTypeInfo[i].sizeMultiplier))
-                continue;
-            meta->capacity *= fileTypeInfo[i].sizeMultiplier;
-        }
- 
-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset != -1) {
-            int crypt_format;
-+static int
-+virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(int format,
-+                                 const char *path,
-+                                 unsigned char *buf,
-+                                 size_t buflen,
-+                                 virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
-+{
-+    /* XXX we should consider moving virStorageBackendUpdateVolInfo
-+     * code into this method, for non-magic files
-+     */
-+    if (!fileTypeInfo[format].magic) {
-+        return 0;
-+    }
- 
-            crypt_format = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset] << 24) |
-                (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+1] << 16) |
-                (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+2] << 8) |
-                head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+3];
-            meta->encrypted = crypt_format != 0;
-+    /* Optionally extract capacity from file */
-+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset != -1) {
-+        if ((fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset + 8) > buflen)
-+            return 1;
-+
-+        if (fileTypeInfo[format].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
-+            meta->capacity =
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+7] << 56) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+6] << 48) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+5] << 40) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+4] << 32) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+3] << 24) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+2] << 16) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+1] << 8) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset]);
-+        } else {
-+            meta->capacity =
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset] << 56) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+1] << 48) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+2] << 40) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+3] << 32) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+4] << 24) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+5] << 16) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+6] << 8) |
-+                ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+7]);
-         }
-+        /* Avoid unlikely, but theoretically possible overflow */
-+        if (meta->capacity > (ULLONG_MAX / fileTypeInfo[format].sizeMultiplier))
-+            return 1;
-+        meta->capacity *= fileTypeInfo[format].sizeMultiplier;
-+    }
- 
-        /* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
-        meta->format = i;
-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
-            char *backing;
-            int backingFormat;
-+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset != -1) {
-+        int crypt_format;
- 
-            switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&backing,
-                                                    &backingFormat,
-                                                    head, len)) {
-            case BACKING_STORE_OK:
-                break;
-+        crypt_format =
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset] << 24) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+1] << 16) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+2] << 8) |
-+            (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+3]);
-+        meta->encrypted = crypt_format != 0;
-+    }
- 
-            case BACKING_STORE_INVALID:
-                continue;
-+    if (fileTypeInfo[format].getBackingStore != NULL) {
-+        char *backing;
-+        int backingFormat;
-+        int ret = fileTypeInfo[format].getBackingStore(&backing,
-+                                                       &backingFormat,
-+                                                       buf, buflen);
-+        if (ret == BACKING_STORE_INVALID)
-+            return 1;
-+
-+        if (ret == BACKING_STORE_ERROR)
-+            return -1;
- 
-            case BACKING_STORE_ERROR:
-+        if (backing != NULL) {
-+            meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
-+            VIR_FREE(backing);
-+            if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
-+                virReportOOMError();
-                 return -1;
-             }
-            if (backing != NULL) {
-                meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
-                VIR_FREE(backing);
-                if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
-                    virReportOOMError();
-                    return -1;
-                }
-                meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
-            } else {
-                meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
-            }
-+            meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
-+        } else {
-+            meta->backingStore = NULL;
-+            meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
-+static int
-+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(const char *path,
-+                                 unsigned char *buf,
-+                                 size_t buflen)
-+{
-+    int format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW;
-+    int i;
-+
-+    /* First check file magic */
-+    for (i = 0 ; i < VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST ; i++) {
-+        if (virStorageFileMatchesMagic(i, buf, buflen) &&
-+            virStorageFileMatchesVersion(i, buf, buflen)) {
-+            format = i;
-+            goto cleanup;
-         }
-        return 0;
-     }
- 
-     /* No magic, so check file extension */
-    for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) ; i++) {
-        if (fileTypeInfo[i].extension == NULL)
-            continue;
-+    for (i = 0 ; i < VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST ; i++) {
-+        if (virStorageFileMatchesExtension(i, path)) {
-+            format = i;
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        }
-+    }
- 
-        if (!virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[i].extension))
-            continue;
-+cleanup:
-+    return format;
-+}
- 
-        meta->format = i;
-        return 0;
-+
-+/**
-+ * virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD:
-+ *
-+ * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
-+ * pointing to 'path'), returning the detected disk format.
-+ *
-+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'format'
-+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
-+ * malicious guest can turn a file into any other non-raw
-+ * format at will.
-+ *
-+ * Best option: Don't use this function
-+ */
-+int
-+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path, int fd)
-+{
-+    unsigned char *head;
-+    ssize_t len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
-+    int ret = -1;
-+
-+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(head, len) < 0) {
-+        virReportOOMError();
-+        return -1;
-     }
- 
-    return 0;
-+    if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
-+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    if ((len = read(fd, head, len)) < 0) {
-+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    ret = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    VIR_FREE(head);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/**
-+ * virStorageFileProbeFormat:
-+ *
-+ * Probe for the format of 'path', returning the detected
-+ * disk format.
-+ *
-+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'format'
-+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
-+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
-+ * format at will.
-+ *
-+ * Best option: Don't use this function
-+ */
-+int
-+virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path)
-+{
-+    int fd, ret;
-+
-+    if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
-+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot open file '%s'"), path);
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    ret = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(path, fd);
-+
-+    close(fd);
-+
-+    return ret;
- }
- 
-+/**
-+ * virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD:
-+ *
-+ * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
-+ * for the file 'path'), filling 'meta' with the detected
-+ * format and other associated metadata.
-+ *
-+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
-+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
-+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
-+ * format at will.
-+ */
-+int
-+virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-+                                int fd,
-+                                virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
-+{
-+    unsigned char *head;
-+    ssize_t len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
-+    int ret = -1;
-+
-+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(head, len) < 0) {
-+        virReportOOMError();
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    memset(meta, 0, sizeof (*meta));
-+
-+    if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
-+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    if ((len = read(fd, head, len)) < 0) {
-+        virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    meta->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
-+
-+    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(meta->format, path, head, len, meta);
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    VIR_FREE(head);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * virStorageFileGetMetadata:
-+ *
-+ * Probe for the format of 'path', filling 'meta' with the detected
-+ * format and other associated metadata.
-+ *
-+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
-+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
-+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
-+ * format at will.
-+ */
- int
- virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
-                           virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
-diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
-index 6328ba7..3420d44 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
-+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
-@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
- #  define DEV_BSIZE 512
- # endif
- 
-+int virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path);
-+int virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path,
-+                                    int fd);
-+
- int virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
-                               virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
- int virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
-From 726a63a437efd96510ce316bf30d16f213d4db27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:15:51 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 04/11] Require format to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata
-
-Require the disk image to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata.
-If this is set to VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, then the format will be
-resolved using probing. This makes it easier to control when
-probing will be used
-
-* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
-  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
-  Set VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO when calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
-* src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c: Probe for disk format before
-  calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
-* src/util/storage_file.h, src/util/storage_file.c: Remove format
-  from virStorageFileMeta struct & require it to be passed into
-  method.
---
- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c           |   27 +++++++++++++++++---
- src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c     |    4 ++-
- src/security/security_selinux.c  |    4 ++-
- src/security/virt-aa-helper.c    |    4 ++-
- src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c |   11 ++++++--
- src/util/storage_file.c          |   50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- src/util/storage_file.h          |    3 +-
- 7 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-index 487bfa3..97f2990 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-@@ -3069,7 +3069,9 @@ static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-             }
-         }
- 
-        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
-+        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-+                                       VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-+                                       &meta);
-         if (rc < 0)
-             VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
- 
-@@ -3119,7 +3121,9 @@ static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-             }
-         }
- 
-        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
-+        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-+                                       VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-+                                       &meta);
-         if (rc < 0)
-             VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
- 
-@@ -9614,6 +9618,7 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
-     virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = NULL;
-     struct stat sb;
-     int i;
-+    int format;
- 
-     virCheckFlags(0, -1);
- 
-@@ -9658,7 +9663,21 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
-     }
- 
-     /* Probe for magic formats */
-    if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, &meta) < 0)
-+    if (disk->driverType) {
-+        if ((format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(disk->driverType)) < 0) {
-+            qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-+                            _("unknown disk format %s for %s"),
-+                            disk->driverType, disk->src);
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        }
-+    } else {
-+        if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd,
-+                                        format,
-+                                        &meta) < 0)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-     /* Get info for normal formats */
-@@ -9706,7 +9725,7 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
-        highest allocated extent from QEMU */
-     if (virDomainObjIsActive(vm) &&
-         disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_BLOCK &&
-        meta.format != VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW &&
-+        format != VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW &&
-         S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode)) {
-         qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
-         if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(vm) < 0)
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-index 95015b0..acfe48e 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-@@ -115,7 +115,9 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-         virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-         int ret;
- 
-        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
-+        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-+                                        VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-+                                        &meta);
- 
-         if (path != disk->src)
-             VIR_FREE(path);
-diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-index e5eef19..5c0f002 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-@@ -457,7 +457,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
-         virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-         int ret;
- 
-        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
-+        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-+                                        VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-+                                        &meta);
- 
-         if (path != disk->src)
-             VIR_FREE(path);
-diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-index c66f107..2c045e6 100644
--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-@@ -830,7 +830,9 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
-             do {
-                 virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- 
-                ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
-+                ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-+                                                VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-+                                                &meta);
- 
-                 if (path != ctl->def->disks[i]->src)
-                     VIR_FREE(path);
-diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
-index f0cd770..d3ac0fe 100644
--- a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
-+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
-@@ -75,14 +75,19 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
- 
-     memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
- 
-    if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(target->path, fd, &meta) < 0) {
-+    if ((target->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(target->path, fd)) < 0) {
-         close(fd);
-         return -1;
-     }
- 
-    close(fd);
-+    if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(target->path, fd,
-+                                        target->format,
-+                                        &meta) < 0) {
-+        close(fd);
-+        return -1;
-+    }
- 
-    target->format = meta.format;
-+    close(fd);
- 
-     if (backingStore) {
-         *backingStore = meta.backingStore;
-diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
-index 221268b..9712d92 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
-+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
-@@ -696,18 +696,23 @@ virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path)
- /**
-  * virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD:
-  *
- * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
- * for the file 'path'), filling 'meta' with the detected
- * format and other associated metadata.
-+ * Extract metadata about the storage volume with the specified
-+ * image format. If image format is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, it
-+ * will probe to automatically identify the format. 
-  *
- * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
- * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
- * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
- * format at will.
-+ * Callers are advised never to use VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO as a
-+ * format, since a malicious guest can turn a raw file into any
-+ * other non-raw format at will.
-+ *
-+ * If the returned meta.backingStoreFormat is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO
-+ * it indicates the image didn't specify an explicit format for its
-+ * backing store. Callers are advised against probing for the
-+ * backing store format in this case.
-  */
- int
- virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-                                 int fd,
-+                                int format,
-                                 virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
- {
-     unsigned char *head;
-@@ -731,9 +736,16 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
-    meta->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
-+    if (format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO)
-+        format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
-+
-+    if (format < 0 ||
-+        format >= VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST) {
-+        virReportSystemError(EINVAL, _("unknown storage file format %d"), format);
-+        return -1;
-+    }
- 
-    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(meta->format, path, head, len, meta);
-+    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(format, path, head, len, meta);
- 
- cleanup:
-     VIR_FREE(head);
-@@ -743,16 +755,22 @@ cleanup:
- /**
-  * virStorageFileGetMetadata:
-  *
- * Probe for the format of 'path', filling 'meta' with the detected
- * format and other associated metadata.
-+ * Extract metadata about the storage volume with the specified
-+ * image format. If image format is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, it
-+ * will probe to automatically identify the format. 
-  *
- * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
- * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
- * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
- * format at will.
-+ * Callers are advised never to use VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO as a
-+ * format, since a malicious guest can turn a raw file into any
-+ * other non-raw format at will.
-+ *
-+ * If the returned meta.backingStoreFormat is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO
-+ * it indicates the image didn't specify an explicit format for its
-+ * backing store. Callers are advised against probing for the
-+ * backing store format in this case.
-  */
- int
- virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
-+                          int format,
-                           virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
- {
-     int fd, ret;
-@@ -762,7 +780,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
-         return -1;
-     }
- 
-    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, meta);
-+    ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, format, meta);
- 
-     close(fd);
- 
-diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
-index 3420d44..6853182 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
-+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
-@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ enum virStorageFileFormat {
- VIR_ENUM_DECL(virStorageFileFormat);
- 
- typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
-    int format;
-     char *backingStore;
-     int backingStoreFormat;
-     unsigned long long capacity;
-@@ -62,9 +61,11 @@ int virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path,
-                                     int fd);
- 
- int virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
-+                              int format,
-                               virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
- int virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
-                                     int fd,
-+                                    int format,
-                                     virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
- 
- int virStorageFileIsSharedFS(const char *path);
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-From ac5067f1e2e98181ee0e9230f756697f50d853eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 18:09:15 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Add an API for iterating over disk paths
-
-There is duplicated code which iterates over disk backing stores
-performing some action. Provide a convenient helper for doing
-this to eliminate duplication & risk of mistakes with disk format
-probing
-
-* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h,
-  src/libvirt_private.syms: Add virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
---
- src/conf/domain_conf.c   |   99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- src/conf/domain_conf.h   |   11 +++++
- src/libvirt_private.syms |    1 +
- 3 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
-index 378c06e..b20ca97 100644
--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
-+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
- #include "macvtap.h"
- #include "nwfilter_conf.h"
- #include "ignore-value.h"
-+#include "storage_file.h"
- 
- #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_DOMAIN
- 
-@@ -7273,4 +7274,102 @@ done:
- }
- 
- 
-+int virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
-+                                bool allowProbing,
-+                                bool ignoreOpenFailure,
-+                                virDomainDiskDefPathIterator iter,
-+                                void *opaque)
-+{
-+    virHashTablePtr paths;
-+    int format;
-+    int ret = -1;
-+    size_t depth = 0;
-+    char *nextpath = NULL;
-+
-+    if (!disk->src)
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    if (disk->driverType) {
-+        const char *formatStr = disk->driverType;
-+        if (STREQ(formatStr, "aio"))
-+            formatStr = "raw"; /* Xen compat */
-+
-+        if ((format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(formatStr)) < 0) {
-+            virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-+                                 _("unknown disk format '%s' for %s"),
-+                                 disk->driverType, disk->src);
-+            return -1;
-+        }
-+    } else {
-+        if (allowProbing) {
-+            format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
-+        } else {
-+            virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-+                                 _("no disk format for %s and probing is disabled"),
-+                                 disk->src);
-+            return -1;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    paths = virHashCreate(5);
-+
-+    do {
-+        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-+        const char *path = nextpath ? nextpath : disk->src;
-+        int fd;
-+
-+        if (iter(disk, path, depth, opaque) < 0)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+
-+        if (virHashLookup(paths, path)) {
-+            virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-+                                 _("backing store for %s is self-referential"),
-+                                 disk->src);
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        }
-+
-+        if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
-+            if (ignoreOpenFailure) {
-+                char ebuf[1024];
-+                VIR_WARN("Ignoring open failure on %s: %s", path,
-+                         virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
-+                break;
-+            } else {
-+                virReportSystemError(errno,
-+                                     _("unable to open disk path %s"),
-+                                     path);
-+                goto cleanup;
-+            }
-+        }
-+
-+        if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, format, &meta) < 0) {
-+            close(fd);
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        }
-+        close(fd);
-+
-+        if (virHashAddEntry(paths, path, (void*)0x1) < 0) {
-+            virReportOOMError();
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        }
-+
-+        depth++;
-+        nextpath = meta.backingStore;
-+
-+        format = meta.backingStoreFormat;
-+
-+        if (format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO &&
-+            !allowProbing)
-+            format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW; /* Stops further recursion */
-+    } while (nextpath);
-+
-+    ret = 0;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    virHashFree(paths, NULL);
-+    VIR_FREE(nextpath);
-+
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* ! PROXY */
-diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h
-index 01da17e..d46869e 100644
--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h
-+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h
-@@ -1079,6 +1079,17 @@ int virDomainChrDefForeach(virDomainDefPtr def,
-                            void *opaque);
- 
- 
-+typedef int (*virDomainDiskDefPathIterator)(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
-+                                            const char *path,
-+                                            size_t depth,
-+                                            void *opaque);
-+
-+int virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
-+                                bool allowProbing,
-+                                bool ignoreOpenFailure,
-+                                virDomainDiskDefPathIterator iter,
-+                                void *opaque);
-+
- VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainVirt)
- VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainBoot)
- VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainFeature)
-diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms
-index 4607f49..b5f3695 100644
--- a/src/libvirt_private.syms
-+++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms
-@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ virDomainSnapshotDefFormat;
- virDomainSnapshotAssignDef;
- virDomainObjAssignDef;
- virDomainChrDefForeach;
-+virDomainDiskDefForeachPath;
- 
- 
- # domain_event.h
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
-From 54c1bb731d2b19a46a594cf9682c022f1e1114d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:40:47 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 06/11] Convert all disk backing store loops to shared helper API
-
-Update the QEMU cgroups code, QEMU DAC security driver, SELinux
-and AppArmour security drivers over to use the shared helper API
-virDomainDiskDefForeachPath().
-
-* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
-  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
-  Convert over to use virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
---
- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c          |  161 ++++++++++++++++----------------------
- src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c    |   47 ++++--------
- src/security/security_selinux.c |   67 +++++++----------
- src/security/virt-aa-helper.c   |   71 ++++++++----------
- 4 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-index 97f2990..99aeffa 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-@@ -3040,107 +3040,82 @@ static const char *const defaultDeviceACL[] = {
- #define DEVICE_PTY_MAJOR 136
- #define DEVICE_SND_MAJOR 116
- 
-static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-                               virDomainObjPtr vm,
-                               virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
-{
-    char *path = disk->src;
-    int ret = -1;
- 
-    while (path != NULL) {
-        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-        int rc;
-+static int qemuSetupDiskPathAllow(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-+                                  const char *path,
-+                                  size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-+                                  void *opaque)
-+{
-+    virCgroupPtr cgroup = opaque;
-+    int rc;
- 
-        VIR_DEBUG("Process path '%s' for disk", path);
-        rc = virCgroupAllowDevicePath(cgroup, path);
-        if (rc != 0) {
-            /* Get this for non-block devices */
-            if (rc == -EINVAL) {
-                VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
-            } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
-                VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
-            } else {
-                virReportSystemError(-rc,
-                                     _("Unable to allow device %s for %s"),
-                                     path, vm->def->name);
-                if (path != disk->src)
-                    VIR_FREE(path);
-                goto cleanup;
-            }
-+    VIR_DEBUG("Process path %s for disk", path);
-+    /* XXX RO vs RW */
-+    rc = virCgroupAllowDevicePath(cgroup, path);
-+    if (rc != 0) {
-+        /* Get this for non-block devices */
-+        if (rc == -EINVAL) {
-+            VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
-+        } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
-+            VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
-+        } else {
-+            virReportSystemError(-rc,
-+                                 _("Unable to allow access for disk path %s"),
-+                                 path);
-+            return -1;
-         }
-
-        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-                                       VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-                                       &meta);
-        if (rc < 0)
-            VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
-
-        if (path != disk->src)
-            VIR_FREE(path);
-        path = NULL;
-
-        if (rc < 0)
-            break; /* Treating as non fatal */
-
-        path = meta.backingStore;
-     }
-+    return 0;
-+}
- 
-    ret = 0;
- 
-cleanup:
-    return ret;
-+static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-+                               virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
-+{
-+    return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
-+                                       true,
-+                                       true,
-+                                       qemuSetupDiskPathAllow,
-+                                       cgroup);
- }
- 
- 
-static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-                                  virDomainObjPtr vm,
-                                  virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
-+static int qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-+                                    const char *path,
-+                                    size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-+                                    void *opaque)
- {
-    char *path = disk->src;
-    int ret = -1;
-
-    while (path != NULL) {
-        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-        int rc;
-+    virCgroupPtr cgroup = opaque;
-+    int rc;
- 
-        VIR_DEBUG("Process path '%s' for disk", path);
-        rc = virCgroupDenyDevicePath(cgroup, path);
-        if (rc != 0) {
-            /* Get this for non-block devices */
-            if (rc == -EINVAL) {
-                VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
-            } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
-                VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
-            } else {
-                virReportSystemError(-rc,
-                                     _("Unable to deny device %s for %s"),
-                                     path, vm->def->name);
-                if (path != disk->src)
-                    VIR_FREE(path);
-                goto cleanup;
-            }
-+    VIR_DEBUG("Process path %s for disk", path);
-+    /* XXX RO vs RW */
-+    rc = virCgroupDenyDevicePath(cgroup, path);
-+    if (rc != 0) {
-+        /* Get this for non-block devices */
-+        if (rc == -EINVAL) {
-+            VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
-+        } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
-+            VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
-+        } else {
-+            virReportSystemError(-rc,
-+                                 _("Unable to allow access for disk path %s"),
-+                                 path);
-+            return -1;
-         }
-
-        rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-                                       VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-                                       &meta);
-        if (rc < 0)
-            VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
-
-        if (path != disk->src)
-            VIR_FREE(path);
-        path = NULL;
-
-        if (rc < 0)
-            break; /* Treating as non fatal */
-
-        path = meta.backingStore;
-     }
-+    return 0;
-+}
- 
-    ret = 0;
- 
-cleanup:
-    return ret;
-+static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-+                                  virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
-+{
-+    return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
-+                                       true,
-+                                       true,
-+                                       qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny,
-+                                       cgroup);
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -3204,7 +3179,7 @@ static int qemuSetupCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-         }
- 
-         for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
-+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
-                 goto cleanup;
-         }
- 
-@@ -8035,7 +8010,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
-                                 vm->def->name);
-                 goto endjob;
-             }
-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-                 goto endjob;
-         }
- 
-@@ -8080,7 +8055,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
-             /* Fallthrough */
-         }
-         if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
-            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-                 VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
-                          NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
-         }
-@@ -8280,7 +8255,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
-                                 vm->def->name);
-                 goto endjob;
-             }
-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-                 goto endjob;
-         }
- 
-@@ -8303,7 +8278,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
-         }
- 
-         if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
-            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-                 VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
-                          NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
-         }
-@@ -8430,7 +8405,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-         VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
- 
-     if (cgroup != NULL) {
-        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-             VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
-                      NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
-     }
-@@ -8493,7 +8468,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachSCSIDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-         VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
- 
-     if (cgroup != NULL) {
-        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-             VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
-                      NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
-     }
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-index acfe48e..770010d 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-@@ -98,45 +98,28 @@ err:
- 
- 
- static int
-+qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-+                                    const char *path,
-+                                    size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-+                                    void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
-+{
-+    return qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(path, driver->user, driver->group);
-+}
-+
-+
-+static int
- qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-                                      virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
- 
- {
-    const char *path;
-
-     if (!driver->privileged || !driver->dynamicOwnership)
-         return 0;
- 
-    if (!disk->src)
-        return 0;
-
-    path = disk->src;
-    do {
-        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-        int ret;
-
-        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-                                        VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-                                        &meta);
-
-        if (path != disk->src)
-            VIR_FREE(path);
-        path = NULL;
-
-        if (ret < 0)
-            return -1;
-
-        if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
-            qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(meta.backingStore,
-                                        driver->user, driver->group) < 0) {
-            VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        path = meta.backingStore;
-    } while (path != NULL);
-
-    return qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(disk->src, driver->user, driver->group);
-+    return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
-+                                       true,
-+                                       false,
-+                                       qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel,
-+                                       NULL);
- }
- 
- 
-diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-index 5c0f002..d191118 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-@@ -439,54 +439,43 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
- 
- 
- static int
-+SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
-+                            const char *path,
-+                            size_t depth,
-+                            void *opaque)
-+{
-+    const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = opaque;
-+
-+    if (depth == 0) {
-+        if (disk->shared) {
-+            return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_image_context);
-+        } else if (disk->readonly) {
-+            return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
-+        } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
-+            return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, secdef->imagelabel);
-+        } else {
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-+    } else {
-+        return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+static int
- SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
-                              virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
- 
- {
-     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
-    const char *path;
- 
-     if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
-         return 0;
- 
-    if (!disk->src)
-        return 0;
-
-    path = disk->src;
-    do {
-        virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-        int ret;
-
-        ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-                                        VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-                                        &meta);
-
-        if (path != disk->src)
-            VIR_FREE(path);
-        path = NULL;
-
-        if (ret < 0)
-           break;
-
-        if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
-            SELinuxSetFilecon(meta.backingStore,
-                              default_content_context) < 0) {
-            VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        path = meta.backingStore;
-    } while (path != NULL);
-
-    if (disk->shared) {
-        return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, default_image_context);
-    } else if (disk->readonly) {
-        return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, default_content_context);
-    } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
-        return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-+    return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
-+                                       true,
-+                                       false,
-+                                       SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
-+                                       secdef);
- }
- 
- 
-diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-index 2c045e6..9ed0cd3 100644
--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
- #include "uuid.h"
- #include "hostusb.h"
- #include "pci.h"
-#include "storage_file.h"
- 
- static char *progname;
- 
-@@ -801,6 +800,28 @@ file_iterate_pci_cb(pciDevice *dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
- }
- 
- static int
-+add_file_path(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
-+              const char *path,
-+              size_t depth,
-+              void *opaque)
-+{
-+    virBufferPtr buf = opaque;
-+    int ret;
-+
-+    if (depth == 0) {
-+        if (disk->readonly)
-+            ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "r");
-+        else
-+            ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "rw");
-+    } else {
-+        ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "r");
-+    }
-+
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+
-+static int
- get_files(vahControl * ctl)
- {
-     virBuffer buf = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER;
-@@ -821,45 +842,15 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
-         goto clean;
-     }
- 
-    for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++)
-        if (ctl->def->disks[i] && ctl->def->disks[i]->src) {
-            int ret;
-            const char *path;
-
-            path = ctl->def->disks[i]->src;
-            do {
-                virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-
-                ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
-                                                VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
-                                                &meta);
-
-                if (path != ctl->def->disks[i]->src)
-                    VIR_FREE(path);
-                path = NULL;
-
-                if (ret < 0) {
-                    vah_warning("could not open path, skipping");
-                    continue;
-                }
-
-                if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
-                    (ret = vah_add_file(&buf, meta.backingStore, "rw")) != 0) {
-                    VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
-                    goto clean;
-                }
-
-                path = meta.backingStore;
-            } while (path != NULL);
-
-            if (ctl->def->disks[i]->readonly)
-                ret = vah_add_file(&buf, ctl->def->disks[i]->src, "r");
-            else
-                ret = vah_add_file(&buf, ctl->def->disks[i]->src, "rw");
-
-            if (ret != 0)
-                goto clean;
-        }
-+    for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++) {
-+        int ret = virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(ctl->def->disks[i],
-+                                              true,
-+                                              false,
-+                                              add_file_path,
-+                                              &buf);
-+        if (ret != 0)
-+            goto clean;
-+    }
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->nserials; i++)
-         if (ctl->def->serials[i] && ctl->def->serials[i]->data.file.path)
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,468 +0,0 @@
-From dac2b936e77f6c76c11f162e4b175492e4803acb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:58:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Disable all disk probing in QEMU driver & add config option to re-enable
-
-Disk format probing is now disabled by default. A new config
-option in /etc/qemu/qemu.conf will re-enable it for existing
-deployments where this causes trouble
---
- src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug       |    1 +
- src/qemu/qemu.conf               |   12 ++++++++++++
- src/qemu/qemu_conf.c             |    4 ++++
- src/qemu/qemu_conf.h             |    1 +
- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c           |   36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c     |    2 +-
- src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug  |    4 ++++
- src/security/security_apparmor.c |   12 ++++++++----
- src/security/security_driver.c   |   16 ++++++++++++++--
- src/security/security_driver.h   |   10 ++++++++--
- src/security/security_selinux.c  |    9 ++++++---
- src/security/virt-aa-helper.c    |   10 +++++++++-
- tests/seclabeltest.c             |    2 +-
- 13 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug b/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
-index 7c9f271..47d0525 100644
--- a/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
-+++ b/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ module Libvirtd_qemu =
-                  | bool_entry "relaxed_acs_check"
-                  | bool_entry "vnc_allow_host_audio"
-                  | bool_entry "clear_emulator_capabilities"
-+                 | bool_entry "allow_disk_format_probing"
- 
-    (* Each enty in the config is one of the following three ... *)
-    let entry = vnc_entry
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu.conf b/src/qemu/qemu.conf
-index 93934f3..dc8eb83 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu.conf
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu.conf
-@@ -187,3 +187,15 @@
- # exploit the privileges and possibly do damage to the host.
- #
- # clear_emulator_capabilities = 1
-+
-+
-+
-+# If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk
-+# images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise
-+# specified in the XML. This is disabled by default.
-+#
-+# WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all
-+# deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their
-+# guest XML <disk> elements to include  <driver type='XXXX'/>
-+# elements instead of enabling this option.
-+# allow_disk_format_probing = 1
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
-index 988220b..3ba48bf 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
-@@ -365,6 +365,10 @@ int qemudLoadDriverConfig(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-     CHECK_TYPE ("clear_emulator_capabilities", VIR_CONF_LONG);
-     if (p) driver->clearEmulatorCapabilities = p->l;
- 
-+    p = virConfGetValue (conf, "allow_disk_format_probing");
-+    CHECK_TYPE ("allow_disk_format_probing", VIR_CONF_LONG);
-+    if (p) driver->allowDiskFormatProbing = p->l;
-+
-     virConfFree (conf);
-     return 0;
- }
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
-index ab5f158..30e9f20 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
-@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ struct qemud_driver {
-     unsigned int relaxedACS : 1;
-     unsigned int vncAllowHostAudio : 1;
-     unsigned int clearEmulatorCapabilities : 1;
-+    unsigned int allowDiskFormatProbing : 1;
- 
-     virCapsPtr caps;
- 
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-index 616547c..3c479c5 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-@@ -1322,7 +1322,8 @@ qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
-     qemuSecurityDACSetDriver(qemud_drv);
- 
-     ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv,
-                                   qemud_drv->securityDriverName);
-+                                   qemud_drv->securityDriverName,
-+                                   qemud_drv->allowDiskFormatProbing);
-     if (ret == -1) {
-         VIR_ERROR0(_("Failed to start security driver"));
-         return -1;
-@@ -3070,11 +3071,12 @@ static int qemuSetupDiskPathAllow(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
- }
- 
- 
-static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-+static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-+                               virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-                                virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
- {
-     return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
-                                       true,
-+                                       driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
-                                        true,
-                                        qemuSetupDiskPathAllow,
-                                        cgroup);
-@@ -3109,11 +3111,12 @@ static int qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
- }
- 
- 
-static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-+static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-+                                  virCgroupPtr cgroup,
-                                   virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
- {
-     return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
-                                       true,
-+                                       driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
-                                        true,
-                                        qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny,
-                                        cgroup);
-@@ -3180,7 +3183,7 @@ static int qemuSetupCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-         }
- 
-         for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
-+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
-                 goto cleanup;
-         }
- 
-@@ -8033,7 +8036,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
-                                 vm->def->name);
-                 goto endjob;
-             }
-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-                 goto endjob;
-         }
- 
-@@ -8078,7 +8081,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
-             /* Fallthrough */
-         }
-         if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
-            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-                 VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
-                          NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
-         }
-@@ -8278,7 +8281,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
-                                 vm->def->name);
-                 goto endjob;
-             }
-            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+            if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-                 goto endjob;
-         }
- 
-@@ -8301,7 +8304,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
-         }
- 
-         if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
-            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+            if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-                 VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
-                          NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
-         }
-@@ -8429,7 +8432,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-         VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
- 
-     if (cgroup != NULL) {
-        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-             VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
-                      NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
-     }
-@@ -8493,7 +8496,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachSCSIDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
-         VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
- 
-     if (cgroup != NULL) {
-        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-+        if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
-             VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
-                      NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
-     }
-@@ -9672,8 +9675,15 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
-             goto cleanup;
-         }
-     } else {
-        if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
-+        if (driver->allowDiskFormatProbing) {
-+            if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
-+                goto cleanup;
-+        } else {
-+            qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-+                            _("no disk format for %s and probing is disabled"),
-+                            disk->src);
-             goto cleanup;
-+        }
-     }
- 
-     if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd,
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-index 0bbcf69..55dc0c6 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
-@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-         return 0;
- 
-     return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
-                                       true,
-+                                       driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
-                                        false,
-                                        qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel,
-                                        NULL);
-diff --git a/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug b/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
-index 3326cc5..f0c4a0d 100644
--- a/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
-+++ b/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
-@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ relaxed_acs_check = 1
- vnc_allow_host_audio = 1
- 
- clear_emulator_capabilities = 0
-+
-+allow_disk_format_probing = 1
- "
- 
-    test Libvirtd_qemu.lns get conf =
-@@ -212,3 +214,5 @@ clear_emulator_capabilities = 0
- { "vnc_allow_host_audio" = "1" }
- { "#empty" }
- { "clear_emulator_capabilities" = "0" }
-+{ "#empty" }
-+{ "allow_disk_format_probing" = "1" }
-diff --git a/src/security/security_apparmor.c b/src/security/security_apparmor.c
-index cb5c739..c5f9829 100644
--- a/src/security/security_apparmor.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_apparmor.c
-@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ load_profile(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-     char *xml = NULL;
-     int pipefd[2];
-     pid_t child;
-+    const char *probe = virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv)
-+        ? "1" : "0";
- 
-     if (pipe(pipefd) < -1) {
-         virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("unable to create pipe"));
-@@ -172,19 +174,19 @@ load_profile(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
- 
-     if (create) {
-         const char *const argv[] = {
-            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-c", "-u", profile, NULL
-+            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-c", "-u", profile, NULL
-         };
-         ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
-                       pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
-     } else if (fn) {
-         const char *const argv[] = {
-            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-r", "-u", profile, "-f", fn, NULL
-+            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-r", "-u", profile, "-f", fn, NULL
-         };
-         ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
-                       pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
-     } else {
-         const char *const argv[] = {
-            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-r", "-u", profile, NULL
-+            VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-r", "-u", profile, NULL
-         };
-         ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
-                       pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
-@@ -347,9 +349,11 @@ AppArmorSecurityDriverProbe(void)
-  * currently not used.
-  */
- static int
-AppArmorSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
-+AppArmorSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-+                           bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
- {
-     virSecurityDriverSetDOI(drv, SECURITY_APPARMOR_VOID_DOI);
-+    virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv, allowDiskFormatProbing);
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/security/security_driver.c b/src/security/security_driver.c
-index aac9f78..9e32fa4 100644
--- a/src/security/security_driver.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_driver.c
-@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def)
- 
- int
- virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
-                         const char *name)
-+                         const char *name,
-+                         bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
- {
-     unsigned int i;
- 
-@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
-         switch (tmp->probe()) {
-         case SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE:
-             virSecurityDriverInit(tmp);
-            if (tmp->open(tmp) == -1) {
-+            if (tmp->open(tmp, allowDiskFormatProbing) == -1) {
-                 return -1;
-             } else {
-                 *drv = tmp;
-@@ -125,3 +126,14 @@ virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
- {
-     return drv->name;
- }
-+
-+void virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-+                                                bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
-+{
-+    drv->_private.allowDiskFormatProbing = allowDiskFormatProbing;
-+}
-+
-+bool virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
-+{
-+    return drv->_private.allowDiskFormatProbing;
-+}
-diff --git a/src/security/security_driver.h b/src/security/security_driver.h
-index 61c9eb0..d768f32 100644
--- a/src/security/security_driver.h
-+++ b/src/security/security_driver.h
-@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ typedef struct _virSecurityDriverState virSecurityDriverState;
- typedef virSecurityDriverState *virSecurityDriverStatePtr;
- 
- typedef virSecurityDriverStatus (*virSecurityDriverProbe) (void);
-typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
-+typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-+                                      bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
- typedef int (*virSecurityDomainRestoreImageLabel) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-                                                    virDomainObjPtr vm,
-                                                    virDomainDiskDefPtr disk);
-@@ -102,12 +103,14 @@ struct _virSecurityDriver {
-      */
-     struct {
-         char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN];
-+        bool allowDiskFormatProbing;
-     } _private;
- };
- 
- /* Global methods */
- int virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
-                             const char *name);
-+                             const char *name,
-+                             bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
- 
- int
- virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def);
-@@ -120,7 +123,10 @@ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def);
- void virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
- int virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-                             const char *doi);
-+void virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-+                                                bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
- const char *virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
- const char *virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
-+bool virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
- 
- #endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_H__ */
-diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-index cc3812b..a9dd836 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
-@@ -266,13 +266,15 @@ SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void)
- }
- 
- static int
-SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
-+SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-+                          bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
- {
-     /*
-      * Where will the DOI come from?  SELinux configuration, or qemu
-      * configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0".
-      */
-     virSecurityDriverSetDOI(drv, SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI);
-+    virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv, allowDiskFormatProbing);
-     return SELinuxInitialize();
- }
- 
-@@ -467,18 +469,19 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
- }
- 
- static int
-SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-+SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
-                              virDomainObjPtr vm,
-                              virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
- 
- {
-     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
-+    bool allowDiskFormatProbing = virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv);
- 
-     if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
-         return 0;
- 
-     return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
-                                       true,
-+                                       allowDiskFormatProbing,
-                                        false,
-                                        SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
-                                        secdef);
-diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-index 9ed0cd3..521545d 100644
--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- static char *progname;
- 
- typedef struct {
-+    bool allowDiskFormatProbing;
-     char uuid[PROFILE_NAME_SIZE];       /* UUID of vm */
-     bool dryrun;                /* dry run */
-     char cmd;                   /* 'c'   create
-@@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++) {
-         int ret = virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(ctl->def->disks[i],
-                                              true,
-+                                              ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing,
-                                               false,
-                                               add_file_path,
-                                               &buf);
-@@ -943,6 +944,7 @@ vahParseArgv(vahControl * ctl, int argc, char **argv)
- {
-     int arg, idx = 0;
-     struct option opt[] = {
-+        {"probing", 1, 0, 'p' },
-         {"add", 0, 0, 'a'},
-         {"create", 0, 0, 'c'},
-         {"dryrun", 0, 0, 'd'},
-@@ -991,6 +993,12 @@ vahParseArgv(vahControl * ctl, int argc, char **argv)
-                     PROFILE_NAME_SIZE) == NULL)
-                     vah_error(ctl, 1, "error copying UUID");
-                 break;
-+            case 'p':
-+                if (STREQ(optarg, "1"))
-+                    ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing = true;
-+                else
-+                    ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing = false;
-+                break;
-             default:
-                 vah_error(ctl, 1, "unsupported option");
-                 break;
-diff --git a/tests/seclabeltest.c b/tests/seclabeltest.c
-index 26d1f86..ef3f026 100644
--- a/tests/seclabeltest.c
-+++ b/tests/seclabeltest.c
-@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ main (int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char **argv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
-     const char *doi, *model;
-     virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
- 
-    ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "selinux");
-+    ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "selinux", false);
-     if (ret == -1)
-     {
-         fprintf (stderr, "Failed to start security driver");
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From 3534cd47a57ee9cf7041472511444784f14d6939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 16:08:55 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 09/11] Add ability to set a default driver name/type when parsing disks
-
-Record a default driver name/type in capabilities struct. Use this
-when parsing disks if value is not set in XML config.
-
-* src/conf/capabilities.h: Record default driver name/type for disks
-* src/conf/domain_conf.c: Fallback to default driver name/type
-  when parsing disks
-* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Set default driver name/type to raw
---
- src/conf/capabilities.h |    2 ++
- src/conf/domain_conf.c  |   16 +++++++++++++++-
- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c  |    8 ++++++++
- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/conf/capabilities.h b/src/conf/capabilities.h
-index 9290c82..f676eb8 100644
--- a/src/conf/capabilities.h
-+++ b/src/conf/capabilities.h
-@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ struct _virCaps {
-     virCapsGuestPtr *guests;
-     unsigned char macPrefix[VIR_MAC_PREFIX_BUFLEN];
-     unsigned int emulatorRequired : 1;
-+    const char *defaultDiskDriverName;
-+    const char *defaultDiskDriverType;
-     void *(*privateDataAllocFunc)(void);
-     void (*privateDataFreeFunc)(void *);
-     int (*privateDataXMLFormat)(virBufferPtr, void *);
-diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
-index b20ca97..f3b8cfa 100644
--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
-+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
-@@ -1639,6 +1639,16 @@ virDomainDiskDefParseXML(virCapsPtr caps,
-     def->serial = serial;
-     serial = NULL;
- 
-+    if (!def->driverType &&
-+        caps->defaultDiskDriverType &&
-+        !(def->driverType = strdup(caps->defaultDiskDriverType)))
-+        goto no_memory;
-+
-+    if (!def->driverName &&
-+        caps->defaultDiskDriverName &&
-+        !(def->driverName = strdup(caps->defaultDiskDriverName)))
-+        goto no_memory;
-+
-     if (def->info.type == VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_ADDRESS_TYPE_NONE
-         && virDomainDiskDefAssignAddress(caps, def) < 0)
-         goto error;
-@@ -1659,6 +1669,9 @@ cleanup:
- 
-     return def;
- 
-+no_memory:
-+    virReportOOMError();
-+
-  error:
-     virDomainDiskDefFree(def);
-     def = NULL;
-@@ -4275,7 +4288,8 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParseXML(virCapsPtr caps,
-     if (n && VIR_ALLOC_N(def->disks, n) < 0)
-         goto no_memory;
-     for (i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
-        virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(caps, nodes[i],
-+        virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(caps,
-+                                                            nodes[i],
-                                                             flags);
-         if (!disk)
-             goto error;
-diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-index 3c479c5..14b790e 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
-@@ -1357,6 +1357,14 @@ qemuCreateCapabilities(virCapsPtr oldcaps,
-         return NULL;
-     }
- 
-+    if (driver->allowDiskFormatProbing) {
-+        caps->defaultDiskDriverName = NULL;
-+        caps->defaultDiskDriverType = NULL;
-+    } else {
-+        caps->defaultDiskDriverName = "qemu";
-+        caps->defaultDiskDriverType = "raw";
-+    }
-+
-     /* Domain XML parser hooks */
-     caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
-     caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
-From 2ba8625d6d148fa489586efabdfaf2ef20903762 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2010 14:14:05 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 10/11] Rewrite qemu-img backing store format handling
-
-When creating qcow2 files with a backing store, it is important
-to set an explicit format to prevent QEMU probing. The storage
-backend was only doing this if it found a 'kvm-img' binary. This
-is wrong because plenty of kvm-img binaries don't support an
-explicit format, and plenty of 'qemu-img' binaries do support
-a format. The result was that most qcow2 files were not getting
-a backing store format.
-
-This patch runs 'qemu-img -h' to check for the two support
-argument formats
-
-  '-o backing_format=raw'
-  '-F raw'
-
-and use whichever option it finds
-
-* src/storage/storage_backend.c: Query binary to determine
-  how to set the backing store format
---
- src/storage/storage_backend.c |  214 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 1 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend.c b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
-index aba8937..c185693 100644
--- a/src/storage/storage_backend.c
-+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
-@@ -561,6 +561,69 @@ static int virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(virStoragePoolObjPtr pool,
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-+enum {
-+    QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_NONE = 0,
-+    QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG,
-+    QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS,
-+};
-+
-+static int virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat(const char *qemuimg)
-+{
-+    const char *const qemuarg[] = { qemuimg, "-h", NULL };
-+    const char *const qemuenv[] = { "LC_ALL=C", NULL };
-+    pid_t child = 0;
-+    int status;
-+    int newstdout = -1;
-+    char *help = NULL;
-+    enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 1024*8 };
-+    int len;
-+    char *start;
-+    char *end;
-+    char *tmp;
-+    int ret = -1;
-+
-+    if (virExec(qemuarg, qemuenv, NULL,
-+                &child, -1, &newstdout, NULL, VIR_EXEC_CLEAR_CAPS) < 0)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    if ((len = virFileReadLimFD(newstdout, MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE, &help)) < 0) {
-+        virReportSystemError(errno,
-+                             _("Unable to read '%s -h' output"),
-+                             qemuimg);
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    start = strstr(help, " create ");
-+    end = strstr(start, "\n");
-+    if ((tmp = strstr(start, "-F fmt")) && tmp < end)
-+        ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG;
-+    else if ((tmp = strstr(start, "[-o options]")) && tmp < end)
-+        ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS;
-+    else
-+        ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_NONE;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    VIR_FREE(help);
-+    close(newstdout);
-+rewait:
-+    if (child) {
-+        if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child) {
-+            if (errno == EINTR)
-+                goto rewait;
-+
-+            VIR_ERROR(_("Unexpected exit status from qemu %d pid %lu"),
-+                      WEXITSTATUS(status), (unsigned long)child);
-+        }
-+        if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-+            VIR_WARN("Unexpected exit status '%d', qemu probably failed",
-+                     WEXITSTATUS(status));
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+
- static int
- virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
-                                virStoragePoolObjPtr pool,
-@@ -568,10 +631,9 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
-                                virStorageVolDefPtr inputvol,
-                                unsigned int flags ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
- {
-    int ret;
-+    int ret = -1;
-     char size[100];
-     char *create_tool;
-    short use_kvmimg;
- 
-     const char *type = virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(vol->target.format);
-     const char *backingType = vol->backingStore.path ?
-@@ -582,41 +644,10 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
-     const char *inputPath = inputvol ? inputvol->target.path : NULL;
-     /* Treat input block devices as 'raw' format */
-     const char *inputType = inputPath ?
-                            virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(inputvol->type == VIR_STORAGE_VOL_BLOCK ? VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW : inputvol->target.format) :
-                            NULL;
-
-    const char **imgargv;
-    /* The extra NULL field is for indicating encryption (-e). */
-    const char *imgargvnormal[] = {
-        NULL, "create",
-        "-f", type,
-        vol->target.path,
-        size,
-        NULL,
-        NULL
-    };
-    /* Extra NULL fields are for including "backingType" when using
-     * kvm-img (-F backingType), and for indicating encryption (-e).
-     */
-    const char *imgargvbacking[] = {
-        NULL, "create",
-        "-f", type,
-        "-b", vol->backingStore.path,
-        vol->target.path,
-        size,
-        NULL,
-        NULL,
-        NULL,
-        NULL
-    };
-    const char *convargv[] = {
-        NULL, "convert",
-        "-f", inputType,
-        "-O", type,
-        inputPath,
-        vol->target.path,
-        NULL,
-    };
-+        virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(inputvol->type == VIR_STORAGE_VOL_BLOCK ?
-+                                         VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW :
-+                                         inputvol->target.format) :
-+        NULL;
- 
-     if (type == NULL) {
-         virStorageReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-@@ -690,44 +721,103 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
-         }
-     }
- 
-    if ((create_tool = virFindFileInPath("kvm-img")) != NULL)
-        use_kvmimg = 1;
-    else if ((create_tool = virFindFileInPath("qemu-img")) != NULL)
-        use_kvmimg = 0;
-    else {
-+    /* Size in KB */
-+    snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "%lluK", vol->capacity/1024);
-+
-+    /* KVM is usually ahead of qemu on features, so try that first */
-+    create_tool = virFindFileInPath("kvm-img");
-+    if (!create_tool)
-+        create_tool = virFindFileInPath("qemu-img");
-+
-+    if (!create_tool) {
-         virStorageReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-                               "%s", _("unable to find kvm-img or qemu-img"));
-         return -1;
-     }
- 
-     if (inputvol) {
-        convargv[0] = create_tool;
-        imgargv = convargv;
-+        const char *imgargv[] = {
-+            create_tool,
-+            "convert",
-+            "-f", inputType,
-+            "-O", type,
-+            inputPath,
-+            vol->target.path,
-+            NULL,
-+        };
-+
-+        ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
-     } else if (vol->backingStore.path) {
-        imgargvbacking[0] = create_tool;
-        if (use_kvmimg) {
-            imgargvbacking[6] = "-F";
-            imgargvbacking[7] = backingType;
-            imgargvbacking[8] = vol->target.path;
-            imgargvbacking[9] = size;
-+        const char *imgargv[] = {
-+            create_tool,
-+            "create",
-+            "-f", type,
-+            "-b", vol->backingStore.path,
-+            NULL,
-+            NULL,
-+            NULL,
-+            NULL,
-+            NULL,
-+            NULL
-+        };
-+        int imgformat = virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat(create_tool);
-+        char *optflag = NULL;
-+        if (imgformat < 0)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+
-+        switch (imgformat) {
-+        case QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG:
-+            imgargv[6] = "-F";
-+            imgargv[7] = backingType;
-+            imgargv[8] = vol->target.path;
-+            imgargv[9] = size;
-+            if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
-+                imgargv[10] = "-e";
-+            break;
-+
-+        case QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS:
-+            if (virAsprintf(&optflag, "backing_fmt=%s", backingType) < 0) {
-+                virReportOOMError();
-+                goto cleanup;
-+            }
-+            imgargv[6] = "-o";
-+            imgargv[7] = optflag;
-+            imgargv[8] = vol->target.path;
-+            imgargv[9] = size;
-             if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
-                imgargvbacking[10] = "-e";
-        } else if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
-            imgargvbacking[8] = "-e";
-        imgargv = imgargvbacking;
-+                imgargv[10] = "-e";
-+            break;
-+
-+        default:
-+            VIR_INFO("Unable to set backing store format for %s with %s",
-+                     vol->target.path, create_tool);
-+            imgargv[6] = vol->target.path;
-+            imgargv[7] = size;
-+            if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
-+                imgargv[8] = "-e";
-+        }
-+
-+        ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
-+        VIR_FREE(optflag);
-     } else {
-        imgargvnormal[0] = create_tool;
-        imgargv = imgargvnormal;
-+        /* The extra NULL field is for indicating encryption (-e). */
-+        const char *imgargv[] = {
-+            create_tool,
-+            "create",
-+            "-f", type,
-+            vol->target.path,
-+            size,
-+            NULL,
-+            NULL
-+        };
-         if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
-             imgargv[6] = "-e";
-    }
- 
-+        ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
-+    }
- 
-    /* Size in KB */
-    snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "%lluK", vol->capacity/1024);
-
-    ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
-    VIR_FREE(imgargv[0]);
-+    cleanup:
-+    VIR_FREE(create_tool);
- 
-     return ret;
- }
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-From d33f44c2e74de28c89b64cdc2c0a6564662e075c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2010 11:28:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 11/11] Use the extract backing store format in storage volume lookup
-
-The storage volume lookup code was probing for the backing store
-format, instead of using the format extracted from the file
-itself. This meant it could report in accurate information. If
-a format is included in the file, then use that in preference,
-with probing as a fallback.
-
-* src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c: Use extracted backing store
-  format
---
- src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c |   80 +++++++++++++++++---------------------
- 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
-index d3ac0fe..ffb0071 100644
--- a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
-+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- static int
- virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
-                              char **backingStore,
-+                             int *backingStoreFormat,
-                              unsigned long long *allocation,
-                              unsigned long long *capacity,
-                              virStorageEncryptionPtr *encryption)
-@@ -58,6 +59,10 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
-     int fd, ret;
-     virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- 
-+    if (backingStore)
-+        *backingStore = NULL;
-+    if (backingStoreFormat)
-+        *backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
-     if (encryption)
-         *encryption = NULL;
- 
-@@ -89,22 +94,30 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
- 
-     close(fd);
- 
-    if (backingStore) {
-        *backingStore = meta.backingStore;
-        meta.backingStore = NULL;
-+    if (meta.backingStore) {
-+        if (backingStore) {
-+            *backingStore = meta.backingStore;
-+            meta.backingStore = NULL;
-+            if (meta.backingStoreFormat == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO) {
-+                if ((*backingStoreFormat = virStorageFileProbeFormat(*backingStore)) < 0) {
-+                    close(fd);
-+                    goto cleanup;
-+                }
-+            } else {
-+                *backingStoreFormat = meta.backingStoreFormat;
-+            }
-+        } else {
-+            VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
-+        }
-     }
- 
-    VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
-
-     if (capacity && meta.capacity)
-         *capacity = meta.capacity;
- 
-     if (encryption != NULL && meta.encrypted) {
-         if (VIR_ALLOC(*encryption) < 0) {
-             virReportOOMError();
-            if (backingStore)
-                VIR_FREE(*backingStore);
-            return -1;
-+            goto cleanup;
-         }
- 
-         switch (target->format) {
-@@ -124,6 +137,11 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
-     }
- 
-     return 0;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    if (backingStore)
-+        VIR_FREE(*backingStore);
-+    return -1;
- }
- 
- #if WITH_STORAGE_FS
-@@ -585,6 +603,7 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-     while ((ent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
-         int ret;
-         char *backingStore;
-+        int backingStoreFormat;
- 
-         if (VIR_ALLOC(vol) < 0)
-             goto no_memory;
-@@ -604,6 +623,7 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
- 
-         if ((ret = virStorageBackendProbeTarget(&vol->target,
-                                                 &backingStore,
-+                                                &backingStoreFormat,
-                                                 &vol->allocation,
-                                                 &vol->capacity,
-                                                 &vol->target.encryption)) < 0) {
-@@ -619,46 +639,18 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
-         }
- 
-         if (backingStore != NULL) {
-            if (vol->target.format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2 &&
-                STRPREFIX("fmt:", backingStore)) {
-                char *fmtstr = backingStore + 4;
-                char *path = strchr(fmtstr, ':');
-                if (!path) {
-                    VIR_FREE(backingStore);
-                } else {
-                    *path = '\0';
-                    if ((vol->backingStore.format =
-                         virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(fmtstr)) < 0) {
-                        VIR_FREE(backingStore);
-                    } else {
-                        memmove(backingStore, path, strlen(path) + 1);
-                        vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
-
-                        if (virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfo(&vol->backingStore,
-                                                                 NULL,
-                                                                 NULL) < 0)
-                            VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore);
-                    }
-                }
-            } else {
-                vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
-
-                if ((ret = virStorageBackendProbeTarget(&vol->backingStore,
-                                                        NULL, NULL, NULL,
-                                                        NULL)) < 0) {
-                    if (ret == -1)
-                        goto cleanup;
-                    else {
-                        /* Silently ignore non-regular files,
-                         * eg '.' '..', 'lost+found' */
-                        VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore);
-                    }
-                }
-+            vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
-+            vol->backingStore.format = backingStoreFormat;
-+
-+            if (virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfo(&vol->backingStore,
-+                                                     NULL,
-+                                                     NULL) < 0) {
-+                VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore.path);
-+                goto cleanup;
-             }
-         }
- 
- 
-
-         if (VIR_REALLOC_N(pool->volumes.objs,
-                           pool->volumes.count+1) < 0)
-             goto no_memory;
-- 
-1.7.1.1
-
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-From 112a309bc7839e95c558b535143f855ce89cca8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2010 12:50:38 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2010-2242 Apply a source port mapping to virtual network masquerading
-
-IPtables will seek to preserve the source port unchanged when
-doing masquerading, if possible. NFS has a pseudo-security
-option where it checks for the source port <= 1023 before
-allowing a mount request. If an admin has used this to make the
-host OS trusted for mounts, the default iptables behaviour will
-potentially allow NAT'd guests access too. This needs to be
-stopped.
-
-With this change, the iptables -t nat -L -n -v rules for the
-default network will be
-
-Chain POSTROUTING (policy ACCEPT 95 packets, 9163 bytes)
- pkts bytes target     prot opt in     out     source               destination
-   14   840 MASQUERADE  tcp  --  *      *       192.168.122.0/24    !192.168.122.0/24    masq ports: 1024-65535
-   75  5752 MASQUERADE  udp  --  *      *       192.168.122.0/24    !192.168.122.0/24    masq ports: 1024-65535
-    0     0 MASQUERADE  all  --  *      *       192.168.122.0/24    !192.168.122.0/24
-
-* src/network/bridge_driver.c: Add masquerade rules for TCP
-  and UDP protocols
-* src/util/iptables.c, src/util/iptables.c: Add source port
-  mappings for TCP & UDP protocols when masquerading.
---
- src/network/bridge_driver.c |   73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- src/util/iptables.c         |   70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- src/util/iptables.h         |    6 ++-
- 3 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver.c b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
-index 72255c1..80ed57a 100644
--- a/src/network/bridge_driver.c
-+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
-@@ -638,18 +638,74 @@ networkAddMasqueradingIptablesRules(struct network_driver *driver,
-         goto masqerr2;
-     }
- 
-    /* enable masquerading */
-+    /*
-+     * Enable masquerading.
-+     *
-+     * We need to end up with 3 rules in the table in this order
-+     *
-+     *  1. protocol=tcp with sport mapping restricton
-+     *  2. protocol=udp with sport mapping restricton
-+     *  3. generic any protocol
-+     *
-+     * The sport mappings are required, because default IPtables
-+     * MASQUERADE is maintain port number unchanged where possible.
-+     *
-+     * NFS can be configured to only "trust" port numbers < 1023.
-+     *
-+     * Guests using NAT thus need to be prevented from having port
-+     * numbers < 1023, otherwise they can bypass the NFS "security"
-+     * check on the source port number.
-+     *
-+     * Since we use '--insert' to add rules to the header of the
-+     * chain, we actually need to add them in the reverse of the
-+     * order just mentioned !
-+     */
-+
-+    /* First the generic masquerade rule for other protocols */
-     if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
-                                             network->def->network,
-                                            network->def->forwardDev))) {
-+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
-+                                            NULL))) {
-         virReportSystemError(err,
-                              _("failed to add iptables rule to enable masquerading to '%s'"),
-                              network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
-         goto masqerr3;
-     }
- 
-+    /* UDP with a source port restriction */
-+    if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
-+                                            network->def->network,
-+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
-+                                            "udp"))) {
-+        virReportSystemError(err,
-+                             _("failed to add iptables rule to enable UDP masquerading to '%s'"),
-+                             network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
-+        goto masqerr4;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* TCP with a source port restriction */
-+    if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
-+                                            network->def->network,
-+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
-+                                            "tcp"))) {
-+        virReportSystemError(err,
-+                             _("failed to add iptables rule to enable TCP masquerading to '%s'"),
-+                             network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
-+        goto masqerr5;
-+    }
-+
-     return 1;
- 
-+ masqerr5:
-+    iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
-+                                    network->def->network,
-+                                    network->def->forwardDev,
-+                                    "udp");
-+ masqerr4:
-+    iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
-+                                    network->def->network,
-+                                    network->def->forwardDev,
-+                                    NULL);
-  masqerr3:
-     iptablesRemoveForwardAllowRelatedIn(driver->iptables,
-                                  network->def->network,
-@@ -814,8 +870,17 @@ networkRemoveIptablesRules(struct network_driver *driver,
-     if (network->def->forwardType != VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NONE) {
-         if (network->def->forwardType == VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NAT) {
-             iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
-                                                network->def->network,
-                                                network->def->forwardDev);
-+                                            network->def->network,
-+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
-+                                            "tcp");
-+            iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
-+                                            network->def->network,
-+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
-+                                            "udp");
-+            iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
-+                                            network->def->network,
-+                                            network->def->forwardDev,
-+                                            NULL);
-             iptablesRemoveForwardAllowRelatedIn(driver->iptables,
-                                                 network->def->network,
-                                                 network->def->bridge,
-diff --git a/src/util/iptables.c b/src/util/iptables.c
-index d06b857..f63e8c6 100644
--- a/src/util/iptables.c
-+++ b/src/util/iptables.c
-@@ -692,25 +692,49 @@ iptablesRemoveForwardRejectIn(iptablesContext *ctx,
-  */
- static int
- iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
-                       const char *network,
-                       const char *physdev,
-                       int action)
-+                          const char *network,
-+                          const char *physdev,
-+                          const char *protocol,
-+                          int action)
- {
-    if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
-        return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
-                                     action,
-                                     "--source", network,
-                                     "!", "--destination", network,
-                                     "--out-interface", physdev,
-                                     "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
-                                     NULL);
-+    if (protocol && protocol[0]) {
-+        if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
-+            return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
-+                                         action,
-+                                         "--source", network,
-+                                         "-p", protocol,
-+                                         "!", "--destination", network,
-+                                         "--out-interface", physdev,
-+                                         "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
-+                                         "--to-ports", "1024-65535",
-+                                         NULL);
-+        } else {
-+            return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
-+                                         action,
-+                                         "--source", network,
-+                                         "-p", protocol,
-+                                         "!", "--destination", network,
-+                                         "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
-+                                         "--to-ports", "1024-65535",
-+                                         NULL);
-+        }
-     } else {
-        return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
-                                     action,
-                                     "--source", network,
-                                     "!", "--destination", network,
-                                     "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
-                                     NULL);
-+        if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
-+            return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
-+                                         action,
-+                                         "--source", network,
-+                                         "!", "--destination", network,
-+                                         "--out-interface", physdev,
-+                                         "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
-+                                         NULL);
-+        } else {
-+            return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
-+                                         action,
-+                                         "--source", network,
-+                                         "!", "--destination", network,
-+                                         "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
-+                                         NULL);
-+        }
-     }
- }
- 
-@@ -719,6 +743,7 @@ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
-  * @ctx: pointer to the IP table context
-  * @network: the source network name
-  * @physdev: the physical input device or NULL
-+ * @protocol: the network protocol or NULL
-  *
-  * Add rules to the IP table context to allow masquerading
-  * network @network on @physdev. This allow the bridge to
-@@ -729,9 +754,10 @@ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
- int
- iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
-                              const char *network,
-                             const char *physdev)
-+                             const char *physdev,
-+                             const char *protocol)
- {
-    return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, ADD);
-+    return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, protocol, ADD);
- }
- 
- /**
-@@ -739,6 +765,7 @@ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
-  * @ctx: pointer to the IP table context
-  * @network: the source network name
-  * @physdev: the physical input device or NULL
-+ * @protocol: the network protocol or NULL
-  *
-  * Remove rules from the IP table context to stop masquerading
-  * network @network on @physdev. This stops the bridge from
-@@ -749,7 +776,8 @@ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
- int
- iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
-                                 const char *network,
-                                const char *physdev)
-+                                const char *physdev,
-+                                const char *protocol)
- {
-    return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, REMOVE);
-+    return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, protocol, REMOVE);
- }
-diff --git a/src/util/iptables.h b/src/util/iptables.h
-index 7d55a6d..b47d854 100644
--- a/src/util/iptables.h
-+++ b/src/util/iptables.h
-@@ -85,9 +85,11 @@ int              iptablesRemoveForwardRejectIn   (iptablesContext *ctx,
- 
- int              iptablesAddForwardMasquerade    (iptablesContext *ctx,
-                                                   const char *network,
-                                                  const char *physdev);
-+                                                  const char *physdev,
-+                                                  const char *protocol);
- int              iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade (iptablesContext *ctx,
-                                                   const char *network,
-                                                  const char *physdev);
-+                                                  const char *physdev,
-+                                                  const char *protocol);
- 
- #endif /* __QEMUD_IPTABLES_H__ */
-- 
-1.6.6.1
-
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 66aaaf1af42d6f1e9f9b75bd1514c0c097e244e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2011 16:45:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] daemon: Avoid resetting errors before they are reported
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=690733
-
-Commit f44bfb7 was supposed to make sure no additional libvirt API (esp.
-*Free) is called before remoteDispatchConnError() is called on error.
-However, the patch missed two instances.
-(cherry picked from commit 55cc591fc18e87b29febf78dc5b424b7c12f7349)
---
- daemon/remote.c |    6 ++++--
- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/daemon/remote.c b/daemon/remote.c
-index abf9cf3..8a25f05 100644
--- a/daemon/remote.c
-+++ b/daemon/remote.c
-@@ -4531,12 +4531,13 @@ remoteDispatchStoragePoolListVolumes (struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUS
-     ret->names.names_len =
-         virStoragePoolListVolumes (pool,
-                                    ret->names.names_val, args->maxnames);
-    virStoragePoolFree(pool);
-     if (ret->names.names_len == -1) {
-         VIR_FREE(ret->names.names_val);
-         remoteDispatchConnError(rerr, conn);
-+        virStoragePoolFree(pool);
-         return -1;
-     }
-+    virStoragePoolFree(pool);
- 
-     return 0;
- }
-@@ -4560,11 +4561,12 @@ remoteDispatchStoragePoolNumOfVolumes (struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNU
-     }
- 
-     ret->num = virStoragePoolNumOfVolumes (pool);
-    virStoragePoolFree(pool);
-     if (ret->num == -1) {
-         remoteDispatchConnError(rerr, conn);
-+        virStoragePoolFree(pool);
-         return -1;
-     }
-+    virStoragePoolFree(pool);
- 
-     return 0;
- }
-- 
-1.7.3.4
-
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From f970d802ab805f1a37af384f148f34e108714034 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2010 15:20:24 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH] rpm: fix /var/lib/libvirt permissions
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=649511
-
-Regression of forcing 0700 permissions (which breaks guest startup
-because the qemu user can't see /var/lib/libvirt/*.monitor) was
-introduced in commit 66823690e, as part of libvirt 0.8.2.
-
-* libvirt.spec.in (%files): Drop %{_localstatedir}/lib/libvirt,
-since libvirt depends on libvirt-client.
-(%files client): Guarantee 755 permissions on
-%(_localstatedir}/lib/libvirt, since the qemu user must be able to
-do pathname resolution to a subdirectory.
---
- libvirt.spec.in |    3 +--
- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in
-index 813e0c0..f77626e 100644
--- a/libvirt.spec.in
-+++ b/libvirt.spec.in
-@@ -770,7 +770,6 @@ fi
- 
- %dir %{_localstatedir}/run/libvirt/
- 
-%dir %{_localstatedir}/lib/libvirt/
- %dir %attr(0711, root, root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/libvirt/images/
- %dir %attr(0711, root, root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/libvirt/boot/
- %dir %attr(0700, root, root) %{_localstatedir}/cache/libvirt/
-@@ -862,7 +861,7 @@ fi
- 
- %{_sysconfdir}/rc.d/init.d/libvirt-guests
- %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/libvirt-guests
-%dir %attr(0700, root, root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/libvirt
-+%dir %attr(0755, root, root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/libvirt/
- 
- %if %{with_sasl}
- %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sasl2/libvirt.conf
-- 
-1.7.3.4
-
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-From: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
-Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2011 02:56:28 +0000 (+0800)
-Subject: Add missing checks for read only connections
-X-Git-Url: http://libvirt.org/git/?p=libvirt.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=71753cb7f7a16ff800381c0b5ee4e99eea92fed3;hp=13c00dde3171b3a38d23cceb3f9151cb6cac3dad
-
-Add missing checks for read only connections
-
-As pointed on CVE-2011-1146, some API forgot to check the read-only
-status of the connection for entry point which modify the state
-of the system or may lead to a remote execution using user data.
-The entry points concerned are:
-  - virConnectDomainXMLToNative
-  - virNodeDeviceDettach
-  - virNodeDeviceReAttach
-  - virNodeDeviceReset
-  - virDomainRevertToSnapshot
-  - virDomainSnapshotDelete
-
-* src/libvirt.c: fix the above set of entry points to error on read-only
-                 connections
-
-Rebased to 0.8.2, mostly changed the call of the error routines
---
-
--- src/libvirt.c.orig	2011-03-14 17:03:45.000000000 +0800
-+++ src/libvirt.c	2011-03-14 17:10:41.000000000 +0800
-@@ -3190,6 +3190,10 @@ char *virConnectDomainXMLToNative(virCon
-         virDispatchError(NULL);
-         return (NULL);
-     }
-+    if (conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) {
-+        virLibConnError(NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, __FUNCTION__);
-+        goto error;
-+    }
- 
-     if (nativeFormat == NULL || domainXml == NULL) {
-         virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__);
-@@ -9432,6 +9436,11 @@ virNodeDeviceDettach(virNodeDevicePtr de
-         return (-1);
-     }
- 
-+    if (dev->conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) {
-+        virLibConnError(dev->conn, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, __FUNCTION__);
-+        goto error;
-+    }
-+
-     if (dev->conn->driver->nodeDeviceDettach) {
-         int ret;
-         ret = dev->conn->driver->nodeDeviceDettach (dev);
-@@ -9475,6 +9484,11 @@ virNodeDeviceReAttach(virNodeDevicePtr d
-         return (-1);
-     }
- 
-+    if (dev->conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) {
-+        virLibConnError(dev->conn, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, __FUNCTION__);
-+        goto error;
-+    }
-+
-     if (dev->conn->driver->nodeDeviceReAttach) {
-         int ret;
-         ret = dev->conn->driver->nodeDeviceReAttach (dev);
-@@ -9520,6 +9534,11 @@ virNodeDeviceReset(virNodeDevicePtr dev)
-         return (-1);
-     }
- 
-+    if (dev->conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) {
-+        virLibConnError(dev->conn, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, __FUNCTION__);
-+        goto error;
-+    }
-+
-     if (dev->conn->driver->nodeDeviceReset) {
-         int ret;
-         ret = dev->conn->driver->nodeDeviceReset (dev);
-@@ -12775,6 +12794,10 @@ virDomainRevertToSnapshot(virDomainSnaps
-     }
- 
-     conn = snapshot->domain->conn;
-+    if (conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) {
-+        virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, __FUNCTION__);
-+        goto error;
-+    }
- 
-     if (conn->driver->domainRevertToSnapshot) {
-         int ret = conn->driver->domainRevertToSnapshot(snapshot, flags);
-@@ -12821,6 +12844,10 @@ virDomainSnapshotDelete(virDomainSnapsho
-     }
- 
-     conn = snapshot->domain->conn;
-+    if (conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) {
-+        virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, __FUNCTION__);
-+        goto error;
-+    }
- 
-     if (conn->driver->domainSnapshotDelete) {
-         int ret = conn->driver->domainSnapshotDelete(snapshot, flags);
@@ -1 +1 @@
-14164638fe0e7f65e425acc85dabc517  libvirt-0.8.2.tar.gz
+SHA512 (libvirt-5.1.0.tar.xz) = ca64d7be683614bdeb20a8865655fe80f911cf13c00aed2334db3a2e4131e1dd6fe5e9663a24e6f82161ad5aa53f1a2637cd21730eed46e4764b7eebced94f3f