libvirt-5.6.0-7
Fix iptables No chain/target/match by that name (bz #1813830) systemd: start libvirtd after firewalld/iptables services (bz #1697636) CVE-2020-12430: memory leak in domstats may allow read-only user to perform DoS attack (bz #1828216, bz #1828190) CVE-2020-10703: Potential denial of service via active pool without target path (bz #1820690, bz #1816650) CVE-2019-20485: potential DoS by holding a monitor job while querying QEMU guest-agent (bz #1809741, bz #1809740)
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
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From: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
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Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 22:32:59 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] network: make it safe to call networkSetupPrivateChains()
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multiple times
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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networkSetupPrivateChains() is currently called only once per run of
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libvirtd, so it can assume that errInitV4 and errInitV6 are empty/null
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when it is called. In preparation for potentially calling this
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function multiple times during one run, this patch moves the reset of
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errInitV[46] to the top of the function, to assure no memory is
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leaked.
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Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit de110f110fb917a31b9f33ad8e4b3c1d3284766a)
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---
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src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c | 8 ++++----
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
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index 35459c10d1..f4e4e2df76 100644
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--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
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+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
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@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
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VIR_DEBUG("Setting up global firewall chains");
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createdChains = false;
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+ virFreeError(errInitV4);
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+ errInitV4 = NULL;
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+ virFreeError(errInitV6);
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+ errInitV6 = NULL;
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rc = iptablesSetupPrivateChains(VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV4);
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if (rc < 0) {
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@@ -56,8 +60,6 @@ static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
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errInitV4 = virSaveLastError();
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virResetLastError();
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} else {
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- virFreeError(errInitV4);
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- errInitV4 = NULL;
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if (rc) {
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VIR_DEBUG("Created global IPv4 chains");
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createdChains = true;
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@@ -73,8 +75,6 @@ static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
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errInitV6 = virSaveLastError();
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virResetLastError();
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} else {
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- virFreeError(errInitV6);
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- errInitV6 = NULL;
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if (rc) {
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VIR_DEBUG("Created global IPv6 chains");
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createdChains = true;
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@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
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From: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
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Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 21:54:39 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] network: force re-creation of iptables private chains on
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firewalld restart
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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When firewalld is stopped, it removes *all* iptables rules and chains,
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including those added by libvirt. Since restarting firewalld means
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stopping and then starting it, any time it is restarted, libvirt needs
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to recreate all the private iptables chains it uses, along with all
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the rules it adds.
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We already have code in place to call networkReloadFirewallRules() any
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time we're notified of a firewalld start, and
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networkReloadFirewallRules() will call
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networkPreReloadFirewallRules(), which calls
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networkSetupPrivateChains(); unfortunately that last call is called
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using virOnce(), meaning that it will only be called the first time
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through networkPreReloadFirewallRules() after libvirtd starts - so of
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course when firewalld is later restarted, the call to
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networkSetupPrivateChains() is skipped.
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The neat and tidy way to fix this would be if there was a standard way
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to reset a pthread_once_t object so that the next time virOnce was
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called, it would think the function hadn't been called, and call it
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again. Unfortunately, there isn't any official way of doing that (we
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*could* just fill it with 0 and hope for the best, but that doesn't
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seem very safe.
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So instead, this patch just adds a static variable called
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chainInitDone, which is set to true after networkSetupPrivateChains()
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is called for the first time, and then during calls to
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networkPreReloadFirewallRules(), if chainInitDone is set, we call
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networkSetupPrivateChains() directly instead of via virOnce().
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It may seem unsafe to directly call a function that is meant to be
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called only once, but I think in this case we're safe - there's
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nothing in the function that is inherently "once only" - it doesn't
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initialize anything that can't safely be re-initialized (as long as
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two threads don't try to do it at the same time), and it only happens
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when responding to a dbus message that firewalld has been started (and
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I don't think it's possible for us to be processing two of those at
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once), and even then only if the initial call to the function has
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already been completed (so we're safe if we receive a firewalld
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restart call at a time when we haven't yet called it, or even if
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another thread is already in the process of executing it. The only
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problematic bit I can think of is if another thread is in the process
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of adding an iptable rule at the time we're executing this function,
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but 1) none of those threads will be trying to add chains, and 2) if
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there was a concurrency problem with other threads adding iptables
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rules while firewalld was being restarted, it would still be a problem
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even without this change.
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This is yet another patch that fixes an occurrence of this error:
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COMMAND_FAILED: '/usr/sbin/iptables -w10 -w --table filter --insert LIBVIRT_INP --in-interface virbr0 --protocol tcp --destination-port 67 --jump ACCEPT' failed: iptables: No chain/target/match by that name.
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In particular, this resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1813830
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Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit f5418b427e7d2f26803880309478de9103680826)
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---
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src/network/bridge_driver.c | 16 ++++---
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src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++----------
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src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c | 3 +-
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src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h | 2 +-
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4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver.c b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
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index d5c544f556..981b4e4578 100644
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--- a/src/network/bridge_driver.c
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+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
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@@ -289,7 +289,9 @@ static int
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networkShutdownNetworkExternal(virNetworkObjPtr obj);
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static void
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-networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup);
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+networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver,
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+ bool startup,
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+ bool force);
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static void
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networkRefreshDaemons(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver);
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@@ -695,7 +697,7 @@ firewalld_dbus_filter_bridge(DBusConnection *connection ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
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if (reload) {
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VIR_DEBUG("Reload in bridge_driver because of firewalld.");
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- networkReloadFirewallRules(driver, false);
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+ networkReloadFirewallRules(driver, false, true);
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}
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return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
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@@ -814,7 +816,7 @@ networkStateInitialize(bool privileged,
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virNetworkObjListPrune(network_driver->networks,
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VIR_CONNECT_LIST_NETWORKS_INACTIVE |
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VIR_CONNECT_LIST_NETWORKS_TRANSIENT);
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- networkReloadFirewallRules(network_driver, true);
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+ networkReloadFirewallRules(network_driver, true, false);
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networkRefreshDaemons(network_driver);
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if (virDriverShouldAutostart(network_driver->stateDir, &autostart) < 0)
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@@ -884,7 +886,7 @@ networkStateReload(void)
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network_driver->networkConfigDir,
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network_driver->networkAutostartDir,
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network_driver->xmlopt);
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- networkReloadFirewallRules(network_driver, false);
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+ networkReloadFirewallRules(network_driver, false, false);
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networkRefreshDaemons(network_driver);
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virNetworkObjListForEach(network_driver->networks,
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networkAutostartConfig,
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@@ -2267,14 +2269,16 @@ networkReloadFirewallRulesHelper(virNetworkObjPtr obj,
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static void
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-networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup)
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+networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver,
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+ bool startup,
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+ bool force)
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{
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VIR_INFO("Reloading iptables rules");
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/* Ideally we'd not even register the driver when unprivilegd
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* but until we untangle the virt driver that's not viable */
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if (!driver->privileged)
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return;
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- networkPreReloadFirewallRules(driver, startup);
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+ networkPreReloadFirewallRules(driver, startup, force);
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virNetworkObjListForEach(driver->networks,
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networkReloadFirewallRulesHelper,
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NULL);
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diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
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index f4e4e2df76..f65928e556 100644
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--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
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+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
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@@ -36,11 +36,14 @@ VIR_LOG_INIT("network.bridge_driver_linux");
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#define PROC_NET_ROUTE "/proc/net/route"
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static virOnceControl createdOnce;
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-static bool createdChains;
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+static bool chainInitDone; /* true iff networkSetupPrivateChains was ever called */
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+static bool createdChains; /* true iff networkSetupPrivateChains created chains during most recent call */
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static virErrorPtr errInitV4;
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static virErrorPtr errInitV6;
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-/* Only call via virOnce */
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+/* Usually only called via virOnce, but can also be called directly in
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+ * response to firewalld reload (if chainInitDone == true)
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+ */
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static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
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{
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int rc;
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@@ -82,6 +85,8 @@ static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
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VIR_DEBUG("Global IPv6 chains already exist");
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}
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}
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+
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+ chainInitDone = true;
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}
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@@ -111,7 +116,10 @@ networkHasRunningNetworks(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver)
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}
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-void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup)
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+void
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+networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver,
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+ bool startup,
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+ bool force)
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{
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/*
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* If there are any running networks, we need to
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@@ -130,29 +138,42 @@ void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup
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* of starting the network though as that makes them
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* more likely to be seen by a human
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*/
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- if (!networkHasRunningNetworks(driver)) {
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- VIR_DEBUG("Delayed global rule setup as no networks are running");
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- return;
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- }
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+ if (chainInitDone && force) {
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+ /* The Private chains have already been initialized once
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+ * during this run of libvirtd, so 1) we can't do it again via
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+ * virOnce(), and 2) we need to re-add the private chains even
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+ * if there are currently no running networks, because the
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+ * next time a network is started, libvirt will expect that
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+ * the chains have already been added. So we call directly
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+ * instead of via virOnce().
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+ */
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+ networkSetupPrivateChains();
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- ignore_value(virOnce(&createdOnce, networkSetupPrivateChains));
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+ } else {
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+ if (!networkHasRunningNetworks(driver)) {
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+ VIR_DEBUG("Delayed global rule setup as no networks are running");
|
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+ return;
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+ }
|
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|
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- /*
|
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- * If this is initial startup, and we just created the
|
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- * top level private chains we either
|
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- *
|
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- * - upgraded from old libvirt
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- * - freshly booted from clean state
|
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- *
|
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- * In the first case we must delete the old rules from
|
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- * the built-in chains, instead of our new private chains.
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- * In the second case it doesn't matter, since no existing
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- * rules will be present. Thus we can safely just tell it
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- * to always delete from the builin chain
|
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- */
|
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- if (startup && createdChains) {
|
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- VIR_DEBUG("Requesting cleanup of legacy firewall rules");
|
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- iptablesSetDeletePrivate(false);
|
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+ ignore_value(virOnce(&createdOnce, networkSetupPrivateChains));
|
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+
|
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+ /*
|
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+ * If this is initial startup, and we just created the
|
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+ * top level private chains we either
|
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+ *
|
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+ * - upgraded from old libvirt
|
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+ * - freshly booted from clean state
|
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+ *
|
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+ * In the first case we must delete the old rules from
|
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+ * the built-in chains, instead of our new private chains.
|
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+ * In the second case it doesn't matter, since no existing
|
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+ * rules will be present. Thus we can safely just tell it
|
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+ * to always delete from the builin chain
|
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+ */
|
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+ if (startup && createdChains) {
|
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+ VIR_DEBUG("Requesting cleanup of legacy firewall rules");
|
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+ iptablesSetDeletePrivate(false);
|
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+ }
|
||||
}
|
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}
|
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|
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diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
|
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index ec7b1ed8b7..74a9b87158 100644
|
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--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@
|
||||
#include <config.h>
|
||||
|
||||
void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
|
||||
- bool startup ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
|
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+ bool startup ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
|
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+ bool force ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
|
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{
|
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}
|
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|
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diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h b/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
|
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index 169417a6c0..48ab52c160 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
|
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+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
|
||||
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ struct _virNetworkDriverState {
|
||||
typedef struct _virNetworkDriverState virNetworkDriverState;
|
||||
typedef virNetworkDriverState *virNetworkDriverStatePtr;
|
||||
|
||||
-void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup);
|
||||
+void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup, bool force);
|
||||
void networkPostReloadFirewallRules(bool startup);
|
||||
|
||||
int networkCheckRouteCollision(virNetworkDefPtr def);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
From: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 00:05:50 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] systemd: start libvirtd after firewalld/iptables services
|
||||
|
||||
When a system has enabled the iptables/ip6tables services rather than
|
||||
firewalld, there is no explicit ordering of the start of those
|
||||
services vs. libvirtd. This creates a problem when libvirtd.service is
|
||||
started before ip[6]tables, as the latter, when it finally is started,
|
||||
will remove all of the iptables rules that had previously been added
|
||||
by libvirt, including the custom chains where libvirt's rules are
|
||||
kept. This results in an error message similar to the following when a
|
||||
user subsequently tries to start a new libvirt network:
|
||||
|
||||
"Error while activating network: Call to virNetworkCreate failed:
|
||||
internal error: Failed to apply firewall rules
|
||||
/usr/sbin/ip6tables -w --table filter --insert LIBVIRT_FWO \
|
||||
--in-interface virbr2 --jump REJECT:
|
||||
ip6tables: No chain/target/match by that name."
|
||||
|
||||
(Prior to logging this error, it also would have caused failure to
|
||||
forward (or block) traffic in some cases, e.g. for guests on a NATed
|
||||
network, since libvirt's rules to forward/block had all been deleted
|
||||
and libvirt didn't know about it, so it couldn't fix the problem)
|
||||
|
||||
When this happens, the problem can be remedied by simply restarting
|
||||
libvirtd.service (which has the side-effect of reloading all
|
||||
libvirt-generated firewall rules)
|
||||
|
||||
Instead, we can just explicitly stating in the libvirtd.service file
|
||||
that libvirtd.service should start after ip6tables.service and
|
||||
ip6tables.service, eliminating the race condition that leads to the
|
||||
error.
|
||||
|
||||
There is also nothing (that I can see) in the systemd .service files
|
||||
to guarantee that firewalld.service will be started (if enabled) prior
|
||||
to libvirtd.service. The same error scenario given above would occur
|
||||
if libvirtd.service started before firewalld.service. Even before
|
||||
that, though libvirtd would have detected that firewalld.service was
|
||||
disabled, and then turn off all firewalld support. So, for example,
|
||||
firewalld's libvirt zone wouldn't be used, and most likely traffic
|
||||
from guests would therefore be blocked (all with no external
|
||||
indication of the source of the problem other than a debug-level log
|
||||
when libvirtd was started saying that firewalld wasn't in use); also
|
||||
libvirtd wouldn't notice when firewalld reloaded its rules (which also
|
||||
simultaneously deletes all of libvirt's rules).
|
||||
|
||||
I'm not aware of any reports that have been traced back to
|
||||
libvirtd.service starting before firewalld.service, but have seen that
|
||||
error reported multiple times, and also don't see an existing
|
||||
dependency that would guarantee firewalld.service starts before
|
||||
libvirtd.service, so it's possible it's been happening and we just
|
||||
haven't gotten to the bottom of it.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch adds an After= line to the libvirtd.service file for each
|
||||
of iptables.service, ip6tables.service, and firewalld.servicee, which
|
||||
should guarantee that libvirtd.service isn't started until systemd has
|
||||
started whichever of the others is enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
This race was diagnosed, and patch proposed, by Jason Montleon in
|
||||
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1723698 . At the time (April 2019) danpb
|
||||
agreed with him that this change to libvirtd.service was a reasonable
|
||||
thing to do, but I guess everyone thought someone else was going to
|
||||
post a patch, so in the end nobody did.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 0756415f147dda15a417bd79eef9a62027d176e6)
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/remote/libvirtd.service.in | 3 +++
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in
|
||||
index d5d98f0c12..ada5be62e6 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in
|
||||
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ Wants=libvirtd-admin.socket
|
||||
Wants=systemd-machined.service
|
||||
Before=libvirt-guests.service
|
||||
After=network.target
|
||||
+After=firewalld.service
|
||||
+After=iptables.service
|
||||
+After=ip6tables.service
|
||||
After=dbus.service
|
||||
After=iscsid.service
|
||||
After=apparmor.service
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
From: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 08:40:59 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] qemuDomainGetStatsIOThread: Don't leak array with 0 iothreads
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
qemuMonitorGetIOThreads returns a NULL-terminated list even when 0
|
||||
iothreads are present. The caller didn't perform cleanup if there were 0
|
||||
iothreads leaking the array.
|
||||
|
||||
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1804548
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: d1eac92784573559b6fd56836e33b215c89308e3
|
||||
Reported-by: Jing Yan <jiyan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 9bf9e0ae6af38c806f4672ca7b12a6b38d5a9581)
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 8 ++++++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
index 5dd2616c7b..331e53b971 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
@@ -21632,8 +21632,12 @@ qemuDomainGetStatsIOThread(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
|
||||
if ((niothreads = qemuDomainGetIOThreadsMon(driver, dom, &iothreads)) < 0)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (niothreads == 0)
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
+ /* qemuDomainGetIOThreadsMon returns a NULL-terminated list, so we must free
|
||||
+ * it even if it returns 0 */
|
||||
+ if (niothreads == 0) {
|
||||
+ ret = 0;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
QEMU_ADD_COUNT_PARAM(record, maxparams, "iothread", niothreads);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
||||
From: Yi Li <yili@winhong.com>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 21 Dec 2019 08:33:33 +0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] storage: Fix daemon crash on lookup storagepool by targetpath
|
||||
|
||||
Causing a crash when storagePoolLookupByTargetPath beacuse of
|
||||
Some types of storage pool have no target elements.
|
||||
Use STREQ_NULLABLE instead of STREQ
|
||||
Avoids segfaults when using NULL arguments.
|
||||
|
||||
Core was generated by `/usr/sbin/libvirtd'.
|
||||
Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.
|
||||
(gdb) bt
|
||||
0 0x0000ffff9e951388 in strcmp () from /lib64/libc.so.6
|
||||
1 0x0000ffff92103e9c in storagePoolLookupByTargetPathCallback (
|
||||
obj=0xffff7009aab0, opaque=0xffff801058b0) at storage/storage_driver.c:1649
|
||||
2 0x0000ffff9f2c52a4 in virStoragePoolObjListSearchCb (
|
||||
payload=0xffff801058b0, name=<optimized out>, opaque=<optimized out>)
|
||||
at conf/virstorageobj.c:476
|
||||
3 0x0000ffff9f1f2f7c in virHashSearch (ctable=0xffff800f4f60,
|
||||
iter=iter@entry=0xffff9f2c5278 <virStoragePoolObjListSearchCb>,
|
||||
data=data@entry=0xffff95af7488, name=name@entry=0x0) at util/virhash.c:696
|
||||
4 0x0000ffff9f2c64f0 in virStoragePoolObjListSearch (pools=0xffff800f2ce0,
|
||||
searcher=searcher@entry=0xffff92103e68 <storagePoolLookupByTargetPathCallback>,
|
||||
opaque=<optimized out>) at conf/virstorageobj.c:505
|
||||
5 0x0000ffff92101f54 in storagePoolLookupByTargetPath (conn=0xffff5c0009f0,
|
||||
path=0xffff7009a850 "/vms/images") at storage/storage_driver.c:1672
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Yi Li <yili@winhong.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit dfff16a7c261f8d28e3abe60a47165f845fa952f)
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/storage/storage_driver.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/storage/storage_driver.c b/src/storage/storage_driver.c
|
||||
index 05192027d6..d878b0be92 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/storage/storage_driver.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/storage/storage_driver.c
|
||||
@@ -1675,7 +1675,7 @@ storagePoolLookupByTargetPathCallback(virStoragePoolObjPtr obj,
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
def = virStoragePoolObjGetDef(obj);
|
||||
- return STREQ(path, def->target.path);
|
||||
+ return STREQ_NULLABLE(path, def->target.path);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
|
||||
From: Jonathon Jongsma <jjongsma@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 10:08:52 -0600
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] qemu: don't hold both jobs for suspend
|
||||
|
||||
We have to assume that the guest agent may be malicious so we don't want
|
||||
to allow any agent queries to block any other libvirt API. By holding a
|
||||
monitor job while we're querying the agent, we open ourselves up to a
|
||||
DoS.
|
||||
|
||||
So split the function up a bit to only hold the monitor job while
|
||||
querying qemu for whether the domain supports suspend. Then acquire only
|
||||
an agent job while issuing the agent suspend command.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Jongsma <jjongsma@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit a663a860819287e041c3de672aad1d8543098ecc)
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
index 331e53b971..96c0b3505a 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
|
||||
@@ -19867,6 +19867,59 @@ qemuDomainProbeQMPCurrentMachine(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+/* returns -1 on error, or if query is not supported, 0 if query was successful */
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+qemuDomainQueryWakeupSuspendSupport(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
|
||||
+ virDomainObjPtr vm,
|
||||
+ bool *wakeupSupported)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
|
||||
+ int ret = -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CURRENT_MACHINE))
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((ret = virDomainObjCheckActive(vm)) < 0)
|
||||
+ goto endjob;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ret = qemuDomainProbeQMPCurrentMachine(driver, vm, wakeupSupported);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ endjob:
|
||||
+ qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm);
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+qemuDomainPMSuspendAgent(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
|
||||
+ virDomainObjPtr vm,
|
||||
+ unsigned int target)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ qemuAgentPtr agent;
|
||||
+ int ret = -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (qemuDomainObjBeginAgentJob(driver, vm, QEMU_AGENT_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((ret = virDomainObjCheckActive(vm)) < 0)
|
||||
+ goto endjob;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!qemuDomainAgentAvailable(vm, true))
|
||||
+ goto endjob;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ agent = qemuDomainObjEnterAgent(vm);
|
||||
+ ret = qemuAgentSuspend(agent, target);
|
||||
+ qemuDomainObjExitAgent(vm, agent);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ endjob:
|
||||
+ qemuDomainObjEndAgentJob(vm);
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
static int
|
||||
qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
|
||||
unsigned int target,
|
||||
@@ -19874,11 +19927,9 @@ qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
|
||||
unsigned int flags)
|
||||
{
|
||||
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = dom->conn->privateData;
|
||||
- qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
|
||||
virDomainObjPtr vm;
|
||||
- qemuAgentPtr agent;
|
||||
- qemuDomainJob job = QEMU_JOB_NONE;
|
||||
int ret = -1;
|
||||
+ bool wakeupSupported;
|
||||
|
||||
virCheckFlags(0, -1);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19903,17 +19954,6 @@ qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
|
||||
if (virDomainPMSuspendForDurationEnsureACL(dom->conn, vm->def) < 0)
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
- priv = vm->privateData;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CURRENT_MACHINE))
|
||||
- job = QEMU_JOB_MODIFY;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (qemuDomainObjBeginJobWithAgent(driver, vm, job, QEMU_AGENT_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
|
||||
- goto cleanup;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (virDomainObjCheckActive(vm) < 0)
|
||||
- goto endjob;
|
||||
-
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The case we want to handle here is when QEMU has the API (i.e.
|
||||
* QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CURRENT_MACHINE is set). Otherwise, do not interfere
|
||||
@@ -19921,16 +19961,11 @@ qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
|
||||
* that don't know about this cap, will keep their old behavior of
|
||||
* suspending 'in the dark'.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CURRENT_MACHINE)) {
|
||||
- bool wakeupSupported;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (qemuDomainProbeQMPCurrentMachine(driver, vm, &wakeupSupported) < 0)
|
||||
- goto endjob;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ if (qemuDomainQueryWakeupSuspendSupport(driver, vm, &wakeupSupported) == 0) {
|
||||
if (!wakeupSupported) {
|
||||
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
|
||||
_("Domain does not have suspend support"));
|
||||
- goto endjob;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19940,29 +19975,18 @@ qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
|
||||
target == VIR_NODE_SUSPEND_TARGET_HYBRID)) {
|
||||
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
|
||||
_("S3 state is disabled for this domain"));
|
||||
- goto endjob;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (vm->def->pm.s4 == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO &&
|
||||
target == VIR_NODE_SUSPEND_TARGET_DISK) {
|
||||
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
|
||||
_("S4 state is disabled for this domain"));
|
||||
- goto endjob;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!qemuDomainAgentAvailable(vm, true))
|
||||
- goto endjob;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- agent = qemuDomainObjEnterAgent(vm);
|
||||
- ret = qemuAgentSuspend(agent, target);
|
||||
- qemuDomainObjExitAgent(vm, agent);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- endjob:
|
||||
- if (job)
|
||||
- qemuDomainObjEndJobWithAgent(driver, vm);
|
||||
- else
|
||||
- qemuDomainObjEndAgentJob(vm);
|
||||
+ ret = qemuDomainPMSuspendAgent(driver, vm, target);
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
virDomainObjEndAPI(&vm);
|
||||
+25
-1
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
|
||||
Summary: Library providing a simple virtualization API
|
||||
Name: libvirt
|
||||
Version: 5.6.0
|
||||
Release: 6%{?dist}
|
||||
Release: 7%{?dist}
|
||||
License: LGPLv2+
|
||||
URL: https://libvirt.org/
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -276,6 +276,20 @@ Patch0121: 0121-virhostuptime-Add-linux-stub-for-musl.patch
|
||||
Patch0122: 0122-virhostuptime-Wrap-virHostGetBootTimeProcfs-call-in-.patch
|
||||
Patch0123: 0123-virhostuptime-Introduce-virHostBootTimeInit.patch
|
||||
Patch0124: 0124-remote_daemon-Initialize-host-boot-time-global-varia.patch
|
||||
# Fix iptables No chain/target/match by that name (bz #1813830)
|
||||
Patch0125: 0125-network-make-it-safe-to-call-networkSetupPrivateChai.patch
|
||||
Patch0126: 0126-network-force-re-creation-of-iptables-private-chains.patch
|
||||
# systemd: start libvirtd after firewalld/iptables services (bz #1697636)
|
||||
Patch0127: 0127-systemd-start-libvirtd-after-firewalld-iptables-serv.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2020-12430: memory leak in domstats may allow read-only user to
|
||||
# perform DoS attack (bz #1828216, bz #1828190)
|
||||
Patch0128: 0128-qemuDomainGetStatsIOThread-Don-t-leak-array-with-0-i.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2020-10703: Potential denial of service via active pool without target
|
||||
# path (bz #1820690, bz #1816650)
|
||||
Patch0129: 0129-storage-Fix-daemon-crash-on-lookup-storagepool-by-ta.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2019-20485: potential DoS by holding a monitor job while querying QEMU
|
||||
# guest-agent (bz #1809741, bz #1809740)
|
||||
Patch0130: 0130-qemu-don-t-hold-both-jobs-for-suspend.patch
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: libvirt-daemon = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: libvirt-daemon-config-network = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
@@ -1940,6 +1954,16 @@ exit 0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Wed May 27 2020 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 5.6.0-7
|
||||
- Fix iptables No chain/target/match by that name (bz #1813830)
|
||||
- systemd: start libvirtd after firewalld/iptables services (bz #1697636)
|
||||
- CVE-2020-12430: memory leak in domstats may allow read-only user to
|
||||
perform DoS attack (bz #1828216, bz #1828190)
|
||||
- CVE-2020-10703: Potential denial of service via active pool without target
|
||||
path (bz #1820690, bz #1816650)
|
||||
- CVE-2019-20485: potential DoS by holding a monitor job while querying QEMU
|
||||
guest-agent (bz #1809741, bz #1809740)
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Apr 07 2020 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 5.6.0-6
|
||||
- Fix issues with uptime detection (bz #1783715)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user