libvirt-5.6.0-7

Fix iptables No chain/target/match by that name (bz #1813830)
systemd: start libvirtd after firewalld/iptables services (bz #1697636)
CVE-2020-12430: memory leak in domstats may allow read-only user to perform DoS attack (bz #1828216, bz #1828190)
CVE-2020-10703: Potential denial of service via active pool without target path (bz #1820690, bz #1816650)
CVE-2019-20485: potential DoS by holding a monitor job while querying QEMU guest-agent (bz #1809741, bz #1809740)
This commit is contained in:
Cole Robinson
2020-05-27 17:44:01 -04:00
parent a72fbea0f8
commit 44dd796f94
7 changed files with 686 additions and 1 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 22:32:59 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] network: make it safe to call networkSetupPrivateChains()
multiple times
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
networkSetupPrivateChains() is currently called only once per run of
libvirtd, so it can assume that errInitV4 and errInitV6 are empty/null
when it is called. In preparation for potentially calling this
function multiple times during one run, this patch moves the reset of
errInitV[46] to the top of the function, to assure no memory is
leaked.
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit de110f110fb917a31b9f33ad8e4b3c1d3284766a)
---
src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
index 35459c10d1..f4e4e2df76 100644
--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up global firewall chains");
createdChains = false;
+ virFreeError(errInitV4);
+ errInitV4 = NULL;
+ virFreeError(errInitV6);
+ errInitV6 = NULL;
rc = iptablesSetupPrivateChains(VIR_FIREWALL_LAYER_IPV4);
if (rc < 0) {
@@ -56,8 +60,6 @@ static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
errInitV4 = virSaveLastError();
virResetLastError();
} else {
- virFreeError(errInitV4);
- errInitV4 = NULL;
if (rc) {
VIR_DEBUG("Created global IPv4 chains");
createdChains = true;
@@ -73,8 +75,6 @@ static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
errInitV6 = virSaveLastError();
virResetLastError();
} else {
- virFreeError(errInitV6);
- errInitV6 = NULL;
if (rc) {
VIR_DEBUG("Created global IPv6 chains");
createdChains = true;
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
From: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 21:54:39 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] network: force re-creation of iptables private chains on
firewalld restart
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When firewalld is stopped, it removes *all* iptables rules and chains,
including those added by libvirt. Since restarting firewalld means
stopping and then starting it, any time it is restarted, libvirt needs
to recreate all the private iptables chains it uses, along with all
the rules it adds.
We already have code in place to call networkReloadFirewallRules() any
time we're notified of a firewalld start, and
networkReloadFirewallRules() will call
networkPreReloadFirewallRules(), which calls
networkSetupPrivateChains(); unfortunately that last call is called
using virOnce(), meaning that it will only be called the first time
through networkPreReloadFirewallRules() after libvirtd starts - so of
course when firewalld is later restarted, the call to
networkSetupPrivateChains() is skipped.
The neat and tidy way to fix this would be if there was a standard way
to reset a pthread_once_t object so that the next time virOnce was
called, it would think the function hadn't been called, and call it
again. Unfortunately, there isn't any official way of doing that (we
*could* just fill it with 0 and hope for the best, but that doesn't
seem very safe.
So instead, this patch just adds a static variable called
chainInitDone, which is set to true after networkSetupPrivateChains()
is called for the first time, and then during calls to
networkPreReloadFirewallRules(), if chainInitDone is set, we call
networkSetupPrivateChains() directly instead of via virOnce().
It may seem unsafe to directly call a function that is meant to be
called only once, but I think in this case we're safe - there's
nothing in the function that is inherently "once only" - it doesn't
initialize anything that can't safely be re-initialized (as long as
two threads don't try to do it at the same time), and it only happens
when responding to a dbus message that firewalld has been started (and
I don't think it's possible for us to be processing two of those at
once), and even then only if the initial call to the function has
already been completed (so we're safe if we receive a firewalld
restart call at a time when we haven't yet called it, or even if
another thread is already in the process of executing it. The only
problematic bit I can think of is if another thread is in the process
of adding an iptable rule at the time we're executing this function,
but 1) none of those threads will be trying to add chains, and 2) if
there was a concurrency problem with other threads adding iptables
rules while firewalld was being restarted, it would still be a problem
even without this change.
This is yet another patch that fixes an occurrence of this error:
COMMAND_FAILED: '/usr/sbin/iptables -w10 -w --table filter --insert LIBVIRT_INP --in-interface virbr0 --protocol tcp --destination-port 67 --jump ACCEPT' failed: iptables: No chain/target/match by that name.
In particular, this resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1813830
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f5418b427e7d2f26803880309478de9103680826)
---
src/network/bridge_driver.c | 16 ++++---
src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++----------
src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c | 3 +-
src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h | 2 +-
4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver.c b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
index d5c544f556..981b4e4578 100644
--- a/src/network/bridge_driver.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver.c
@@ -289,7 +289,9 @@ static int
networkShutdownNetworkExternal(virNetworkObjPtr obj);
static void
-networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup);
+networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver,
+ bool startup,
+ bool force);
static void
networkRefreshDaemons(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver);
@@ -695,7 +697,7 @@ firewalld_dbus_filter_bridge(DBusConnection *connection ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
if (reload) {
VIR_DEBUG("Reload in bridge_driver because of firewalld.");
- networkReloadFirewallRules(driver, false);
+ networkReloadFirewallRules(driver, false, true);
}
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
@@ -814,7 +816,7 @@ networkStateInitialize(bool privileged,
virNetworkObjListPrune(network_driver->networks,
VIR_CONNECT_LIST_NETWORKS_INACTIVE |
VIR_CONNECT_LIST_NETWORKS_TRANSIENT);
- networkReloadFirewallRules(network_driver, true);
+ networkReloadFirewallRules(network_driver, true, false);
networkRefreshDaemons(network_driver);
if (virDriverShouldAutostart(network_driver->stateDir, &autostart) < 0)
@@ -884,7 +886,7 @@ networkStateReload(void)
network_driver->networkConfigDir,
network_driver->networkAutostartDir,
network_driver->xmlopt);
- networkReloadFirewallRules(network_driver, false);
+ networkReloadFirewallRules(network_driver, false, false);
networkRefreshDaemons(network_driver);
virNetworkObjListForEach(network_driver->networks,
networkAutostartConfig,
@@ -2267,14 +2269,16 @@ networkReloadFirewallRulesHelper(virNetworkObjPtr obj,
static void
-networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup)
+networkReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver,
+ bool startup,
+ bool force)
{
VIR_INFO("Reloading iptables rules");
/* Ideally we'd not even register the driver when unprivilegd
* but until we untangle the virt driver that's not viable */
if (!driver->privileged)
return;
- networkPreReloadFirewallRules(driver, startup);
+ networkPreReloadFirewallRules(driver, startup, force);
virNetworkObjListForEach(driver->networks,
networkReloadFirewallRulesHelper,
NULL);
diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
index f4e4e2df76..f65928e556 100644
--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_linux.c
@@ -36,11 +36,14 @@ VIR_LOG_INIT("network.bridge_driver_linux");
#define PROC_NET_ROUTE "/proc/net/route"
static virOnceControl createdOnce;
-static bool createdChains;
+static bool chainInitDone; /* true iff networkSetupPrivateChains was ever called */
+static bool createdChains; /* true iff networkSetupPrivateChains created chains during most recent call */
static virErrorPtr errInitV4;
static virErrorPtr errInitV6;
-/* Only call via virOnce */
+/* Usually only called via virOnce, but can also be called directly in
+ * response to firewalld reload (if chainInitDone == true)
+ */
static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
{
int rc;
@@ -82,6 +85,8 @@ static void networkSetupPrivateChains(void)
VIR_DEBUG("Global IPv6 chains already exist");
}
}
+
+ chainInitDone = true;
}
@@ -111,7 +116,10 @@ networkHasRunningNetworks(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver)
}
-void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup)
+void
+networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver,
+ bool startup,
+ bool force)
{
/*
* If there are any running networks, we need to
@@ -130,29 +138,42 @@ void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup
* of starting the network though as that makes them
* more likely to be seen by a human
*/
- if (!networkHasRunningNetworks(driver)) {
- VIR_DEBUG("Delayed global rule setup as no networks are running");
- return;
- }
+ if (chainInitDone && force) {
+ /* The Private chains have already been initialized once
+ * during this run of libvirtd, so 1) we can't do it again via
+ * virOnce(), and 2) we need to re-add the private chains even
+ * if there are currently no running networks, because the
+ * next time a network is started, libvirt will expect that
+ * the chains have already been added. So we call directly
+ * instead of via virOnce().
+ */
+ networkSetupPrivateChains();
- ignore_value(virOnce(&createdOnce, networkSetupPrivateChains));
+ } else {
+ if (!networkHasRunningNetworks(driver)) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("Delayed global rule setup as no networks are running");
+ return;
+ }
- /*
- * If this is initial startup, and we just created the
- * top level private chains we either
- *
- * - upgraded from old libvirt
- * - freshly booted from clean state
- *
- * In the first case we must delete the old rules from
- * the built-in chains, instead of our new private chains.
- * In the second case it doesn't matter, since no existing
- * rules will be present. Thus we can safely just tell it
- * to always delete from the builin chain
- */
- if (startup && createdChains) {
- VIR_DEBUG("Requesting cleanup of legacy firewall rules");
- iptablesSetDeletePrivate(false);
+ ignore_value(virOnce(&createdOnce, networkSetupPrivateChains));
+
+ /*
+ * If this is initial startup, and we just created the
+ * top level private chains we either
+ *
+ * - upgraded from old libvirt
+ * - freshly booted from clean state
+ *
+ * In the first case we must delete the old rules from
+ * the built-in chains, instead of our new private chains.
+ * In the second case it doesn't matter, since no existing
+ * rules will be present. Thus we can safely just tell it
+ * to always delete from the builin chain
+ */
+ if (startup && createdChains) {
+ VIR_DEBUG("Requesting cleanup of legacy firewall rules");
+ iptablesSetDeletePrivate(false);
+ }
}
}
diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c b/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
index ec7b1ed8b7..74a9b87158 100644
--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_nop.c
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@
#include <config.h>
void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
- bool startup ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+ bool startup ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ bool force ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
}
diff --git a/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h b/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
index 169417a6c0..48ab52c160 100644
--- a/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
+++ b/src/network/bridge_driver_platform.h
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ struct _virNetworkDriverState {
typedef struct _virNetworkDriverState virNetworkDriverState;
typedef virNetworkDriverState *virNetworkDriverStatePtr;
-void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup);
+void networkPreReloadFirewallRules(virNetworkDriverStatePtr driver, bool startup, bool force);
void networkPostReloadFirewallRules(bool startup);
int networkCheckRouteCollision(virNetworkDefPtr def);
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
From: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 00:05:50 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] systemd: start libvirtd after firewalld/iptables services
When a system has enabled the iptables/ip6tables services rather than
firewalld, there is no explicit ordering of the start of those
services vs. libvirtd. This creates a problem when libvirtd.service is
started before ip[6]tables, as the latter, when it finally is started,
will remove all of the iptables rules that had previously been added
by libvirt, including the custom chains where libvirt's rules are
kept. This results in an error message similar to the following when a
user subsequently tries to start a new libvirt network:
"Error while activating network: Call to virNetworkCreate failed:
internal error: Failed to apply firewall rules
/usr/sbin/ip6tables -w --table filter --insert LIBVIRT_FWO \
--in-interface virbr2 --jump REJECT:
ip6tables: No chain/target/match by that name."
(Prior to logging this error, it also would have caused failure to
forward (or block) traffic in some cases, e.g. for guests on a NATed
network, since libvirt's rules to forward/block had all been deleted
and libvirt didn't know about it, so it couldn't fix the problem)
When this happens, the problem can be remedied by simply restarting
libvirtd.service (which has the side-effect of reloading all
libvirt-generated firewall rules)
Instead, we can just explicitly stating in the libvirtd.service file
that libvirtd.service should start after ip6tables.service and
ip6tables.service, eliminating the race condition that leads to the
error.
There is also nothing (that I can see) in the systemd .service files
to guarantee that firewalld.service will be started (if enabled) prior
to libvirtd.service. The same error scenario given above would occur
if libvirtd.service started before firewalld.service. Even before
that, though libvirtd would have detected that firewalld.service was
disabled, and then turn off all firewalld support. So, for example,
firewalld's libvirt zone wouldn't be used, and most likely traffic
from guests would therefore be blocked (all with no external
indication of the source of the problem other than a debug-level log
when libvirtd was started saying that firewalld wasn't in use); also
libvirtd wouldn't notice when firewalld reloaded its rules (which also
simultaneously deletes all of libvirt's rules).
I'm not aware of any reports that have been traced back to
libvirtd.service starting before firewalld.service, but have seen that
error reported multiple times, and also don't see an existing
dependency that would guarantee firewalld.service starts before
libvirtd.service, so it's possible it's been happening and we just
haven't gotten to the bottom of it.
This patch adds an After= line to the libvirtd.service file for each
of iptables.service, ip6tables.service, and firewalld.servicee, which
should guarantee that libvirtd.service isn't started until systemd has
started whichever of the others is enabled.
This race was diagnosed, and patch proposed, by Jason Montleon in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1723698 . At the time (April 2019) danpb
agreed with him that this change to libvirtd.service was a reasonable
thing to do, but I guess everyone thought someone else was going to
post a patch, so in the end nobody did.
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0756415f147dda15a417bd79eef9a62027d176e6)
---
src/remote/libvirtd.service.in | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in
index d5d98f0c12..ada5be62e6 100644
--- a/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ Wants=libvirtd-admin.socket
Wants=systemd-machined.service
Before=libvirt-guests.service
After=network.target
+After=firewalld.service
+After=iptables.service
+After=ip6tables.service
After=dbus.service
After=iscsid.service
After=apparmor.service
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 08:40:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] qemuDomainGetStatsIOThread: Don't leak array with 0 iothreads
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
qemuMonitorGetIOThreads returns a NULL-terminated list even when 0
iothreads are present. The caller didn't perform cleanup if there were 0
iothreads leaking the array.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1804548
Fixes: d1eac92784573559b6fd56836e33b215c89308e3
Reported-by: Jing Yan <jiyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9bf9e0ae6af38c806f4672ca7b12a6b38d5a9581)
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 5dd2616c7b..331e53b971 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -21632,8 +21632,12 @@ qemuDomainGetStatsIOThread(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
if ((niothreads = qemuDomainGetIOThreadsMon(driver, dom, &iothreads)) < 0)
return -1;
- if (niothreads == 0)
- return 0;
+ /* qemuDomainGetIOThreadsMon returns a NULL-terminated list, so we must free
+ * it even if it returns 0 */
+ if (niothreads == 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
QEMU_ADD_COUNT_PARAM(record, maxparams, "iothread", niothreads);
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From: Yi Li <yili@winhong.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Dec 2019 08:33:33 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] storage: Fix daemon crash on lookup storagepool by targetpath
Causing a crash when storagePoolLookupByTargetPath beacuse of
Some types of storage pool have no target elements.
Use STREQ_NULLABLE instead of STREQ
Avoids segfaults when using NULL arguments.
Core was generated by `/usr/sbin/libvirtd'.
Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.
(gdb) bt
0 0x0000ffff9e951388 in strcmp () from /lib64/libc.so.6
1 0x0000ffff92103e9c in storagePoolLookupByTargetPathCallback (
obj=0xffff7009aab0, opaque=0xffff801058b0) at storage/storage_driver.c:1649
2 0x0000ffff9f2c52a4 in virStoragePoolObjListSearchCb (
payload=0xffff801058b0, name=<optimized out>, opaque=<optimized out>)
at conf/virstorageobj.c:476
3 0x0000ffff9f1f2f7c in virHashSearch (ctable=0xffff800f4f60,
iter=iter@entry=0xffff9f2c5278 <virStoragePoolObjListSearchCb>,
data=data@entry=0xffff95af7488, name=name@entry=0x0) at util/virhash.c:696
4 0x0000ffff9f2c64f0 in virStoragePoolObjListSearch (pools=0xffff800f2ce0,
searcher=searcher@entry=0xffff92103e68 <storagePoolLookupByTargetPathCallback>,
opaque=<optimized out>) at conf/virstorageobj.c:505
5 0x0000ffff92101f54 in storagePoolLookupByTargetPath (conn=0xffff5c0009f0,
path=0xffff7009a850 "/vms/images") at storage/storage_driver.c:1672
Reviewed-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yi Li <yili@winhong.com>
(cherry picked from commit dfff16a7c261f8d28e3abe60a47165f845fa952f)
---
src/storage/storage_driver.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/storage/storage_driver.c b/src/storage/storage_driver.c
index 05192027d6..d878b0be92 100644
--- a/src/storage/storage_driver.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_driver.c
@@ -1675,7 +1675,7 @@ storagePoolLookupByTargetPathCallback(virStoragePoolObjPtr obj,
return false;
def = virStoragePoolObjGetDef(obj);
- return STREQ(path, def->target.path);
+ return STREQ_NULLABLE(path, def->target.path);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
From: Jonathon Jongsma <jjongsma@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 10:08:52 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] qemu: don't hold both jobs for suspend
We have to assume that the guest agent may be malicious so we don't want
to allow any agent queries to block any other libvirt API. By holding a
monitor job while we're querying the agent, we open ourselves up to a
DoS.
So split the function up a bit to only hold the monitor job while
querying qemu for whether the domain supports suspend. Then acquire only
an agent job while issuing the agent suspend command.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Jongsma <jjongsma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a663a860819287e041c3de672aad1d8543098ecc)
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 331e53b971..96c0b3505a 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -19867,6 +19867,59 @@ qemuDomainProbeQMPCurrentMachine(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
}
+/* returns -1 on error, or if query is not supported, 0 if query was successful */
+static int
+qemuDomainQueryWakeupSuspendSupport(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
+ virDomainObjPtr vm,
+ bool *wakeupSupported)
+{
+ qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CURRENT_MACHINE))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if ((ret = virDomainObjCheckActive(vm)) < 0)
+ goto endjob;
+
+ ret = qemuDomainProbeQMPCurrentMachine(driver, vm, wakeupSupported);
+
+ endjob:
+ qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int
+qemuDomainPMSuspendAgent(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
+ virDomainObjPtr vm,
+ unsigned int target)
+{
+ qemuAgentPtr agent;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (qemuDomainObjBeginAgentJob(driver, vm, QEMU_AGENT_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if ((ret = virDomainObjCheckActive(vm)) < 0)
+ goto endjob;
+
+ if (!qemuDomainAgentAvailable(vm, true))
+ goto endjob;
+
+ agent = qemuDomainObjEnterAgent(vm);
+ ret = qemuAgentSuspend(agent, target);
+ qemuDomainObjExitAgent(vm, agent);
+
+ endjob:
+ qemuDomainObjEndAgentJob(vm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
static int
qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
unsigned int target,
@@ -19874,11 +19927,9 @@ qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
unsigned int flags)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = dom->conn->privateData;
- qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
virDomainObjPtr vm;
- qemuAgentPtr agent;
- qemuDomainJob job = QEMU_JOB_NONE;
int ret = -1;
+ bool wakeupSupported;
virCheckFlags(0, -1);
@@ -19903,17 +19954,6 @@ qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
if (virDomainPMSuspendForDurationEnsureACL(dom->conn, vm->def) < 0)
goto cleanup;
- priv = vm->privateData;
-
- if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CURRENT_MACHINE))
- job = QEMU_JOB_MODIFY;
-
- if (qemuDomainObjBeginJobWithAgent(driver, vm, job, QEMU_AGENT_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
- goto cleanup;
-
- if (virDomainObjCheckActive(vm) < 0)
- goto endjob;
-
/*
* The case we want to handle here is when QEMU has the API (i.e.
* QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CURRENT_MACHINE is set). Otherwise, do not interfere
@@ -19921,16 +19961,11 @@ qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
* that don't know about this cap, will keep their old behavior of
* suspending 'in the dark'.
*/
- if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CURRENT_MACHINE)) {
- bool wakeupSupported;
-
- if (qemuDomainProbeQMPCurrentMachine(driver, vm, &wakeupSupported) < 0)
- goto endjob;
-
+ if (qemuDomainQueryWakeupSuspendSupport(driver, vm, &wakeupSupported) == 0) {
if (!wakeupSupported) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("Domain does not have suspend support"));
- goto endjob;
+ goto cleanup;
}
}
@@ -19940,29 +19975,18 @@ qemuDomainPMSuspendForDuration(virDomainPtr dom,
target == VIR_NODE_SUSPEND_TARGET_HYBRID)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("S3 state is disabled for this domain"));
- goto endjob;
+ goto cleanup;
}
if (vm->def->pm.s4 == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO &&
target == VIR_NODE_SUSPEND_TARGET_DISK) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("S4 state is disabled for this domain"));
- goto endjob;
+ goto cleanup;
}
}
- if (!qemuDomainAgentAvailable(vm, true))
- goto endjob;
-
- agent = qemuDomainObjEnterAgent(vm);
- ret = qemuAgentSuspend(agent, target);
- qemuDomainObjExitAgent(vm, agent);
-
- endjob:
- if (job)
- qemuDomainObjEndJobWithAgent(driver, vm);
- else
- qemuDomainObjEndAgentJob(vm);
+ ret = qemuDomainPMSuspendAgent(driver, vm, target);
cleanup:
virDomainObjEndAPI(&vm);
+25 -1
View File
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
Summary: Library providing a simple virtualization API
Name: libvirt
Version: 5.6.0
Release: 6%{?dist}
Release: 7%{?dist}
License: LGPLv2+
URL: https://libvirt.org/
@@ -276,6 +276,20 @@ Patch0121: 0121-virhostuptime-Add-linux-stub-for-musl.patch
Patch0122: 0122-virhostuptime-Wrap-virHostGetBootTimeProcfs-call-in-.patch
Patch0123: 0123-virhostuptime-Introduce-virHostBootTimeInit.patch
Patch0124: 0124-remote_daemon-Initialize-host-boot-time-global-varia.patch
# Fix iptables No chain/target/match by that name (bz #1813830)
Patch0125: 0125-network-make-it-safe-to-call-networkSetupPrivateChai.patch
Patch0126: 0126-network-force-re-creation-of-iptables-private-chains.patch
# systemd: start libvirtd after firewalld/iptables services (bz #1697636)
Patch0127: 0127-systemd-start-libvirtd-after-firewalld-iptables-serv.patch
# CVE-2020-12430: memory leak in domstats may allow read-only user to
# perform DoS attack (bz #1828216, bz #1828190)
Patch0128: 0128-qemuDomainGetStatsIOThread-Don-t-leak-array-with-0-i.patch
# CVE-2020-10703: Potential denial of service via active pool without target
# path (bz #1820690, bz #1816650)
Patch0129: 0129-storage-Fix-daemon-crash-on-lookup-storagepool-by-ta.patch
# CVE-2019-20485: potential DoS by holding a monitor job while querying QEMU
# guest-agent (bz #1809741, bz #1809740)
Patch0130: 0130-qemu-don-t-hold-both-jobs-for-suspend.patch
Requires: libvirt-daemon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: libvirt-daemon-config-network = %{version}-%{release}
@@ -1940,6 +1954,16 @@ exit 0
%changelog
* Wed May 27 2020 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 5.6.0-7
- Fix iptables No chain/target/match by that name (bz #1813830)
- systemd: start libvirtd after firewalld/iptables services (bz #1697636)
- CVE-2020-12430: memory leak in domstats may allow read-only user to
perform DoS attack (bz #1828216, bz #1828190)
- CVE-2020-10703: Potential denial of service via active pool without target
path (bz #1820690, bz #1816650)
- CVE-2019-20485: potential DoS by holding a monitor job while querying QEMU
guest-agent (bz #1809741, bz #1809740)
* Tue Apr 07 2020 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 5.6.0-6
- Fix issues with uptime detection (bz #1783715)