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216 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Cole Robinson d2399d7bdf Fix qemu:///session connect race failures (bz #1271183)
driver: log missing modules as INFO, not WARN (bz #1274849)
2016-03-17 17:31:07 -04:00
Cole Robinson c76aa1c80f Fix XML validation with qemu commandline passthrough (bz #1292131)
Fix crash in libvirt_leasehelper (bz #1202350)
Generate consistent systemtap tapsets regardless of host arch (bz #1173641)
Fix qemu:///session error 'Transport endpoint is not connected' (bz #1271183)
Fix parallel VM start/top svirt errors on kernel/initrd (bz #1269975)
2016-01-20 20:04:34 -05:00
Cole Robinson 43c932192d Rebased to version 1.2.13.2
disk backend is not removed properly when disk frontent hotplug fails (bz #1265968)
Fix TPM cancel path on newer kernels (bz #1244895)
Remove timeout for libvirt-guests.service (bz #1195544)
CVE-2015-5313 libvirt: filesystem storage volume names path traversal flaw (bz #1291433)
Fix VM names with non-ascii (bz #1062943)
Fix backwards migration with graphics listen address (bz #1276883)
2015-12-23 19:09:14 -05:00
Cole Robinson 1b23098699 Fix polkit dep 2015-09-22 09:11:23 -04:00
Cole Robinson 925965e626 Add sanity checks for drive mirroring (bz #1263438) 2015-09-21 21:24:48 -04:00
Cole Robinson b8aa82790b Add patches 2015-06-06 11:17:32 -04:00
Cole Robinson ba6977e03f lxc network fixes (bz #1225591, bz #1225593, bz #1225594)
polkit: Allow password-less access for 'libvirt' group (bz #957300)
2015-06-06 11:12:42 -04:00
Cole Robinson e18130141c Rebased to version 1.2.13.1
Fix getVersion() after installing qemu (bz #1000116)
Fix autosocket setup with qemu:///session (bz #1044561, bz #1105274)
Ignore storage volumes with non-ascii in names (bz #1066564)
Don't generate invalid system nodedev XML (bz #1184131)
Fix crash via race when unrefing rpc identity object (bz #1203030)
Fix domcapabilities failure with ppc64le (bz #1209948)
Fix regression with 'virsh event ' (bz #1212620)
Add {Haswell,Broadwell}-noTSX CPU models (bz #1182650)
Don't lose VMs on libvirtd restart if qemu is uninstalled (bz #1099847)
Ignore storage volumes that libvirt can't open (bz #1103308)
2015-04-28 12:20:27 -04:00
Cole Robinson a99455b301 Fix LXC domain startup (bz #1210397)
Fix crash via identify object cleanup race (bz #1203030)
Fix race starting multiple session daemons (bz #1200149)
Fix change-media success messages
Strip invalid control codes from XML (bz #1066564, bz #1184131)
2015-04-15 14:37:39 -04:00
Cole Robinson 6b531d9967 Fix connecting to qemu:///session (bz #1198244) 2015-03-10 11:10:16 -04:00
Cole Robinson 4d05ac021c Rebased to version 1.2.13
lot of improvements around NUMA code
a lot of improvement and bug fixes
2015-03-02 11:36:45 -05:00
Daniel Veillard d29aa84b17 upstream release of libvirt-1.2.13 2015-03-02 11:46:49 +08:00
Daniel P. Berrange a075adc818 Rebuild for changed xen soname 2015-02-03 09:21:55 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 4d0e63f99c Update to 1.2.12 release 2015-01-27 10:53:52 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 9e11936ec5 Disable -Werror 2014-12-15 15:29:30 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange a4075ec632 Update to 1.2.11 release 2014-12-15 12:01:37 +00:00
Cole Robinson dadb59c95f Allow arm/aarch64 with UEFI 2014-11-21 10:15:51 -05:00
Cole Robinson e73cc6a9d8 Fix caps probing when KVM is disabled (bz #1160318)
ppc64le fixes (bz #1163439)
2014-11-15 18:33:55 -05:00
Cole Robinson 10cd84e37f Remove unused patches 2014-11-15 15:21:48 -05:00
Daniel Veillard e63e2040cd Upstream release of 1.2.10 2014-11-03 15:13:32 +08:00
Cole Robinson 91063332d7 Fix creating i686 guest with x86_64 emulator (bz #1153797)
Fix tests with latest libxml2
2014-10-30 11:01:41 -04:00
Cole Robinson 503330ba5d Fix selinux errors with /dev/net/tun (bz #1147057) 2014-10-09 13:00:53 -04:00
Cole Robinson 0a64085f47 Fix specifying CPU for qemu aarch64 2014-10-03 09:32:42 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange 1073e2447a Update to 1.2.9 release 2014-10-01 17:09:48 +01:00
Cole Robinson 5b1a906ace Fix labelling host devices (bz #1145968) 2014-09-24 12:15:49 -04:00
Cole Robinson aff97e0146 Fix specifying CPU for qemu aarch64 2014-09-23 17:27:47 -04:00
Cole Robinson a4b41a378b Rerun autotools for new patches 2014-09-18 16:06:49 -04:00
Cole Robinson 3ec523d168 Don't mess up labelling of /dev/net/tun (bz #1141879)
pflash/nvram support for UEFI/OVMF
2014-09-18 15:36:06 -04:00
Cole Robinson 622cf0d642 Fix preun script (bz #1142367) 2014-09-17 10:55:26 -04:00
Cole Robinson a540751e83 Generate non-colliding network IP range at RPM install time (bz #811967)
Fix directory creation at session daemon startup (bz #1139672)
Disable wireshark building, currently broken on f21/rawhide
2014-09-15 14:52:07 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange 11b596669a Re-disable wireshark 2014-09-05 16:42:57 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange fefbae879b Update to 1.2.8 release 2014-09-05 16:15:21 +01:00
Peter Robinson 695b281409 - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_22_Mass_Rebuild 2014-08-17 06:38:41 +00:00
Cole Robinson 9f9eae34c1 Rebased to version 1.2.7 2014-08-12 13:58:50 -04:00
Peter Robinson ae37ed3500 Enable kvm on aarch64, Cleanup F-16/18 conditionals 2014-07-15 17:52:18 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange f7f509999b Update to 1.2.6 release
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2014-07-02 17:21:15 +01:00
Daniel Veillard 419bcc4b2f new release 2014-07-02 14:25:52 +08:00
Dennis Gilmore 7b59d4f7eb - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_Mass_Rebuild 2014-06-07 00:55:30 -05:00
Daniel P. Berrange 03326e9c04 Update to 1.2.5 release
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2014-06-02 10:42:59 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange f40b464d1e Update to 1.2.4 release
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2014-05-06 15:54:45 +01:00
Cole Robinson 810ca6c207 Fix LXC from throwing error System lacks NETNS support (bz #1084902) 2014-04-11 15:53:56 -04:00
Cole Robinson 8df3aef6aa Add sources 2014-04-01 18:00:14 -04:00
Cole Robinson 0223d5a656 Rebased to version 1.2.3 2014-04-01 17:50:30 -04:00
Cole Robinson aad810a204 Rebuild for xen 4.4 2014-03-24 08:53:56 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange 1b8b7567b1 Update to 1.2.2 release
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2014-03-03 11:19:24 +00:00
Cole Robinson 442040caac Rebuild for openwsman soname bump 2014-01-27 13:21:35 -05:00
Daniel P. Berrange 65efaafca2 Update to 1.2.1 release
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2014-01-21 11:18:53 +00:00
Cole Robinson e87c8ab0c7 Remove unused patch 2014-01-16 20:36:40 -05:00
Daniel Veillard be6bda45b4 Updated to new tarball, but not the spec file 2014-01-16 18:17:37 +08:00
Daniel P. Berrange 8c9e40d383 Update to 1.2.0 release with python binding split off
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2013-12-03 15:10:43 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 0f6f9b973a New release, but do not build until libvirt-python is in git too 2013-12-02 13:31:49 +08:00
Cole Robinson 3db6039b2b virsh nodedev-detach fails if device has no driver (bz #1028629) 2013-11-12 09:46:29 -05:00
Daniel P. Berrange 4051217c8b Remove obsolete sources files
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 12:03:07 +08:00
Daniel Veillard c5c28baba1 Upstream release of libvirt-1.1.4 2013-11-04 14:27:40 +08:00
Cole Robinson 43618df1d4 Allow QoS change with update-device (bz #1014200)
Fix nwfilter crash during firewalld install (bz #1014762)
Fix crash with nographics (bz #1014088)
2013-10-06 15:14:15 -04:00
Daniel Veillard a2951dccb5 Rebase ot upstream 1.1.3 2013-10-01 15:51:28 +08:00
Cole Robinson b884323c03 Fix snapshot restore when VM has disabled usb support (bz #1011520) 2013-09-24 10:27:38 -04:00
Cole Robinson adeaf839fd Sync with v1.1.2-maint
Rebuild for libswan soname bump (bz #1009701)
CVE-2013-4311: Insecure polkit usage (bz #1009539, bz #1005332)
CVE-2013-4296: Invalid free memory stats (bz #1006173, bz #1009667)
CVE-2013-4297: Invalid free in NBDDeviceAssociate (bz #1006505, bz #1006511)
Fix virsh block-commit abort (bz #1010056)
2013-09-23 14:35:01 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange 40d99010e1 Rebuild for soname break in openswman package 2013-09-18 14:44:25 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 11755d8663 Update to 1.1.2 release, rebasing ARM patches
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2013-09-02 11:48:17 +01:00
Cole Robinson 2daa92daf9 Fix launching ARM guests on x86 (patches posted upstream, F20 feature) 2013-08-20 15:25:47 -04:00
Cole Robinson db2858c661 CVE-2013-4239: xen: memory corruption in legacy driver (bz #996241, bz #996244) 2013-08-14 20:00:13 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange 53adb9aaba Re-add code to delete python tests
Upstream mistakenly deleted code to remove the python test
files from the docs dir

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2013-07-30 11:27:28 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 168df8b606 Update to 1.1.1 release
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2013-07-30 10:59:15 +01:00
Dennis Gilmore f9085f2538 fix doc path in libvirt-python 2013-07-28 22:28:27 -05:00
Cole Robinson b159bbdc98 CVE-2013-4153: Fix double free of returned JSON (bz #986408, bz #986383)
CVE-2013-4154: Crash of libvirtd if guest agent not configured (bz #986386, bz #986406)
2013-07-25 17:53:26 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange a5af3cf105 Rebuild for change in Xen library ABI/soname 2013-07-17 13:15:58 +01:00
Cole Robinson 27ca069db7 CVE-2013-2230 libvirt: multiple registered events crash 2013-07-11 16:47:16 -04:00
Daniel Veillard 000a3274d2 Release of libvirt-1.1.0 2013-07-01 19:30:25 +08:00
Peter Robinson 19c7799c31 Enable KVM support on ARM 2013-06-14 14:30:53 +01:00
Cole Robinson 198ff818c6 Drop bogus dep on vbox 2013-06-08 18:44:16 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange e80c83ad06 Update to 1.0.6 release 2013-06-03 16:27:28 +01:00
Cole Robinson 660e0112c6 Rebased to version 1.0.5.1
Follow updated packaging guidelines for user alloc (bz #924501)
CVE-2013-1962 Open files DoS (bz #963789, bz #953107)
2013-05-19 18:33:15 -04:00
Cole Robinson 45c1cabef6 Fix stream operations like screenshot (bz #960879) 2013-05-14 17:32:09 -04:00
Richard W.M. Jones 56be2c5e38 Fix network driver when using qemu:///session (bz #958907). 2013-05-03 15:15:22 +01:00
Daniel Veillard 4aa9c4f1a3 Upstream release of libvirt-1.0.5 2013-05-02 18:39:42 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 7be420ad22 Update to 1.0.4 release 2013-04-01 15:54:31 +08:00
Daniel P. Berrange 40b00623a4 Update to 1.0.3 release 2013-03-05 16:00:44 +00:00
Richard W.M. Jones ce09ec66c7 Fix bogus dates in libvirt.spec by comparing changelog to true dates in git log. 2013-02-28 13:22:28 +00:00
Richard W.M. Jones 97d7c80e2e Disable virnettlscontexttest which apparently fails because of a broken gnutls3.
Note since this patch touches Makefile.am, I have enabled autoreconf
(enable_autotools).
2013-02-28 13:02:27 +00:00
Richard W.M. Jones b856ae03bf Backport "qemu: check backing chains even when cgroup is omitted"
(RHBZ#896685).
2013-02-28 09:58:19 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 803b3b891a Fix missing python binding constants 2013-02-05 15:51:47 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 350081d1a9 Update to 1.0.2 release 2013-02-01 10:48:53 +00:00
Cole Robinson 1b71b68bb9 Fix network persistence after define (bz #890492) 2013-01-29 20:17:02 -05:00
Cole Robinson 4084288dd5 CVE-2013-0170 libvirt: use-after-free in virNetMessageFree() (bz #893450, bz #905173) 2013-01-28 15:11:38 -05:00
Richard W.M. Jones d1cd1b7ceb Rebuild for libnl soname breakage (RHBZ#901569). 2013-01-20 19:56:14 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 5ed69704b9 Work around kernel headers problem 2013-01-18 20:01:53 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange be6e136cb1 Rebuild for libnl3 soname change 2013-01-18 14:46:40 +00:00
Cole Robinson d3109abfa4 Fix scriplet warning when uninstalling libvirt-client (bz #888071) 2012-12-17 18:48:44 -05:00
Daniel Veillard f5ff4a2393 Update to upstream 1.0.1 release 2012-12-17 14:24:00 +08:00
Daniel P. Berrange 8cc50838dc Update to 1.0.0 release 2012-11-08 22:21:41 +01:00
Cole Robinson 2c2e71c0ce Disable libxl on F18 too 2012-10-30 20:54:40 -04:00
Cole Robinson 96b1b18b42 Rebased to version 0.10.2.1
Fix lvm volume creation when alloc=0 (bz #866481)
Clarify virsh send-keys man page example (bz #860004)
Fix occasional deadlock via virDomainDestroy (bz #859009)
Fix LXC deadlock from ctrl-c (bz #848119)
Fix occasional selinux denials with macvtap (bz #798605)
Fix multilib conflict with systemtap files (bz #831425)
Don't trigger keytab warning in system logs (bz #745203)
Fix qemu domxml-2-native NIC model out (bz #636832)
Fix error message if not enough space for lvm vol (bz #609104)
2012-10-27 17:56:09 -04:00
Cole Robinson f7763bfd17 Disable libxl driver, since it doesn't build with xen 4.2 in rawhide 2012-10-25 17:16:59 -04:00
Richard W.M. Jones 404e58cb18 Add upstream patches: don't duplicate environment variables (RHBZ#859596). 2012-09-24 20:59:05 +01:00
Richard W.M. Jones cd3767e3b9 Re-add 0001-Use-qemu-system-i386-as-binary-instead-of-qemu.patch
NB: This patch is Fedora-specific and not upstream.
2012-09-24 18:36:40 +01:00
Daniel Veillard f1867a5ecc Upstream release 0.10.2 2012-09-24 14:22:55 +08:00
Richard W.M. Jones b5548f62cb Add (upstream) patches to label sockets for SELinux (RHBZ#853393). 2012-09-21 18:58:41 +01:00
Richard W.M. Jones 52f3bedee7 Fix for 32 bit qemu renamed to qemu-system-i386 (RHBZ#857026).
The difference in the output of virsh capabilities (non-root)
before and after is:

 <capabilities>

   <host>
-    <uuid>9ecd5b8f-4b44-5dae-f4c6-4b9cf108e47a</uuid>
+    <uuid>4cae6f0f-dd64-8d9a-bc36-b3f2e62844cf</uuid>
     <cpu>
       <arch>i686</arch>
       <model>Westmere</model>
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
     <os_type>hvm</os_type>
     <arch name='i686'>
       <wordsize>32</wordsize>
-      <emulator>/bin/qemu-system-x86_64</emulator>
+      <emulator>/bin/qemu-system-i386</emulator>
       <machine>pc-1.2</machine>
       <machine>none</machine>
       <machine canonical='pc-1.2'>pc</machine>
2012-09-13 15:03:19 +01:00
Cole Robinson f87237919c Drop unneeded dnsmasq --filterwin2k
Fix unwanted connection closing, needed for boxes
Fix libvirtd segfault with old netcf-libs (bz 853381)
2012-09-12 08:18:36 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange e8969fb913 Remove dep on ceph RPM (rhbz #854360) 2012-09-05 11:01:22 +01:00
Daniel Veillard 74d46bc7dd Release of libvirt-0.10.1
Brown paper bag release
2012-08-31 21:52:10 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 4b6ea94306 Upstream release of 0.10.0
- agent: add qemuAgentArbitraryCommand() for general qemu agent command
- Introduce virDomainPinEmulator and virDomainGetEmulatorPinInfo functions
- network: use firewalld instead of iptables, when available
- network: make network driver vlan-aware
- esx: Implement network driver
- driver for parallels hypervisor
- Various LXC improvements
- Add virDomainGetHostname
- a lot of bug fixes, improvements and portability work
2012-08-29 14:32:06 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 963754bc8c Fix a missing build requirement on dbus-devel 2012-08-23 16:14:20 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 7b5483236c release candidate 1 of 0.10.0 2012-08-23 15:53:24 +08:00
Daniel P. Berrange 438006407c Add correct patch for fixing module linkage & enable autotools
Add the correct patch to fix the module linkage problems
and enable autotools, so the Makefile.am changes actually
get applied
2012-08-14 16:21:02 +01:00
Daniel Veillard 76c8282ee2 Fix missing symbols in libvirt daemon in rc0 snapshot 2012-08-14 20:06:04 +08:00
Daniel Veillard f463598b24 Prerelease for libvirt-0.10.0
Snapshot before 0.10.0 expected beginning of september
2012-08-08 22:45:35 +08:00
Richard W.M. Jones f4e752a385 Add upstream patch to fix RHBZ#842114. 2012-07-23 14:09:48 +01:00
Dennis Gilmore c37cb21dea - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_18_Mass_Rebuild 2012-07-19 16:33:02 -05:00
Cole Robinson e0bfc1f8aa BuildRequires: openssl-devel for rbd 2012-07-15 13:26:31 -04:00
Daniel Veillard 544ad4a787 Release of libvirt-0.9.13
- S390: support for s390(x)
- snapshot: implement new APIs for esx and vbox
- snapshot: new query APIs and many improvements
- virsh: Allow users to reedit rejected XML
- nwfilter: add DHCP snooping
- Enable driver modules in libvirt RPM
- Default to enable driver modules for libvirtd
- storage backend: Add RBD (RADOS Block Device) support
- sVirt support for LXC domains inprovement
- a lot of bug fixes, improvements and portability work
2012-07-02 13:15:52 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 8f163760ed Update to 0.9.12 2012-05-14 22:23:10 +08:00
Cole Robinson 565427cf89 Remove all accidentally added patches 2012-04-27 17:01:40 -04:00
Cole Robinson e10da2f6d4 Rebased to version 0.9.11.3
Abide URI username when connecting to hypervisor (bz 811397)
Fix managed USB mode (bz 814866)
Fix crash connecting to ESX host (bz 811891)
2012-04-27 16:56:05 -04:00
Cole Robinson aa386576d5 Fix python doc filelist 2012-04-26 20:39:12 -04:00
Cole Robinson c73c129b48 Rebased to version 0.9.11.2
Abide URI username when connecting to hypervisor (bz 811397)
Fix managed USB mode (bz 814866)
Fix crash connecting to ESX host (bz 811891)
2012-04-26 20:14:34 -04:00
Daniel P. Berrange afe729ac3c Fix initial hypervisor conditionals 2012-04-04 11:42:12 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange b6038bae4f Remove bogus xen-devel dep from libvirt-devel RPM 2012-04-04 11:42:00 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange e6d9787587 Introduce per-hypervisor virtual RPMs 2012-04-04 11:41:48 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 44699dc495 Split config files & daemon off from main daemon RPM 2012-04-04 11:41:26 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 991d719dde Remove API XML files from libvirt RPM 2012-04-04 11:41:06 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 96a520b555 Move all documentation into a -docs sub-RPM 2012-04-04 11:40:53 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange e31df5e9de Update to 0.9.11 release 2012-04-04 11:40:32 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 6763b267b9 Fix client only RPM build & other misc RPM problems 2012-04-04 11:39:42 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 24e91208a4 spec: Add missed dependancy for numad 2012-04-04 11:38:11 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 15dec999e7 Add qemu support for ppc64 on FC16 or above for rpm packaging 2012-04-04 11:37:55 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange d6b0635d3d Fixed service handling in specfile 2012-04-04 11:37:36 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 336a93264e storage: Allow runtime detection of scrub 2012-04-04 11:36:56 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 6398d1cff5 Fix typos in API XML file paths 2012-04-04 11:36:26 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 6926ed26ea Install API XML desc to a standard location 2012-04-04 11:36:11 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 6253f97a2d Revert previous change 2012-04-03 11:02:04 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 37ddbd0eac Refactor RPM spec to allow install without default configs 2012-03-31 12:38:10 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 95fe7c8df2 Rebuild for libparted soname break 2012-03-15 15:10:56 +00:00
Peter Robinson 79ae809020 fix ix86 macros 2012-02-17 15:27:03 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange f19e302ba9 Update to 0.9.10 2012-02-13 16:10:28 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange e9c1d3f4b0 Update to 0.9.10-rc2 release 2012-02-08 11:34:10 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 0f577d932b Fix LXC I/O handling 2012-01-12 21:07:02 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 21a02c2e90 Fix LXC I/O handling 2012-01-12 21:04:43 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 4e460d5f09 Upstream release of 0.9.9 2012-01-07 21:53:09 +08:00
Peter Robinson f9de2f6bc6 update util-linux-ng -> util-linux 2011-12-29 16:21:18 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 2daa1b7814 Add BR on gettext-devel when autotools is enabled 2011-12-08 14:39:53 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange f99eeb8567 Fix install of libvirt-guests.service and libvirtd.service 2011-12-08 13:50:55 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 7069f75cb8 update to libvirt-0.9.8
cleanup of old patches, of spec too
2011-12-08 17:03:16 +08:00
Justin M. Forbes 2cac7dac46 Remove versioning on yajl buildreq 2011-11-14 17:54:13 -06:00
Daniel P. Berrange 913c3c6554 Rebuild for yajl 2.0.1 release 2011-11-10 16:24:26 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange a5a4c0c89b Another attempt to disable shunloadtest 2011-11-08 20:18:01 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 8c8aca2fab Update to 0.9.7 release 2011-11-08 19:52:05 +00:00
Dan Horák daf8e124ca xenlight available only on Xen arches (#745020) 2011-10-11 10:29:54 +02:00
Laine Stump 38c4b724fe release 0.9.6-2
* Make PCI multifunction support more manual - Bug 742836
* Builds on F15 should still use cgconfig - Bug 738725
2011-10-03 00:27:06 -04:00
Daniel Veillard 4d00487275 Upstream release of 0.9.6
Fix the qemu reboot bug from 0.9.5 and a few others bug fixes
2011-09-22 16:33:16 +08:00
Daniel Veillard a6831c26c1 Upstream release of libvirt-0.9.5 2011-09-20 14:51:18 +08:00
Daniel Veillard c363c7ebdb Upstream release of 0.9.4 2011-08-03 13:19:23 +08:00
Dan Horak 18ee6daf8a xenlight available only on Xen arches 2011-07-30 13:16:44 -04:00
Peter Robinson 459eb426c3 add ARM to NUMA platform exlcludes 2011-07-06 15:19:11 +01:00
Daniel Veillard a0d670d2bf Temporary disable sanlock as version is too old 2011-07-04 23:05:01 +08:00
Daniel Veillard d7b41212c1 Updating for 0.9.3 upstream release, Daniel 2011-07-04 21:22:51 +08:00
Richard W.M. Jones 2e1539eba4 Rebuild because of libparted soname bump (libparted.so.0 -> libparted.so.1). 2011-06-29 22:07:28 +01:00
Laine Stump ee9521d87c update to 0.9.2
- require netcf-0.1.8 so transactional network config APIs are included
- document that CVE-2011-2178 has been resolved
2011-06-21 20:25:22 -04:00
Daniel Veillard 8d8fc08bac Deactivate sanlock for now until Dan Berrange updates it 2011-06-06 17:06:09 +08:00
Daniel Veillard e79d304c79 Release of libvirt-0.9.2 upstream 2011-06-06 13:19:32 +08:00
Richard W.M. Jones db03f03fd9 Add patch so users can try out virt-dmesg. 2011-05-25 22:29:05 +01:00
Daniel Veillard 957403ebec Update to upstream release 0.9.1
- support various persistent domain updates
- improvements on memory APIs
- Add virDomainEventRebootNew
- various improvements to libxl driver
- Spice: support audio, images and stream compression
- Various improvements and bug fixes
2011-05-05 13:23:46 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 6c32e1aaeb Fix libvirt-0.9.0 build for rawhide, Daniel 2011-04-08 15:16:29 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 362e335c0b Try to force the buidl with libxenlight 2011-04-07 17:13:40 +08:00
Daniel Veillard ed6c49f874 Update to release 0.9.0 2011-04-07 15:47:13 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 47fcec5405 Fix for CVE-2011-1146, missing checks on read-only connections 2011-03-14 21:48:48 +08:00
Daniel P. Berrange d7239a45b6 Add patch to fix -kernel boot with latest QEMU 2011-02-21 14:34:17 +00:00
Daniel Veillard f13fb18c58 Release of libvirt-0.8.8 upstream
- expose new API for sysinfo extraction
- cgroup blkio weight support
- smartcard device support
- qemu: Support per-device boot ordering
- Various improvements and bug fixes
Daniel
2011-02-17 12:29:20 +08:00
Dennis Gilmore d29644418d - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_15_Mass_Rebuild 2011-02-08 06:38:06 -06:00
Daniel Veillard ed9e426b26 Update to libvirt 0.8.7
- Preliminary support for VirtualBox 4.0
- IPv6 support
- Add VMware Workstation and Player driver driver
- Add network disk support
- Various improvements and bug fixes
- from 0.8.6:
- Add support for iSCSI target auto-discovery
- QED: Basic support for QED images
- remote console support
- support for SPICE graphics
- sysinfo and VMBIOS support
- virsh qemu-monitor-command
2011-01-06 10:45:38 +08:00
Daniel Veillard 659febf9ff Temporary disable xen support on fedora build
temporary workaround since 0.8.5 fails with xen on F15 missing
MAX_VIRT_CPUS, to fix once sorted out upstream
2010-10-29 18:11:45 +02:00
Daniel Veillard fca1fccfad Upstream release of 0.8.5
- Enable JSON and netdev features in QEMU >= 0.13
- framework for auditing integration
- framework DTrace/SystemTap integration
- Setting the number of vcpu at boot
- Enable support for nested SVM
- Virtio plan9fs filesystem QEMU
- Memory parameter controls
- various improvements and bug fixes
Daniel
2010-10-29 17:57:15 +02:00
Jesse Keating f713d63bab - Rebuilt for gcc bug 634757 2010-09-29 14:43:44 -07:00
Dan Horák 5a45e466cf - disable the nwfilterxml2xmltest also on s390(x) 2010-09-16 22:29:05 +02:00
Daniel Veillard 742b24eb23 Upstream release libvirt-0.8.4 2010-09-13 15:26:25 +02:00
Daniel P. Berrange 03369d2383 Fix potential overflow in boot menu code 2010-08-23 21:14:34 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange 2605d662e0 Update to 0.8.3 sources 2010-08-23 19:50:11 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrange e8394ab5b5 Update 0.8.3 release 2010-08-23 19:45:47 +01:00
Fedora Release Engineering 8ad156a5c2 dist-git conversion 2010-07-29 07:20:27 +00:00
dmalcolm f2d6fb6239 - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Features/Python_2.7/MassRebuild 2010-07-22 02:22:13 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange e3a592c38d Fix CVE-2010-2237, CVE-2010-2238, CVE-2010-2239, CVE-2010-2242 2010-07-12 16:01:43 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 7e99819dda Release of libvirt-0.8.2, update of spec file, Daniel 2010-07-05 15:51:43 +00:00
Daniel Veillard a160d7f98d Upstream release of libvirt-0.8.1, Daniel 2010-04-30 17:10:08 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 36cab842e8 - Upstream release 0.8.0
- Snapshotting support (QEmu/VBox/ESX)
- Network filtering API
- XenAPI driver
- new APIs for domain events
- Libvirt managed save API
- timer subselection for domain clock
- synchronous hooks
- API to update guest CPU to host CPU
- virDomainUpdateDeviceFlags new API
- migrate max downtime API
- volume wiping API
- and many bug fixes
Daniel
2010-04-12 18:05:13 +00:00
Richard W.M. Jones 7b7b86e327 No change, just rebuild against new libparted with bumped soname. 2010-03-30 21:08:36 +00:00
Cole Robinson f4bfe638b6 Fix USB devices by product with security enabled (bz 574136)
Set kernel/initrd in security driver, fixes some URL installs (bz 566425)
2010-03-22 15:19:02 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 0e9d242f05 Upstream release 0.7.7
Daniel
2010-03-05 16:33:57 +00:00
Adam Jackson e24467a8c2 * Tue Feb 16 2010 Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> 0.7.6-2
- libvirt-0.7.6-add-needed.patch: Fix FTBFS from --no-add-needed
- Add BuildRequires: xmlrpc-c-client for libxmlrpc_client.so
2010-02-17 00:11:39 +00:00
Adam Jackson b39c370a76 add the patch 2010-02-16 23:59:23 +00:00
Adam Jackson 62e4e7cde2 * Tue Feb 16 2010 Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> 0.7.6-2
- libvirt-0.7.6-add-needed.patch: Fix FTBFS from --no-add-needed
2010-02-16 23:49:24 +00:00
Daniel Veillard f822179f97 Oops forgot to bump version, Daniel 2010-02-03 17:40:46 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 47e7e1e548 upstream release of 0.7.6
daniel
2010-02-03 17:39:33 +00:00
Chris Weyl e73b75314b * Thu Jan 14 2010 Chris Weyl <cweyl@alumni.drew.edu> 0.7.5-3
- bump for libssh2 rebuild
2010-01-14 16:59:58 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 8193a55b4a Rebuild for libparted soname change 2010-01-12 14:10:20 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 6036708fa2 Fix a problem in spec file, Daniel 2009-12-23 15:56:25 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 4717aa0b6d Upstream release of 0.7.5, Daniel 2009-12-23 15:40:21 +00:00
Bill Nottingham 97ae25ea7d Fix typo that causes a failure to update the common directory. (releng #2781) 2009-11-25 23:51:22 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 6470ed033b Upstream release of 0.7.3, Daniel 2009-11-20 18:59:17 +00:00
Daniel Veillard b550f9c1d5 Fix netcf BuildRequire, Daniel 2009-11-20 18:02:51 +00:00
Daniel Veillard ee0273ffc3 Upstream release of libvirt-0.7.3, Daniel 2009-11-20 16:55:47 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 50fce74b00 Really fix restore file labelling this time 2009-11-19 12:51:32 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange e29f71d1c9 Disable numactl on s390[x] 2009-11-11 18:11:49 +00:00
Daniel P. Berrange 427ed20801 Fix QEMU save/restore permissions / labelling 2009-11-11 15:33:52 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin d23e6c285b * Thu Oct 29 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.2-3
- Avoid compressing small log files (#531030)
2009-10-29 17:26:05 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 2c139b45d8 * Thu Oct 29 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.2-2
- Fix qemu machine types handling
2009-10-29 10:57:55 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 762435e3b7 * Thu Oct 29 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.2-2
- Make libvirt-devel require libvirt-client, not libvirt
2009-10-29 10:15:23 +00:00
Daniel Veillard 6383d6b056 0.7.2 release, Daniel 2009-10-14 13:03:30 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 3712441ea6 Add the second patch for #523158 2009-10-13 15:43:47 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 9d0bc882fa * Tue Oct 13 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-12
- Fix restore of qemu guest using raw save format (#523158)
2009-10-13 15:34:15 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 90dddf3d3d * Fri Oct 9 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-11
- Fix libvirtd memory leak during error reply sending (#528162)
- Add several PCI hot-unplug typo fixes from upstream
2009-10-09 14:53:48 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 86abd54d02 * Tue Oct 6 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-10
- Create /var/log/libvirt/{lxc,uml} dirs for logrotate
- Make libvirt-python dependon on libvirt-client
- Sync misc minor changes from upstream spec
2009-10-06 12:48:58 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 4ab5ad5425 * Tue Oct 6 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-9
- Change logrotate config to weekly (#526769)
2009-10-06 09:45:04 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin f9c1b758c3 - Re-label qcow2 backing files (#497131) 2009-10-01 15:17:31 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin 38cf1bd5ba * Thu Oct 1 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-8
- Disable sound backend, even when selinux is disabled (#524499)
2009-10-01 08:35:16 +00:00
Mark McLoughlin aeda455930 * Wed Sep 30 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.7.1-7
- Fix USB device passthrough (#522683)
2009-09-30 17:58:52 +00:00
26 changed files with 3123 additions and 5019 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:43:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] schema: interleave domain name and uuid with other elements
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Allow <name> and <uuid> anywhere under <domain>, not just at the top:
error:XML document failed to validate against schema: Unable to validate
doc against /usr/share/libvirt/schemas/domain.rng
Expecting an element name, got nothing
Invalid sequence in interleave
Element domain failed to validate content
Introduced with the first RelaxNG schema in commit c642103.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1292131
(cherry picked from commit b4e0549febe416ffefc16f389423740d6d65fa74)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
---
docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
index b252a17..48610ce 100644
--- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
+++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
<define name="domain">
<element name="domain">
<ref name="hvs"/>
- <ref name="ids"/>
<interleave>
+ <ref name="ids"/>
<optional>
<ref name="title"/>
</optional>
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A1n=20Tomko?= <jtomko@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:31:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] leaseshelper: fix crash when no mac is specified
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
If dnsmasq specified DNSMASQ_IAID (so we're dealing with an IPv6
lease) but no DNSMASQ_MAC, we skip creation of the new lease object.
Also skip adding it to the leases array.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1202350
(cherry picked from commit df9fe124d650bc438c531673492569da87523d20)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
---
src/network/leaseshelper.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/network/leaseshelper.c b/src/network/leaseshelper.c
index 2d528f7..6930310 100644
--- a/src/network/leaseshelper.c
+++ b/src/network/leaseshelper.c
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
case VIR_LEASE_ACTION_OLD:
case VIR_LEASE_ACTION_ADD:
- if (virJSONValueArrayAppend(leases_array_new, lease_new) < 0) {
+ if (lease_new && virJSONValueArrayAppend(leases_array_new, lease_new) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("failed to create json"));
goto cleanup;
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:19:56 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] build: predictably generate systemtap tapsets (bz 1173641)
The generated output is dependent on perl hashtable ordering, which
gives different results for i686 and x86_64. Fix this by sorting
the hash keys before iterating over them
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1173641
(cherry picked from commit a1edb05c6028470aa24b74aa0f8d5fb5a181128a)
---
src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl b/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
index 2467300..7b80fbf 100755
--- a/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
+++ b/src/rpc/gensystemtap.pl
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_auth_name(type, verbose)
{
EOF
my $first = 1;
-foreach my $type (keys %auth) {
+foreach my $type (sort(keys %auth)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (type == ", $type, ") {\n";
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_type_name(type, verbose)
{
EOF
$first = 1;
-foreach my $type (keys %type) {
+foreach my $type (sort(keys %type)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (type == ", $type, ") {\n";
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_status_name(status, verbose)
{
EOF
$first = 1;
-foreach my $status (keys %status) {
+foreach my $status (sort(keys %status)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (status == ", $status, ") {\n";
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_program_name(program, verbose)
{
EOF
$first = 1;
-foreach my $prog (keys %funcs) {
+foreach my $prog (sort(keys %funcs)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (program == ", $funcs{$prog}->{id}, ") {\n";
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ function libvirt_rpc_procedure_name(program, version, proc, verbose)
{
EOF
$first = 1;
-foreach my $prog (keys %funcs) {
+foreach my $prog (sort(keys %funcs)) {
my $cond = $first ? "if" : "} else if";
$first = 0;
print " $cond (program == ", $funcs{$prog}->{id}, " && version == ", $funcs{$prog}->{version}, ") {\n";
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 16:51:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: ensure daemon is spawn even if dead socket exists
The auto-spawn code would originally attempt to spawn the
daemon for both ENOENT and ECONNREFUSED errors from connect().
The various refactorings eventually lost this so we only
spawn the daemon on ENOENT. The result is if the daemon exits
uncleanly, so that the socket is left in the filesystem, we
will never be able to auto-spawn the daemon again.
(cherry picked from commit 406ee8c226d2197ba1aaecb9cf3ad2b6df31ae44)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index 51f94d4..6153e0e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
while (retries &&
connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) < 0) {
- if (!(spawnDaemon && errno == ENOENT)) {
+ if (!(spawnDaemon && (errno == ENOENT ||
+ errno == ECONNREFUSED))) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
path);
goto cleanup;
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:01:24 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Minor cleanups
- Add some debugging
- Make the loop dependent only on retries
- Make it explicit that connect(2) success exits the loop
- Invert the error checking logic
(cherry picked from commit f102c7146ed7f6e04af0ad3bce302476239f2502)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index 6153e0e..dcff69e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -548,6 +548,9 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
char *rundir = NULL;
int ret = -1;
+ VIR_DEBUG("path=%s spawnDaemon=%d binary=%s", path, spawnDaemon,
+ NULLSTR(binary));
+
memset(&localAddr, 0, sizeof(localAddr));
memset(&remoteAddr, 0, sizeof(remoteAddr));
@@ -608,10 +611,15 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
if (remoteAddr.data.un.sun_path[0] == '@')
remoteAddr.data.un.sun_path[0] = '\0';
- while (retries &&
- connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) < 0) {
- if (!(spawnDaemon && (errno == ENOENT ||
- errno == ECONNREFUSED))) {
+ while (retries) {
+ if (connect(fd, &remoteAddr.data.sa, remoteAddr.len) == 0) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("connect() succeeded");
+ break;
+ }
+ VIR_DEBUG("connect() failed: retries=%d errno=%d", retries, errno);
+
+ if (!spawnDaemon ||
+ (errno != ENOENT && errno != ECONNREFUSED)) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
path);
goto cleanup;
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:08:45 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Explicitly error if we exceed retry count
When we autolaunch libvirtd for session URIs, we spin in a retry
loop waiting for the daemon to start and the connect(2) to succeed.
However if we exceed the retry count, we don't explicitly raise an
error, which can yield a slew of different error messages elsewhere
in the code.
Explicitly raise the last connect(2) failure if we run out of retries.
(cherry picked from commit 8da02d528068942303923fc4f935e77cccac9c7c)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index dcff69e..90951be 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -618,7 +618,9 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
}
VIR_DEBUG("connect() failed: retries=%d errno=%d", retries, errno);
+ retries--;
if (!spawnDaemon ||
+ retries == 0 ||
(errno != ENOENT && errno != ECONNREFUSED)) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("Failed to connect socket to '%s'"),
path);
@@ -628,7 +630,6 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
goto cleanup;
- retries--;
usleep(5000);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 20:13:38 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: socket: Don't repeatedly attempt to launch daemon
On every socket connect(2) attempt we were re-launching session
libvirtd, up to 100 times in 5 seconds.
This understandably caused some weird load races and intermittent
qemu:///session startup failures
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1271183
(cherry picked from commit 2eb7a975756d05a5b54ab4acf60083beb6161ac6)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index 90951be..2ee4b6e 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
virSocketAddr remoteAddr;
char *rundir = NULL;
int ret = -1;
+ bool daemonLaunched = false;
VIR_DEBUG("path=%s spawnDaemon=%d binary=%s", path, spawnDaemon,
NULLSTR(binary));
@@ -627,8 +628,12 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
goto cleanup;
}
- if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
+ if (!daemonLaunched) {
+ if (virNetSocketForkDaemon(binary) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ daemonLaunched = true;
+ }
usleep(5000);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 10:55:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] security: Do not restore kernel and initrd labels
Kernel/initrd files are essentially read-only shareable images and thus
should be handled in the same way. We already use the appropriate label
for kernel/initrd files when starting a domain, but when a domain gets
destroyed we would remove the labels which would make other running
domains using the same files very unhappy.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=921135
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 68acc701bd449481e3206723c25b18fcd3d261b7)
---
src/security/security_dac.c | 8 --------
src/security/security_selinux.c | 8 --------
2 files changed, 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/security/security_dac.c b/src/security/security_dac.c
index deb6980..d01215f 100644
--- a/src/security/security_dac.c
+++ b/src/security/security_dac.c
@@ -971,14 +971,6 @@ virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.loader->nvram) < 0)
rc = -1;
- if (def->os.kernel &&
- virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.kernel) < 0)
- rc = -1;
-
- if (def->os.initrd &&
- virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.initrd) < 0)
- rc = -1;
-
if (def->os.dtb &&
virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(def->os.dtb) < 0)
rc = -1;
diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
index 6e67a86..2475a80 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -1953,14 +1953,6 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.loader->nvram) < 0)
rc = -1;
- if (def->os.kernel &&
- virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.kernel) < 0)
- rc = -1;
-
- if (def->os.initrd &&
- virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.initrd) < 0)
- rc = -1;
-
if (def->os.dtb &&
virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, def->os.dtb) < 0)
rc = -1;
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2016 17:04:32 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] rpc: wait longer for session daemon to start up
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1271183
We only wait 0.5 seconds for the session daemon to start up and present
its socket, which isn't sufficient for many users. Bump up the sleep
interval and retry amount so we wait for a total of 5.0 seconds.
(cherry picked from commit ca0c06f4008154de55e0b3109885facd0bf02d32)
---
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
index 2ee4b6e..275f1f5 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
char *lockpath = NULL;
int lockfd = -1;
int fd = -1;
- int retries = 100;
+ int retries = 500;
virSocketAddr localAddr;
virSocketAddr remoteAddr;
char *rundir = NULL;
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path,
daemonLaunched = true;
}
- usleep(5000);
+ usleep(10000);
}
localAddr.len = sizeof(localAddr.data);
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
From: Jovanka Gulicoska <jovanka.gulicoska@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 20:02:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] driver: log missing modules as INFO, not WARN
Missing modules is a common expected scenario for most libvirt usage on
RPM distributions like Fedora, so it doesn't really warrant logging at
WARN level. Use INFO instead
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1274849
(cherry picked from commit 9a0c7f5f834185db9017c34aabc03ad99cf37bed)
---
src/driver.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/driver.c b/src/driver.c
index db03438..f926fe4 100644
--- a/src/driver.c
+++ b/src/driver.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ virDriverLoadModule(const char *name)
return NULL;
if (access(modfile, R_OK) < 0) {
- VIR_WARN("Module %s not accessible", modfile);
+ VIR_INFO("Module %s not accessible", modfile);
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:38:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] polkit: Allow password-less access for 'libvirt' group
Many users, who admin their own machines, want to be able to access
system libvirtd via tools like virt-manager without having to enter
a root password. Just google 'virt-manager without password' and
you'll find many hits. I've read at least 5 blog posts over the years
describing slightly different ways of achieving this goal.
Let's finally add official support for this.
Install a polkit-1 rules file granting password-less auth for any user
in the new 'libvirt' group. Create the group on RPM install
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=957300
(cherry picked from commit e94979e901517af9fdde358d7b7c92cc055dd50c)
---
daemon/Makefile.am | 13 +++++++++++++
daemon/libvirt.rules | 9 +++++++++
libvirt.spec.in | 15 +++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 daemon/libvirt.rules
diff --git a/daemon/Makefile.am b/daemon/Makefile.am
index b95a79d..9c5ea37 100644
--- a/daemon/Makefile.am
+++ b/daemon/Makefile.am
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
libvirtd.init.in \
libvirtd.upstart \
libvirtd.policy.in \
+ libvirt.rules \
libvirtd.sasl \
libvirtd.service.in \
libvirtd.socket.in \
@@ -233,6 +234,8 @@ policyauth = auth_admin_keep_session
else ! WITH_POLKIT0
policydir = $(datadir)/polkit-1/actions
policyauth = auth_admin_keep
+rulesdir = $(datadir)/polkit-1/rules.d
+rulesfile = libvirt.rules
endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
endif WITH_POLKIT
@@ -263,9 +266,19 @@ if WITH_POLKIT
install-data-polkit::
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)
$(INSTALL_DATA) libvirtd.policy $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)/org.libvirt.unix.policy
+if ! WITH_POLKIT0
+ $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$(rulesfile) $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)/50-libvirt.rules
+endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
+
uninstall-data-polkit::
rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(policydir)/org.libvirt.unix.policy
rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(policydir) || :
+if ! WITH_POLKIT0
+ rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir)/50-libvirt.rules
+ rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(rulesdir) || :
+endif ! WITH_POLKIT0
+
else ! WITH_POLKIT
install-data-polkit::
uninstall-data-polkit::
diff --git a/daemon/libvirt.rules b/daemon/libvirt.rules
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01a15fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/daemon/libvirt.rules
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// Allow any user in the 'libvirt' group to connect to system libvirtd
+// without entering a password.
+
+polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
+ if (action.id == "org.libvirt.unix.manage" &&
+ subject.isInGroup("libvirt")) {
+ return polkit.Result.YES;
+ }
+});
diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in
index dc327a2..a23629d 100644
--- a/libvirt.spec.in
+++ b/libvirt.spec.in
@@ -1631,9 +1631,9 @@ then
fi
%if %{with_libvirtd}
+%pre daemon
%if ! %{with_driver_modules}
%if %{with_qemu}
-%pre daemon
%if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
# We want soft static allocation of well-known ids, as disk images
# are commonly shared across NFS mounts by id rather than name; see
@@ -1647,11 +1647,21 @@ if ! getent passwd qemu >/dev/null; then
useradd -r -g qemu -G kvm -d / -s /sbin/nologin -c "qemu user" qemu
fi
fi
-exit 0
%endif
%endif
%endif
+ %if %{with_polkit}
+ %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
+# 'libvirt' group is just to allow password-less polkit access to
+# libvirtd. The uid number is irrelevant, so we use dynamic allocation
+# described at the above link.
+getent group libvirt >/dev/null || groupadd -r libvirt
+ %endif
+ %endif
+
+exit 0
+
%post daemon
%if %{with_systemd}
@@ -1925,6 +1935,7 @@ exit 0
%if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
%{_datadir}/polkit-1/actions/org.libvirt.unix.policy
%{_datadir}/polkit-1/actions/org.libvirt.api.policy
+%{_datadir}/polkit-1/rules.d/50-libvirt.rules
%else
%{_datadir}/PolicyKit/policy/org.libvirt.unix.policy
%endif
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
F-12
@@ -1,356 +0,0 @@
From 953440bd12608a20007ee5da5ab69fbbe910bd28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 15:53:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Extract the backing store format as well as name, if available
When QEMU opens a backing store for a QCow2 file, it will
normally auto-probe for the format of the backing store,
rather than assuming it has the same format as the referencing
file. There is a QCow2 extension that allows an explicit format
for the backing store to be embedded in the referencing file.
This closes the auto-probing security hole in QEMU.
This backing store format can be useful for libvirt users
of virStorageFileGetMetadata, so extract this data and report
it.
QEMU does not require disk image backing store files to be in
the same format the file linkee. It will auto-probe the disk
format for the backing store when opening it. If the backing
store was intended to be a raw file this could be a security
hole, because a guest may have written data into its disk that
then makes the backing store look like a qcow2 file. If it can
trick QEMU into thinking the raw file is a qcow2 file, it can
access arbitrary files on the host by adding further backing
store links.
To address this, callers of virStorageFileGetMeta need to be
told of the backing store format. If no format is declared,
they can make a decision whether to allow format probing or
not.
---
src/util/storage_file.c | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
src/util/storage_file.h | 2 +
2 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
index 0adea40..80f743e 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
@@ -78,12 +78,33 @@ struct FileTypeInfo {
int qcowCryptOffset; /* Byte offset from start of file
* where to find encryption mode,
* -1 if encryption is not used */
- int (*getBackingStore)(char **res, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_size);
+ int (*getBackingStore)(char **res, int *format,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_size);
};
-static int cowGetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
-static int qcowXGetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
-static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int cowGetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int qcow1GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int qcow2GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+
+#define QCOWX_HDR_VERSION (4)
+#define QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET (QCOWX_HDR_VERSION+4)
+#define QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE (QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+8)
+#define QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE (QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+4+4)
+
+#define QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT (QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE+8+1+1)
+#define QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT (QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE+8)
+
+#define QCOW1_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE (QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT+4+8)
+#define QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE (QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT+4+4+8+8+4+4+8)
+
+#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END 0
+#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT 0xE2792ACA
+
static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
@@ -119,11 +140,11 @@ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
/* QCow */
{ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW, "QFI", NULL,
LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
- 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8+1+1+2, qcowXGetBackingStore },
+ QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore },
/* QCow 2 */
{ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2, "QFI", NULL,
LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
- 4+4+8+4+4, 8, 1, 4+4+8+4+4+8, qcowXGetBackingStore },
+ QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore },
/* VMDK 3 */
/* XXX Untested
{ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "COWD", NULL,
@@ -142,11 +163,14 @@ static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
static int
cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buf_size)
{
#define COW_FILENAME_MAXLEN 1024
*res = NULL;
+ *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+
if (buf_size < 4+4+ COW_FILENAME_MAXLEN)
return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
if (buf[4+4] == '\0') /* cow_header_v2.backing_file[0] */
@@ -160,31 +184,98 @@ cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
return BACKING_STORE_OK;
}
+
+static int
+qcow2GetBackingStoreFormat(int *format,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_size,
+ size_t extension_start,
+ size_t extension_end)
+{
+ size_t offset = extension_start;
+
+ /*
+ * The extensions take format of
+ *
+ * int32: magic
+ * int32: length
+ * byte[length]: payload
+ *
+ * Unknown extensions can be ignored by skipping
+ * over "length" bytes in the data stream.
+ */
+ while (offset < (buf_size-8) &&
+ offset < (extension_end-8)) {
+ unsigned int magic =
+ (buf[offset] << 24) +
+ (buf[offset+1] << 16) +
+ (buf[offset+2] << 8) +
+ (buf[offset+3]);
+ unsigned int len =
+ (buf[offset+4] << 24) +
+ (buf[offset+5] << 16) +
+ (buf[offset+6] << 8) +
+ (buf[offset+7]);
+
+ offset += 8;
+
+ if ((offset + len) < offset)
+ break;
+
+ if ((offset + len) > buf_size)
+ break;
+
+ switch (magic) {
+ case QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END:
+ goto done;
+
+ case QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT:
+ if (buf[offset+len] != '\0')
+ break;
+ *format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(
+ ((const char *)buf)+offset);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ offset += len;
+ }
+
+done:
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
static int
qcowXGetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buf_size)
+ size_t buf_size,
+ bool isQCow2)
{
unsigned long long offset;
unsigned long size;
*res = NULL;
- if (buf_size < 4+4+8+4)
+ if (format)
+ *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+
+ if (buf_size < QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+8+4)
return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
- offset = (((unsigned long long)buf[4+4] << 56)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+1] << 48)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+2] << 40)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+3] << 32)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+4] << 24)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+5] << 16)
- | ((unsigned long long)buf[4+4+6] << 8)
- | buf[4+4+7]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_offset */
+ offset = (((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET] << 56)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+1] << 48)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+2] << 40)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+3] << 32)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+4] << 24)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+5] << 16)
+ | ((unsigned long long)buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+6] << 8)
+ | buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_OFFSET+7]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_offset */
if (offset > buf_size)
return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
- size = ((buf[4+4+8] << 24)
- | (buf[4+4+8+1] << 16)
- | (buf[4+4+8+2] << 8)
- | buf[4+4+8+3]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_size */
+ size = ((buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE] << 24)
+ | (buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+1] << 16)
+ | (buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+2] << 8)
+ | buf[QCOWX_HDR_BACKING_FILE_SIZE+3]); /* QCowHeader.backing_file_size */
if (size == 0)
return BACKING_STORE_OK;
if (offset + size > buf_size || offset + size < offset)
@@ -197,12 +288,63 @@ qcowXGetBackingStore(char **res,
}
memcpy(*res, buf + offset, size);
(*res)[size] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Traditionally QCow2 files had a layout of
+ *
+ * [header]
+ * [backingStoreName]
+ *
+ * Although the backingStoreName typically followed
+ * the header immediately, this was not required by
+ * the format. By specifying a higher byte offset for
+ * the backing file offset in the header, it was
+ * possible to leave space between the header and
+ * start of backingStore.
+ *
+ * This hack is now used to store extensions to the
+ * qcow2 format:
+ *
+ * [header]
+ * [extensions]
+ * [backingStoreName]
+ *
+ * Thus the file region to search for extensions is
+ * between the end of the header (QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE)
+ * and the start of the backingStoreName (offset)
+ */
+ if (isQCow2)
+ qcow2GetBackingStoreFormat(format, buf, buf_size, QCOW2_HDR_TOTAL_SIZE, offset);
+
return BACKING_STORE_OK;
}
static int
+qcow1GetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_size)
+{
+ /* QCow1 doesn't have the extensions capability
+ * used to store backing format */
+ *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+ return qcowXGetBackingStore(res, NULL, buf, buf_size, false);
+}
+
+static int
+qcow2GetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_size)
+{
+ return qcowXGetBackingStore(res, format, buf, buf_size, true);
+}
+
+
+static int
vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
+ int *format,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buf_size)
{
@@ -212,6 +354,14 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
size_t len;
*res = NULL;
+ /*
+ * Technically this should have been VMDK, since
+ * VMDK spec / VMWare impl only support VMDK backed
+ * by VMDK. QEMU isn't following this though and
+ * does probing on VMDK backing files, hence we set
+ * AUTO
+ */
+ *format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
if (buf_size <= 0x200)
return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
@@ -358,9 +508,12 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
/* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
- char *base;
+ char *backing;
+ int backingFormat;
- switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&base, head, len)) {
+ switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&backing,
+ &backingFormat,
+ head, len)) {
case BACKING_STORE_OK:
break;
@@ -370,13 +523,16 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
case BACKING_STORE_ERROR:
return -1;
}
- if (base != NULL) {
- meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, base);
- VIR_FREE(base);
+ if (backing != NULL) {
+ meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
+ VIR_FREE(backing);
if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
virReportOOMError();
return -1;
}
+ meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
+ } else {
+ meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
}
}
return 0;
diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
index 58533ee..6328ba7 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
# include <stdbool.h>
enum virStorageFileFormat {
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO = -1,
VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW = 0,
VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR,
VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS,
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virStorageFileFormat);
typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
int format;
char *backingStore;
+ int backingStoreFormat;
unsigned long long capacity;
bool encrypted;
} virStorageFileMetadata;
--
1.7.1.1
-159
View File
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
From cab428b1d4d432965cee6f5afb67265557706715 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 16:39:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/11] Remove 'type' field from FileTypeInfo struct
Instead of including a field in FileTypeInfo struct for the
disk format, rely on the array index matching the format.
Use verify() to assert the correct number of elements in the
array.
* src/util/storage_file.c: remove type field from FileTypeInfo
---
src/util/storage_file.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
index 80f743e..df0e3a1 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ enum {
/* Either 'magic' or 'extension' *must* be provided */
struct FileTypeInfo {
- int type; /* One of the constants above */
const char *magic; /* Optional string of file magic
* to check at head of file */
const char *extension; /* Optional file extension to check */
@@ -108,58 +107,59 @@ static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
- /* Bochs */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS, "Bochs Virtual HD Image", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 64, 0x20000,
- 32+16+16+4+4+4+4+4, 8, 1, -1, NULL },*/
- /* CLoop */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_VOL_CLOOP, "#!/bin/sh\n#V2.0 Format\nmodprobe cloop file=$0 && mount -r -t iso9660 /dev/cloop $1\n", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
- -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL }, */
- /* Cow */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_COW, "OOOM", NULL,
- LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
- 4+4+1024+4, 8, 1, -1, cowGetBackingStore },
- /* DMG */
- /* XXX QEMU says there's no magic for dmg, but we should check... */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DMG, NULL, ".dmg",
- 0, -1, 0,
- -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL },
- /* XXX there's probably some magic for iso we can validate too... */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_ISO, NULL, ".iso",
- 0, -1, 0,
- -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL },
- /* Parallels */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_PARALLELS, "WithoutFreeSpace", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 16, 2,
- 16+4+4+4+4, 4, 512, -1, NULL },
- */
- /* QCow */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW, "QFI", NULL,
- LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
- QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore },
- /* QCow 2 */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2, "QFI", NULL,
- LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
- QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore },
- /* VMDK 3 */
- /* XXX Untested
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "COWD", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
- 4+4+4, 4, 512, -1, NULL },
- */
- /* VMDK 4 */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK, "KDMV", NULL,
- LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
- 4+4+4, 8, 512, -1, vmdk4GetBackingStore },
- /* Connectix / VirtualPC */
- { VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VPC, "conectix", NULL,
- LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 12, 0x10000,
- 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 4, 8, 1, -1, NULL},
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR] = { NULL, NULL, LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_BOCHS] = {
+ /*"Bochs Virtual HD Image", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 64, 0x20000,
+ 32+16+16+4+4+4+4+4, 8, 1, -1, NULL
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_CLOOP] = {
+ /*"#!/bin/sh\n#V2.0 Format\nmodprobe cloop file=$0 && mount -r -t iso9660 /dev/cloop $1\n", */ /* Untested */ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, -1, 0,
+ -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_COW] = {
+ "OOOM", NULL,
+ LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+ 4+4+1024+4, 8, 1, -1, cowGetBackingStore
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DMG] = {
+ NULL, /* XXX QEMU says there's no magic for dmg, but we should check... */
+ ".dmg",
+ 0, -1, 0,
+ -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_ISO] = {
+ NULL, /* XXX there's probably some magic for iso we can validate too... */
+ ".iso",
+ 0, -1, 0,
+ -1, 0, 0, -1, NULL
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW] = {
+ "QFI", NULL,
+ LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+ QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW1_HDR_CRYPT, qcow1GetBackingStore,
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2] = {
+ "QFI", NULL,
+ LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 4, 2,
+ QCOWX_HDR_IMAGE_SIZE, 8, 1, QCOW2_HDR_CRYPT, qcow2GetBackingStore,
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VMDK] = {
+ "KDMV", NULL,
+ LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN, 4, 1,
+ 4+4+4, 8, 512, -1, vmdk4GetBackingStore
+ },
+ [VIR_STORAGE_FILE_VPC] = {
+ "conectix", NULL,
+ LV_BIG_ENDIAN, 12, 0x10000,
+ 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 4, 8, 1, -1, NULL
+ },
};
+verify(ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST);
static int
cowGetBackingStore(char **res,
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
}
/* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
- meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
+ meta->format = i;
if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
char *backing;
int backingFormat;
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
if (!virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[i].extension))
continue;
- meta->format = fileTypeInfo[i].type;
+ meta->format = i;
return 0;
}
--
1.7.1.1
@@ -1,585 +0,0 @@
From 57482ca0be29e9e92e242c9acb577e0b770c01d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 14:58:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/11] Refactor virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD to separate functionality
The virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD did two jobs in one. First
it probed for storage type, then it extracted metadata for the
type. It is desirable to be able to separate these jobs, allowing
probing without querying metadata, and querying metadata without
probing.
To prepare for this, split out probing code into a new pair of
methods
virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD
virStorageFileProbeFormat
* src/util/storage_file.c, src/util/storage_file.h,
src/libvirt_private.syms: Introduce virStorageFileProbeFormat
and virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD
---
src/libvirt_private.syms | 2 +
src/util/storage_file.c | 460 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
src/util/storage_file.h | 4 +
3 files changed, 335 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms
index 778ceb1..4607f49 100644
--- a/src/libvirt_private.syms
+++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms
@@ -628,6 +628,8 @@ virStorageGenerateQcowPassphrase;
# storage_file.h
virStorageFileFormatTypeToString;
virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString;
+virStorageFileProbeFormat;
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD;
virStorageFileGetMetadata;
virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD;
virStorageFileIsSharedFS;
diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
index df0e3a1..221268b 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ static int vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **, int *,
#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_END 0
#define QCOW2_HDR_EXTENSION_BACKING_FORMAT 0xE2792ACA
+/* VMDK needs at least this to find backing store,
+ * other formats are less */
+#define STORAGE_MAX_HEAD (20*512)
static struct FileTypeInfo const fileTypeInfo[] = {
@@ -349,9 +352,14 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
size_t buf_size)
{
static const char prefix[] = "parentFileNameHint=\"";
-
- char desc[20*512 + 1], *start, *end;
+ char *desc, *start, *end;
size_t len;
+ int ret = BACKING_STORE_ERROR;
+
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(desc, STORAGE_MAX_HEAD + 1) < 0) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
*res = NULL;
/*
@@ -363,29 +371,42 @@ vmdk4GetBackingStore(char **res,
*/
*format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
- if (buf_size <= 0x200)
- return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+ if (buf_size <= 0x200) {
+ ret = BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
len = buf_size - 0x200;
- if (len > sizeof(desc) - 1)
- len = sizeof(desc) - 1;
+ if (len > STORAGE_MAX_HEAD)
+ len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
memcpy(desc, buf + 0x200, len);
desc[len] = '\0';
start = strstr(desc, prefix);
- if (start == NULL)
- return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+ if (start == NULL) {
+ ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
start += strlen(prefix);
end = strchr(start, '"');
- if (end == NULL)
- return BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
- if (end == start)
- return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+ if (end == NULL) {
+ ret = BACKING_STORE_INVALID;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (end == start) {
+ ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
*end = '\0';
*res = strdup(start);
if (*res == NULL) {
virReportOOMError();
- return BACKING_STORE_ERROR;
+ goto cleanup;
}
- return BACKING_STORE_OK;
+
+ ret = BACKING_STORE_OK;
+
+cleanup:
+ VIR_FREE(desc);
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -411,148 +432,325 @@ absolutePathFromBaseFile(const char *base_file, const char *path)
return res;
}
-/**
- * Probe the header of a file to determine what type of disk image
- * it is, and info about its capacity if available.
- */
-int
-virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
- int fd,
- virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+
+static bool
+virStorageFileMatchesMagic(int format,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen)
{
- unsigned char head[20*512]; /* vmdk4GetBackingStore needs this much. */
- int len, i;
+ int mlen;
- memset(meta, 0, sizeof (*meta));
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].magic == NULL)
+ return false;
- /* If all else fails, call it a raw file */
- meta->format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW;
+ /* Validate magic data */
+ mlen = strlen(fileTypeInfo[format].magic);
+ if (mlen > buflen)
+ return false;
- if ((len = read(fd, head, sizeof(head))) < 0) {
- virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
- return -1;
+ if (memcmp(buf, fileTypeInfo[format].magic, mlen) != 0)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+
+static bool
+virStorageFileMatchesExtension(int format,
+ const char *path)
+{
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].extension == NULL)
+ return false;
+
+ if (virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[format].extension))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+
+static bool
+virStorageFileMatchesVersion(int format,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ int version;
+
+ /* Validate version number info */
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset == -1)
+ return false;
+
+ if ((fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset + 4) > buflen)
+ return false;
+
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
+ version =
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+3] << 24) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+2] << 16) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+1] << 8) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset]);
+ } else {
+ version =
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset] << 24) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+1] << 16) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+2] << 8) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].versionOffset+3]);
}
+ if (version != fileTypeInfo[format].versionNumber)
+ return false;
- /* First check file magic */
- for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) ; i++) {
- int mlen;
-
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].magic == NULL)
- continue;
-
- /* Validate magic data */
- mlen = strlen(fileTypeInfo[i].magic);
- if (mlen > len)
- continue;
- if (memcmp(head, fileTypeInfo[i].magic, mlen) != 0)
- continue;
-
- /* Validate version number info */
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].versionNumber != -1) {
- int version;
-
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
- version = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+3] << 24) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+2] << 16) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+1] << 8) |
- head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset];
- } else {
- version = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset] << 24) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+1] << 16) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+2] << 8) |
- head[fileTypeInfo[i].versionOffset+3];
- }
- if (version != fileTypeInfo[i].versionNumber)
- continue;
- }
+ return true;
+}
- /* Optionally extract capacity from file */
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset != -1) {
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
- meta->capacity =
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+7] << 56) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+6] << 48) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+5] << 40) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+4] << 32) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+3] << 24) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+2] << 16) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+1] << 8) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset]);
- } else {
- meta->capacity =
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset] << 56) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+1] << 48) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+2] << 40) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+3] << 32) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+4] << 24) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+5] << 16) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+6] << 8) |
- ((unsigned long long)head[fileTypeInfo[i].sizeOffset+7]);
- }
- /* Avoid unlikely, but theoretically possible overflow */
- if (meta->capacity > (ULLONG_MAX / fileTypeInfo[i].sizeMultiplier))
- continue;
- meta->capacity *= fileTypeInfo[i].sizeMultiplier;
- }
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset != -1) {
- int crypt_format;
+static int
+virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(int format,
+ const char *path,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+{
+ /* XXX we should consider moving virStorageBackendUpdateVolInfo
+ * code into this method, for non-magic files
+ */
+ if (!fileTypeInfo[format].magic) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- crypt_format = (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset] << 24) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+1] << 16) |
- (head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+2] << 8) |
- head[fileTypeInfo[i].qcowCryptOffset+3];
- meta->encrypted = crypt_format != 0;
+ /* Optionally extract capacity from file */
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset != -1) {
+ if ((fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset + 8) > buflen)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
+ meta->capacity =
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+7] << 56) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+6] << 48) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+5] << 40) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+4] << 32) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+3] << 24) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+2] << 16) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+1] << 8) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset]);
+ } else {
+ meta->capacity =
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset] << 56) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+1] << 48) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+2] << 40) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+3] << 32) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+4] << 24) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+5] << 16) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+6] << 8) |
+ ((unsigned long long)buf[fileTypeInfo[format].sizeOffset+7]);
}
+ /* Avoid unlikely, but theoretically possible overflow */
+ if (meta->capacity > (ULLONG_MAX / fileTypeInfo[format].sizeMultiplier))
+ return 1;
+ meta->capacity *= fileTypeInfo[format].sizeMultiplier;
+ }
- /* Validation passed, we know the file format now */
- meta->format = i;
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore != NULL) {
- char *backing;
- int backingFormat;
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset != -1) {
+ int crypt_format;
- switch (fileTypeInfo[i].getBackingStore(&backing,
- &backingFormat,
- head, len)) {
- case BACKING_STORE_OK:
- break;
+ crypt_format =
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset] << 24) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+1] << 16) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+2] << 8) |
+ (buf[fileTypeInfo[format].qcowCryptOffset+3]);
+ meta->encrypted = crypt_format != 0;
+ }
- case BACKING_STORE_INVALID:
- continue;
+ if (fileTypeInfo[format].getBackingStore != NULL) {
+ char *backing;
+ int backingFormat;
+ int ret = fileTypeInfo[format].getBackingStore(&backing,
+ &backingFormat,
+ buf, buflen);
+ if (ret == BACKING_STORE_INVALID)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (ret == BACKING_STORE_ERROR)
+ return -1;
- case BACKING_STORE_ERROR:
+ if (backing != NULL) {
+ meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
+ VIR_FREE(backing);
+ if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
+ virReportOOMError();
return -1;
}
- if (backing != NULL) {
- meta->backingStore = absolutePathFromBaseFile(path, backing);
- VIR_FREE(backing);
- if (meta->backingStore == NULL) {
- virReportOOMError();
- return -1;
- }
- meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
- } else {
- meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
- }
+ meta->backingStoreFormat = backingFormat;
+ } else {
+ meta->backingStore = NULL;
+ meta->backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(const char *path,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ int format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW;
+ int i;
+
+ /* First check file magic */
+ for (i = 0 ; i < VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST ; i++) {
+ if (virStorageFileMatchesMagic(i, buf, buflen) &&
+ virStorageFileMatchesVersion(i, buf, buflen)) {
+ format = i;
+ goto cleanup;
}
- return 0;
}
/* No magic, so check file extension */
- for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(fileTypeInfo) ; i++) {
- if (fileTypeInfo[i].extension == NULL)
- continue;
+ for (i = 0 ; i < VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST ; i++) {
+ if (virStorageFileMatchesExtension(i, path)) {
+ format = i;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
- if (!virFileHasSuffix(path, fileTypeInfo[i].extension))
- continue;
+cleanup:
+ return format;
+}
- meta->format = i;
- return 0;
+
+/**
+ * virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
+ * pointing to 'path'), returning the detected disk format.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ *
+ * Best option: Don't use this function
+ */
+int
+virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path, int fd)
+{
+ unsigned char *head;
+ ssize_t len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(head, len) < 0) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ return -1;
}
- return 0;
+ if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((len = read(fd, head, len)) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+
+cleanup:
+ VIR_FREE(head);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * virStorageFileProbeFormat:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'path', returning the detected
+ * disk format.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ *
+ * Best option: Don't use this function
+ */
+int
+virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path)
+{
+ int fd, ret;
+
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot open file '%s'"), path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(path, fd);
+
+ close(fd);
+
+ return ret;
}
+/**
+ * virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
+ * for the file 'path'), filling 'meta' with the detected
+ * format and other associated metadata.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ */
+int
+virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
+ int fd,
+ virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
+{
+ unsigned char *head;
+ ssize_t len = STORAGE_MAX_HEAD;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(head, len) < 0) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memset(meta, 0, sizeof (*meta));
+
+ if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((len = read(fd, head, len)) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ meta->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(meta->format, path, head, len, meta);
+
+cleanup:
+ VIR_FREE(head);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * virStorageFileGetMetadata:
+ *
+ * Probe for the format of 'path', filling 'meta' with the detected
+ * format and other associated metadata.
+ *
+ * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
+ * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
+ * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
+ * format at will.
+ */
int
virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
index 6328ba7..3420d44 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
# define DEV_BSIZE 512
# endif
+int virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path);
+int virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path,
+ int fd);
+
int virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
int virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
--
1.7.1.1
@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
From 726a63a437efd96510ce316bf30d16f213d4db27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:15:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/11] Require format to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata
Require the disk image to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata.
If this is set to VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, then the format will be
resolved using probing. This makes it easier to control when
probing will be used
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
Set VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO when calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
* src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c: Probe for disk format before
calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
* src/util/storage_file.h, src/util/storage_file.c: Remove format
from virStorageFileMeta struct & require it to be passed into
method.
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++---
src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c | 4 ++-
src/security/security_selinux.c | 4 ++-
src/security/virt-aa-helper.c | 4 ++-
src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c | 11 ++++++--
src/util/storage_file.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
src/util/storage_file.h | 3 +-
7 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 487bfa3..97f2990 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -3069,7 +3069,9 @@ static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
}
}
- rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+ rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+ &meta);
if (rc < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
@@ -3119,7 +3121,9 @@ static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
}
}
- rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+ rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+ &meta);
if (rc < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
@@ -9614,6 +9618,7 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = NULL;
struct stat sb;
int i;
+ int format;
virCheckFlags(0, -1);
@@ -9658,7 +9663,21 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
}
/* Probe for magic formats */
- if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, &meta) < 0)
+ if (disk->driverType) {
+ if ((format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(disk->driverType)) < 0) {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("unknown disk format %s for %s"),
+ disk->driverType, disk->src);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd,
+ format,
+ &meta) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Get info for normal formats */
@@ -9706,7 +9725,7 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
highest allocated extent from QEMU */
if (virDomainObjIsActive(vm) &&
disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_BLOCK &&
- meta.format != VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW &&
+ format != VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW &&
S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode)) {
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(vm) < 0)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
index 95015b0..acfe48e 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
@@ -115,7 +115,9 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virStorageFileMetadata meta;
int ret;
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+ &meta);
if (path != disk->src)
VIR_FREE(path);
diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
index e5eef19..5c0f002 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -457,7 +457,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virStorageFileMetadata meta;
int ret;
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+ &meta);
if (path != disk->src)
VIR_FREE(path);
diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
index c66f107..2c045e6 100644
--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
@@ -830,7 +830,9 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
do {
virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path, &meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
+ &meta);
if (path != ctl->def->disks[i]->src)
VIR_FREE(path);
diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
index f0cd770..d3ac0fe 100644
--- a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
@@ -75,14 +75,19 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
- if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(target->path, fd, &meta) < 0) {
+ if ((target->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(target->path, fd)) < 0) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
- close(fd);
+ if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(target->path, fd,
+ target->format,
+ &meta) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
- target->format = meta.format;
+ close(fd);
if (backingStore) {
*backingStore = meta.backingStore;
diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.c b/src/util/storage_file.c
index 221268b..9712d92 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.c
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.c
@@ -696,18 +696,23 @@ virStorageFileProbeFormat(const char *path)
/**
* virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD:
*
- * Probe for the format of 'fd' (which is an open file descriptor
- * for the file 'path'), filling 'meta' with the detected
- * format and other associated metadata.
+ * Extract metadata about the storage volume with the specified
+ * image format. If image format is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, it
+ * will probe to automatically identify the format.
*
- * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
- * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
- * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
- * format at will.
+ * Callers are advised never to use VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO as a
+ * format, since a malicious guest can turn a raw file into any
+ * other non-raw format at will.
+ *
+ * If the returned meta.backingStoreFormat is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO
+ * it indicates the image didn't specify an explicit format for its
+ * backing store. Callers are advised against probing for the
+ * backing store format in this case.
*/
int
virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
int fd,
+ int format,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
{
unsigned char *head;
@@ -731,9 +736,16 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
goto cleanup;
}
- meta->format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+ if (format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO)
+ format = virStorageFileProbeFormatFromBuf(path, head, len);
+
+ if (format < 0 ||
+ format >= VIR_STORAGE_FILE_LAST) {
+ virReportSystemError(EINVAL, _("unknown storage file format %d"), format);
+ return -1;
+ }
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(meta->format, path, head, len, meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromBuf(format, path, head, len, meta);
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(head);
@@ -743,16 +755,22 @@ cleanup:
/**
* virStorageFileGetMetadata:
*
- * Probe for the format of 'path', filling 'meta' with the detected
- * format and other associated metadata.
+ * Extract metadata about the storage volume with the specified
+ * image format. If image format is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, it
+ * will probe to automatically identify the format.
*
- * Callers are advised never to trust the returned 'meta->format'
- * unless it is listed as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW, since a
- * malicious guest can turn a raw file into any other non-raw
- * format at will.
+ * Callers are advised never to use VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO as a
+ * format, since a malicious guest can turn a raw file into any
+ * other non-raw format at will.
+ *
+ * If the returned meta.backingStoreFormat is VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO
+ * it indicates the image didn't specify an explicit format for its
+ * backing store. Callers are advised against probing for the
+ * backing store format in this case.
*/
int
virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+ int format,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta)
{
int fd, ret;
@@ -762,7 +780,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
return -1;
}
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, meta);
+ ret = virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, format, meta);
close(fd);
diff --git a/src/util/storage_file.h b/src/util/storage_file.h
index 3420d44..6853182 100644
--- a/src/util/storage_file.h
+++ b/src/util/storage_file.h
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ enum virStorageFileFormat {
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virStorageFileFormat);
typedef struct _virStorageFileMetadata {
- int format;
char *backingStore;
int backingStoreFormat;
unsigned long long capacity;
@@ -62,9 +61,11 @@ int virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path,
int fd);
int virStorageFileGetMetadata(const char *path,
+ int format,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
int virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(const char *path,
int fd,
+ int format,
virStorageFileMetadata *meta);
int virStorageFileIsSharedFS(const char *path);
--
1.7.1.1
-170
View File
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
From ac5067f1e2e98181ee0e9230f756697f50d853eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 18:09:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Add an API for iterating over disk paths
There is duplicated code which iterates over disk backing stores
performing some action. Provide a convenient helper for doing
this to eliminate duplication & risk of mistakes with disk format
probing
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h,
src/libvirt_private.syms: Add virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
---
src/conf/domain_conf.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/conf/domain_conf.h | 11 +++++
src/libvirt_private.syms | 1 +
3 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
index 378c06e..b20ca97 100644
--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include "macvtap.h"
#include "nwfilter_conf.h"
#include "ignore-value.h"
+#include "storage_file.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_DOMAIN
@@ -7273,4 +7274,102 @@ done:
}
+int virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ bool allowProbing,
+ bool ignoreOpenFailure,
+ virDomainDiskDefPathIterator iter,
+ void *opaque)
+{
+ virHashTablePtr paths;
+ int format;
+ int ret = -1;
+ size_t depth = 0;
+ char *nextpath = NULL;
+
+ if (!disk->src)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (disk->driverType) {
+ const char *formatStr = disk->driverType;
+ if (STREQ(formatStr, "aio"))
+ formatStr = "raw"; /* Xen compat */
+
+ if ((format = virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(formatStr)) < 0) {
+ virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("unknown disk format '%s' for %s"),
+ disk->driverType, disk->src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (allowProbing) {
+ format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
+ } else {
+ virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("no disk format for %s and probing is disabled"),
+ disk->src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ paths = virHashCreate(5);
+
+ do {
+ virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+ const char *path = nextpath ? nextpath : disk->src;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (iter(disk, path, depth, opaque) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (virHashLookup(paths, path)) {
+ virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("backing store for %s is self-referential"),
+ disk->src);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ if (ignoreOpenFailure) {
+ char ebuf[1024];
+ VIR_WARN("Ignoring open failure on %s: %s", path,
+ virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
+ break;
+ } else {
+ virReportSystemError(errno,
+ _("unable to open disk path %s"),
+ path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd, format, &meta) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ if (virHashAddEntry(paths, path, (void*)0x1) < 0) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ depth++;
+ nextpath = meta.backingStore;
+
+ format = meta.backingStoreFormat;
+
+ if (format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO &&
+ !allowProbing)
+ format = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW; /* Stops further recursion */
+ } while (nextpath);
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ virHashFree(paths, NULL);
+ VIR_FREE(nextpath);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
#endif /* ! PROXY */
diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h
index 01da17e..d46869e 100644
--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h
+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h
@@ -1079,6 +1079,17 @@ int virDomainChrDefForeach(virDomainDefPtr def,
void *opaque);
+typedef int (*virDomainDiskDefPathIterator)(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ const char *path,
+ size_t depth,
+ void *opaque);
+
+int virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ bool allowProbing,
+ bool ignoreOpenFailure,
+ virDomainDiskDefPathIterator iter,
+ void *opaque);
+
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainVirt)
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainBoot)
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainFeature)
diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms
index 4607f49..b5f3695 100644
--- a/src/libvirt_private.syms
+++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ virDomainSnapshotDefFormat;
virDomainSnapshotAssignDef;
virDomainObjAssignDef;
virDomainChrDefForeach;
+virDomainDiskDefForeachPath;
# domain_event.h
--
1.7.1.1
-506
View File
@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
From 54c1bb731d2b19a46a594cf9682c022f1e1114d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:40:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 06/11] Convert all disk backing store loops to shared helper API
Update the QEMU cgroups code, QEMU DAC security driver, SELinux
and AppArmour security drivers over to use the shared helper API
virDomainDiskDefForeachPath().
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
Convert over to use virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++----------------------
src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c | 47 ++++--------
src/security/security_selinux.c | 67 +++++++----------
src/security/virt-aa-helper.c | 71 ++++++++----------
4 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 97f2990..99aeffa 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -3040,107 +3040,82 @@ static const char *const defaultDeviceACL[] = {
#define DEVICE_PTY_MAJOR 136
#define DEVICE_SND_MAJOR 116
-static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
- virDomainObjPtr vm,
- virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
-{
- char *path = disk->src;
- int ret = -1;
- while (path != NULL) {
- virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- int rc;
+static int qemuSetupDiskPathAllow(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ const char *path,
+ size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ void *opaque)
+{
+ virCgroupPtr cgroup = opaque;
+ int rc;
- VIR_DEBUG("Process path '%s' for disk", path);
- rc = virCgroupAllowDevicePath(cgroup, path);
- if (rc != 0) {
- /* Get this for non-block devices */
- if (rc == -EINVAL) {
- VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
- } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
- VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
- } else {
- virReportSystemError(-rc,
- _("Unable to allow device %s for %s"),
- path, vm->def->name);
- if (path != disk->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ VIR_DEBUG("Process path %s for disk", path);
+ /* XXX RO vs RW */
+ rc = virCgroupAllowDevicePath(cgroup, path);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ /* Get this for non-block devices */
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
+ } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
+ VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
+ } else {
+ virReportSystemError(-rc,
+ _("Unable to allow access for disk path %s"),
+ path);
+ return -1;
}
-
- rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
- VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
- &meta);
- if (rc < 0)
- VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
-
- if (path != disk->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- path = NULL;
-
- if (rc < 0)
- break; /* Treating as non fatal */
-
- path = meta.backingStore;
}
+ return 0;
+}
- ret = 0;
-cleanup:
- return ret;
+static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+ virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+{
+ return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+ true,
+ true,
+ qemuSetupDiskPathAllow,
+ cgroup);
}
-static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
- virDomainObjPtr vm,
- virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+static int qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ const char *path,
+ size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ void *opaque)
{
- char *path = disk->src;
- int ret = -1;
-
- while (path != NULL) {
- virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- int rc;
+ virCgroupPtr cgroup = opaque;
+ int rc;
- VIR_DEBUG("Process path '%s' for disk", path);
- rc = virCgroupDenyDevicePath(cgroup, path);
- if (rc != 0) {
- /* Get this for non-block devices */
- if (rc == -EINVAL) {
- VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
- } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
- VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
- } else {
- virReportSystemError(-rc,
- _("Unable to deny device %s for %s"),
- path, vm->def->name);
- if (path != disk->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ VIR_DEBUG("Process path %s for disk", path);
+ /* XXX RO vs RW */
+ rc = virCgroupDenyDevicePath(cgroup, path);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ /* Get this for non-block devices */
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EINVAL for %s", path);
+ } else if (rc == -EACCES) { /* Get this for root squash NFS */
+ VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring EACCES for %s", path);
+ } else {
+ virReportSystemError(-rc,
+ _("Unable to allow access for disk path %s"),
+ path);
+ return -1;
}
-
- rc = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
- VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
- &meta);
- if (rc < 0)
- VIR_WARN("Unable to lookup parent image for %s", path);
-
- if (path != disk->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- path = NULL;
-
- if (rc < 0)
- break; /* Treating as non fatal */
-
- path = meta.backingStore;
}
+ return 0;
+}
- ret = 0;
-cleanup:
- return ret;
+static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+ virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+{
+ return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+ true,
+ true,
+ qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny,
+ cgroup);
}
@@ -3204,7 +3179,7 @@ static int qemuSetupCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
}
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
- if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+ if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -8035,7 +8010,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
vm->def->name);
goto endjob;
}
- if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
goto endjob;
}
@@ -8080,7 +8055,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
/* Fallthrough */
}
if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
- if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
}
@@ -8280,7 +8255,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
vm->def->name);
goto endjob;
}
- if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
goto endjob;
}
@@ -8303,7 +8278,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
}
if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
- if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
}
@@ -8430,7 +8405,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
if (cgroup != NULL) {
- if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
}
@@ -8493,7 +8468,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachSCSIDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
if (cgroup != NULL) {
- if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
}
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
index acfe48e..770010d 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
@@ -98,45 +98,28 @@ err:
static int
+qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ const char *path,
+ size_t depth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+{
+ return qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(path, driver->user, driver->group);
+}
+
+
+static int
qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
- const char *path;
-
if (!driver->privileged || !driver->dynamicOwnership)
return 0;
- if (!disk->src)
- return 0;
-
- path = disk->src;
- do {
- virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- int ret;
-
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
- VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
- &meta);
-
- if (path != disk->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- path = NULL;
-
- if (ret < 0)
- return -1;
-
- if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
- qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(meta.backingStore,
- driver->user, driver->group) < 0) {
- VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
- return -1;
- }
-
- path = meta.backingStore;
- } while (path != NULL);
-
- return qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(disk->src, driver->user, driver->group);
+ return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+ true,
+ false,
+ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel,
+ NULL);
}
diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
index 5c0f002..d191118 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -439,54 +439,43 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
static int
+SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ const char *path,
+ size_t depth,
+ void *opaque)
+{
+ const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = opaque;
+
+ if (depth == 0) {
+ if (disk->shared) {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_image_context);
+ } else if (disk->readonly) {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
+ } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, secdef->imagelabel);
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
- const char *path;
if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
return 0;
- if (!disk->src)
- return 0;
-
- path = disk->src;
- do {
- virStorageFileMetadata meta;
- int ret;
-
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
- VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
- &meta);
-
- if (path != disk->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- path = NULL;
-
- if (ret < 0)
- break;
-
- if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
- SELinuxSetFilecon(meta.backingStore,
- default_content_context) < 0) {
- VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
- return -1;
- }
-
- path = meta.backingStore;
- } while (path != NULL);
-
- if (disk->shared) {
- return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, default_image_context);
- } else if (disk->readonly) {
- return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, default_content_context);
- } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
- return SELinuxSetFilecon(disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
- }
-
- return 0;
+ return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
+ true,
+ false,
+ SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
+ secdef);
}
diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
index 2c045e6..9ed0cd3 100644
--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
#include "uuid.h"
#include "hostusb.h"
#include "pci.h"
-#include "storage_file.h"
static char *progname;
@@ -801,6 +800,28 @@ file_iterate_pci_cb(pciDevice *dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
}
static int
+add_file_path(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+ const char *path,
+ size_t depth,
+ void *opaque)
+{
+ virBufferPtr buf = opaque;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (depth == 0) {
+ if (disk->readonly)
+ ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "r");
+ else
+ ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "rw");
+ } else {
+ ret = vah_add_file(buf, path, "r");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int
get_files(vahControl * ctl)
{
virBuffer buf = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER;
@@ -821,45 +842,15 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
goto clean;
}
- for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++)
- if (ctl->def->disks[i] && ctl->def->disks[i]->src) {
- int ret;
- const char *path;
-
- path = ctl->def->disks[i]->src;
- do {
- virStorageFileMetadata meta;
-
- ret = virStorageFileGetMetadata(path,
- VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO,
- &meta);
-
- if (path != ctl->def->disks[i]->src)
- VIR_FREE(path);
- path = NULL;
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- vah_warning("could not open path, skipping");
- continue;
- }
-
- if (meta.backingStore != NULL &&
- (ret = vah_add_file(&buf, meta.backingStore, "rw")) != 0) {
- VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
- goto clean;
- }
-
- path = meta.backingStore;
- } while (path != NULL);
-
- if (ctl->def->disks[i]->readonly)
- ret = vah_add_file(&buf, ctl->def->disks[i]->src, "r");
- else
- ret = vah_add_file(&buf, ctl->def->disks[i]->src, "rw");
-
- if (ret != 0)
- goto clean;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++) {
+ int ret = virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(ctl->def->disks[i],
+ true,
+ false,
+ add_file_path,
+ &buf);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto clean;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->nserials; i++)
if (ctl->def->serials[i] && ctl->def->serials[i]->data.file.path)
--
1.7.1.1
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-468
View File
@@ -1,468 +0,0 @@
From dac2b936e77f6c76c11f162e4b175492e4803acb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:58:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Disable all disk probing in QEMU driver & add config option to re-enable
Disk format probing is now disabled by default. A new config
option in /etc/qemu/qemu.conf will re-enable it for existing
deployments where this causes trouble
---
src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug | 1 +
src/qemu/qemu.conf | 12 ++++++++++++
src/qemu/qemu_conf.c | 4 ++++
src/qemu/qemu_conf.h | 1 +
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c | 2 +-
src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug | 4 ++++
src/security/security_apparmor.c | 12 ++++++++----
src/security/security_driver.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
src/security/security_driver.h | 10 ++++++++--
src/security/security_selinux.c | 9 ++++++---
src/security/virt-aa-helper.c | 10 +++++++++-
tests/seclabeltest.c | 2 +-
13 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug b/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
index 7c9f271..47d0525 100644
--- a/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
+++ b/src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ module Libvirtd_qemu =
| bool_entry "relaxed_acs_check"
| bool_entry "vnc_allow_host_audio"
| bool_entry "clear_emulator_capabilities"
+ | bool_entry "allow_disk_format_probing"
(* Each enty in the config is one of the following three ... *)
let entry = vnc_entry
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu.conf b/src/qemu/qemu.conf
index 93934f3..dc8eb83 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu.conf
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu.conf
@@ -187,3 +187,15 @@
# exploit the privileges and possibly do damage to the host.
#
# clear_emulator_capabilities = 1
+
+
+
+# If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk
+# images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise
+# specified in the XML. This is disabled by default.
+#
+# WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all
+# deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their
+# guest XML <disk> elements to include <driver type='XXXX'/>
+# elements instead of enabling this option.
+# allow_disk_format_probing = 1
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
index 988220b..3ba48bf 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
@@ -365,6 +365,10 @@ int qemudLoadDriverConfig(struct qemud_driver *driver,
CHECK_TYPE ("clear_emulator_capabilities", VIR_CONF_LONG);
if (p) driver->clearEmulatorCapabilities = p->l;
+ p = virConfGetValue (conf, "allow_disk_format_probing");
+ CHECK_TYPE ("allow_disk_format_probing", VIR_CONF_LONG);
+ if (p) driver->allowDiskFormatProbing = p->l;
+
virConfFree (conf);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
index ab5f158..30e9f20 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ struct qemud_driver {
unsigned int relaxedACS : 1;
unsigned int vncAllowHostAudio : 1;
unsigned int clearEmulatorCapabilities : 1;
+ unsigned int allowDiskFormatProbing : 1;
virCapsPtr caps;
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 616547c..3c479c5 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -1322,7 +1322,8 @@ qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
qemuSecurityDACSetDriver(qemud_drv);
ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv,
- qemud_drv->securityDriverName);
+ qemud_drv->securityDriverName,
+ qemud_drv->allowDiskFormatProbing);
if (ret == -1) {
VIR_ERROR0(_("Failed to start security driver"));
return -1;
@@ -3070,11 +3071,12 @@ static int qemuSetupDiskPathAllow(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
}
-static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+static int qemuSetupDiskCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+ virCgroupPtr cgroup,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
- true,
+ driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
true,
qemuSetupDiskPathAllow,
cgroup);
@@ -3109,11 +3111,12 @@ static int qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
}
-static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(virCgroupPtr cgroup,
+static int qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+ virCgroupPtr cgroup,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
- true,
+ driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
true,
qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny,
cgroup);
@@ -3180,7 +3183,7 @@ static int qemuSetupCgroup(struct qemud_driver *driver,
}
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
- if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+ if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -8033,7 +8036,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
vm->def->name);
goto endjob;
}
- if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
goto endjob;
}
@@ -8078,7 +8081,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
/* Fallthrough */
}
if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
- if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
}
@@ -8278,7 +8281,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
vm->def->name);
goto endjob;
}
- if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuSetupDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
goto endjob;
}
@@ -8301,7 +8304,7 @@ static int qemuDomainUpdateDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr dom,
}
if (ret != 0 && cgroup) {
- if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
}
@@ -8429,7 +8432,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachPciDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
if (cgroup != NULL) {
- if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
}
@@ -8493,7 +8496,7 @@ static int qemudDomainDetachSCSIDiskDevice(struct qemud_driver *driver,
VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", dev->data.disk->src);
if (cgroup != NULL) {
- if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
+ if (qemuTeardownDiskCgroup(driver, cgroup, dev->data.disk) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to teardown cgroup for disk path %s",
NULLSTR(dev->data.disk->src));
}
@@ -9672,8 +9675,15 @@ static int qemuDomainGetBlockInfo(virDomainPtr dom,
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
- if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+ if (driver->allowDiskFormatProbing) {
+ if ((format = virStorageFileProbeFormat(disk->src)) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("no disk format for %s and probing is disabled"),
+ disk->src);
goto cleanup;
+ }
}
if (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD(path, fd,
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
index 0bbcf69..55dc0c6 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
return 0;
return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
- true,
+ driver->allowDiskFormatProbing,
false,
qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityFileLabel,
NULL);
diff --git a/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug b/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
index 3326cc5..f0c4a0d 100644
--- a/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
+++ b/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ relaxed_acs_check = 1
vnc_allow_host_audio = 1
clear_emulator_capabilities = 0
+
+allow_disk_format_probing = 1
"
test Libvirtd_qemu.lns get conf =
@@ -212,3 +214,5 @@ clear_emulator_capabilities = 0
{ "vnc_allow_host_audio" = "1" }
{ "#empty" }
{ "clear_emulator_capabilities" = "0" }
+{ "#empty" }
+{ "allow_disk_format_probing" = "1" }
diff --git a/src/security/security_apparmor.c b/src/security/security_apparmor.c
index cb5c739..c5f9829 100644
--- a/src/security/security_apparmor.c
+++ b/src/security/security_apparmor.c
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ load_profile(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
char *xml = NULL;
int pipefd[2];
pid_t child;
+ const char *probe = virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv)
+ ? "1" : "0";
if (pipe(pipefd) < -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno, "%s", _("unable to create pipe"));
@@ -172,19 +174,19 @@ load_profile(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
if (create) {
const char *const argv[] = {
- VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-c", "-u", profile, NULL
+ VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-c", "-u", profile, NULL
};
ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
} else if (fn) {
const char *const argv[] = {
- VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-r", "-u", profile, "-f", fn, NULL
+ VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-r", "-u", profile, "-f", fn, NULL
};
ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
} else {
const char *const argv[] = {
- VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-r", "-u", profile, NULL
+ VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-p", probe, "-r", "-u", profile, NULL
};
ret = virExec(argv, NULL, NULL, &child,
pipefd[0], NULL, NULL, VIR_EXEC_NONE);
@@ -347,9 +349,11 @@ AppArmorSecurityDriverProbe(void)
* currently not used.
*/
static int
-AppArmorSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+AppArmorSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
{
virSecurityDriverSetDOI(drv, SECURITY_APPARMOR_VOID_DOI);
+ virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv, allowDiskFormatProbing);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/security/security_driver.c b/src/security/security_driver.c
index aac9f78..9e32fa4 100644
--- a/src/security/security_driver.c
+++ b/src/security/security_driver.c
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def)
int
virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
- const char *name)
+ const char *name,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
{
unsigned int i;
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
switch (tmp->probe()) {
case SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE:
virSecurityDriverInit(tmp);
- if (tmp->open(tmp) == -1) {
+ if (tmp->open(tmp, allowDiskFormatProbing) == -1) {
return -1;
} else {
*drv = tmp;
@@ -125,3 +126,14 @@ virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
{
return drv->name;
}
+
+void virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
+{
+ drv->_private.allowDiskFormatProbing = allowDiskFormatProbing;
+}
+
+bool virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+ return drv->_private.allowDiskFormatProbing;
+}
diff --git a/src/security/security_driver.h b/src/security/security_driver.h
index 61c9eb0..d768f32 100644
--- a/src/security/security_driver.h
+++ b/src/security/security_driver.h
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ typedef struct _virSecurityDriverState virSecurityDriverState;
typedef virSecurityDriverState *virSecurityDriverStatePtr;
typedef virSecurityDriverStatus (*virSecurityDriverProbe) (void);
-typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
typedef int (*virSecurityDomainRestoreImageLabel) (virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk);
@@ -102,12 +103,14 @@ struct _virSecurityDriver {
*/
struct {
char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN];
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing;
} _private;
};
/* Global methods */
int virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr *drv,
- const char *name);
+ const char *name,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
int
virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def);
@@ -120,7 +123,10 @@ virSecurityDriverVerify(virDomainDefPtr def);
void virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
int virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
const char *doi);
+void virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing);
const char *virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
const char *virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+bool virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_H__ */
diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
index cc3812b..a9dd836 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -266,13 +266,15 @@ SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void)
}
static int
-SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing)
{
/*
* Where will the DOI come from? SELinux configuration, or qemu
* configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0".
*/
virSecurityDriverSetDOI(drv, SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI);
+ virSecurityDriverSetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv, allowDiskFormatProbing);
return SELinuxInitialize();
}
@@ -467,18 +469,19 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
}
static int
-SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing = virSecurityDriverGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(drv);
if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
return 0;
return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
- true,
+ allowDiskFormatProbing,
false,
SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
secdef);
diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
index 9ed0cd3..521545d 100644
--- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
+++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
static char *progname;
typedef struct {
+ bool allowDiskFormatProbing;
char uuid[PROFILE_NAME_SIZE]; /* UUID of vm */
bool dryrun; /* dry run */
char cmd; /* 'c' create
@@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
for (i = 0; i < ctl->def->ndisks; i++) {
int ret = virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(ctl->def->disks[i],
- true,
+ ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing,
false,
add_file_path,
&buf);
@@ -943,6 +944,7 @@ vahParseArgv(vahControl * ctl, int argc, char **argv)
{
int arg, idx = 0;
struct option opt[] = {
+ {"probing", 1, 0, 'p' },
{"add", 0, 0, 'a'},
{"create", 0, 0, 'c'},
{"dryrun", 0, 0, 'd'},
@@ -991,6 +993,12 @@ vahParseArgv(vahControl * ctl, int argc, char **argv)
PROFILE_NAME_SIZE) == NULL)
vah_error(ctl, 1, "error copying UUID");
break;
+ case 'p':
+ if (STREQ(optarg, "1"))
+ ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing = true;
+ else
+ ctl->allowDiskFormatProbing = false;
+ break;
default:
vah_error(ctl, 1, "unsupported option");
break;
diff --git a/tests/seclabeltest.c b/tests/seclabeltest.c
index 26d1f86..ef3f026 100644
--- a/tests/seclabeltest.c
+++ b/tests/seclabeltest.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ main (int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char **argv ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
const char *doi, *model;
virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
- ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "selinux");
+ ret = virSecurityDriverStartup (&security_drv, "selinux", false);
if (ret == -1)
{
fprintf (stderr, "Failed to start security driver");
--
1.7.1.1
-94
View File
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
From 3534cd47a57ee9cf7041472511444784f14d6939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 16:08:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/11] Add ability to set a default driver name/type when parsing disks
Record a default driver name/type in capabilities struct. Use this
when parsing disks if value is not set in XML config.
* src/conf/capabilities.h: Record default driver name/type for disks
* src/conf/domain_conf.c: Fallback to default driver name/type
when parsing disks
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Set default driver name/type to raw
---
src/conf/capabilities.h | 2 ++
src/conf/domain_conf.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 8 ++++++++
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/conf/capabilities.h b/src/conf/capabilities.h
index 9290c82..f676eb8 100644
--- a/src/conf/capabilities.h
+++ b/src/conf/capabilities.h
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ struct _virCaps {
virCapsGuestPtr *guests;
unsigned char macPrefix[VIR_MAC_PREFIX_BUFLEN];
unsigned int emulatorRequired : 1;
+ const char *defaultDiskDriverName;
+ const char *defaultDiskDriverType;
void *(*privateDataAllocFunc)(void);
void (*privateDataFreeFunc)(void *);
int (*privateDataXMLFormat)(virBufferPtr, void *);
diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
index b20ca97..f3b8cfa 100644
--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
@@ -1639,6 +1639,16 @@ virDomainDiskDefParseXML(virCapsPtr caps,
def->serial = serial;
serial = NULL;
+ if (!def->driverType &&
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverType &&
+ !(def->driverType = strdup(caps->defaultDiskDriverType)))
+ goto no_memory;
+
+ if (!def->driverName &&
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverName &&
+ !(def->driverName = strdup(caps->defaultDiskDriverName)))
+ goto no_memory;
+
if (def->info.type == VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_ADDRESS_TYPE_NONE
&& virDomainDiskDefAssignAddress(caps, def) < 0)
goto error;
@@ -1659,6 +1669,9 @@ cleanup:
return def;
+no_memory:
+ virReportOOMError();
+
error:
virDomainDiskDefFree(def);
def = NULL;
@@ -4275,7 +4288,8 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParseXML(virCapsPtr caps,
if (n && VIR_ALLOC_N(def->disks, n) < 0)
goto no_memory;
for (i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
- virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(caps, nodes[i],
+ virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = virDomainDiskDefParseXML(caps,
+ nodes[i],
flags);
if (!disk)
goto error;
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 3c479c5..14b790e 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -1357,6 +1357,14 @@ qemuCreateCapabilities(virCapsPtr oldcaps,
return NULL;
}
+ if (driver->allowDiskFormatProbing) {
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverName = NULL;
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverType = NULL;
+ } else {
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverName = "qemu";
+ caps->defaultDiskDriverType = "raw";
+ }
+
/* Domain XML parser hooks */
caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
--
1.7.1.1
@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
From 2ba8625d6d148fa489586efabdfaf2ef20903762 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2010 14:14:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/11] Rewrite qemu-img backing store format handling
When creating qcow2 files with a backing store, it is important
to set an explicit format to prevent QEMU probing. The storage
backend was only doing this if it found a 'kvm-img' binary. This
is wrong because plenty of kvm-img binaries don't support an
explicit format, and plenty of 'qemu-img' binaries do support
a format. The result was that most qcow2 files were not getting
a backing store format.
This patch runs 'qemu-img -h' to check for the two support
argument formats
'-o backing_format=raw'
'-F raw'
and use whichever option it finds
* src/storage/storage_backend.c: Query binary to determine
how to set the backing store format
---
src/storage/storage_backend.c | 214 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend.c b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
index aba8937..c185693 100644
--- a/src/storage/storage_backend.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
@@ -561,6 +561,69 @@ static int virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(virStoragePoolObjPtr pool,
return 0;
}
+enum {
+ QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_NONE = 0,
+ QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG,
+ QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS,
+};
+
+static int virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat(const char *qemuimg)
+{
+ const char *const qemuarg[] = { qemuimg, "-h", NULL };
+ const char *const qemuenv[] = { "LC_ALL=C", NULL };
+ pid_t child = 0;
+ int status;
+ int newstdout = -1;
+ char *help = NULL;
+ enum { MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE = 1024*8 };
+ int len;
+ char *start;
+ char *end;
+ char *tmp;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (virExec(qemuarg, qemuenv, NULL,
+ &child, -1, &newstdout, NULL, VIR_EXEC_CLEAR_CAPS) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if ((len = virFileReadLimFD(newstdout, MAX_HELP_OUTPUT_SIZE, &help)) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(errno,
+ _("Unable to read '%s -h' output"),
+ qemuimg);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ start = strstr(help, " create ");
+ end = strstr(start, "\n");
+ if ((tmp = strstr(start, "-F fmt")) && tmp < end)
+ ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG;
+ else if ((tmp = strstr(start, "[-o options]")) && tmp < end)
+ ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS;
+ else
+ ret = QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_NONE;
+
+cleanup:
+ VIR_FREE(help);
+ close(newstdout);
+rewait:
+ if (child) {
+ if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ goto rewait;
+
+ VIR_ERROR(_("Unexpected exit status from qemu %d pid %lu"),
+ WEXITSTATUS(status), (unsigned long)child);
+ }
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ VIR_WARN("Unexpected exit status '%d', qemu probably failed",
+ WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
static int
virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
virStoragePoolObjPtr pool,
@@ -568,10 +631,9 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
virStorageVolDefPtr inputvol,
unsigned int flags ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = -1;
char size[100];
char *create_tool;
- short use_kvmimg;
const char *type = virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(vol->target.format);
const char *backingType = vol->backingStore.path ?
@@ -582,41 +644,10 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
const char *inputPath = inputvol ? inputvol->target.path : NULL;
/* Treat input block devices as 'raw' format */
const char *inputType = inputPath ?
- virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(inputvol->type == VIR_STORAGE_VOL_BLOCK ? VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW : inputvol->target.format) :
- NULL;
-
- const char **imgargv;
- /* The extra NULL field is for indicating encryption (-e). */
- const char *imgargvnormal[] = {
- NULL, "create",
- "-f", type,
- vol->target.path,
- size,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
- /* Extra NULL fields are for including "backingType" when using
- * kvm-img (-F backingType), and for indicating encryption (-e).
- */
- const char *imgargvbacking[] = {
- NULL, "create",
- "-f", type,
- "-b", vol->backingStore.path,
- vol->target.path,
- size,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
- const char *convargv[] = {
- NULL, "convert",
- "-f", inputType,
- "-O", type,
- inputPath,
- vol->target.path,
- NULL,
- };
+ virStorageFileFormatTypeToString(inputvol->type == VIR_STORAGE_VOL_BLOCK ?
+ VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW :
+ inputvol->target.format) :
+ NULL;
if (type == NULL) {
virStorageReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
@@ -690,44 +721,103 @@ virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg(virConnectPtr conn,
}
}
- if ((create_tool = virFindFileInPath("kvm-img")) != NULL)
- use_kvmimg = 1;
- else if ((create_tool = virFindFileInPath("qemu-img")) != NULL)
- use_kvmimg = 0;
- else {
+ /* Size in KB */
+ snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "%lluK", vol->capacity/1024);
+
+ /* KVM is usually ahead of qemu on features, so try that first */
+ create_tool = virFindFileInPath("kvm-img");
+ if (!create_tool)
+ create_tool = virFindFileInPath("qemu-img");
+
+ if (!create_tool) {
virStorageReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("unable to find kvm-img or qemu-img"));
return -1;
}
if (inputvol) {
- convargv[0] = create_tool;
- imgargv = convargv;
+ const char *imgargv[] = {
+ create_tool,
+ "convert",
+ "-f", inputType,
+ "-O", type,
+ inputPath,
+ vol->target.path,
+ NULL,
+ };
+
+ ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
} else if (vol->backingStore.path) {
- imgargvbacking[0] = create_tool;
- if (use_kvmimg) {
- imgargvbacking[6] = "-F";
- imgargvbacking[7] = backingType;
- imgargvbacking[8] = vol->target.path;
- imgargvbacking[9] = size;
+ const char *imgargv[] = {
+ create_tool,
+ "create",
+ "-f", type,
+ "-b", vol->backingStore.path,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
+ int imgformat = virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat(create_tool);
+ char *optflag = NULL;
+ if (imgformat < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ switch (imgformat) {
+ case QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_FLAG:
+ imgargv[6] = "-F";
+ imgargv[7] = backingType;
+ imgargv[8] = vol->target.path;
+ imgargv[9] = size;
+ if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+ imgargv[10] = "-e";
+ break;
+
+ case QEMU_IMG_BACKING_FORMAT_OPTIONS:
+ if (virAsprintf(&optflag, "backing_fmt=%s", backingType) < 0) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ imgargv[6] = "-o";
+ imgargv[7] = optflag;
+ imgargv[8] = vol->target.path;
+ imgargv[9] = size;
if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
- imgargvbacking[10] = "-e";
- } else if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
- imgargvbacking[8] = "-e";
- imgargv = imgargvbacking;
+ imgargv[10] = "-e";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ VIR_INFO("Unable to set backing store format for %s with %s",
+ vol->target.path, create_tool);
+ imgargv[6] = vol->target.path;
+ imgargv[7] = size;
+ if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
+ imgargv[8] = "-e";
+ }
+
+ ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
+ VIR_FREE(optflag);
} else {
- imgargvnormal[0] = create_tool;
- imgargv = imgargvnormal;
+ /* The extra NULL field is for indicating encryption (-e). */
+ const char *imgargv[] = {
+ create_tool,
+ "create",
+ "-f", type,
+ vol->target.path,
+ size,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
if (vol->target.encryption != NULL)
imgargv[6] = "-e";
- }
+ ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
+ }
- /* Size in KB */
- snprintf(size, sizeof(size), "%lluK", vol->capacity/1024);
-
- ret = virStorageBackendCreateExecCommand(pool, vol, imgargv);
- VIR_FREE(imgargv[0]);
+ cleanup:
+ VIR_FREE(create_tool);
return ret;
}
--
1.7.1.1
-165
View File
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
From d33f44c2e74de28c89b64cdc2c0a6564662e075c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2010 11:28:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/11] Use the extract backing store format in storage volume lookup
The storage volume lookup code was probing for the backing store
format, instead of using the format extracted from the file
itself. This meant it could report in accurate information. If
a format is included in the file, then use that in preference,
with probing as a fallback.
* src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c: Use extracted backing store
format
---
src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
index d3ac0fe..ffb0071 100644
--- a/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
static int
virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
char **backingStore,
+ int *backingStoreFormat,
unsigned long long *allocation,
unsigned long long *capacity,
virStorageEncryptionPtr *encryption)
@@ -58,6 +59,10 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
int fd, ret;
virStorageFileMetadata meta;
+ if (backingStore)
+ *backingStore = NULL;
+ if (backingStoreFormat)
+ *backingStoreFormat = VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO;
if (encryption)
*encryption = NULL;
@@ -89,22 +94,30 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
close(fd);
- if (backingStore) {
- *backingStore = meta.backingStore;
- meta.backingStore = NULL;
+ if (meta.backingStore) {
+ if (backingStore) {
+ *backingStore = meta.backingStore;
+ meta.backingStore = NULL;
+ if (meta.backingStoreFormat == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO) {
+ if ((*backingStoreFormat = virStorageFileProbeFormat(*backingStore)) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *backingStoreFormat = meta.backingStoreFormat;
+ }
+ } else {
+ VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
+ }
}
- VIR_FREE(meta.backingStore);
-
if (capacity && meta.capacity)
*capacity = meta.capacity;
if (encryption != NULL && meta.encrypted) {
if (VIR_ALLOC(*encryption) < 0) {
virReportOOMError();
- if (backingStore)
- VIR_FREE(*backingStore);
- return -1;
+ goto cleanup;
}
switch (target->format) {
@@ -124,6 +137,11 @@ virStorageBackendProbeTarget(virStorageVolTargetPtr target,
}
return 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (backingStore)
+ VIR_FREE(*backingStore);
+ return -1;
}
#if WITH_STORAGE_FS
@@ -585,6 +603,7 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
while ((ent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
int ret;
char *backingStore;
+ int backingStoreFormat;
if (VIR_ALLOC(vol) < 0)
goto no_memory;
@@ -604,6 +623,7 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
if ((ret = virStorageBackendProbeTarget(&vol->target,
&backingStore,
+ &backingStoreFormat,
&vol->allocation,
&vol->capacity,
&vol->target.encryption)) < 0) {
@@ -619,46 +639,18 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemRefresh(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
}
if (backingStore != NULL) {
- if (vol->target.format == VIR_STORAGE_FILE_QCOW2 &&
- STRPREFIX("fmt:", backingStore)) {
- char *fmtstr = backingStore + 4;
- char *path = strchr(fmtstr, ':');
- if (!path) {
- VIR_FREE(backingStore);
- } else {
- *path = '\0';
- if ((vol->backingStore.format =
- virStorageFileFormatTypeFromString(fmtstr)) < 0) {
- VIR_FREE(backingStore);
- } else {
- memmove(backingStore, path, strlen(path) + 1);
- vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
-
- if (virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfo(&vol->backingStore,
- NULL,
- NULL) < 0)
- VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore);
- }
- }
- } else {
- vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
-
- if ((ret = virStorageBackendProbeTarget(&vol->backingStore,
- NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL)) < 0) {
- if (ret == -1)
- goto cleanup;
- else {
- /* Silently ignore non-regular files,
- * eg '.' '..', 'lost+found' */
- VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore);
- }
- }
+ vol->backingStore.path = backingStore;
+ vol->backingStore.format = backingStoreFormat;
+
+ if (virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfo(&vol->backingStore,
+ NULL,
+ NULL) < 0) {
+ VIR_FREE(vol->backingStore.path);
+ goto cleanup;
}
}
-
if (VIR_REALLOC_N(pool->volumes.objs,
pool->volumes.count+1) < 0)
goto no_memory;
--
1.7.1.1
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
From 112a309bc7839e95c558b535143f855ce89cca8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2010 12:50:38 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2010-2242 Apply a source port mapping to virtual network masquerading
IPtables will seek to preserve the source port unchanged when
doing masquerading, if possible. NFS has a pseudo-security
option where it checks for the source port <= 1023 before
allowing a mount request. If an admin has used this to make the
host OS trusted for mounts, the default iptables behaviour will
potentially allow NAT'd guests access too. This needs to be
stopped.
With this change, the iptables -t nat -L -n -v rules for the
default network will be
Chain POSTROUTING (policy ACCEPT 95 packets, 9163 bytes)
pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination
14 840 MASQUERADE tcp -- * * 192.168.122.0/24 !192.168.122.0/24 masq ports: 1024-65535
75 5752 MASQUERADE udp -- * * 192.168.122.0/24 !192.168.122.0/24 masq ports: 1024-65535
0 0 MASQUERADE all -- * * 192.168.122.0/24 !192.168.122.0/24
* src/network/bridge_driver.c: Add masquerade rules for TCP
and UDP protocols
* src/util/iptables.c, src/util/iptables.c: Add source port
mappings for TCP & UDP protocols when masquerading.
---
src/network/bridge_driver.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/util/iptables.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
src/util/iptables.h | 6 ++-
3 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver.c b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
index 72255c1..80ed57a 100644
--- a/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
@@ -638,18 +638,74 @@ networkAddMasqueradingIptablesRules(struct network_driver *driver,
goto masqerr2;
}
- /* enable masquerading */
+ /*
+ * Enable masquerading.
+ *
+ * We need to end up with 3 rules in the table in this order
+ *
+ * 1. protocol=tcp with sport mapping restricton
+ * 2. protocol=udp with sport mapping restricton
+ * 3. generic any protocol
+ *
+ * The sport mappings are required, because default IPtables
+ * MASQUERADE is maintain port number unchanged where possible.
+ *
+ * NFS can be configured to only "trust" port numbers < 1023.
+ *
+ * Guests using NAT thus need to be prevented from having port
+ * numbers < 1023, otherwise they can bypass the NFS "security"
+ * check on the source port number.
+ *
+ * Since we use '--insert' to add rules to the header of the
+ * chain, we actually need to add them in the reverse of the
+ * order just mentioned !
+ */
+
+ /* First the generic masquerade rule for other protocols */
if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
network->def->network,
- network->def->forwardDev))) {
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ NULL))) {
virReportSystemError(err,
_("failed to add iptables rule to enable masquerading to '%s'"),
network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
goto masqerr3;
}
+ /* UDP with a source port restriction */
+ if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "udp"))) {
+ virReportSystemError(err,
+ _("failed to add iptables rule to enable UDP masquerading to '%s'"),
+ network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
+ goto masqerr4;
+ }
+
+ /* TCP with a source port restriction */
+ if ((err = iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "tcp"))) {
+ virReportSystemError(err,
+ _("failed to add iptables rule to enable TCP masquerading to '%s'"),
+ network->def->forwardDev ? network->def->forwardDev : NULL);
+ goto masqerr5;
+ }
+
return 1;
+ masqerr5:
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "udp");
+ masqerr4:
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ NULL);
masqerr3:
iptablesRemoveForwardAllowRelatedIn(driver->iptables,
network->def->network,
@@ -814,8 +870,17 @@ networkRemoveIptablesRules(struct network_driver *driver,
if (network->def->forwardType != VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NONE) {
if (network->def->forwardType == VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NAT) {
iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
- network->def->network,
- network->def->forwardDev);
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "tcp");
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ "udp");
+ iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(driver->iptables,
+ network->def->network,
+ network->def->forwardDev,
+ NULL);
iptablesRemoveForwardAllowRelatedIn(driver->iptables,
network->def->network,
network->def->bridge,
diff --git a/src/util/iptables.c b/src/util/iptables.c
index d06b857..f63e8c6 100644
--- a/src/util/iptables.c
+++ b/src/util/iptables.c
@@ -692,25 +692,49 @@ iptablesRemoveForwardRejectIn(iptablesContext *ctx,
*/
static int
iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
- const char *network,
- const char *physdev,
- int action)
+ const char *network,
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol,
+ int action)
{
- if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
- return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
- action,
- "--source", network,
- "!", "--destination", network,
- "--out-interface", physdev,
- "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
- NULL);
+ if (protocol && protocol[0]) {
+ if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
+ return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+ action,
+ "--source", network,
+ "-p", protocol,
+ "!", "--destination", network,
+ "--out-interface", physdev,
+ "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+ "--to-ports", "1024-65535",
+ NULL);
+ } else {
+ return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+ action,
+ "--source", network,
+ "-p", protocol,
+ "!", "--destination", network,
+ "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+ "--to-ports", "1024-65535",
+ NULL);
+ }
} else {
- return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
- action,
- "--source", network,
- "!", "--destination", network,
- "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
- NULL);
+ if (physdev && physdev[0]) {
+ return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+ action,
+ "--source", network,
+ "!", "--destination", network,
+ "--out-interface", physdev,
+ "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+ NULL);
+ } else {
+ return iptablesAddRemoveRule(ctx->nat_postrouting,
+ action,
+ "--source", network,
+ "!", "--destination", network,
+ "--jump", "MASQUERADE",
+ NULL);
+ }
}
}
@@ -719,6 +743,7 @@ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
* @ctx: pointer to the IP table context
* @network: the source network name
* @physdev: the physical input device or NULL
+ * @protocol: the network protocol or NULL
*
* Add rules to the IP table context to allow masquerading
* network @network on @physdev. This allow the bridge to
@@ -729,9 +754,10 @@ iptablesForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
int
iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
const char *network,
- const char *physdev)
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol)
{
- return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, ADD);
+ return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, protocol, ADD);
}
/**
@@ -739,6 +765,7 @@ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
* @ctx: pointer to the IP table context
* @network: the source network name
* @physdev: the physical input device or NULL
+ * @protocol: the network protocol or NULL
*
* Remove rules from the IP table context to stop masquerading
* network @network on @physdev. This stops the bridge from
@@ -749,7 +776,8 @@ iptablesAddForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
int
iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade(iptablesContext *ctx,
const char *network,
- const char *physdev)
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol)
{
- return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, REMOVE);
+ return iptablesForwardMasquerade(ctx, network, physdev, protocol, REMOVE);
}
diff --git a/src/util/iptables.h b/src/util/iptables.h
index 7d55a6d..b47d854 100644
--- a/src/util/iptables.h
+++ b/src/util/iptables.h
@@ -85,9 +85,11 @@ int iptablesRemoveForwardRejectIn (iptablesContext *ctx,
int iptablesAddForwardMasquerade (iptablesContext *ctx,
const char *network,
- const char *physdev);
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol);
int iptablesRemoveForwardMasquerade (iptablesContext *ctx,
const char *network,
- const char *physdev);
+ const char *physdev,
+ const char *protocol);
#endif /* __QEMUD_IPTABLES_H__ */
--
1.6.6.1
+2581 -521
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
14164638fe0e7f65e425acc85dabc517 libvirt-0.8.2.tar.gz
05f461cd499c628ef07822dd607c340a libvirt-1.2.13.2.tar.gz