Compare commits

..
126 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Peter Korsgaard 1a6bd98fa8 Update for 2020.02.12
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-05 12:36:40 +02:00
Bernd Kuhls eed984e34a package/nettle: bump version to 3.6
Release notes:
https://git.lysator.liu.se/nettle/nettle/-/blob/master/NEWS

Reformatted hashes.

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 01632805ab)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-05 09:32:35 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 8af587372b package/openmpi: drop unrecognized option
--disable-vt has been dropped since version 2.0.0 and
https://github.com/open-mpi/ompi/commit/94190bf04b0877e878223a04c236443774e57ef2

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 210ec9c0d8)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 22:03:44 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine ca85202e60 package/libvips: add librsvg optional dependency
librsvg is an optional dependency which is enabled by default since
version 8.3.0 and
https://github.com/libvips/libvips/commit/153886d2eb71eebcdca860cb691d8fbb976ad816

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit adc0e0c6af)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 21:56:45 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine b743fff1f6 package/libvips: add zlib optional dependency
zlib is an optional dependency which is enabled by default since version
8.4.2 and
https://github.com/libvips/libvips/commit/5ab0001ec68a5f61396aecd8d2d7a619b1dbe1fa

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 43a9cfd317)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 21:56:36 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 2b669a6648 package/libvips: add giflib optional dependency
giflib is an optional dependency which is enabled by default since
version 8.3.0 and
https://github.com/libvips/libvips/commit/d79407f285c768a7338e73ccfc6cf09480b95582

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit bd1a3a29de)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 21:36:30 +02:00
Michael Vetter 824a5a719e package/jasper: bump version to 2.0.28
Changes:
  * Fix potential null pointer dereference in the JP2/JPC decoder. (#269)
  * Fix ignoring of JAS_STREAM_FILEOBJ_NOCLOSE at stream close time. (#286)
  * Fix integral type sizing problem in JP2 codec. (#284)
Signed-off-by: Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7727703a8b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 21:25:48 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 3eff34b241 package/upx: fix CVE-2021-20285
A flaw was found in upx canPack in p_lx_elf.cpp in UPX 3.96. This flaw
allows attackers to cause a denial of service (SEGV or buffer overflow
and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impacts via a
crafted ELF. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system
availability.

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 92a6db4fc6)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 21:11:05 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 3e1d696191 package/gnutls: security bump to version 3.7.1
- Fix CVE-2021-20231 and CVE-2021-20232:
  https://www.gnutls.org/security-new.html#GNUTLS-SA-2021-03-10
- Drop patch (not needed since:
  https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gnulib.git/commit/?id=b2d4b6c87827e34a694278d085a31508af052a37)

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit ce978e0a67)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 21:10:31 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 2c199f270e package/rpm: security bump to version 4.16.1.3
- Fix arbitrary data copied from signature header past signature
  checking (CVE-2021-3421)
- Fix signature check bypass with corrupted package (CVE-2021-20271)
- Fix missing bounds checks in headerImport() and headerCheck()
  (CVE-2021-20266)
- Fix missing sanity checks on header entry count and region data
  overlap
- Fix access past end of header if the last entry is string type
- Fix unsafe headerCopyLoad() still used in codebase

Drop all patches (already in version)

https://rpm.org/wiki/Releases/4.16.1.3.html

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 768152e2a6)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:44:21 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 6a6e82e008 package/rpm: don't set openmp
Don't set openmp to fix a build failure with codesourcery toolchain that
doesn't have OpenMP >= 4.5 indeed upstream doesn't want to remove the
build failure if the user provides --enable-openmp and OpenMP is < 4.5:
https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/pull/1433

Fixes:
 - http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/05dd945d24e8684aad6a2343ba7f6f8a7cea8349

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 81b462a405)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:44:01 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 595e7b06c2 package/rpm: bump to version 4.16.0
- Drop patch (already in version) and so autoreconf
- Update hash of COPYING (explicitly mention that the rpmio/ sub dir is
  under LGPL:
  https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/d5c69756cf6cd16e7c2e8b81fba19bf81f3dd1ba)
- sqlite is an optional dependency since
  https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/07129b641b733ab30995c93e2b08d0673b9d218c
- rpm can be built without berkeleydb since
  https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/4c7323f69b4fddf928245e9db2d1c9ca9b277ef2
  It should be noted that berkeleydb is deprecated since
  https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/fc0169eb03c893d63dc44f2ada954d42e0e759ed
- Update indentation in hash file (two spaces)

https://rpm.org/wiki/Releases/4.16.0.html

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit bc52fc7426)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:42:56 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 62485fec9d package/lldpd: security bump to version 1.0.9
- Out-of-bound read access when parsing LLDP-MED civic address in
  liblldpctl for malformed fields.
- Fix memory leak when receiving LLDPU with duplicate fields.
  CVE-2020-27827.
- More memory leak fixes on duplicate TLVs in LLDP, CDP and EDP
  (related to CVE-2020-27827).

https://github.com/lldpd/lldpd/blob/1.0.9/NEWS

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 5522b7526b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:39:50 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine f31579d1c0 package/lldpd: bump to version 1.0.7
https://github.com/lldpd/lldpd/blob/1.0.7/NEWS

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit c9670dfa21)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:39:42 +02:00
Baruch Siach c5e44760e8 package/lldpd: bump to version 1.0.5
Add tarball signature information.

Use https for site.

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5591f639dc)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:39:38 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine b0cf597510 package/pkg-cmake.mk: don't unconditionally set CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER
Don't unconditionally set CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER as it will raise a build
failure on qpid-proton because "if the toolchain specifies a value for
CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER, then CMake assumes the compiler works and goes
straight ahead trying to use it":
https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/module/CheckLanguage.html
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PROTON-2365

Fixes:
 - http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/05f344151100219c159ca4d466a453df96bf07fa

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: rename placeholder]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 2c2c0192a2)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:26:56 +02:00
Nicolas Cavallari 8cb6c36b0a package/netsnmp: fix script net-snmp-create-v3-user's usage of 'ps'.
net-snmp-create-v3-user uses ps to check if snmpd is running.  To know
how to invoke 'ps', the build system use 'which ps' and does other
checks for the output format of 'ps', therefore inspecting 'ps' on the
build machine instead of the target.

If the build machine runs a OS like Debian, that uses a merged-usr and a
PATH of '/usr/bin:/bin', then 'which ps' returns /usr/bin/ps, which will
not work on the target if it does not also use a merged-usr.

Hardcode 'ps' to be /bin/ps to fix this issue and to improve build
reproducibility.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Cavallari <nicolas.cavallari@green-communications.fr>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 57d339f20b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:24:35 +02:00
Baruch Siach 1f09d62641 package/libcurl: security bump to version 7.76.0
CVE-2021-22890: TLS 1.3 session ticket proxy host mixup (since 7.63.0)

CVE-2021-22876: Automatic referer leaks credentials (since 7.1.1)

This version adds optional dependency on libgsasl.

Cc: Matt Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit ab6d38ab8f)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:23:41 +02:00
Bernd Kuhls 0ef5a904f8 package/libcurl: bump version to 7.75.0
Updated license hash due to copyright year bump:
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/275c28e6502e1ded6c62b5bf22a409de16b4a04e

Changelog: https://curl.se/changes.html

Release notes:
https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2021/02/03/curl-7-75-0-is-smaller/
"No new security advisories this time!"

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 87f8356a2b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:23:34 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine e942043319 package/libvips: add poppler optional dependency
poppler is an optional dependency which is enabled by default since
version 8.3.0 and
https://github.com/libvips/libvips/commit/8da4e706dd60aba1a69e49bd562d8de225d2404d

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 26439a3bed)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:21:22 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 2a927eff9d package/libupnp: disable samples
Disable samples which are built (but not installed) by default since at
least version 1.6.0 and
https://github.com/pupnp/pupnp/commit/89e7a40fcc5c51afacdc9d5f3d18f5338b2bc5e9

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1f639e7d10)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-04 11:10:22 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 9c51cf079b package/efivar: disable -Werror
Fix the following build failure with gcc 10:

/home/buildroot/autobuild/run/instance-1/output-1/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-gcc -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64  -O2   -I/home/buildroot/autobuild/run/instance-1/output-1/build/efivar-37/src/include/   -specs=/home/buildroot/autobuild/run/instance-1/output-1/build/efivar-37/gcc.specs  -L.  -fPIC -Wl,-z,muldefs     -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -o efivar efivar.c -lefivar -ldl
In file included from efivar.h:28,
                 from efivar.c:40:
In function 'text_to_guid',
    inlined from 'parse_name.constprop' at efivar.c:157:8:
guid.h:106:2: error: 'strncpy' output may be truncated copying 8 bytes from a string of length 38 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
  106 |  strncpy(eightbytes, text, 8);
      |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors

Fixes:
 - http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/fcba72d359f4128515560e9105384cd4deff5043

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 720deac3d9)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 13:51:59 +02:00
Peter Seiderer 98fe47d4a2 package/tzdata: bump version to 2021a
For details see [1].

[1] https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/tz-announce/2021-January/000065.html

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 01dc8f5341)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 13:50:08 +02:00
Bert Outtier ea9fdc21ef support/scripts: fix pycompile for short filenames
Signed-off-by: Bert Outtier <outtierbert@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 6fdc878d73)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 13:48:04 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 66e6177ea9 package/wpa_supplicant: annotate CVE-2021-27803
Add a WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES entry for CVE-2021-27803 which was
fixed by commit 9ada4eb2f1, which we
have backported as
0001-P2P-Fix-a-corner-case-in-peer-addition-based-on-PD-R.patch.

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1a7cf592a8)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 13:42:50 +02:00
Giulio Benetti 1a9ae3203c package/pkg-kconfig: fix error string
Current error string speaks only about "fragment" but here we also deal
with Kconfig files, so let's add "file or fragment" instead of "fragment".

Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit a7348f0f7d)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 13:34:19 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine e40b2aa34a package/gnutls: drop unrecognized option
crywrap has been dropped since version 3.6.12 and
https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/commit/c991b5223140e4ef311afac0f25272e602238826

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 580f1fccc7)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 13:29:51 +02:00
Peter Korsgaard f533d0c2b0 package/squid: security bump to version 4.14
Fixes the following security issues:

- CVE-2020-25097: HTTP Request Smuggling

  Due to improper input validation Squid is vulnerable to an HTTP Request
  Smuggling attack.

For more details, see the advisory:
https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/security/advisories/GHSA-jvf6-h9gj-pmj6

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7b56384603)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 12:20:59 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine d96b97e6d9 package/sqlcipher: security bump to version 4.4.3
Fix CVE-2021-3119: Zetetic SQLCipher 4.x before 4.4.3 has a NULL pointer
dereferencing issue related to sqlcipher_export in crypto.c and
sqlite3StrICmp in sqlite3.c. This may allow an attacker to perform a
remote denial of service attack. For example, an SQL injection can be
used to execute the crafted SQL command sequence, which causes a
segmentation fault.

https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher/blob/v4.4.3/CHANGELOG.md

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6f0a81de6b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 12:19:38 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine a3edd9d144 package/python-lxml: security bump to version 4.6.3
Fix CVE-2021-28957: lxml 4.6.2 allows XSS. It places the HTML action
attribute into defs.link_attrs (in html/defs.py) for later use in input
sanitization, but does not do the same for the HTML5 formaction
attribute.

https://github.com/lxml/lxml/blob/lxml-4.6.3/CHANGES.txt

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9d678ed1de)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 12:17:23 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine 8e81ca5db9 package/mariadb: security bump to version 10.3.28
Fix CVE-2021-27928: A remote code execution issue was discovered in
MariaDB 10.2 before 10.2.37, 10.3 before 10.3.28, 10.4 before 10.4.18,
and 10.5 before 10.5.9; Percona Server through 2021-03-03; and the wsrep
patch through 2021-03-03 for MySQL. An untrusted search path leads to
eval injection, in which a database SUPER user can execute OS commands
after modifying wsrep_provider and wsrep_notify_cmd. NOTE: this does not
affect an Oracle product.

https://mariadb.com/kb/en/mariadb-10328-release-notes/
https://mariadb.com/kb/en/mariadb-10328-changelog/

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit f06339f3fc)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 12:16:29 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine eaea17c4a6 package/haserl: security bump to version 0.9.36
2021-03-07	0.9.36
*	Fix sf.net issue #5 - its possible to issue a PUT request
	without a CONTENT-TYPE.   Assume an octet-stream in that case.
*	Change the Prefix for variables to be the REQUEST_METHOD
	(PUT/DELETE/GET/POST)
	**** THIS IS A BREAKING CHANGE vs 0.9.33 ****
*	Mitigations vs running haserl to get access to files not
	available to the user.

- Fix CVE-2021-29133: Lack of verification in haserl, a component of
  Alpine Linux Configuration Framework, before 0.9.36 allows local users
  to read the contents of any file on the filesystem.
- Update indentation in hash file (two spaces)

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 661ce9aac9)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 12:15:46 +02:00
Peter Korsgaard c121ef2b63 package/wireshark: security bump to version 3.2.12
Fix CVE-2021-22191: Improper URL handling in Wireshark 3.4.0 to 3.4.3
and 3.2.0 to 3.2.11 could allow remote code execution via via packet
injection or crafted capture file.

https://www.wireshark.org/security/wnpa-sec-2021-03.html

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 11:17:44 +02:00
Michael Nosthoff aed168e34e board/beaglebone: remove genimage_linux41.cfg
Commit 5502a889dd
("configs/beaglebone_qt5: don't use custom post-image script") removed the use
of genimage_linux41.cfg but didn't remove the file.

Signed-off-by: Michael Nosthoff <buildroot@heine.tech>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8c60df5a77)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 11:11:34 +02:00
John Keeping 9f900ac132 package/ca-certificates: bump to version 20210119
Upstream has switched to requiring python3, so change the dependency to
always use host-python3.

Signed-off-by: John Keeping <john@metanate.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 7e0c490f45)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 11:08:19 +02:00
Jörg Krause dd0666de60 package/pkg-meson.mk: fix setting host C++ compiler
Commit f4a61d1ae2 introduced CC_FOR_BUILD and
CXX_FOR_BUILD to avoid detecting ccache.

Both values are set to `HOSTCC`. This causes issues where C++ files are
compiled with the C compiler without passing the `stdc++` flag to the
linker, too.

Therefore, switch to pass the C++ compiler to CXX_FOR_BUILD.

Correctly fixes:
http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/871e1362c44e5b68a149e6a5dd3caf99ea0d904a

Commit 9783c04aaf proposed a fix which in
fact is a workaround to get Meson to pass the `stdc++` flag to the C
linker.

A follow-up commit will revert this commit, as it is no longer
needed.

Signed-off-by: Jörg Krause <joerg.krause@embedded.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 00d41f58eb)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 11:04:29 +02:00
Thomas Petazzoni 9376694a4a docs/manual: improve details about the Github macro
The Github macro example shows something that is now considered
incorrect: using v1.0 as the VERSION. This is not longer recommended
as it prevents from matching with release-monitoring.org details.

Let's update the example, and add a note to explain this in more
details.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit b7cd17eb09)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 09:45:27 +02:00
Bernd Kuhls b093161aca package/php: bump version to 7.4.16
Changelog: https://www.php.net/ChangeLog-7.php#7.4.16

Update license hash due to copyright year bump:
http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commitdiff;h=8c04944b66fd4a4fa88e54b65a2391397998c51d

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 92797a8923)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-04-03 09:44:38 +02:00
Yann E. MORIN 5b3896cb76 package/perl: fix configure when BR2_VERSION_FULL contains a '/'
When BR2_VERSION_FULL contains one or more '/', injection our version
in the perl patch-level fails:

    /usr/bin/sed: -e expression #1, char 27: unknown option to `s'

When the build is done in a git tree, and HEAD is a tag, BR2_VERSION_FULL
will contain that tag name. Even if not widely common, it is not unusual
for a tag to contain a '/', and this is perfectly legit in git.

So, mangle BR2_VERSION_FULL to escape all '/' with a backslash '\', so
that the sed expression is correct, and so that we eventually have a
correct patchlevel string in perl's --version output.

Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Francois Perrad <francois.perrad@gadz.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0a2141349c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-31 08:13:52 +02:00
Fabrice Fontaine cf3460fbf4 package/openssh: security bump to version 8.5p1
* ssh-agent(1): fixed a double-free memory corruption that was
   introduced in OpenSSH 8.2 . We treat all such memory faults as
   potentially exploitable. This bug could be reached by an attacker
   with access to the agent socket.

   On modern operating systems where the OS can provide information
   about the user identity connected to a socket, OpenSSH ssh-agent
   and sshd limit agent socket access only to the originating user
   and root. Additional mitigation may be afforded by the system's
   malloc(3)/free(3) implementation, if it detects double-free
   conditions.

   The most likely scenario for exploitation is a user forwarding an
   agent either to an account shared with a malicious user or to a
   host with an attacker holding root access.

 * Portable sshd(8): Prevent excessively long username going to PAM.
   This is a mitigation for a buffer overflow in Solaris' PAM username
   handling (CVE-2020-14871), and is only enabled for Sun-derived PAM
   implementations.  This is not a problem in sshd itself, it only
   prevents sshd from being used as a vector to attack Solaris' PAM.
   It does not prevent the bug in PAM from being exploited via some
   other PAM application. GHPR#212

Also license has been updated to add some openbsd-compat licenses:
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/922cfac5ed5ead9f796f7d39f012dd653dc5c173

https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-8.5

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit ed63f95966)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-29 21:52:26 +02:00
Bernd Kuhls 519fd80585 package/kodi: honour the libusb option even when disabled
Make sure libusb support is properly disabled even if the libusb
package is enabled, and in case it gets built before Kodi.

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 0e1acc6e36)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-29 21:43:41 +02:00
Bernd Kuhls f939fb2a7d package/libopenssl: security bump version to 1.1.1k
Fixes CVE-2021-3449 & CVE-2021-3450:
https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities-1.1.1.html

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 198e20921f)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-28 22:46:08 +02:00
Petr Vorel 1df80397f1 linux: bump CIP kernel 4.19 series
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit c670ab1e6c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-28 22:44:51 +02:00
Petr Vorel ca7f3ffcbf {linux, linux-headers}: bump 5.{4, 10, 11}.x 4.{4, 9, 14, 19} series
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit ddfac826ae)
[Peter: drop 5.10.x/5.11.x bump]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-28 22:28:07 +02:00
Peter Korsgaard d4c44a728a package/tor: security bump version to 0.4.4.8
Updated license hash due to upstream commit:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/LICENSE?h=tor-0.4.4.8&id=02230575c4da6cd6342516e6682f95dad3e3e29e

Fixes CVE-2021-28089 & CVE-2021-28090.

Release notes: https://blog.torproject.org/node/2009

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3359de91b0)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-26 23:27:20 +01:00
Bernd Kuhls eebb212c88 package/tor: security bump version to 0.4.4.6
Release notes: https://blog.torproject.org/node/1952

Fixes TROVE-2020-005.

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 345b4aa6ce)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-26 23:27:13 +01:00
Bernd Kuhls c861546535 package/tor: bump version to 0.4.4.5
Release notes: https://blog.torproject.org/node/1921

Rebased patch.

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4ceefab178)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-26 23:26:53 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard 3a79ba37e2 package/efivar: add upstream post-37 patches fixing efibootmgr -v
Without this patch, efibootmgr -v errors out:

efibootmgr -v
BootCurrent: 0001
Timeout: 1 seconds
BootOrder: 0001,0002,0000
Boot0000* Diagnostic ProgramCould not parse device path: Invalid argument

vs:

efibootmgr -v
BootCurrent: 0001
Timeout: 1 seconds
BootOrder: 0001,0002,0000
Boot0000* Diagnostic Program    FvVol(5c60f367-a505-419a-859e-2a4ff6ca6fe5)/FvFile(085e8cc2-8ec9-4666-bd2a-49d481e95fa7)
Boot0001* containeros-a HD(1,GPT,1491d519-d9d7-7c4e-9110-4ab21271ac64,0x800,0x20000)/File(\efi\container\boot.efi)

For more details, see:

https://github.com/rhboot/efibootmgr/issues/133
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=963475

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Barnett <ryan.barnett@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 82f65e2c5f)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-25 08:16:44 +01:00
Michael Vetter fa3dbc059f package/jasper: bump version to 2.0.27
Changes:
  * Check for an image containing no samples in the PGX
    decoder. (#271, #272, #273, #274, #275, #276, #281)
  * Check for dimensions of zero in the JPC and JPEG decoders.
  * Fix an arguably incorrect type for an integer literal
    in the PGX decoder. (#270)
  * Check for an invalid component reference in the
    JP2 decoder. (#269)
  * Check on integer size in JP2 decoder. (#278)

Signed-off-by: Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 34743fadba)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-25 08:16:25 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard 618185998f package/git: security bump to version 2.24.4
Fixes CVE-2021-21300:

On case-insensitive file systems with support for symbolic links, if Git is
configured globally to apply delay-capable clean/smudge filters (such as Git
LFS), Git could be fooled into running remote code during a clone.

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-24 23:43:59 +01:00
Jean-pierre Cartal 7d377e1f44 support/download: Fix tarball generation with symlinks pointing to ./something
When a --transform expression is provided, it is by default also applied
to the target of a symlink.

When we create tarballs (from git or svn checkouts), we use a --transform
expression to replace the leading ./ with the package name and version.

This causes issues when a package contains symlinks that points to
./something, as the leading './' is also replaced.

Fix that by using the 'S' transformation scope flag, as described in the
tar manual:
  https://www.gnu.org/software/tar/manual/html_node/transform.html#transform

  In addition, several transformation scope flags are supported, that
  control to what files transformations apply. These are:

  ‘r’ Apply transformation to regular archive members.
  ‘R’ Do not apply transformation to regular archive members.
  ‘s’ Apply transformation to symbolic link targets.
  ‘S’ Do not apply transformation to symbolic link targets.
  ‘h’ Apply transformation to hard link targets.
  ‘H’ Do not apply transformation to hard link targets.

  Default is ‘rsh’ [...].

Fixes: #13616
Signed-off-by: Jean-pierre Cartal <jpcartal@free.fr>
Tested-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Acked-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-24 10:45:13 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine fc415fd417 package/zstd: security bump to version 1.4.9
Fix CVE-2021-24032: Beginning in v1.4.1 and prior to v1.4.9, due to an
incomplete fix for CVE-2021-24031, the Zstandard command-line utility
created output files with default permissions and restricted those
permissions immediately afterwards. Output files could therefore
momentarily be readable or writable to unintended parties.

https://github.com/facebook/zstd/releases/tag/v1.4.9

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 74ed1b5ca0)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-23 23:13:41 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine 52b98b974e package/zstd: bump to version 1.4.8
Drop patch (already in version)

https://github.com/facebook/zstd/releases/tag/v1.4.7
https://github.com/facebook/zstd/releases/tag/v1.4.8
(No 1.4.6 release)

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 202c083f4a)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-23 23:13:37 +01:00
Nicolas Serafini 9731f7426b DEVELOPERS: update Nicolas Serafini e-mail address
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Serafini <nicolas.serafini@ik.me>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit cd9ffd9473)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-23 23:08:07 +01:00
Titouan Christophe b825501902 package/mosquitto: security bump to v1.6.14
This is a bugfix release and include a minor security fix.
Read the announcement on https://mosquitto.org/blog/2021/03/version-2-0-9-released/

Signed-off-by: Titouan Christophe <titouanchristophe@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-23 22:37:21 +01:00
Peter Seiderer 2e4e940eb7 package/batman-adv: add note about linux mainline kernel module alternative
Since version 2.6.38 batman-adv is integreated into the linux mainline
kernel ([1], [2]) so add a note about it in the Config.in help text.

[1] https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux_2_6_38
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=c6c8fea29769d998d94fcec9b9f14d4b52b349d3

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 8ec31f1bc3)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-23 18:23:07 +01:00
Peter Seiderer cdca0117ef package/batman-adv: fix compile with BR2_PACKAGE_BATMAN_ADV_BATMAN_V disabled
Commit e8b1eeb2f3 (package/batman-adv: fix compile with
BR2_PACKAGE_BATMAN_ADV_BATMAN_V disabled) was tested against an RPi4
linux kernel already enabling the build-in batman-adv module inlcusive
batman-v, hence it missed the case where the in-tree module is not
enabled.

Taking a deeper look at the configure script gen-compat-autoconf.sh
reveals that the batman feature options must be explicitly set to 'y' or
'n' to work as expected.

Fixes:

  ERROR: modpost: "batadv_v_mesh_free" [.../build/batman-adv-2021.0/net/batman-adv/batman-adv.ko] undefined!
  ERROR: modpost: "batadv_v_mesh_init" [.../build/batman-adv-2021.0/net/batman-adv/batman-adv.ko] undefined!
  ERROR: modpost: "batadv_v_hardif_init" [.../build/batman-adv-2021.0/net/batman-adv/batman-adv.ko] undefined!
  ERROR: modpost: "batadv_v_init" [.../build/batman-adv-2021.0/net/batman-adv/batman-adv.ko] undefined!

Reported-by: Christian Stewart <christian@paral.in>
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: add blurb about tests on previous commit]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 20b9724ee2)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-23 18:21:45 +01:00
Peter Seiderer cf2cd27a23 package/batman-adv: fix compile with BR2_PACKAGE_BATMAN_ADV_BATMAN_V disabled
The given 'CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_BATMAN_V=' is enough to trigger the wrong
code compile path in net/batman-adv/bat_v.h missing the static inline
dummy implementations.

Fixes:

  ERROR: modpost: "batadv_v_mesh_free" [.../build/batman-adv-2021.0/net/batman-adv/batman-adv.ko] undefined!
  ERROR: modpost: "batadv_v_mesh_init" [.../build/batman-adv-2021.0/net/batman-adv/batman-adv.ko] undefined!
  ERROR: modpost: "batadv_v_hardif_init" [.../build/batman-adv-2021.0/net/batman-adv/batman-adv.ko] undefined!
  ERROR: modpost: "batadv_v_init" [.../build/batman-adv-2021.0/net/batman-adv/batman-adv.ko] undefined!

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
  - move all conditional options together
  - slight cleanup/reorganise
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit e8b1eeb2f3)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-23 18:21:10 +01:00
Yann E. MORIN a42d58a208 support/dependencies: detect and bailout when PATH contains spaces/TABs
In Makefiles, variables are split, filtered, and otherwise mangled on
a space as a separator. In a shell, they will also be split on TABs.

We split and filter and iterate on variables in a lot of places, and
most importantly, spaces in PATH is very seldom tested, if at all, so
a lot of packages will not be working properly in such a situation.

For example, the config.guess contains constructs that are not resilient
to a space in PATH:

    PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH

Also, our fakedate will iterate over PATH:

    for P in `echo $PATH | tr ':' ' '`; do

Those are only two cases, but the first means basically all
autotools-based packages are susceptible to subtle breakage.

Furthermore, Buildroot itself does not support that the top-level or
output directories are in a path with spaces anyway.

So, instead of chasing all cases that might be potentially broken,
let's just detect the case and bail out, like we already do when PATH
contains a \n, or when it contains the current working directory.

Reported-by: Dan Raymond <draymond@foxvalley.net>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit e36974d9e8)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-21 19:59:20 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine c38a30371d package/sconeserver: pcre is optional, not mandatory
pcre is optional not mandatory since
https://github.com/sconemad/sconeserver/commit/98ec61436c9ea68ffe2d70a818c1175dcafa2a79

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 754633fe8c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-21 19:55:19 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine 926b07d1c3 package/sconeserver: drop unrecognized options
Drop Magick++-config, lettuce and ui options which are
not recognized since latest bump in commit
ca17e0c7a0 (back in 2018).

Indeed:
- Magick++-config is not used since
  https://github.com/sconemad/sconeserver/commit/b025999b8a9a9715b72d0fc8ccbf0888e163388f
- Experimental UI and lettuce modules have been dropped since
  https://github.com/sconemad/sconeserver/commit/ccc1efdb8981fbef63a714ff6315c8a18372090a

Moreover, replace sconesite-image by image (broken since 2013 and
https://github.com/sconemad/sconeserver/commit/7693301fdb0076bf7676eb2db278c2f015ac7157)

As UI and lettuce options are broken since a long time, it does not seem
useful to add entries in Config.in.legacy

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit d3b818c3cf)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-21 19:53:41 +01:00
Giulio Benetti 9aad439be4 package/protobuf: disable package if binutils is affected from bug 21464
This package is affected from binutils bug 21464, since there is no
workaround, let's disable it.

Fixes:
http://autobuild.buildroot.net/results/908/9084cd777aefe0fa8235514c33767d8640ad7a5b/

Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9e71b6e2cb)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 23:40:10 +01:00
Giulio Benetti 4aff544321 toolchain: introduce BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_BINUTILS_BUG_21464
The OpenRISC binutils is affected by a linker bug (binutils bug 21464)
for which no workaround exists. This causes build breakage in a number
of packages, so this commit introduces a
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_BINUTILS_BUG_21464 option to identify this bug. As
all binutils versions are affected, this option is true whenever the
configuration targets OpenRISC.

The bug was already reported and it's been recently updated:

  https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=21464

Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 227cefef41)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 23:40:01 +01:00
Ryan Barnett ae19032d6d DEVELOPERS: Add Ryan Barnett for opkg and opkg-utils
Signed-off-by: Ryan Barnett <ryan.barnett@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit c994860de5)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 20:19:31 +01:00
Christian Stewart 786f9eea04 package/docker-containerd: security bump to 1.4.4
Security fix for CVE-2021-21334:

https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/GHSA-6g2q-w5j3-fwh4

Other changes:

 - Fix container create in CRI to prevent possible environment variable leak between containers
 - Update shim server to return grpc NotFound error
 - Add bounds on max oom_score_adj value for shim's AdjustOOMScore
 - Update task manager to use fresh context when calling shim shutdown
 - Update Docker resolver to avoid possible concurrent map access panic
 - Update shim's log file open flags to avoid containerd hang on syscall open
 - Fix incorrect usage calculation

Signed-off-by: Christian Stewart <christian@paral.in>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 43a766e92d)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 20:07:38 +01:00
Grzegorz Blach 074b76495a package/python-rpi-ws281x: set proper license
The license is BSD-2-Clause, not MIT.

Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Blach <grzegorz@blach.pl>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: split off into its own commit]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 7b5d624bb6)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 18:02:25 +01:00
Stefan Sørensen b76054dd82 boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

As detailed in commit 7e64a050fb, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.

In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:

  f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
  04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
  ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
  d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection

The following security issues are fixed:

CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
               ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.

Reported-by: Máté Kukri

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.

Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.

Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.

Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
               memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.

Reported-by: Teddy Reed

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.

If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.

This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.

Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.

Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
               space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.

Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)

*******************************************************************************

Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 1bad507220)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 17:53:22 +01:00
Nicolas Toromanoff 82be647185 boot/uboot: fix kconfig with per-package directories and host-make
If PER_PACKAGE_DIRECTORIES=Y and using host-make package (because
BR2_FORCE_HOST_BUILD=Y or local make is too old) .stamp_dotconfig
target needs per-package/uboot/host/bin/host-make that doesn't
exist yet.

Add host-make into UBOOT_KCONFIG_DEPENDENCIES.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Toromanoff <nicolas.toromanoff@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 3cf8173e5c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 17:49:50 +01:00
Ryan Barnett f55c8c56f2 package/opkg-utils: add missing dependencies for host build
opkg-utils is a collection of bash and python scripts which require
additional commands/tools be available for the bash scripts. The full
list of dependencies that the opkg-util scripts require is:

  bash
  binutils
  bzip2
  coreutils
  diffutils
  findutils
  grep
  gzip
  lz4
  python3
  sed
  tar
  xz

The Buildroot manual requires a few packages (bash, binutils, bzip2,
gzip, sed and tar) to be installed on the host system, so we need not
add those. Additionally, and even though they are not in that list,
that grep and find are also required (we already make extensive use of
both everywhere, so it is as good as them being in the list).

We have a host variant for coreutils, but only for systems that do not
already have a recent-enough one, i.e. that provides 'realpath' and
'ln --relative'. opkg-utils uses neither, so can rely on the ones on the
system.

Only add dependencies on the remaining host tools: diffutils, lz4, and
xz.

Signed-off-by: Ryan Barnett <ryan.barnett@rockwellcollins.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
  - drop excessive dependencies,
  - reword the commit log accordingly
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 9521492bd0)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 17:47:22 +01:00
Ryan Barnett bcf60fd6d1 package/diffutils: add host package
Signed-off-by: Ryan Barnett <ryan.barnett@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 819637e0e9)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 17:44:56 +01:00
Ryan Barnett af952c01a4 package/opkg-utils: remove build step
opkg-utils is a package that only provides bash and python scripts.
Upon further inspection of the Makefile for the package, invoking
`make` only ever builds the manpage. The previous commit dropped the
installation of the manpage. This makes the build step unnecessary so
remove it.

Add a comment to explain the situation

Signed-off-by: Ryan Barnett <ryan.barnett@rockwellcollins.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: reword commit log]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 05bf014f56)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 17:42:35 +01:00
Ryan Barnett 525e4f6335 package/opkg-utils: install only utility scripts
When `make install` is run to install the opkg-utils scripts, it also
invokes building of the man page for opkg-build. The generation of the
man page requires `pod2man` executable which is a part of perl.

Since buildroot does not support man pages in the host directory,
patch the opkg-utils Makefile to separate the installation of man
pages and utility scripts.

With the options to install man pages and utils separately, only
install the opkg-utils scripts.

Signed-off-by: Ryan Barnett <ryan.barnett@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 0424eee0ee)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-20 17:41:07 +01:00
Christian Stewart f112febdd9 DEVELOPERS: remove myself for aufs
Aufs has been deprecated for the purposes of Docker/containers since overlay2
became the mainline kernel module of choice.

Signed-off-by: Christian Stewart <christian@paral.in>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 8a99b47ec2)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-19 23:19:22 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine d09b798bb7 package/mbedtls: security bump to version 2.6.10
- Fix a buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when calculating
  |A| - |B| where |B| is larger than |A| and has more limbs (so the
  function should return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE). Only
  applications calling mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() directly are affected:
  all calls inside the library were safe since this function is
  only called with |A| >= |B|.
- Fix an errorneous estimation for an internal buffer in
  mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(). If MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is set to an odd
  value the function might fail to write a private RSA keys of the
  largest supported size.
- Fix a stack buffer overflow with mbedtls_net_poll() and
  mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() when given a file descriptor that is
  beyond FD_SETSIZE.
- Guard against strong local side channel attack against base64 tables
  by making access aceess to them use constant flow code.

https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.16.10

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: fix the hash after upstream mess-up]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 694c7d3ece)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-19 23:08:50 +01:00
Peter Seiderer bf53d8c14f package/transmission: fix sysv init script (name vs. exec)
With the start-stop-daemon enabled (instead of the busybox applet),
stopping transmission emits spurious warnings:

  $ /etc/init.d/S92transmission stop
  Stopping bittorrent client transmission-daemon...
  start-stop-daemon: warning: this system is not able to track process names
  longer than 15 characters, please use --exec instead of --name.

Update our startup script to match what was done upstream 9 years ago:
    https://trac.transmissionbt.com/ticket/4724
    https://trac.transmissionbt.com/wiki/Scripts/initd?action=diff&version=24&old_version=23

Partially fixes:
  - https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=13576

Reported-by: ingineru_de_sistem@yahoo.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
  - reword commit log
  - add reference to upstream ticket and changeset
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 45d326a08c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-19 23:03:40 +01:00
Peter Seiderer cb39699db0 package/sysvinit: add patch to fix compile without stack-protector support
In Buildroot, the SSP flags are passed via the wrapper, and only flags
supported by the toolchain will be used.

Add patch to remove '-fstack-protector-strong' compile flag.

Fixes:
  .../aarch64-buildroot-linux-uclibc/bin/ld: runlevel.o: in function `main':
  runlevel.c:(.text.startup+0x4): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
  .../aarch64-buildroot-linux-uclibc/bin/ld: cannot find -lssp_nonshared
  .../aarch64-buildroot-linux-uclibc/bin/ld: cannot find -lssp

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 50cbac5099)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-19 22:07:39 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine 8315da3e4c package/wolfssl: security bump to version 4.7.0
Fix CVE-2021-3336: DoTls13CertificateVerify in tls13.c in wolfSSL before
4.7.0 does not cease processing for certain anomalous peer behavior
(sending an ED22519, ED448, ECC, or RSA signature without the
corresponding certificate). The client side is affected because
man-in-the-middle attackers can impersonate TLS 1.3 servers.

https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v4.7.0-stable

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 238b5df775)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 23:19:54 +01:00
Yann E. MORIN bf4916554d package/libjpeg: fix LIBJPEG_SITE
Commit b83184de67 (package/libjpeg: switch to s.b.o. as source site)
improperly added a trailing slash '/' at the end of LIBJPEG_SITE,
causing builds to fail:

    package/libjpeg/libjpeg.mk:35: *** LIBJPEG_SITE (http://sources.buildroot.org/libjpeg/) cannot have a trailing slash.  Stop.

Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 308f4428c8)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 23:19:25 +01:00
Giulio Benetti 9d0ebeeb3d package/asterisk: fix build failure due to gcc bug 93847
The asterisk package exhibits gcc bug 93847 when built for the Nios2
architecture with optimization enabled, which causes a build failure.

As done for other packages in Buildroot work around this gcc bug by
setting optimization to -O0 if BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_GCC_BUG_93847=y.

Fixes:
http://autobuild.buildroot.net/results/24c0a6ca3b272711a1e6ceaa033925182d0d49c4

Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 830fb82822)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 23:14:16 +01:00
Giulio Benetti 9223b19da7 package/asterisk: remove default -O3 optimization flag
Actually asterisk package gets built with -O3 cflag since it's defaulted
into its sources, but it's not what we want, so let's empty its OPTIMIZE
Makefile variable letting Buildroot CFLAGS to take place instead.

Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit eaba3c8e13)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 23:13:37 +01:00
Yann E. MORIN 6f679d20ba package/libjpeg: switch to s.b.o. as source site
Fixes #13581

The tarball for version 9d, released 2020-01-12, has been silently
replaced upstream (a unicode BOM was removed from a few files),
causing hash mismatch.

This means that all our versions since 2020.02 will fail the hash
check, and fallback to using s.b.o. so we can't update the copy we
have on s.b.o.

As a consequence, we can't update the hash in master (soon 2021.02)
otherwise it would not match what we have on s.b.o.

This means that users will see hash mismatch by default, which is not
very nice. Although we can't do anything for all previous releases,
we can still try to paper over the problem for the future ones, like
2021.02, by switching the upstream to be s.b.o.

Sigh... :-(

Reported-by: Nick Shaforostov <mshaforostov@airmusictech.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit b83184de67)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 22:35:52 +01:00
Michael Vetter db4e04cae5 package/jasper: bump version to 2.0.26
Changes:
* Fix JP2 decoder bug that can cause a null pointer dereference for
  some invalid CDEF boxes. (#268)

Signed-off-by: Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5742a0f33e)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 22:34:57 +01:00
Bernd Kuhls 0b88d3f087 package/dovecot-pigeonhole: bump version to 0.5.14
Release notes:
https://dovecot.org/pipermail/dovecot-news/2021-March/000456.html

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9b29e94980)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 22:29:37 +01:00
Bernd Kuhls 01ae2122ec package/dovecot: bump version to 2.3.14
Release notes:
https://dovecot.org/pipermail/dovecot-news/2021-March/000455.html

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5a16d45360)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 22:29:34 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine 46e3a6e421 package/gnuchess: security bump to version 6.2.7
Fix CVE-2019-15767: In GNU Chess 6.2.5, there is a stack-based buffer
overflow in the cmd_load function in frontend/cmd.cc via a crafted chess
position in an EPD file.

Update indentation in hash file (two spaces)

https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/info-gnu-chess/2020-04/msg00000.html
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/info-gnu-chess/2020-05/msg00000.html

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5d9fb6a2ae)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 22:15:46 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine a19693c6ad package/sox: fix static build with magic
This build failure is raised since bump to
7524160b29a476f7e87bc14fddf12d349f9a3c5e

Fixes:
 - http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/d96f27cd96926060046e2e1115777f5bceda3741

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
(cherry picked from commit 183d583fb5)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-16 22:13:46 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine 878a7fded0 package/libebml: security bump to version 1.4.2
Fix CVE-2021-3405: A flaw was found in libebml before 1.4.2. A heap
overflow bug exists in the implementation of EbmlString::ReadData and
EbmlUnicodeString::ReadData in libebml.

https://github.com/Matroska-Org/libebml/blob/release-1.4.2/ChangeLog

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit ff18652b42)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-14 22:22:43 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine 391331d77c package/libebml: bump to version 1.4.0
Update indentation in hash file (two spaces)

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 89fe7e140b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-14 22:22:27 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard ca8e5c9e33 package/wpa_supplicant: add upstream 2021-1 security fix
Fixes the following security issue:

- wpa_supplicant P2P provision discovery processing vulnerability (no CVE
  yet)

A vulnerability was discovered in how wpa_supplicant processes P2P
(Wi-Fi Direct) provision discovery requests. Under a corner case
condition, an invalid Provision Discovery Request frame could end up
reaching a state where the oldest peer entry needs to be removed. With
a suitably constructed invalid frame, this could result in use
(read+write) of freed memory. This can result in an attacker within
radio range of the device running P2P discovery being able to cause
unexpected behavior, including termination of the wpa_supplicant process
and potentially code execution.

For more details, see the advisory:
https://w1.fi/security/2021-1/wpa_supplicant-p2p-provision-discovery-processing-vulnerability.txt

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: actually add the patch URL to the patch list]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 9ada4eb2f1)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-14 21:29:36 +01:00
Asaf Kahlon 1a2f44dc91 package/python{3}-pyyaml: switch to setuptools
Since version 5.4.0 pyyaml uses setuptools (see
https://github.com/yaml/pyyaml/blob/master/CHANGES)

Fixes:
  - http://autobuild.buildroot.net/results/bc36ae51a1e4d70c5fd2a3eb4b458aba4220f2dc

Signed-off-by: Asaf Kahlon <asafka7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit d64a905d9f)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-14 21:21:16 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine 9f7f5e8374 package/python-pyyaml: security bump to version 5.4.1
Fix CVE-2020-14343: A vulnerability was discovered in the PyYAML library
in versions before 5.4, where it is susceptible to arbitrary code
execution when it processes untrusted YAML files through the full_load
method or with the FullLoader loader. Applications that use the library
to process untrusted input may be vulnerable to this flaw. This flaw
allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system by abusing
the python/object/new constructor. This flaw is due to an incomplete fix
for CVE-2020-1747.

Update hash of LICENSE file (update in year:
https://github.com/yaml/pyyaml/commit/58d0cb7ee09954c67fabfbd714c5673b03e7a9e1)

https://github.com/yaml/pyyaml/blob/5.4.1/CHANGES

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit de43a9775d)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-14 21:20:26 +01:00
Thomas De Schampheleire 523a6427ed package/redis: security bump to version 5.0.12 (CVE-2021-21309)
References:
https://github.com/redis/redis/security/advisories/GHSA-hgj8-vff2-7cjf
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21309

"Impact:

    An integer overflow bug in 32-bit Redis version 4.0 or newer could be
    exploited to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code
    execution.

    Redis 4.0 or newer uses a configurable limit for the maximum supported
    bulk input size. By default, it is 512MB which is a safe value for all
    platforms.

    If the limit is significantly increased, receiving a large request from
    a client may trigger several integer overflow scenarios, which would
    result with buffer overflow and heap corruption. We believe this could
    in certain conditions be exploited for remote code execution.

    By default, authenticated Redis users have access to all configuration
    parameters and can therefore use the “CONFIG SET proto-max-bulk-len” to
    change the safe default, making the system vulnerable.

    This problem only affects 32-bit Redis (on a 32-bit system, or as a
    32-bit executable running on a 64-bit system).

Patches

    The problem is fixed in version 6.2, and the fix is back ported to
    6.0.11 and 5.0.11. Make sure you use one of these versions if you're
    running 32-bit Redis.
"

Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
[Peter: update to 5.0.12 to fix build on !glibc]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 17:06:26 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard 6e58a0dbf8 {linux, linux-headers}: bump 4.{4, 9, 14, 19}.x / 5.{4, 10}.x series
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit f6e9e22ac9)
[Peter: drop 5.10.x bump]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 17:00:15 +01:00
Francois Perrad df6b120e93 package/prosody: security bump to 0.11.8
From the release notes:
https://blog.prosody.im/prosody-0.11.8-released/

This release also fixes a security issue, where channel binding, which
connects the authentication layer (i.e.  SASL) with the security layer (i.e.
TLS) to detect man-in-the-middle attacks, could be used on connections
encrypted with TLS 1.3, despite the holy texts declaring this undefined.

https://issues.prosody.im/1542

Signed-off-by: Francois Perrad <francois.perrad@gadz.org>
[Peter: mark as security bump, expand commit text]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9aba85e3f5)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 16:08:44 +01:00
Francois Perrad 8923cdc1de package/prosody: bump to version 0.11.7
Signed-off-by: Francois Perrad <francois.perrad@gadz.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0f5e9efbd8)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 16:08:35 +01:00
Francois Perrad de67efd512 package/prosody: bump to version 0.11.6
Signed-off-by: Francois Perrad <francois.perrad@gadz.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit a925b4ee14)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 16:08:29 +01:00
Francois Perrad acc1664c4e package/prosody: bump to version 0.11.5
Signed-off-by: Francois Perrad <francois.perrad@gadz.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4db08ef860)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 16:08:01 +01:00
Peter Seiderer d1745ffdec package/util-linux: disable runuser for the host build
runuser allows running commands as another user, but needs to run as
root to be able to setuid(). But Buildroot does not require running as
root, and so runuser can't be used.

Incientally, that fixes host build in case unsuitable libs are found on
the system:
    http://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/buildroot/2021-February/304261.html

Reported-by: GA K <guyarkam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
  - expand the commit log with a more fundamental explanation that
    runuser can't be used anyway
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 955d6c099b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 16:05:26 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard ba0f46478d package/privoxy: security bump to version 3.0.32
Privoxy 3.0.32 fixes a number of security issues:

- Security/Reliability:
  - ssplit(): Remove an assertion that could be triggered with a
    crafted CGI request.
    Commit 2256d7b4d67. OVE-20210203-0001.
    Reported by: Joshua Rogers (Opera)
  - cgi_send_banner(): Overrule invalid image types. Prevents a
    crash with a crafted CGI request if Privoxy is toggled off.
    Commit e711c505c48. OVE-20210206-0001.
    Reported by: Joshua Rogers (Opera)
  - socks5_connect(): Don't try to send credentials when none are
    configured. Fixes a crash due to a NULL-pointer dereference
    when the socks server misbehaves.
    Commit 85817cc55b9. OVE-20210207-0001.
    Reported by: Joshua Rogers (Opera)
  - chunked_body_is_complete(): Prevent an invalid read of size two.
    Commit a912ba7bc9c. OVE-20210205-0001.
    Reported by: Joshua Rogers (Opera)
  - Obsolete pcre: Prevent invalid memory accesses with an invalid
    pattern passed to pcre_compile(). Note that the obsolete pcre code
    is scheduled to be removed before the 3.0.33 release. There has been
    a warning since 2008 already.
    Commit 28512e5b624. OVE-20210222-0001.
    Reported by: Joshua Rogers (Opera)

for more details, see the announcement:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/28/1

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit e276d14cd8)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 16:04:04 +01:00
Christian Stewart 7b062da66a package/openssh: security bump to version 8.4p1
Fixes CVE-2020-15778: scp in OpenSSH through 8.3p1 allows command injection in
the scp.c toremote function, as demonstrated by backtick characters in the
destination argument. NOTE: the vendor reportedly has stated that they
intentionally omit validation of "anomalous argument transfers" because that
could "stand a great chance of breaking existing workflows."

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15778

Signed-off-by: Christian Stewart <christian@paral.in>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6609cd0d88)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 15:59:41 +01:00
Baruch Siach 6d7544520a package/openssh: bump to version 8.3p1
Format hash file with two spaces separators.

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit b53aea70e6)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 15:59:05 +01:00
Romain Naour 2dfd8067b7 package/openssh: bump to version 8.2p1
This new version is mandatory to allow the glibc package bump to version 2.31.
Otherwise it's not possible to connect to the remote host, as reported by [1] [2].
Upstream commit [3][4] fixes the issue.

[1] https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/65386
[2] https://bugs.gentoo.org/708224
[3] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/beee0ef61866cb567b9abc23bd850f922e59e3f0
[4] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/69298ebfc2c066acee5d187eac8ce9f38c796630

Release Note:
https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-8.2

Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Reviewed-by: David Pierret <david.pierret@smile.fr>
Tested-by: David Pierret <david.pierret@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit bad75bca31)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 15:58:39 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard 5300eb5c5a package/python-aiohttp: security bump to version 3.7.4
Fixes the following security issue:

CVE-2021-21330: Open redirect vulnerability in aiohttp
(normalize_path_middleware middleware)

Beast Glatisant and Jelmer Vernooij reported that python-aiohttp, a async
HTTP client/server framework, is prone to an open redirect vulnerability.  A
maliciously crafted link to an aiohttp-based web-server could redirect the
browser to a different website.

For more details, see the advisory:
https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-v6wp-4m6f-gcjg

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 0e60a9aa83)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 15:53:30 +01:00
Marcin Niestroj 82ce5ba393 package/python-aiohttp: add missing python-typing-extensions dependency
typing_extensions package is needed starting from aiohttp v3.7.1.

While at it sort all dependencies alphabetically.

Signed-off-by: Marcin Niestroj <m.niestroj@grinn-global.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9e504acbbc)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 15:53:22 +01:00
James Hilliard b1e24c34d4 package/python-aiohttp: bump to version 3.7.3
License hash changed due to year update.

Signed-off-by: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 89a950631e)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 15:53:16 +01:00
Marcin Niestroj 28e53bde35 package/python-typing-extensions: new package
Signed-off-by: Marcin Niestroj <m.niestroj@grinn-global.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3fb7bb4560)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 15:52:39 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard ae2a5f72cb package/libglib2: backport upstream security fix for CVE-2021-27218
CVE-2021-27218: An issue was discovered in GNOME GLib before 2.66.7 and
2.67.x before 2.67.4.  If g_byte_array_new_take() was called
with a buffer of 4GB or more on a 64-bit platform, the length would be
truncated modulo 2**32, causing unintended length truncation.

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-13 15:33:27 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard f2b6d4c053 package/openldap: add upstream security fix for CVE-2021-27212
In OpenLDAP through 2.4.57 and 2.5.x through 2.5.1alpha, an assertion
failure in slapd can occur in the issuerAndThisUpdateCheck function via a
crafted packet, resulting in a denial of service (daemon exit) via a short
timestamp.  This is related to schema_init.c and checkTime.

For more details, see the bugtracker:
https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9454

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 2d6a0ea93e)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-10 00:00:03 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard 5db04dd247 package/screen: add security fix for CVE-2021-26937
encoding.c in GNU Screen through 4.8.0 allows remote attackers to cause a
denial of service (invalid write access and application crash) or possibly
have unspecified other impact via a crafted UTF-8 character sequence.

For more details, see the oss-security discussion:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/09/3

So far no fix has been added to upstream git, and a number of early proposed
fixes caused regressions, so pull the security fix from the screen 4.8.0-5
Debian package.

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 6ca1a7c277)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-09 23:58:37 +01:00
Peter Seiderer c48b152247 package/imagemagick: security bump to version 7.0.10-62
Fixes the following security issue:

CVE-2021-20176: A divide-by-zero flaw was found in ImageMagick 6.9.11-57 and
7.0.10-57 in gem.c.  This flaw allows an attacker who submits a crafted file
that is processed by ImageMagick to trigger undefined behavior through a
division by zero.  The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system
availability.

For more details, see the bugtracker:
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/3077

- bump version to 7.0.10-62
- update license file hash (copyright year update)

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[Peter: mention security fix]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit a11b6beab9)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-05 13:31:29 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard 887d4fab3e package/nodejs: security bump to version v12.21.0
Fixes the following security issues:

CVE-2021-22883: HTTP2 'unknownProtocol' cause Denial of Service by resource exhaustion

Affected Node.js versions are vulnerable to denial of service attacks when
too many connection attempts with an 'unknownProtocol' are established.
This leads to a leak of file descriptors.  If a file descriptor limit is
configured on the system, then the server is unable to accept new
connections and prevent the process also from opening, e.g.  a file.  If no
file descriptor limit is configured, then this lead to an excessive memory
usage and cause the system to run out of memory.

CVE-2021-22884: DNS rebinding in --inspect

Affected Node.js versions are vulnerable to denial of service attacks when
the whitelist includes “localhost6”.  When “localhost6” is not present in
/etc/hosts, it is just an ordinary domain that is resolved via DNS, i.e.,
over network.  If the attacker controls the victim's DNS server or can spoof
its responses, the DNS rebinding protection can be bypassed by using the
“localhost6” domain.  As long as the attacker uses the “localhost6” domain,
they can still apply the attack described in CVE-2018-7160.

For more details, see the advisory:
https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/february-2021-security-releases/

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7cb44a2011)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-05 11:55:34 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard 94bed60057 package/python3: security bump to version 3.8.8
Fixes the following security issue:

- CVE-2021-23336: urllib.parse.parse_qsl(): Web cache poisoning - `; ` as a
  query args separator
  https://bugs.python.org/issue42967

And fixes a number of issues. For details, see the changelog:
https://docs.python.org/release/3.8.8/whatsnew/changelog.html

Drop the now upstreamed security patch and update the license hash for a
change of copyright year:

-2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 Python Software Foundation;
+2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 Python Software Foundation;

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-03-04 22:11:23 +01:00
Ryan Barnett 5904d13b90 package/fakeroot: fix glibc detection on patch for new wrappers
Commit f45925a951 add the patch:

0003-libfakeroot.c-add-wrappers-for-new-glibc-2.33-symbol.patch

which allowed fakeroot to be compiled with GLIBC 2.33 or above.
However, this introduce a bug for building with a non-GLIBC based
toolchain as a GLIBC macro - __GLIBC_PREREQ - is used on the same line
as the detection of GLIBC.

Fix this by backporting the fix to this incorrect macro from upstream
commit:

https://salsa.debian.org/clint/fakeroot/-/commit/8090dffdad8fda86dccd47ce7a7db8840bdf7d7b

CC: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Barnett <ryanbarnett3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-28 18:00:19 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard 4f55b56463 package/bind: security bump to version 9.11.28
Fixes the following security issue:

- CVE-2020-8625: When tkey-gssapi-keytab or tkey-gssapi-credential was
  configured, a specially crafted GSS-TSIG query could cause a buffer
  overflow in the ISC implementation of SPNEGO (a protocol enabling
  negotiation of the security mechanism to use for GSSAPI authentication).
  This flaw could be exploited to crash named.  Theoretically, it also
  enabled remote code execution, but achieving the latter is very difficult
  in real-world conditions

For details, see the advisory:
https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2020-8625

In addition, 9.11.26-27 fixed a number of issues, see the release notes for
details:
https://downloads.isc.org/isc/bind9/9.11.28/RELEASE-NOTES-bind-9.11.28.html

Drop now upstreamed patches, update the GPG key for the 2021-2022 variant
and update the COPYRIGHT hash for a change of year:

-Copyright (C) 1996-2020  Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
+Copyright (C) 1996-2021  Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6376decbda)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:41:08 +01:00
Peter Seiderer fdfbc12ffe package/bind: disable backtrace support
Disable backtrace support, fixes linking failure for uclibc/musl based
toolchains.

Fixes:

  - http://autobuild.buildroot.net/results/7a1a140314bc8d134f9eeb95ef2e46e7fb0ce9fd/

  .../arm-buildroot-linux-uclibcgnueabi/bin/ld: ../isc/.libs/libisc.so: undefined reference to `_Unwind_GetIP'

  - http://autobuild.buildroot.net/results/f0db5fe7fc6860b7270c784989c451e2e7aa2afb/

  .../arm-buildroot-linux-uclibcgnueabi/bin/ld: ../isc/.libs/libisc.so: undefined reference to `_Unwind_GetIP'

  - http://autobuild.buildroot.net/results/cb963298885df37f1e5c4d3ab3989773c01c54fc/

  .../arm-buildroot-linux-musleabihf/bin/ld: ../isc/.libs/libisc.so: undefined reference to `_Unwind_GetIP'

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 700674b45c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:40:54 +01:00
Peter Seiderer 49b2d3daed package/bind: fix compile/linking failure
Fixes:

  - http://autobuild.buildroot.net/results/966a3de94aa97fa8e9895eede29c9cbfb4bd7301

  .../host/lib/gcc/arm-buildroot-linux-musleabihf/9.3.0/../../../../arm-buildroot-linux-musleabihf/bin/ld: warning: libisccfg.so.163, needed by ../../lib/bind9/.libs/libbind9.so, not found (try using -rpath or -rpath-link)
  .../host/lib/gcc/arm-buildroot-linux-musleabihf/9.3.0/../../../../arm-buildroot-linux-musleabihf/bin/ld: ../../lib/bind9/.libs/libbind9.so: undefined reference to `cfg_obj_line'

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[Peter: replace by upstream patches]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit e4af234d3c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:40:40 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine e4d7d6b9de package/bind: drop unrecognized option
Drop --enable-newstats option which is not recognized

Unrecognized options:
    --disable-gtk-doc, --disable-gtk-doc-html, --disable-doc, --disable-docs, --disable-documentation, --with-xmlto, --with-fop, --disable-dependency-tracking, --disable-nls, --enable-newstats

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit a2be92afc2)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:31:08 +01:00
Bernd Kuhls 2869d4ee46 package/bind: bump version to 9.11.25
Release notes:
https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/9.11.25/RELEASE-NOTES-bind-9.11.25.html

Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 39b582eba4)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:30:51 +01:00
Fabrice Fontaine d5812f3e52 package/bind: fix license hash
Commit 9679d3f021 forgot to update hash of
COPYRIGHT which was updated to replace http by https:
https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/400171aee8db87c3973987980327051a58a20a80

Fixes:
 - http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/db614a6fa1e17af2fa5c1d4a0d51cdf770893ca9

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit ac6dbae320)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:30:44 +01:00
Petr Vorel b62546d223 package/bind: bump to version 9.11.24
Turn 0001-cross.patch into git patch.

Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9679d3f021)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:30:39 +01:00
Peter Seiderer ceda85977e package/irqbalance: fix irqbalance/irqbalance-ui socket communication
Add patch to fix irqbalance/irqbalance-ui socket communication by
fixing uint64_t printf format usage.

Fixes:

  $ irqbalance-ui
  Invalid data sent.  Unexpected token: (null)TYPE

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
  - do an actual backport as upstream applied the patch
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit f204e58740)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:03:19 +01:00
Peter Seiderer d006b75cbe package/irqbalance: fix sysv startup script (add mkdir /run/irqbalance)
- add mkdir -p /run/irqbalance to sysv startup script needed to
  create socket /run/irqbalance/irqbalance<pid>.sock

Fixes:

  - Bug 13541 [1]

  daemon.warn /usr/sbin/irqbalance: Daemon couldn't be bound to the file-based socket.

[1] https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=13541

Reported-by: Alfredo Pons Menargues <alfredo.pons@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: only create in start case]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 4a95f38f30)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:03:15 +01:00
Peter Seiderer ce9ae9906b package/irqbalance: fix systemd startup script (add RuntimeDirectory)
- add RuntimeDirectory=irqbalance to create /run/irqbalanace needed to
  create socket /run/irqbalance/irqbalance<pid>.sock

Fixes:

  - Bug 13541 [1]

  /usr/sbin/irqbalance[158]: Daemon couldn't be bound to the file-based socket.

[1] https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=13541

Reported-by: Alfredo Pons Menargues <alfredo.pons@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 60518c1d76)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:03:10 +01:00
Scott Fan 5d75ec3070 DEVELOPERS: remove Scott Fan
Signed-off-by: Scott Fan <fancp2007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit d1054e851c)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 19:00:25 +01:00
Thomas Petazzoni 03e713a0cc utils/scanpypi: use python3 explicitly
scanpypi is python3 compatible. In addition, it executes the setup.py
of Python modules to extract the relevant information. Since these are
more and more commonly using python3 constructs, using "python" to run
scanpypi causes problems on systems that have python2 installed as
python, when trying to parse setup.py scripts with python3 constructs.

Fixes part of #13516.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit ee8b680816)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 18:59:59 +01:00
Peter Korsgaard e508d1d86f package/python-django: security bump to version 3.0.13
Fixes the following security issue:

- CVE-2021-23336: Web cache poisoning via django.utils.http.limited_parse_qsl()

  Django contains a copy of urllib.parse.parse_qsl() which was added to
  backport some security fixes.  A further security fix has been issued
  recently such that parse_qsl() no longer allows using ; as a query
  parameter separator by default.  Django now includes this fix.  See
  bpo-42967 for further details.

For more details, see the advisory:
https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2021/feb/19/security-releases/

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
(cherry picked from commit 82abd78a01)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2021-02-27 18:54:11 +01:00
266 changed files with 27075 additions and 645 deletions
+36
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,39 @@
2020.02.12, released April 5, 2021
Important / security related fixes.
Dependencies: Explicitly detect and bail out if PATH contains
spaces or tabs. A number of packages fail to build in such
setups, so explicitly inform about this.
utils/scanpypi: Explicitly use python3 for compatibility with
packages using python3 syntax in setup.py
support/download: Fix tarball generation (from git/svn repos)
including symlinks pointing to ./<something>
Meson: Use correct C++ host compiler (rather than C compiler)
Updated/fixed packages: asterisk, batman-adv, bind,
ca-certificates, docker-containerd, dovecot,
dovecot-pigeonhole, diffutils, efivar, git, gnuchess, gnutls,
grub2, fakeroot, haserl, imagemagick, irqbalance, jasper,
kodi, libebml, libglib2, libjpeg, libopenssl, mariadb,
mbedtls, mosquitto, nodejs, nettle, openldap, openssh,
opkg-utils, perl, php, privoxy, prosody, protobuf,
python-aiohttp, python-django, python-lxml, python-pyyaml,
python-rpi-ws281x, python3, redis, sconeserver, screen, sox,
sqlcipher, squid, sysvinit, tor, transmission, tzdata, uboot,
util-linux, wireshark, wolfssl, wpa_supplicant, zstd
Issues resolved (http://bugs.uclibc.org):
#13516: utils/scanpypi: Failure when parsing diffoscope
#13541: 2021.02.rc2: irqbalance: Daemon couldn't be bound to..
#13576: Issues compiling buildroot for 5x86
#13581: jpegsrc.v9d.tar.gz has changed hash
#13616: tar file from git repository generation issue
2020.02.11, released February 17, 2021
Important / security related fixes.
+4 -8
View File
@@ -517,9 +517,6 @@ N: Christian Kellermann <christian.kellermann@solectrix.de>
F: package/python-pylibftdi/
N: Christian Stewart <christian@paral.in>
F: linux/linux-ext-aufs.mk
F: package/aufs/
F: package/aufs-util/
F: package/batman-adv/
F: package/docker-cli/
F: package/docker-containerd/
@@ -1504,6 +1501,7 @@ F: package/lua-flu/
F: package/lua-stdlib/
F: package/luaossl/
F: package/murata-cyw-fw/
F: package/python-typing-extensions/
F: package/rs485conf/
F: package/turbolua/
@@ -1793,7 +1791,7 @@ F: configs/galileo_defconfig
N: Nicolas Cavallari <nicolas.cavallari@green-communications.fr>
F: package/libgit2/
N: Nicolas Serafini <nicolas.serafini@sensefly.com>
N: Nicolas Serafini <nicolas.serafini@ik.me>
F: package/exiv2/
F: package/nvidia-tegra23/nvidia-tegra23-binaries/
F: package/nvidia-tegra23/nvidia-tegra23-codecs/
@@ -2137,6 +2135,8 @@ F: package/atftp/
F: package/c-periphery/
F: package/miraclecast/
F: package/python-pyasn/
F: package/opkg/
F: package/opkg-utils/
F: package/python-pysnmp/
F: package/python-pysnmp-mibs/
F: package/python-tornado/
@@ -2171,10 +2171,6 @@ F: package/ripgrep/
N: Santosh Multhalli <santosh.multhalli@rockwellcollins.com>
F: package/valijson/
N: Scott Fan <fancp2007@gmail.com>
F: package/libssh/
F: package/x11r7/xdriver_xf86-video-fbturbo/
N: Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
F: package/mmc-utils/
F: package/python-flask-jsonrpc/
+2 -2
View File
@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ all:
.PHONY: all
# Set and export the version string
export BR2_VERSION := 2020.02.11
export BR2_VERSION := 2020.02.12
# Actual time the release is cut (for reproducible builds)
BR2_VERSION_EPOCH = 1613590000
BR2_VERSION_EPOCH = 1617619000
# Save running make version since it's clobbered by the make package
RUNNING_MAKE_VERSION := $(MAKE_VERSION)
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
image boot.vfat {
vfat {
files = {
"MLO",
"u-boot.img",
"zImage",
"uEnv.txt",
"am335x-evm.dtb",
"am335x-evmsk.dtb",
"am335x-bone.dtb",
"am335x-boneblack.dtb",
}
}
size = 16M
}
image sdcard.img {
hdimage {
}
partition u-boot {
partition-type = 0xC
bootable = "true"
image = "boot.vfat"
}
partition rootfs {
partition-type = 0x83
image = "rootfs.ext4"
size = 512M
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
From f76a27996c34900f2c369a8a0d6ac72ae2faa988 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 16:01:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
The GUID will be used to properly detect and report UEFI Secure Boot
status to the x86 Linux kernel. The functionality will be added by
subsequent patches. The shim_lock protocol type is made public for
completeness.
Additionally, fix formatting of four preceding GUIDs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/commands/efi/shim_lock.c | 12 ------------
include/grub/efi/api.h | 19 +++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/efi/shim_lock.c b/grub-core/commands/efi/shim_lock.c
index 764098c..d8f52d7 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/efi/shim_lock.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/efi/shim_lock.c
@@ -27,18 +27,6 @@
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
-#define GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
- { 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, \
- { 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 } \
- }
-
-struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol
-{
- grub_efi_status_t
- (*verify) (void *buffer, grub_uint32_t size);
-};
-typedef struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t;
-
static grub_efi_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
static grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl;
diff --git a/include/grub/efi/api.h b/include/grub/efi/api.h
index cf1355a..13e5715 100644
--- a/include/grub/efi/api.h
+++ b/include/grub/efi/api.h
@@ -316,22 +316,27 @@
#define GRUB_EFI_SAL_TABLE_GUID \
{ 0xeb9d2d32, 0x2d88, 0x11d3, \
- { 0x9a, 0x16, 0x0, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d } \
+ { 0x9a, 0x16, 0x0, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d } \
}
#define GRUB_EFI_HCDP_TABLE_GUID \
{ 0xf951938d, 0x620b, 0x42ef, \
- { 0x82, 0x79, 0xa8, 0x4b, 0x79, 0x61, 0x78, 0x98 } \
+ { 0x82, 0x79, 0xa8, 0x4b, 0x79, 0x61, 0x78, 0x98 } \
}
#define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_TREE_GUID \
{ 0xb1b621d5, 0xf19c, 0x41a5, \
- { 0x83, 0x0b, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x2c, 0x69, 0xaa, 0xe0 } \
+ { 0x83, 0x0b, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x2c, 0x69, 0xaa, 0xe0 } \
}
#define GRUB_EFI_VENDOR_APPLE_GUID \
{ 0x2B0585EB, 0xD8B8, 0x49A9, \
- { 0x8B, 0x8C, 0xE2, 0x1B, 0x01, 0xAE, 0xF2, 0xB7 } \
+ { 0x8B, 0x8C, 0xE2, 0x1B, 0x01, 0xAE, 0xF2, 0xB7 } \
+ }
+
+#define GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
+ { 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, \
+ { 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 } \
}
struct grub_efi_sal_system_table
@@ -1689,6 +1694,12 @@ struct grub_efi_block_io
};
typedef struct grub_efi_block_io grub_efi_block_io_t;
+struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol
+{
+ grub_efi_status_t (*verify) (void *buffer, grub_uint32_t size);
+};
+typedef struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t;
+
#if (GRUB_TARGET_SIZEOF_VOID_P == 4) || defined (__ia64__) \
|| defined (__aarch64__) || defined (__MINGW64__) || defined (__CYGWIN__) \
|| defined(__riscv)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
From 04ae030d0eea8668d4417702d88bf2cf04713d80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 16:01:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This is needed to properly detect and report UEFI Secure Boot status
to the x86 Linux kernel. The functionality will be added by subsequent
patches.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/commands/efi/efifwsetup.c | 8 ++++----
grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 16 +++++++++-------
grub-core/video/efi_gop.c | 2 +-
include/grub/efi/efi.h | 7 ++++---
4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/efi/efifwsetup.c b/grub-core/commands/efi/efifwsetup.c
index 7a137a72a..eaca03283 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/efi/efifwsetup.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/efi/efifwsetup.c
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ grub_cmd_fwsetup (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
grub_size_t oi_size;
grub_efi_guid_t global = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- old_os_indications = grub_efi_get_variable ("OsIndications", &global,
- &oi_size);
+ grub_efi_get_variable ("OsIndications", &global, &oi_size,
+ (void **) &old_os_indications);
if (old_os_indications != NULL && oi_size == sizeof (os_indications))
os_indications |= *old_os_indications;
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ efifwsetup_is_supported (void)
grub_size_t oi_size = 0;
grub_efi_guid_t global = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- os_indications_supported = grub_efi_get_variable ("OsIndicationsSupported",
- &global, &oi_size);
+ grub_efi_get_variable ("OsIndicationsSupported", &global, &oi_size,
+ (void **) &os_indications_supported);
if (!os_indications_supported)
return 0;
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
index e0165e74c..9403b12cd 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
@@ -223,9 +223,9 @@ grub_efi_set_variable(const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_IO, "could not set EFI variable `%s'", var);
}
-void *
+grub_efi_status_t
grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
- grub_size_t *datasize_out)
+ grub_size_t *datasize_out, void **data_out)
{
grub_efi_status_t status;
grub_efi_uintn_t datasize = 0;
@@ -234,13 +234,14 @@ grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
void *data;
grub_size_t len, len16;
+ *data_out = NULL;
*datasize_out = 0;
len = grub_strlen (var);
len16 = len * GRUB_MAX_UTF16_PER_UTF8;
var16 = grub_calloc (len16 + 1, sizeof (var16[0]));
if (!var16)
- return NULL;
+ return GRUB_EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
len16 = grub_utf8_to_utf16 (var16, len16, (grub_uint8_t *) var, len, NULL);
var16[len16] = 0;
@@ -251,14 +252,14 @@ grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
if (status != GRUB_EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL || !datasize)
{
grub_free (var16);
- return NULL;
+ return status;
}
data = grub_malloc (datasize);
if (!data)
{
grub_free (var16);
- return NULL;
+ return GRUB_EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
status = efi_call_5 (r->get_variable, var16, guid, NULL, &datasize, data);
@@ -266,12 +267,13 @@ grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
if (status == GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
{
+ *data_out = data;
*datasize_out = datasize;
- return data;
+ return status;
}
grub_free (data);
- return NULL;
+ return status;
}
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-align"
diff --git a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
index be446f8d2..7fe0cdabf 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ grub_video_gop_get_edid (struct grub_video_edid_info *edid_info)
char edidname[] = "agp-internal-edid";
grub_size_t datasize;
grub_uint8_t *data;
- data = grub_efi_get_variable (edidname, &efi_var_guid, &datasize);
+ grub_efi_get_variable (edidname, &efi_var_guid, &datasize, (void **) &data);
if (data && datasize > 16)
{
copy_size = datasize - 16;
diff --git a/include/grub/efi/efi.h b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
index e90e00dc4..8b2a0f1f5 100644
--- a/include/grub/efi/efi.h
+++ b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
@@ -74,9 +74,10 @@ grub_err_t EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_set_virtual_address_map) (grub_efi_uintn_t memo
grub_efi_uintn_t descriptor_size,
grub_efi_uint32_t descriptor_version,
grub_efi_memory_descriptor_t *virtual_map);
-void *EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_get_variable) (const char *variable,
- const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
- grub_size_t *datasize_out);
+grub_efi_status_t EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_get_variable) (const char *variable,
+ const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
+ grub_size_t *datasize_out,
+ void **data_out);
grub_err_t
EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_set_variable) (const char *var,
const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
--
2.29.2
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From ac5c9367548750e75ed1e7fc4354a3d20186d733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 16:01:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
It will be used to properly detect and report UEFI Secure Boot status to
the x86 Linux kernel. The functionality will be added by subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
include/grub/efi/efi.h | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
index 9403b12cd..2942b8e35 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
@@ -224,8 +224,11 @@ grub_efi_set_variable(const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
}
grub_efi_status_t
-grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
- grub_size_t *datasize_out, void **data_out)
+grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes (const char *var,
+ const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
+ grub_size_t *datasize_out,
+ void **data_out,
+ grub_efi_uint32_t *attributes)
{
grub_efi_status_t status;
grub_efi_uintn_t datasize = 0;
@@ -262,7 +265,7 @@ grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
return GRUB_EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
- status = efi_call_5 (r->get_variable, var16, guid, NULL, &datasize, data);
+ status = efi_call_5 (r->get_variable, var16, guid, attributes, &datasize, data);
grub_free (var16);
if (status == GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
@@ -276,6 +279,13 @@ grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
return status;
}
+grub_efi_status_t
+grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
+ grub_size_t *datasize_out, void **data_out)
+{
+ return grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes (var, guid, datasize_out, data_out, NULL);
+}
+
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-align"
/* Search the mods section from the PE32/PE32+ image. This code uses
diff --git a/include/grub/efi/efi.h b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
index 8b2a0f1f5..83d958f99 100644
--- a/include/grub/efi/efi.h
+++ b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ grub_err_t EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_set_virtual_address_map) (grub_efi_uintn_t memo
grub_efi_uintn_t descriptor_size,
grub_efi_uint32_t descriptor_version,
grub_efi_memory_descriptor_t *virtual_map);
+grub_efi_status_t EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes) (const char *variable,
+ const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
+ grub_size_t *datasize_out,
+ void **data_out,
+ grub_efi_uint32_t *attributes);
grub_efi_status_t EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_get_variable) (const char *variable,
const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
grub_size_t *datasize_out,
--
2.29.2
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
From d7e54b2e5feee95d2f83058ed30d883c450d1473 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 16:01:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] efi: Add secure boot detection
Introduce grub_efi_get_secureboot() function which returns whether
UEFI Secure Boot is enabled or not on UEFI systems.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
[Add changes to generated files]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/Makefile.am | 1 +
grub-core/Makefile.core.am | 14 +++---
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 1 +
grub-core/Makefile.in | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/efi/sb.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++
po/POTFILES.in | 2 +
7 files changed, 225 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/sb.h
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.am b/grub-core/Makefile.am
index 3ea8e7f..c6ba5b2 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.am
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.am
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/command.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/device.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/disk.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/dl.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/efi/sb.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/env.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/env_private.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/err.h
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.am b/grub-core/Makefile.core.am
index a217716..f28b753 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.am
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.am
@@ -22421,7 +22421,7 @@ endif
if COND_i386_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/i386/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/i386/efi/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pmtimer.c kern/i386/efi/init.c bus/pci.c kern/i386/dl.c kern/i386/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/i386/efi/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pmtimer.c kern/i386/efi/init.c bus/pci.c kern/i386/dl.c kern/i386/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22531,7 +22531,7 @@ endif
if COND_x86_64_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/x86_64/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/i386/efi/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pmtimer.c kern/x86_64/efi/callwrap.S kern/i386/efi/init.c bus/pci.c kern/x86_64/dl.c kern/i386/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/i386/efi/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pmtimer.c kern/x86_64/efi/callwrap.S kern/i386/efi/init.c bus/pci.c kern/x86_64/dl.c kern/i386/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22707,7 +22707,7 @@ endif
if COND_ia64_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES =
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/ia64/efi/startup.S kern/ia64/efi/init.c kern/ia64/dl.c kern/ia64/dl_helper.c kern/ia64/cache.c lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/ia64/efi/startup.S kern/ia64/efi/init.c kern/ia64/dl.c kern/ia64/dl_helper.c kern/ia64/cache.c lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL) -fno-builtin -fpic -minline-int-divide-max-throughput
@@ -22773,7 +22773,7 @@ endif
if COND_arm_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/arm/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/arm/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/arm/dl.c kern/arm/dl_helper.c kern/arm/cache_armv6.S kern/arm/cache_armv7.S kern/arm/cache.c kern/arm/compiler-rt.S lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/arm/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/arm/dl.c kern/arm/dl_helper.c kern/arm/cache_armv6.S kern/arm/cache_armv7.S kern/arm/cache.c kern/arm/compiler-rt.S lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22795,7 +22795,7 @@ endif
if COND_arm64_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/arm64/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/arm64/cache.c kern/arm64/cache_flush.S kern/arm64/dl.c kern/arm64/dl_helper.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/arm64/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/arm64/cache.c kern/arm64/cache_flush.S kern/arm64/dl.c kern/arm64/dl_helper.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22839,7 +22839,7 @@ endif
if COND_riscv32_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/riscv/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/riscv/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/riscv/cache.c kern/riscv/cache_flush.S kern/riscv/dl.c lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/riscv/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/riscv/cache.c kern/riscv/cache_flush.S kern/riscv/dl.c lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22861,7 +22861,7 @@ endif
if COND_riscv64_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/riscv/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/riscv/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/riscv/cache.c kern/riscv/cache_flush.S kern/riscv/dl.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/riscv/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/riscv/cache.c kern/riscv/cache_flush.S kern/riscv/dl.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
index 474a63e..abd26cf 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ kernel = {
efi = term/efi/console.c;
efi = kern/acpi.c;
efi = kern/efi/acpi.c;
+ efi = kern/efi/sb.c;
i386_coreboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c;
i386_multiboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c;
i386_coreboot = kern/acpi.c;
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.in b/grub-core/Makefile.in
index d287607..8fb81ee 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.in
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.in
@@ -10468,32 +10468,33 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
kern/arm64/cache_flush.S kern/arm64/dl.c \
kern/arm64/dl_helper.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c \
kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c \
- kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
- kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c \
- kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c \
- kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c \
- kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c \
- kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/arm/startup.S \
- kern/arm/coreboot/init.c kern/arm/coreboot/timer.c \
- kern/arm/coreboot/coreboot.S lib/fdt.c bus/fdt.c term/ps2.c \
- term/arm/pl050.c term/arm/cros.c term/arm/cros_ec.c \
- bus/spi/rk3288_spi.c commands/keylayouts.c \
- kern/arm/coreboot/dma.c kern/arm/coreboot/cbtable.c \
- video/coreboot/cbfb.c kern/coreboot/mmap.c \
- kern/coreboot/cbtable.c term/gfxterm.c font/font.c \
- font/font_cmd.c io/bufio.c video/fb/fbblit.c video/fb/fbfill.c \
- video/fb/fbutil.c video/fb/video_fb.c video/video.c \
- kern/arm/dl.c kern/arm/dl_helper.c kern/arm/cache_armv6.S \
- kern/arm/cache_armv7.S kern/arm/cache.c kern/arm/compiler-rt.S \
- lib/division.c kern/arm/efi/startup.S kern/arm/efi/init.c \
- kern/arm/uboot/init.c kern/arm/uboot/uboot.S \
- disk/uboot/ubootdisk.c kern/uboot/uboot.c kern/uboot/init.c \
- kern/uboot/hw.c term/uboot/console.c term/terminfo.c \
- term/tparm.c commands/extcmd.c lib/arg.c disk/host.c \
- kern/emu/cache_s.S kern/emu/hostdisk.c osdep/unix/hostdisk.c \
- osdep/exec.c osdep/devmapper/hostdisk.c osdep/hostdisk.c \
- kern/emu/hostfs.c kern/emu/main.c kern/emu/argp_common.c \
- kern/emu/misc.c kern/emu/mm.c kern/emu/time.c kern/emu/cache.c \
+ kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c \
+ kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
+ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c \
+ kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c \
+ kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c \
+ kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c \
+ kern/arm/startup.S kern/arm/coreboot/init.c \
+ kern/arm/coreboot/timer.c kern/arm/coreboot/coreboot.S \
+ lib/fdt.c bus/fdt.c term/ps2.c term/arm/pl050.c \
+ term/arm/cros.c term/arm/cros_ec.c bus/spi/rk3288_spi.c \
+ commands/keylayouts.c kern/arm/coreboot/dma.c \
+ kern/arm/coreboot/cbtable.c video/coreboot/cbfb.c \
+ kern/coreboot/mmap.c kern/coreboot/cbtable.c term/gfxterm.c \
+ font/font.c font/font_cmd.c io/bufio.c video/fb/fbblit.c \
+ video/fb/fbfill.c video/fb/fbutil.c video/fb/video_fb.c \
+ video/video.c kern/arm/dl.c kern/arm/dl_helper.c \
+ kern/arm/cache_armv6.S kern/arm/cache_armv7.S kern/arm/cache.c \
+ kern/arm/compiler-rt.S lib/division.c kern/arm/efi/startup.S \
+ kern/arm/efi/init.c kern/arm/uboot/init.c \
+ kern/arm/uboot/uboot.S disk/uboot/ubootdisk.c \
+ kern/uboot/uboot.c kern/uboot/init.c kern/uboot/hw.c \
+ term/uboot/console.c term/terminfo.c term/tparm.c \
+ commands/extcmd.c lib/arg.c disk/host.c kern/emu/cache_s.S \
+ kern/emu/hostdisk.c osdep/unix/hostdisk.c osdep/exec.c \
+ osdep/devmapper/hostdisk.c osdep/hostdisk.c kern/emu/hostfs.c \
+ kern/emu/main.c kern/emu/argp_common.c kern/emu/misc.c \
+ kern/emu/mm.c kern/emu/time.c kern/emu/cache.c \
osdep/emuconsole.c osdep/dl.c osdep/sleep.c osdep/init.c \
osdep/emunet.c osdep/cputime.c kern/i386/coreboot/startup.S \
kern/i386/coreboot/init.c kern/i386/pc/acpi.c \
@@ -10580,6 +10581,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/kernel_exec-console.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -10651,6 +10653,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/kernel_exec-console.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -10686,6 +10689,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/kernel_exec-console.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -10881,6 +10885,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/kernel_exec-console.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -11109,6 +11114,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/kernel_exec-console.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -11271,6 +11277,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/kernel_exec-console.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -11360,6 +11367,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/kernel_exec-console.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -16380,6 +16388,7 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES = $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/cache.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/device.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/disk.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/dl.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/efi/sb.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/env.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/env_private.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/err.h \
@@ -25612,7 +25621,7 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/arm64/dl_helper.c disk/efi/efidisk.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
-@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c \
+@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@@ -25661,8 +25670,8 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c \
-@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
-@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
+@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c \
@@ -25739,7 +25748,7 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
-@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c \
+@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@@ -25851,7 +25860,7 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
-@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c \
+@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@@ -25959,9 +25968,9 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c \
-@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/acpi.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
-@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
-@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c \
+@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
+@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c \
+@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c \
@@ -25977,8 +25986,9 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c \
-@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c \
-@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c \
+@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
+@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c \
@@ -26022,7 +26032,8 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c \
-@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
+@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c \
@@ -27989,6 +28000,8 @@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT): kern/$(am__dirstamp) \
kern/$(DEPDIR)/$(am__dirstamp)
kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT): kern/efi/$(am__dirstamp) \
kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/$(am__dirstamp)
+kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT): kern/efi/$(am__dirstamp) \
+ kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/$(am__dirstamp)
kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT): kern/$(am__dirstamp) \
kern/$(DEPDIR)/$(am__dirstamp)
kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT): kern/$(am__dirstamp) \
@@ -30994,6 +31007,7 @@ distclean-compile:
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-fdt.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-init.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-mm.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-sb.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/emu/$(DEPDIR)/grub_emu-full.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/emu/$(DEPDIR)/grub_emu_lite-lite.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/emu/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-argp_common.Po@am__quote@
@@ -35285,6 +35299,20 @@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.obj: kern/efi/acpi.c
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC@am__nodep@)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.obj `if test -f 'kern/efi/acpi.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'kern/efi/acpi.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/kern/efi/acpi.c'; fi`
+kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.o: kern/efi/sb.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_CC)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.o -MD -MP -MF kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-sb.Tpo -c -o kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.o `test -f 'kern/efi/sb.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`kern/efi/sb.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_at)$(am__mv) kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-sb.Tpo kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-sb.Po
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC)source='kern/efi/sb.c' object='kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.o' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC@am__nodep@)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.o `test -f 'kern/efi/sb.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`kern/efi/sb.c
+
+kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.obj: kern/efi/sb.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_CC)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.obj -MD -MP -MF kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-sb.Tpo -c -o kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.obj `if test -f 'kern/efi/sb.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'kern/efi/sb.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/kern/efi/sb.c'; fi`
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_at)$(am__mv) kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-sb.Tpo kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-sb.Po
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC)source='kern/efi/sb.c' object='kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.obj' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC@am__nodep@)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.obj `if test -f 'kern/efi/sb.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'kern/efi/sb.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/kern/efi/sb.c'; fi`
+
kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.o: kern/compiler-rt.c
@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_CC)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.o -MD -MP -MF kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.Tpo -c -o kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.o `test -f 'kern/compiler-rt.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`kern/compiler-rt.c
@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_at)$(am__mv) kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.Tpo kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.Po
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19658d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * UEFI Secure Boot related checkings.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
+#include <grub/efi/pe32.h>
+#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/i386/linux.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ *
+ * Please keep the logic in sync with the Linux kernel,
+ * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
+ */
+grub_uint8_t
+grub_efi_get_secureboot (void)
+{
+ static grub_efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+ static grub_efi_guid_t efi_shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ grub_efi_status_t status;
+ grub_efi_uint32_t attr = 0;
+ grub_size_t size = 0;
+ grub_uint8_t *secboot = NULL;
+ grub_uint8_t *setupmode = NULL;
+ grub_uint8_t *moksbstate = NULL;
+ grub_uint8_t secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN;
+ const char *secureboot_str = "UNKNOWN";
+
+ status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
+ &size, (void **) &secboot);
+
+ if (status == GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ {
+ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+
+ status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
+ &size, (void **) &setupmode);
+
+ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((*secboot == 0) || (*setupmode == 1))
+ {
+ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
+ * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
+ * honor that.
+ */
+ status = grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes ("MokSBState", &efi_shim_lock_guid,
+ &size, (void **) &moksbstate, &attr);
+
+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */
+ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1)
+ {
+ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
+
+ out:
+ grub_free (moksbstate);
+ grub_free (setupmode);
+ grub_free (secboot);
+
+ if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED)
+ secureboot_str = "Disabled";
+ else if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
+ secureboot_str = "Enabled";
+
+ grub_dprintf ("efi", "UEFI Secure Boot state: %s\n", secureboot_str);
+
+ return secureboot;
+}
diff --git a/include/grub/efi/sb.h b/include/grub/efi/sb.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a33d985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/efi/sb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GRUB_EFI_SB_H
+#define GRUB_EFI_SB_H 1
+
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+
+#define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNSET 0
+#define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN 1
+#define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED 2
+#define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED 3
+
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+extern grub_uint8_t
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_get_secureboot) (void);
+#else
+static inline grub_uint8_t
+grub_efi_get_secureboot (void)
+{
+ return GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNSET;
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* GRUB_EFI_SB_H */
diff --git a/po/POTFILES.in b/po/POTFILES.in
index 5574cbe..22543be 100644
--- a/po/POTFILES.in
+++ b/po/POTFILES.in
@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@
./grub-core/kern/efi/fdt.c
./grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
./grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
+./grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
./grub-core/kern/elf.c
./grub-core/kern/elfXX.c
./grub-core/kern/emu/argp_common.c
@@ -1053,6 +1054,7 @@
./include/grub/efi/memory.h
./include/grub/efi/pci.h
./include/grub/efi/pe32.h
+./include/grub/efi/sb.h
./include/grub/efi/tpm.h
./include/grub/efi/uga_draw.h
./include/grub/efiemu/efiemu.h
--
2.14.2
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
From 578c95298bcc46e0296f4c786db64c2ff26ce2cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] kern: Add lockdown support
When the GRUB starts on a secure boot platform, some commands can be
used to subvert the protections provided by the verification mechanism and
could lead to booting untrusted system.
To prevent that situation, allow GRUB to be locked down. That way the code
may check if GRUB has been locked down and further restrict the commands
that are registered or what subset of their functionality could be used.
The lockdown support adds the following components:
* The grub_lockdown() function which can be used to lockdown GRUB if,
e.g., UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.
* The grub_is_lockdown() function which can be used to check if the GRUB
was locked down.
* A verifier that flags OS kernels, the GRUB modules, Device Trees and ACPI
tables as GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH to defer verification to other
verifiers. These files are only successfully verified if another registered
verifier returns success. Otherwise, the whole verification process fails.
For example, PE/COFF binaries verification can be done by the shim_lock
verifier which validates the signatures using the shim_lock protocol.
However, the verification is not deferred directly to the shim_lock verifier.
The shim_lock verifier is hooked into the verification process instead.
* A set of grub_{command,extcmd}_lockdown functions that can be used by
code registering command handlers, to only register unsafe commands if
the GRUB has not been locked down.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
[Add changes to generated files]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
Makefile.in | 2 ++
conf/Makefile.common | 2 ++
docs/grub-dev.texi | 27 +++++++++++++++
docs/grub.texi | 8 +++++
grub-core/Makefile.am | 5 ++-
grub-core/Makefile.core.am | 14 ++++----
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 1 +
grub-core/Makefile.in | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
grub-core/commands/extcmd.c | 23 +++++++++++++
grub-core/kern/command.c | 24 ++++++++++++++
grub-core/kern/lockdown.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/command.h | 5 +++
include/grub/extcmd.h | 7 ++++
include/grub/lockdown.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
po/POTFILES.in | 2 ++
15 files changed, 290 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
create mode 100644 include/grub/lockdown.h
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index e6a185b..ecb3278 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -2617,7 +2617,9 @@ CPPFLAGS_PARTTOOL_LIST = -Dgrub_parttool_register=PARTTOOL_LIST_MARKER
CPPFLAGS_TERMINAL_LIST = '-Dgrub_term_register_input(...)=INPUT_TERMINAL_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
'-Dgrub_term_register_output(...)=OUTPUT_TERMINAL_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST = '-Dgrub_register_command(...)=COMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
+ '-Dgrub_register_command_lockdown(...)=COMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
'-Dgrub_register_extcmd(...)=EXTCOMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
+ '-Dgrub_register_extcmd_lockdown(...)=EXTCOMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
'-Dgrub_register_command_p1(...)=P1COMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_FDT_LIST := '-Dgrub_fdtbus_register(...)=FDT_DRIVER_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_MARKER = $(CPPFLAGS_FS_LIST) $(CPPFLAGS_VIDEO_LIST) \
diff --git a/conf/Makefile.common b/conf/Makefile.common
index 6cd71cb..2a1a886 100644
--- a/conf/Makefile.common
+++ b/conf/Makefile.common
@@ -84,7 +84,9 @@ CPPFLAGS_PARTTOOL_LIST = -Dgrub_parttool_register=PARTTOOL_LIST_MARKER
CPPFLAGS_TERMINAL_LIST = '-Dgrub_term_register_input(...)=INPUT_TERMINAL_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_TERMINAL_LIST += '-Dgrub_term_register_output(...)=OUTPUT_TERMINAL_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST = '-Dgrub_register_command(...)=COMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
+CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST += '-Dgrub_register_command_lockdown(...)=COMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST += '-Dgrub_register_extcmd(...)=EXTCOMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
+CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST += '-Dgrub_register_extcmd_lockdown(...)=EXTCOMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST += '-Dgrub_register_command_p1(...)=P1COMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_FDT_LIST := '-Dgrub_fdtbus_register(...)=FDT_DRIVER_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_MARKER = $(CPPFLAGS_FS_LIST) $(CPPFLAGS_VIDEO_LIST) \
diff --git a/docs/grub-dev.texi b/docs/grub-dev.texi
index ee389fd..635ec72 100644
--- a/docs/grub-dev.texi
+++ b/docs/grub-dev.texi
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ This edition documents version @value{VERSION}.
* PFF2 Font File Format::
* Graphical Menu Software Design::
* Verifiers framework::
+* Lockdown framework::
* Copying This Manual:: Copying This Manual
* Index::
@end menu
@@ -2086,6 +2087,32 @@ Optionally at the end of the file @samp{fini}, if it exists, is called with just
the context. If you return no error during any of @samp{init}, @samp{write} and
@samp{fini} then the file is considered as having succeded verification.
+@node Lockdown framework
+@chapter Lockdown framework
+
+The GRUB can be locked down, which is a restricted mode where some operations
+are not allowed. For instance, some commands cannot be used when the GRUB is
+locked down.
+
+The function
+@code{grub_lockdown()} is used to lockdown GRUB and the function
+@code{grub_is_lockdown()} function can be used to check whether lockdown is
+enabled or not. When enabled, the function returns @samp{GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED}
+and @samp{GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED} when is not enabled.
+
+The following functions can be used to register the commands that can only be
+used when lockdown is disabled:
+
+@itemize
+
+@item @code{grub_cmd_lockdown()} registers command which should not run when the
+GRUB is in lockdown mode.
+
+@item @code{grub_cmd_lockdown()} registers extended command which should not run
+when the GRUB is in lockdown mode.
+
+@end itemize
+
@node Copying This Manual
@appendix Copying This Manual
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index aefe032..a25459f 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -5581,6 +5581,7 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
* Using digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files
* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components
+* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
@end menu
@node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -5795,6 +5796,13 @@ into @file{core.img} in order to avoid a potential gap in measurement between
Measured boot is currently only supported on EFI platforms.
+@node Lockdown
+@section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
+
+The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example
+if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
+be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed.
+
@node Platform limitations
@chapter Platform limitations
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.am b/grub-core/Makefile.am
index cc6fc7d..30e23ad 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.am
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.am
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/fs.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/i18n.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/kernel.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/list.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lockdown.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/misc.h
if COND_emu
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/compiler-rt-emu.h
@@ -377,8 +378,10 @@ command.lst: $(MARKER_FILES)
b=`basename $$pp .marker`; \
sed -n \
-e "/EXTCOMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \
+ -e "/EXTCOMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \
-e "/P1COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \
- -e "/COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" $$pp; \
+ -e "/COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" \
+ -e "/COMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" $$pp; \
done) | sort -u > $@
platform_DATA += command.lst
CLEANFILES += command.lst
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.am b/grub-core/Makefile.core.am
index 5623a5e..fbfb627 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.am
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.am
@@ -22378,7 +22378,7 @@ endif
if COND_i386_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/i386/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/i386/efi/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pmtimer.c kern/i386/efi/init.c bus/pci.c kern/i386/dl.c kern/i386/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/i386/efi/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pmtimer.c kern/i386/efi/init.c bus/pci.c kern/i386/dl.c kern/i386/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22488,7 +22488,7 @@ endif
if COND_x86_64_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/x86_64/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/i386/efi/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pmtimer.c kern/x86_64/efi/callwrap.S kern/i386/efi/init.c bus/pci.c kern/x86_64/dl.c kern/i386/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/i386/efi/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pmtimer.c kern/x86_64/efi/callwrap.S kern/i386/efi/init.c bus/pci.c kern/x86_64/dl.c kern/i386/tsc.c kern/i386/tsc_pit.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22664,7 +22664,7 @@ endif
if COND_ia64_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES =
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/ia64/efi/startup.S kern/ia64/efi/init.c kern/ia64/dl.c kern/ia64/dl_helper.c kern/ia64/cache.c lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/ia64/efi/startup.S kern/ia64/efi/init.c kern/ia64/dl.c kern/ia64/dl_helper.c kern/ia64/cache.c lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL) -fno-builtin -fpic -minline-int-divide-max-throughput
@@ -22730,7 +22730,7 @@ endif
if COND_arm_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/arm/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/arm/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/arm/dl.c kern/arm/dl_helper.c kern/arm/cache_armv6.S kern/arm/cache_armv7.S kern/arm/cache.c kern/arm/compiler-rt.S lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/arm/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/arm/dl.c kern/arm/dl_helper.c kern/arm/cache_armv6.S kern/arm/cache_armv7.S kern/arm/cache.c kern/arm/compiler-rt.S lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22752,7 +22752,7 @@ endif
if COND_arm64_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/arm64/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/arm64/cache.c kern/arm64/cache_flush.S kern/arm64/dl.c kern/arm64/dl_helper.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/arm64/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/arm64/cache.c kern/arm64/cache_flush.S kern/arm64/dl.c kern/arm64/dl_helper.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22796,7 +22796,7 @@ endif
if COND_riscv32_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/riscv/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/riscv/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/riscv/cache.c kern/riscv/cache_flush.S kern/riscv/dl.c lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/riscv/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/riscv/cache.c kern/riscv/cache_flush.S kern/riscv/dl.c lib/division.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
@@ -22818,7 +22818,7 @@ endif
if COND_riscv64_efi
platform_PROGRAMS += kernel.exec
kernel_exec_SOURCES = kern/riscv/efi/startup.S
-kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/riscv/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/riscv/cache.c kern/riscv/cache_flush.S kern/riscv/dl.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
+kernel_exec_SOURCES += kern/riscv/efi/init.c kern/efi/fdt.c kern/riscv/cache.c kern/riscv/cache_flush.S kern/riscv/dl.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c
nodist_kernel_exec_SOURCES = symlist.c ## platform nodist sources
kernel_exec_LDADD =
kernel_exec_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_KERNEL)
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
index 4d380ed..ee8dc55 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ kernel = {
efi = kern/acpi.c;
efi = kern/efi/acpi.c;
efi = kern/efi/sb.c;
+ efi = kern/lockdown.c;
i386_coreboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c;
i386_multiboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c;
i386_coreboot = kern/acpi.c;
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.in b/grub-core/Makefile.in
index 09dc802..ac400ea 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.in
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.in
@@ -10457,13 +10457,14 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
kern/arm64/cache_flush.S kern/arm64/dl.c \
kern/arm64/dl_helper.c disk/efi/efidisk.c kern/efi/efi.c \
kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c \
- kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c \
- kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
- kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c \
- kern/err.c kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c \
- kern/misc.c kern/parser.c kern/partition.c \
- kern/rescue_parser.c kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c \
- kern/verifiers.c kern/arm/startup.S kern/arm/coreboot/init.c \
+ kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c \
+ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c \
+ kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c \
+ kern/file.c kern/fs.c kern/list.c kern/main.c kern/misc.c \
+ kern/parser.c kern/partition.c kern/rescue_parser.c \
+ kern/rescue_reader.c kern/term.c kern/verifiers.c \
+ kern/arm/startup.S kern/arm/coreboot/init.c \
kern/arm/coreboot/timer.c kern/arm/coreboot/coreboot.S \
lib/fdt.c bus/fdt.c term/ps2.c term/arm/pl050.c \
term/arm/cros.c term/arm/cros_ec.c bus/spi/rk3288_spi.c \
@@ -10572,6 +10573,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_FALSE@@COND_sparc64_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -10646,6 +10648,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_FALSE@@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -10683,6 +10686,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_FALSE@@COND_mips_arc_FALSE@@COND_mips_loongson_FALSE@@COND_mips_qemu_mips_FALSE@@COND_powerpc_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -10884,6 +10888,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_FALSE@@COND_i386_ieee1275_FALSE@@COND_i386_multiboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_pc_FALSE@@COND_i386_qemu_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_FALSE@@COND_i386_xen_pvh_FALSE@@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -11120,6 +11125,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_uboot_FALSE@@COND_emu_FALSE@@COND_i386_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -11287,6 +11293,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_FALSE@@COND_arm_coreboot_FALSE@@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -11379,6 +11386,7 @@ am__kernel_exec_SOURCES_DIST = kern/arm64/efi/startup.S \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT) \
+@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT) \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/kernel_exec-time.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -15379,7 +15387,9 @@ CPPFLAGS_PARTTOOL_LIST = -Dgrub_parttool_register=PARTTOOL_LIST_MARKER
CPPFLAGS_TERMINAL_LIST = '-Dgrub_term_register_input(...)=INPUT_TERMINAL_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
'-Dgrub_term_register_output(...)=OUTPUT_TERMINAL_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST = '-Dgrub_register_command(...)=COMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
+ '-Dgrub_register_command_lockdown(...)=COMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
'-Dgrub_register_extcmd(...)=EXTCOMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
+ '-Dgrub_register_extcmd_lockdown(...)=EXTCOMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' \
'-Dgrub_register_command_p1(...)=P1COMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_FDT_LIST := '-Dgrub_fdtbus_register(...)=FDT_DRIVER_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)'
CPPFLAGS_MARKER = $(CPPFLAGS_FS_LIST) $(CPPFLAGS_VIDEO_LIST) \
@@ -16387,6 +16397,7 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES = $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/cache.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/i18n.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/kernel.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/list.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lockdown.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/misc.h $(am__append_5794) \
$(am__append_5795) $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/mm.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/parser.h \
@@ -25594,7 +25605,8 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
-@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
+@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@COND_arm64_efi_TRUE@ kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c \
@@ -25645,7 +25657,8 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
-@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
+@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@COND_arm_efi_TRUE@ kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c \
@@ -25725,7 +25738,8 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
-@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
+@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@COND_i386_efi_TRUE@ kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c \
@@ -25843,7 +25857,8 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
-@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
+@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@COND_ia64_efi_TRUE@ kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c \
@@ -25956,8 +25971,9 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/init.c kern/efi/mm.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ term/efi/console.c kern/acpi.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/acpi.c kern/efi/sb.c \
-@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c \
-@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c \
+@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/lockdown.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
+@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c \
@COND_riscv32_efi_TRUE@ kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c \
@@ -25974,9 +25990,9 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c \
-@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
-@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
-@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c \
+@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c \
+@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c \
+@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/time.c kern/generic/millisleep.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/command.c kern/corecmd.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/device.c kern/disk.c kern/dl.c \
@COND_riscv64_efi_TRUE@ kern/env.c kern/err.c kern/file.c \
@@ -26022,8 +26038,8 @@ gcry_whirlpool_module_DEPENDENCIES = $(TARGET_OBJ2ELF)
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/efi.c kern/efi/init.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/mm.c term/efi/console.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/acpi.c kern/efi/acpi.c \
-@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/sb.c kern/compiler-rt.c \
-@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
+@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/efi/sb.c kern/lockdown.c \
+@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/compiler-rt.c kern/mm.c kern/time.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/generic/millisleep.c kern/command.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/corecmd.c kern/device.c kern/disk.c \
@COND_x86_64_efi_TRUE@ kern/dl.c kern/env.c kern/err.c \
@@ -27994,6 +28010,8 @@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-acpi.$(OBJEXT): kern/efi/$(am__dirstamp) \
kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/$(am__dirstamp)
kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.$(OBJEXT): kern/efi/$(am__dirstamp) \
kern/efi/$(DEPDIR)/$(am__dirstamp)
+kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.$(OBJEXT): kern/$(am__dirstamp) \
+ kern/$(DEPDIR)/$(am__dirstamp)
kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.$(OBJEXT): kern/$(am__dirstamp) \
kern/$(DEPDIR)/$(am__dirstamp)
kern/kernel_exec-mm.$(OBJEXT): kern/$(am__dirstamp) \
@@ -30945,6 +30963,7 @@ distclean-compile:
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-file.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-fs.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-list.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-lockdown.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-main.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-misc.Po@am__quote@
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-mm.Po@am__quote@
@@ -35293,6 +35312,20 @@ kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.obj: kern/efi/sb.c
@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC@am__nodep@)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o kern/efi/kernel_exec-sb.obj `if test -f 'kern/efi/sb.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'kern/efi/sb.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/kern/efi/sb.c'; fi`
+kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.o: kern/lockdown.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_CC)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.o -MD -MP -MF kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-lockdown.Tpo -c -o kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.o `test -f 'kern/lockdown.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`kern/lockdown.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_at)$(am__mv) kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-lockdown.Tpo kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-lockdown.Po
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC)source='kern/lockdown.c' object='kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.o' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC@am__nodep@)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.o `test -f 'kern/lockdown.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`kern/lockdown.c
+
+kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.obj: kern/lockdown.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_CC)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.obj -MD -MP -MF kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-lockdown.Tpo -c -o kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.obj `if test -f 'kern/lockdown.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'kern/lockdown.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/kern/lockdown.c'; fi`
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_at)$(am__mv) kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-lockdown.Tpo kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-lockdown.Po
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC)source='kern/lockdown.c' object='kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.obj' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@ $(AM_V_CC@am__nodep@)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o kern/kernel_exec-lockdown.obj `if test -f 'kern/lockdown.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'kern/lockdown.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/kern/lockdown.c'; fi`
+
kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.o: kern/compiler-rt.c
@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_CC)$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(kernel_exec_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(kernel_exec_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.o -MD -MP -MF kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.Tpo -c -o kern/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.o `test -f 'kern/compiler-rt.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`kern/compiler-rt.c
@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@ $(AM_V_at)$(am__mv) kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.Tpo kern/$(DEPDIR)/kernel_exec-compiler-rt.Po
@@ -46650,8 +46683,10 @@ command.lst: $(MARKER_FILES)
b=`basename $$pp .marker`; \
sed -n \
-e "/EXTCOMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \
+ -e "/EXTCOMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \
-e "/P1COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \
- -e "/COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" $$pp; \
+ -e "/COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" \
+ -e "/COMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" $$pp; \
done) | sort -u > $@
partmap.lst: $(MARKER_FILES)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c b/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c
index 69574e2..90a5ca2 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/list.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#include <grub/misc.h>
#include <grub/extcmd.h>
#include <grub/script_sh.h>
@@ -110,6 +111,28 @@ grub_register_extcmd (const char *name, grub_extcmd_func_t func,
summary, description, parser, 1);
}
+static grub_err_t
+grub_extcmd_lockdown (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ int argc __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ char **argv __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+ N_("%s: the command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced"),
+ ctxt->extcmd->cmd->name);
+}
+
+grub_extcmd_t
+grub_register_extcmd_lockdown (const char *name, grub_extcmd_func_t func,
+ grub_command_flags_t flags, const char *summary,
+ const char *description,
+ const struct grub_arg_option *parser)
+{
+ if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ func = grub_extcmd_lockdown;
+
+ return grub_register_extcmd (name, func, flags, summary, description, parser);
+}
+
void
grub_unregister_extcmd (grub_extcmd_t ext)
{
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/command.c b/grub-core/kern/command.c
index acd7218..4aabcd4 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/command.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/command.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/command.h>
@@ -77,6 +78,29 @@ grub_register_command_prio (const char *name,
return cmd;
}
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_lockdown (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ int argc __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ char **argv __attribute__ ((unused)))
+
+{
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+ N_("%s: the command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced"),
+ cmd->name);
+}
+
+grub_command_t
+grub_register_command_lockdown (const char *name,
+ grub_command_func_t func,
+ const char *summary,
+ const char *description)
+{
+ if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ func = grub_cmd_lockdown;
+
+ return grub_register_command_prio (name, func, summary, description, 0);
+}
+
void
grub_unregister_command (grub_command_t cmd)
{
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c b/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e56c0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/verify.h>
+
+static int lockdown = GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED;
+
+static grub_err_t
+lockdown_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ enum grub_file_type type,
+ void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
+{
+ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
+
+ switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
+ {
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XEN_HYPERVISOR:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NTLDR:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TRUECRYPT:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FREEDOS:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PXECHAINLOADER:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PCCHAINLOADER:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_COREBOOT_CHAINLOADER:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ACPI_TABLE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_DEVICE_TREE_IMAGE:
+ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH;
+
+ /* Fall through. */
+
+ default:
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
+struct grub_file_verifier lockdown_verifier =
+ {
+ .name = "lockdown_verifier",
+ .init = lockdown_verifier_init,
+ };
+
+void
+grub_lockdown (void)
+{
+ lockdown = GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED;
+
+ grub_verifier_register (&lockdown_verifier);
+}
+
+int
+grub_is_lockdown (void)
+{
+ return lockdown;
+}
diff --git a/include/grub/command.h b/include/grub/command.h
index eee4e84..2a6f7f8 100644
--- a/include/grub/command.h
+++ b/include/grub/command.h
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_command_prio) (const char *name,
const char *summary,
const char *description,
int prio);
+grub_command_t
+EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_command_lockdown) (const char *name,
+ grub_command_func_t func,
+ const char *summary,
+ const char *description);
void EXPORT_FUNC(grub_unregister_command) (grub_command_t cmd);
static inline grub_command_t
diff --git a/include/grub/extcmd.h b/include/grub/extcmd.h
index 19fe592..fe9248b 100644
--- a/include/grub/extcmd.h
+++ b/include/grub/extcmd.h
@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ grub_extcmd_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_extcmd) (const char *name,
const char *description,
const struct grub_arg_option *parser);
+grub_extcmd_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_extcmd_lockdown) (const char *name,
+ grub_extcmd_func_t func,
+ grub_command_flags_t flags,
+ const char *summary,
+ const char *description,
+ const struct grub_arg_option *parser);
+
grub_extcmd_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_extcmd_prio) (const char *name,
grub_extcmd_func_t func,
grub_command_flags_t flags,
diff --git a/include/grub/lockdown.h b/include/grub/lockdown.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40531fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/lockdown.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GRUB_LOCKDOWN_H
+#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_H 1
+
+#include <grub/symbol.h>
+
+#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED 0
+#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED 1
+
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+extern void
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown) (void);
+extern int
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_is_lockdown) (void);
+#else
+static inline void
+grub_lockdown (void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int
+grub_is_lockdown (void)
+{
+ return GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED;
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* ! GRUB_LOCKDOWN_H */
diff --git a/po/POTFILES.in b/po/POTFILES.in
index 49755d3..5e26845 100644
--- a/po/POTFILES.in
+++ b/po/POTFILES.in
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@
./grub-core/kern/ieee1275/mmap.c
./grub-core/kern/ieee1275/openfw.c
./grub-core/kern/list.c
+./grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
./grub-core/kern/main.c
./grub-core/kern/mips/arc/init.c
./grub-core/kern/mips/dl.c
@@ -1207,6 +1208,7 @@
./include/grub/linux.h
./include/grub/list.h
./include/grub/loader.h
+./include/grub/lockdown.h
./include/grub/lvm.h
./include/grub/macho.h
./include/grub/machoload.h
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From d90367471779c240e002e62edfb6b31fc85b4908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 19:59:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] kern/lockdown: Set a variable if the GRUB is locked down
It may be useful for scripts to determine whether the GRUB is locked
down or not. Add the lockdown variable which is set to "y" when the GRUB
is locked down.
Suggested-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <xnox@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 3 +++
grub-core/kern/lockdown.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index a25459f..bdbb329 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -5803,6 +5803,9 @@ The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for exampl
if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed.
+The @samp{lockdown} variable is set to @samp{y} when the GRUB is locked down.
+Otherwise it does not exit.
+
@node Platform limitations
@chapter Platform limitations
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c b/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
index 1e56c0b..0bc70fd 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
*/
#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/file.h>
#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#include <grub/verify.h>
@@ -71,6 +72,9 @@ grub_lockdown (void)
lockdown = GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED;
grub_verifier_register (&lockdown_verifier);
+
+ grub_env_set ("lockdown", "y");
+ grub_env_export ("lockdown");
}
int
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From 98b00a403cbf2ba6833d1ac0499871b27a08eb77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] efi: Lockdown the GRUB when the UEFI Secure Boot is enabled
If the UEFI Secure Boot is enabled then the GRUB must be locked down
to prevent executing code that can potentially be used to subvert its
verification mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/kern/efi/init.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
index b683bec..1333465 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <grub/efi/console.h>
#include <grub/efi/disk.h>
#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#include <grub/term.h>
#include <grub/misc.h>
#include <grub/env.h>
@@ -40,8 +41,15 @@ grub_efi_init (void)
/* Initialize the memory management system. */
grub_efi_mm_init ();
- /* Register the shim_lock verifier if UEFI Secure Boot is enabled. */
- grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup ();
+ /*
+ * Lockdown the GRUB and register the shim_lock verifier
+ * if the UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.
+ */
+ if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
+ {
+ grub_lockdown ();
+ grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup ();
+ }
efi_call_4 (grub_efi_system_table->boot_services->set_watchdog_timer,
0, 0, 0, NULL);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
From 8f73052885892bc0dbc01e297f79d7cf4925e491 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] efi: Use grub_is_lockdown() instead of hardcoding a disabled
modules list
Now the GRUB can check if it has been locked down and this can be used to
prevent executing commands that can be utilized to circumvent the UEFI
Secure Boot mechanisms. So, instead of hardcoding a list of modules that
have to be disabled, prevent the usage of commands that can be dangerous.
This not only allows the commands to be disabled on other platforms, but
also properly separate the concerns. Since the shim_lock verifier logic
should be only about preventing to run untrusted binaries and not about
defining these kind of policies.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 15 +++++++++------
grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c | 5 +++--
grub-core/commands/iorw.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
grub-core/commands/memrw.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 41 -----------------------------------------
5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index bdbb329..bbe60a4 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -5256,6 +5256,9 @@ only applies to the particular cpu/core/thread that runs the command.
Also, if you specify a reserved or unimplemented MSR address, it will
cause a general protection exception (which is not currently being handled)
and the system will reboot.
+
+Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
+ This is done to prevent subverting various security mechanisms.
@end deffn
@node xen_hypervisor
@@ -5752,12 +5755,12 @@ boot and the shim. This functionality is provided by the shim_lock verifier. It
is built into the @file{core.img} and is registered if the UEFI secure boot is
enabled.
-All modules not stored in the @file{core.img} and the ACPI tables for the
-@command{acpi} command have to be signed, e.g. using PGP. Additionally, the
-@command{iorw}, the @command{memrw} and the @command{wrmsr} commands are
-prohibited if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. This is done due to
-security reasons. All above mentioned requirements are enforced by the
-shim_lock verifier logic.
+All GRUB modules not stored in the @file{core.img}, OS kernels, ACPI tables,
+Device Trees, etc. have to be signed, e.g, using PGP. Additionally, the commands
+that can be used to subvert the UEFI secure boot mechanism, such as @command{iorw}
+and @command{memrw} will not be available when the UEFI secure boot is enabled.
+This is done for security reasons and are enforced by the GRUB Lockdown mechanism
+(@pxref{Lockdown}).
@node Measured Boot
@section Measuring boot components
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c b/grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c
index 9c5e510..56a29c2 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/command.h>
#include <grub/extcmd.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
#include <grub/i386/cpuid.h>
#include <grub/i386/wrmsr.h>
@@ -83,8 +84,8 @@ grub_cmd_msr_write (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char
GRUB_MOD_INIT(wrmsr)
{
- cmd_write = grub_register_command ("wrmsr", grub_cmd_msr_write, N_("ADDR VALUE"),
- N_("Write a value to a CPU model specific register."));
+ cmd_write = grub_register_command_lockdown ("wrmsr", grub_cmd_msr_write, N_("ADDR VALUE"),
+ N_("Write a value to a CPU model specific register."));
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(wrmsr)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/iorw.c b/grub-core/commands/iorw.c
index a0c164e..584baec 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/iorw.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/iorw.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/cpu/io.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -131,17 +132,17 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memrw)
N_("PORT"), N_("Read 32-bit value from PORT."),
options);
cmd_write_byte =
- grub_register_command ("outb", grub_cmd_write,
- N_("PORT VALUE [MASK]"),
- N_("Write 8-bit VALUE to PORT."));
+ grub_register_command_lockdown ("outb", grub_cmd_write,
+ N_("PORT VALUE [MASK]"),
+ N_("Write 8-bit VALUE to PORT."));
cmd_write_word =
- grub_register_command ("outw", grub_cmd_write,
- N_("PORT VALUE [MASK]"),
- N_("Write 16-bit VALUE to PORT."));
+ grub_register_command_lockdown ("outw", grub_cmd_write,
+ N_("PORT VALUE [MASK]"),
+ N_("Write 16-bit VALUE to PORT."));
cmd_write_dword =
- grub_register_command ("outl", grub_cmd_write,
- N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),
- N_("Write 32-bit VALUE to PORT."));
+ grub_register_command_lockdown ("outl", grub_cmd_write,
+ N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),
+ N_("Write 32-bit VALUE to PORT."));
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(memrw)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/memrw.c b/grub-core/commands/memrw.c
index 98769ea..d401a6d 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/memrw.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/memrw.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <grub/extcmd.h>
#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -133,17 +134,17 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memrw)
N_("ADDR"), N_("Read 32-bit value from ADDR."),
options);
cmd_write_byte =
- grub_register_command ("write_byte", grub_cmd_write,
- N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),
- N_("Write 8-bit VALUE to ADDR."));
+ grub_register_command_lockdown ("write_byte", grub_cmd_write,
+ N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),
+ N_("Write 8-bit VALUE to ADDR."));
cmd_write_word =
- grub_register_command ("write_word", grub_cmd_write,
- N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),
- N_("Write 16-bit VALUE to ADDR."));
+ grub_register_command_lockdown ("write_word", grub_cmd_write,
+ N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),
+ N_("Write 16-bit VALUE to ADDR."));
cmd_write_dword =
- grub_register_command ("write_dword", grub_cmd_write,
- N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),
- N_("Write 32-bit VALUE to ADDR."));
+ grub_register_command_lockdown ("write_dword", grub_cmd_write,
+ N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"),
+ N_("Write 32-bit VALUE to ADDR."));
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(memrw)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
index ce3b7f6..5d7210a 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
@@ -30,9 +30,6 @@
static grub_efi_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-/* List of modules which cannot be loaded if UEFI secure boot mode is enabled. */
-static const char * const disabled_mods[] = {"iorw", "memrw", NULL};
-
/*
* Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
*
@@ -121,53 +118,15 @@ shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),
enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
{
- const char *b, *e;
- int i;
-
*flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
{
- case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE:
- /* Establish GRUB module name. */
- b = grub_strrchr (io->name, '/');
- e = grub_strrchr (io->name, '.');
-
- b = b ? (b + 1) : io->name;
- e = e ? e : io->name + grub_strlen (io->name);
- e = (e > b) ? e : io->name + grub_strlen (io->name);
-
- for (i = 0; disabled_mods[i]; i++)
- if (!grub_strncmp (b, disabled_mods[i], grub_strlen (b) - grub_strlen (e)))
- {
- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
- N_("module cannot be loaded in UEFI secure boot mode: %s"),
- io->name);
- return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
- }
-
- /* Fall through. */
-
- case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ACPI_TABLE:
- case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_DEVICE_TREE_IMAGE:
- *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH;
-
- return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
-
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL:
- for (i = 0; disabled_mods[i]; i++)
- if (grub_dl_get (disabled_mods[i]))
- {
- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
- N_("cannot boot due to dangerous module in memory: %s"),
- disabled_mods[i]);
- return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
- }
-
*flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK;
/* Fall through. */
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
From 3e8e4c0549240fa209acffceb473e1e509b50c95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:41 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] acpi: Don't register the acpi command when locked down
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced. Otherwise an
attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to overwrite
the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute
unsigned code.
Fixes: CVE-2020-14372
Reported-by: Máté Kukri <km@mkukri.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 5 +++++
grub-core/commands/acpi.c | 15 ++++++++-------
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index bbe60a4..98592d3 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -3986,6 +3986,11 @@ Normally, this command will replace the Root System Description Pointer
(RSDP) in the Extended BIOS Data Area to point to the new tables. If the
@option{--no-ebda} option is used, the new tables will be known only to
GRUB, but may be used by GRUB's EFI emulation.
+
+Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
+ Otherwise an attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to
+ overwrite the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute
+ unsigned code.
@end deffn
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/acpi.c b/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
index 5a1499a..1215f2a 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/memory.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
@@ -775,13 +776,13 @@ static grub_extcmd_t cmd;
GRUB_MOD_INIT(acpi)
{
- cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("acpi", grub_cmd_acpi, 0,
- N_("[-1|-2] [--exclude=TABLE1,TABLE2|"
- "--load-only=TABLE1,TABLE2] FILE1"
- " [FILE2] [...]"),
- N_("Load host ACPI tables and tables "
- "specified by arguments."),
- options);
+ cmd = grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("acpi", grub_cmd_acpi, 0,
+ N_("[-1|-2] [--exclude=TABLE1,TABLE2|"
+ "--load-only=TABLE1,TABLE2] FILE1"
+ " [FILE2] [...]"),
+ N_("Load host ACPI tables and tables "
+ "specified by arguments."),
+ options);
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(acpi)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
From d298b41f90cbf1f2e5a10e29daa1fc92ddee52c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 16:33:42 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mmap: Don't register cutmem and badram commands when lockdown
is enforced
The cutmem and badram commands can be used to remove EFI memory regions
and potentially disable the UEFI Secure Boot. Prevent the commands to be
registered if the GRUB is locked down.
Fixes: CVE-2020-27779
Reported-by: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 4 ++++
grub-core/mmap/mmap.c | 13 +++++++------
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index 98592d3..f2fe149 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -4051,6 +4051,10 @@ this page is to be filtered. This syntax makes it easy to represent patterns
that are often result of memory damage, due to physical distribution of memory
cells.
+Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
+ This prevents removing EFI memory regions to potentially subvert the
+ security mechanisms provided by the UEFI secure boot.
+
@node blocklist
@subsection blocklist
diff --git a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
index 57b4e9a..7ebf32e 100644
--- a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
+++ b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <grub/memory.h>
#include <grub/machine/memory.h>
#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
#include <grub/misc.h>
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/command.h>
@@ -534,12 +535,12 @@ static grub_command_t cmd, cmd_cut;
GRUB_MOD_INIT(mmap)
{
- cmd = grub_register_command ("badram", grub_cmd_badram,
- N_("ADDR1,MASK1[,ADDR2,MASK2[,...]]"),
- N_("Declare memory regions as faulty (badram)."));
- cmd_cut = grub_register_command ("cutmem", grub_cmd_cutmem,
- N_("FROM[K|M|G] TO[K|M|G]"),
- N_("Remove any memory regions in specified range."));
+ cmd = grub_register_command_lockdown ("badram", grub_cmd_badram,
+ N_("ADDR1,MASK1[,ADDR2,MASK2[,...]]"),
+ N_("Declare memory regions as faulty (badram)."));
+ cmd_cut = grub_register_command_lockdown ("cutmem", grub_cmd_cutmem,
+ N_("FROM[K|M|G] TO[K|M|G]"),
+ N_("Remove any memory regions in specified range."));
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
From 468a5699b249fe6816b4e7e86c5dc9d325c9b09e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 09:00:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] commands: Restrict commands that can load BIOS or DT blobs
when locked down
There are some more commands that should be restricted when the GRUB is
locked down. Following is the list of commands and reasons to restrict:
* fakebios: creates BIOS-like structures for backward compatibility with
existing OSes. This should not be allowed when locked down.
* loadbios: reads a BIOS dump from storage and loads it. This action
should not be allowed when locked down.
* devicetree: loads a Device Tree blob and passes it to the OS. It replaces
any Device Tree provided by the firmware. This also should
not be allowed when locked down.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 3 +++
grub-core/commands/efi/loadbios.c | 16 ++++++++--------
grub-core/loader/arm/linux.c | 6 +++---
grub-core/loader/efi/fdt.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index f2fe149..79f58c5 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -4235,6 +4235,9 @@ hour, minute, and second unchanged.
Load a device tree blob (.dtb) from a filesystem, for later use by a Linux
kernel. Does not perform merging with any device tree supplied by firmware,
but rather replaces it completely.
+
+Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
+ This is done to prevent subverting various security mechanisms.
@ref{GNU/Linux}.
@end deffn
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/efi/loadbios.c b/grub-core/commands/efi/loadbios.c
index d41d521..5c7725f 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/efi/loadbios.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/efi/loadbios.c
@@ -205,14 +205,14 @@ static grub_command_t cmd_fakebios, cmd_loadbios;
GRUB_MOD_INIT(loadbios)
{
- cmd_fakebios = grub_register_command ("fakebios", grub_cmd_fakebios,
- 0, N_("Create BIOS-like structures for"
- " backward compatibility with"
- " existing OS."));
-
- cmd_loadbios = grub_register_command ("loadbios", grub_cmd_loadbios,
- N_("BIOS_DUMP [INT10_DUMP]"),
- N_("Load BIOS dump."));
+ cmd_fakebios = grub_register_command_lockdown ("fakebios", grub_cmd_fakebios,
+ 0, N_("Create BIOS-like structures for"
+ " backward compatibility with"
+ " existing OS."));
+
+ cmd_loadbios = grub_register_command_lockdown ("loadbios", grub_cmd_loadbios,
+ N_("BIOS_DUMP [INT10_DUMP]"),
+ N_("Load BIOS dump."));
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(loadbios)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/arm/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/arm/linux.c
index d70c174..ed23dc7 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/arm/linux.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/arm/linux.c
@@ -493,9 +493,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (linux)
0, N_("Load Linux."));
cmd_initrd = grub_register_command ("initrd", grub_cmd_initrd,
0, N_("Load initrd."));
- cmd_devicetree = grub_register_command ("devicetree", grub_cmd_devicetree,
- /* TRANSLATORS: DTB stands for device tree blob. */
- 0, N_("Load DTB file."));
+ cmd_devicetree = grub_register_command_lockdown ("devicetree", grub_cmd_devicetree,
+ /* TRANSLATORS: DTB stands for device tree blob. */
+ 0, N_("Load DTB file."));
my_mod = mod;
current_fdt = (const void *) grub_arm_firmware_get_boot_data ();
machine_type = grub_arm_firmware_get_machine_type ();
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/fdt.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/fdt.c
index ee9c559..003d07c 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/fdt.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/fdt.c
@@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ static grub_command_t cmd_devicetree;
GRUB_MOD_INIT (fdt)
{
cmd_devicetree =
- grub_register_command ("devicetree", grub_cmd_devicetree, 0,
- N_("Load DTB file."));
+ grub_register_command_lockdown ("devicetree", grub_cmd_devicetree, 0,
+ N_("Load DTB file."));
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI (fdt)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 58b77d4069823b44c5fa916fa8ddfc9c4cd51e02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 22:59:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] commands/setpci: Restrict setpci command when locked down
This command can set PCI devices register values, which makes it dangerous
in a locked down configuration. Restrict it so can't be used on this setup.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/commands/setpci.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/setpci.c b/grub-core/commands/setpci.c
index d5bc97d..fa2ba7d 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/setpci.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/setpci.c
@@ -329,10 +329,10 @@ static grub_extcmd_t cmd;
GRUB_MOD_INIT(setpci)
{
- cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("setpci", grub_cmd_setpci, 0,
- N_("[-s POSITION] [-d DEVICE] [-v VAR] "
- "REGISTER[=VALUE[:MASK]]"),
- N_("Manipulate PCI devices."), options);
+ cmd = grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("setpci", grub_cmd_setpci, 0,
+ N_("[-s POSITION] [-d DEVICE] [-v VAR] "
+ "REGISTER[=VALUE[:MASK]]"),
+ N_("Manipulate PCI devices."), options);
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(setpci)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 5c97492a29c6063567b65ed1a069f5e6f4e211f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:59:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] commands/hdparm: Restrict hdparm command when locked down
The command can be used to get/set ATA disk parameters. Some of these can
be dangerous since change the disk behavior. Restrict it when locked down.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/commands/hdparm.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/hdparm.c b/grub-core/commands/hdparm.c
index d3fa966..2e2319e 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/hdparm.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/hdparm.c
@@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static grub_extcmd_t cmd;
GRUB_MOD_INIT(hdparm)
{
- cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("hdparm", grub_cmd_hdparm, 0,
- N_("[OPTIONS] DISK"),
- N_("Get/set ATA disk parameters."), options);
+ cmd = grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("hdparm", grub_cmd_hdparm, 0,
+ N_("[OPTIONS] DISK"),
+ N_("Get/set ATA disk parameters."), options);
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(hdparm)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 508270838998f151a82e9c13e7cb8a470a2dc23d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 15:03:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] gdb: Restrict GDB access when locked down
The gdbstub* commands allow to start and control a GDB stub running on
local host that can be used to connect from a remote debugger. Restrict
this functionality when the GRUB is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/gdb/gdb.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/gdb/gdb.c b/grub-core/gdb/gdb.c
index 847a1e1..1818cb6 100644
--- a/grub-core/gdb/gdb.c
+++ b/grub-core/gdb/gdb.c
@@ -75,20 +75,24 @@ static grub_command_t cmd, cmd_stop, cmd_break;
GRUB_MOD_INIT (gdb)
{
grub_gdb_idtinit ();
- cmd = grub_register_command ("gdbstub", grub_cmd_gdbstub,
- N_("PORT"),
- /* TRANSLATORS: GDB stub is a small part of
- GDB functionality running on local host
- which allows remote debugger to
- connect to it. */
- N_("Start GDB stub on given port"));
- cmd_break = grub_register_command ("gdbstub_break", grub_cmd_gdb_break,
- /* TRANSLATORS: this refers to triggering
- a breakpoint so that the user will land
- into GDB. */
- 0, N_("Break into GDB"));
- cmd_stop = grub_register_command ("gdbstub_stop", grub_cmd_gdbstop,
- 0, N_("Stop GDB stub"));
+ cmd = grub_register_command_lockdown ("gdbstub", grub_cmd_gdbstub,
+ N_("PORT"),
+ /*
+ * TRANSLATORS: GDB stub is a small part of
+ * GDB functionality running on local host
+ * which allows remote debugger to
+ * connect to it.
+ */
+ N_("Start GDB stub on given port"));
+ cmd_break = grub_register_command_lockdown ("gdbstub_break", grub_cmd_gdb_break,
+ /*
+ * TRANSLATORS: this refers to triggering
+ * a breakpoint so that the user will land
+ * into GDB.
+ */
+ 0, N_("Break into GDB"));
+ cmd_stop = grub_register_command_lockdown ("gdbstub_stop", grub_cmd_gdbstop,
+ 0, N_("Stop GDB stub"));
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI (gdb)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
From 9c5565135f12400a925ee901b25984e7af4442f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 14:44:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Don't allow loading extension and packages when
locked down
The shim_lock verifier validates the XNU kernels but no its extensions
and packages. Prevent these to be loaded when the GRUB is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
index 9ae4ceb..44fd5a9 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
@@ -1485,20 +1485,23 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(xnu)
N_("Load XNU image."));
cmd_kernel64 = grub_register_command ("xnu_kernel64", grub_cmd_xnu_kernel64,
0, N_("Load 64-bit XNU image."));
- cmd_mkext = grub_register_command ("xnu_mkext", grub_cmd_xnu_mkext, 0,
- N_("Load XNU extension package."));
- cmd_kext = grub_register_command ("xnu_kext", grub_cmd_xnu_kext, 0,
- N_("Load XNU extension."));
- cmd_kextdir = grub_register_command ("xnu_kextdir", grub_cmd_xnu_kextdir,
- /* TRANSLATORS: OSBundleRequired is a
- variable name in xnu extensions
- manifests. It behaves mostly like
- GNU/Linux runlevels.
- */
- N_("DIRECTORY [OSBundleRequired]"),
- /* TRANSLATORS: There are many extensions
- in extension directory. */
- N_("Load XNU extension directory."));
+ cmd_mkext = grub_register_command_lockdown ("xnu_mkext", grub_cmd_xnu_mkext, 0,
+ N_("Load XNU extension package."));
+ cmd_kext = grub_register_command_lockdown ("xnu_kext", grub_cmd_xnu_kext, 0,
+ N_("Load XNU extension."));
+ cmd_kextdir = grub_register_command_lockdown ("xnu_kextdir", grub_cmd_xnu_kextdir,
+ /*
+ * TRANSLATORS: OSBundleRequired is
+ * a variable name in xnu extensions
+ * manifests. It behaves mostly like
+ * GNU/Linux runlevels.
+ */
+ N_("DIRECTORY [OSBundleRequired]"),
+ /*
+ * TRANSLATORS: There are many extensions
+ * in extension directory.
+ */
+ N_("Load XNU extension directory."));
cmd_ramdisk = grub_register_command ("xnu_ramdisk", grub_cmd_xnu_ramdisk, 0,
/* TRANSLATORS: ramdisk here isn't identifier. It can be translated. */
N_("Load XNU ramdisk. "
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
From f05e79a0143beb2d9a482a3ebf4fe0ce76778122 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2020 01:03:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] docs: Document the cutmem command
The command is not present in the docs/grub.texi user documentation.
Reported-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index 79f58c5..8518cc0 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -3892,6 +3892,7 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
* cpuid:: Check for CPU features
* crc:: Compute or check CRC32 checksums
* cryptomount:: Mount a crypto device
+* cutmem:: Remove memory regions
* date:: Display or set current date and time
* devicetree:: Load a device tree blob
* distrust:: Remove a pubkey from trusted keys
@@ -4051,6 +4052,8 @@ this page is to be filtered. This syntax makes it easy to represent patterns
that are often result of memory damage, due to physical distribution of memory
cells.
+The command is similar to @command{cutmem} command.
+
Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
This prevents removing EFI memory regions to potentially subvert the
security mechanisms provided by the UEFI secure boot.
@@ -4214,6 +4217,24 @@ GRUB suports devices encrypted using LUKS and geli. Note that necessary modules
be used.
@end deffn
+@node cutmem
+@subsection cutmem
+
+@deffn Command cutmem from[K|M|G] to[K|M|G]
+Remove any memory regions in specified range.
+@end deffn
+
+This command notifies the memory manager that specified regions of RAM ought to
+be filtered out. This remains in effect after a payload kernel has been loaded
+by GRUB, as long as the loaded kernel obtains its memory map from GRUB. Kernels
+that support this include Linux, GNU Mach, the kernel of FreeBSD and Multiboot
+kernels in general.
+
+The command is similar to @command{badram} command.
+
+Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
+ This prevents removing EFI memory regions to potentially subvert the
+ security mechanisms provided by the UEFI secure boot.
@node date
@subsection date
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
From 7630ec5397fe418276b360f9011934b8c034936c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 14:08:55 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] dl: Only allow unloading modules that are not dependencies
When a module is attempted to be removed its reference counter is always
decremented. This means that repeated rmmod invocations will cause the
module to be unloaded even if another module depends on it.
This may lead to a use-after-free scenario allowing an attacker to execute
arbitrary code and by-pass the UEFI Secure Boot protection.
While being there, add the extern keyword to some function declarations in
that header file.
Fixes: CVE-2020-25632
Reported-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/commands/minicmd.c | 7 +++++--
grub-core/kern/dl.c | 9 +++++++++
include/grub/dl.h | 8 +++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
index 6bbce31..fa49893 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c
@@ -140,8 +140,11 @@ grub_mini_cmd_rmmod (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
if (grub_dl_is_persistent (mod))
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cannot unload persistent module");
- if (grub_dl_unref (mod) <= 0)
- grub_dl_unload (mod);
+ if (grub_dl_ref_count (mod) > 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cannot unload referenced module");
+
+ grub_dl_unref (mod);
+ grub_dl_unload (mod);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
index 48eb5e7..48f8a79 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
@@ -549,6 +549,15 @@ grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod)
return --mod->ref_count;
}
+int
+grub_dl_ref_count (grub_dl_t mod)
+{
+ if (mod == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return mod->ref_count;
+}
+
static void
grub_dl_flush_cache (grub_dl_t mod)
{
diff --git a/include/grub/dl.h b/include/grub/dl.h
index f03c035..b3753c9 100644
--- a/include/grub/dl.h
+++ b/include/grub/dl.h
@@ -203,9 +203,11 @@ grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load) (const char *name);
grub_dl_t grub_dl_load_core (void *addr, grub_size_t size);
grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load_core_noinit) (void *addr, grub_size_t size);
int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unload) (grub_dl_t mod);
-void grub_dl_unload_unneeded (void);
-int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod);
-int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod);
+extern void grub_dl_unload_unneeded (void);
+extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod);
+extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod);
+extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref_count) (grub_dl_t mod);
+
extern grub_dl_t EXPORT_VAR(grub_dl_head);
#ifndef GRUB_UTIL
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
From 128c16a682034263eb519c89bc0934eeb6fa8cfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 19:19:21 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] usb: Avoid possible out-of-bound accesses caused by malicious
devices
The maximum number of configurations and interfaces are fixed but there is
no out-of-bound checking to prevent a malicious USB device to report large
values for these and cause accesses outside the arrays' memory.
Fixes: CVE-2020-25647
Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro <joseph.tartaro@ioactive.com>
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
include/grub/usb.h | 10 +++++++---
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c b/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c
index 8da5e4c..7cb3cc2 100644
--- a/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c
+++ b/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ grub_usb_controller_iterate (grub_usb_controller_iterate_hook_t hook,
grub_usb_err_t
grub_usb_clear_halt (grub_usb_device_t dev, int endpoint)
{
+ if (endpoint >= GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE)
+ return GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE;
+
dev->toggle[endpoint] = 0;
return grub_usb_control_msg (dev, (GRUB_USB_REQTYPE_OUT
| GRUB_USB_REQTYPE_STANDARD
@@ -134,10 +137,10 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev)
return err;
descdev = &dev->descdev;
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF; i++)
dev->config[i].descconf = NULL;
- if (descdev->configcnt == 0)
+ if (descdev->configcnt == 0 || descdev->configcnt > GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF)
{
err = GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE;
goto fail;
@@ -172,6 +175,12 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev)
/* Skip the configuration descriptor. */
pos = dev->config[i].descconf->length;
+ if (dev->config[i].descconf->numif > GRUB_USB_MAX_IF)
+ {
+ err = GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
/* Read all interfaces. */
for (currif = 0; currif < dev->config[i].descconf->numif; currif++)
{
@@ -217,7 +226,7 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev)
fail:
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF; i++)
grub_free (dev->config[i].descconf);
return err;
diff --git a/include/grub/usb.h b/include/grub/usb.h
index 512ae1d..6475c55 100644
--- a/include/grub/usb.h
+++ b/include/grub/usb.h
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
#include <grub/usbdesc.h>
#include <grub/usbtrans.h>
+#define GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF 8
+#define GRUB_USB_MAX_IF 32
+#define GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE 256
+
typedef struct grub_usb_device *grub_usb_device_t;
typedef struct grub_usb_controller *grub_usb_controller_t;
typedef struct grub_usb_controller_dev *grub_usb_controller_dev_t;
@@ -167,7 +171,7 @@ struct grub_usb_configuration
struct grub_usb_desc_config *descconf;
/* Interfaces associated to this configuration. */
- struct grub_usb_interface interf[32];
+ struct grub_usb_interface interf[GRUB_USB_MAX_IF];
};
struct grub_usb_hub_port
@@ -191,7 +195,7 @@ struct grub_usb_device
struct grub_usb_controller controller;
/* Device configurations (after opening the device). */
- struct grub_usb_configuration config[8];
+ struct grub_usb_configuration config[GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF];
/* Device address. */
int addr;
@@ -203,7 +207,7 @@ struct grub_usb_device
int initialized;
/* Data toggle values (used for bulk transfers only). */
- int toggle[256];
+ int toggle[GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE];
/* Used by libusb wrapper. Schedulded for removal. */
void *data;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 8cb2848f9699642a698af84b12ba187cab722031 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 14:39:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] mmap: Fix memory leak when iterating over mapped memory
When returning from grub_mmap_iterate() the memory allocated to present
is not being released causing it to leak.
Fixes: CID 96655
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/mmap/mmap.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
index 7ebf32e..8bf235f 100644
--- a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
+++ b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ grub_mmap_iterate (grub_memory_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
hook_data))
{
grub_free (ctx.scanline_events);
+ grub_free (present);
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ grub_mmap_iterate (grub_memory_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
}
grub_free (ctx.scanline_events);
+ grub_free (present);
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 03f2515ae0c503406f1a99a2178405049c6555db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2020 15:10:26 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] net/net: Fix possible dereference to of a NULL pointer
It is always possible that grub_zalloc() could fail, so we should check for
a NULL return. Otherwise we run the risk of dereferencing a NULL pointer.
Fixes: CID 296221
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/net/net.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
index 38f19df..7c2cdf2 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
@@ -86,8 +86,13 @@ grub_net_link_layer_add_address (struct grub_net_card *card,
/* Add sender to cache table. */
if (card->link_layer_table == NULL)
- card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE
- * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0]));
+ {
+ card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE
+ * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0]));
+ if (card->link_layer_table == NULL)
+ return;
+ }
+
entry = &(card->link_layer_table[card->new_ll_entry]);
entry->avail = 1;
grub_memcpy (&entry->ll_address, ll, sizeof (entry->ll_address));
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 0cb838b281a68b536a09681f9557ea6a7ac5da7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 17:12:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] net/tftp: Fix dangling memory pointer
The static code analysis tool, Parfait, reported that the valid of
file->data was left referencing memory that was freed by the call to
grub_free(data) where data was initialized from file->data.
To ensure that there is no unintentional access to this memory
referenced by file->data we should set the pointer to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/net/tftp.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/net/tftp.c b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
index b4297bc..c106704 100644
--- a/grub-core/net/tftp.c
+++ b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ tftp_close (struct grub_file *file)
grub_net_udp_close (data->sock);
}
grub_free (data);
+ file->data = NULL;
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From d06161b035dde4769199ad65aa0a587a5920012b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:32:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/parser: Fix resource leak if argc == 0
After processing the command-line yet arriving at the point where we are
setting argv, we are allocating memory, even if argc == 0, which makes
no sense since we never put anything into the allocated argv.
The solution is to simply return that we've successfully processed the
arguments but that argc == 0, and also ensure that argv is NULL when
we're not allocating anything in it.
There are only 2 callers of this function, and both are handling a zero
value in argc assuming nothing is allocated in argv.
Fixes: CID 96680
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/kern/parser.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/parser.c b/grub-core/kern/parser.c
index 619db31..d1cf061 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/parser.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/parser.c
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline,
int i;
*argc = 0;
+ *argv = NULL;
do
{
if (!rd || !*rd)
@@ -207,6 +208,10 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline,
(*argc)++;
}
+ /* If there are no args, then we're done. */
+ if (!*argc)
+ return 0;
+
/* Reserve memory for the return values. */
args = grub_malloc (bp - buffer);
if (!args)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From ed286ceba6015d37a9304f04602451c47bf195d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:15:25 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi: Fix memory leak on failure
Free the memory allocated to name before returning on failure.
Fixes: CID 296222
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
index 9cfd88d..4fc14d6 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
"malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len);
+ grub_free (name);
return NULL;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From 6aee4bfd6973c714056fb7b56890b8d524e94ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 15:03:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi/mm: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference
The model of grub_efi_get_memory_map() is that if memory_map is NULL,
then the purpose is to discover how much memory should be allocated to
it for the subsequent call.
The problem here is that with grub_efi_is_finished set to 1, there is no
check at all that the function is being called with a non-NULL memory_map.
While this MAY be true, we shouldn't assume it.
The solution to this is to behave as expected, and if memory_map is NULL,
then don't try to use it and allow memory_map_size to be filled in, and
return 0 as is done later in the code if the buffer is too small (or NULL).
Additionally, drop unneeded ret = 1.
Fixes: CID 96632
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
index b02fab1..5afcef7 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
@@ -328,15 +328,24 @@ grub_efi_get_memory_map (grub_efi_uintn_t *memory_map_size,
if (grub_efi_is_finished)
{
int ret = 1;
- if (*memory_map_size < finish_mmap_size)
+
+ if (memory_map != NULL)
{
- grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, *memory_map_size);
- ret = 0;
+ if (*memory_map_size < finish_mmap_size)
+ {
+ grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, *memory_map_size);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, finish_mmap_size);
}
else
{
- grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, finish_mmap_size);
- ret = 1;
+ /*
+ * Incomplete, no buffer to copy into, same as
+ * GRUB_EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL below.
+ */
+ ret = 0;
}
*memory_map_size = finish_mmap_size;
if (map_key)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
From a983d36bd9178d377d2072fd4b11c635fdc404b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:41:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regexec: Resolve unused variable
This is a really minor issue where a variable is being assigned to but
not checked before it is overwritten again.
The reason for this issue is that we are not building with DEBUG set and
this in turn means that the assert() that reads the value of the
variable match_last is being processed out.
The solution, move the assignment to match_last in to an ifdef DEBUG too.
Fixes: CID 292459
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
[Add changes to generated files]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
Makefile.in | 1 +
conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 +
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch | 14 ++++++++++++++
grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c | 4 ++++
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index ecb3278..e6b287b 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -2742,6 +2742,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh geninit.sh gentpl.py Makefile.util.def \
grub-core/gensyminfo.sh.in grub-core/gensymlist.sh \
grub-core/genemuinit.sh grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch \
+ grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch \
grub-core/lib/libgcrypt \
diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
index 46c4e95..9b01152 100644
--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
+EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba51f1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- a/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:25:35.310195912 +0000
++++ b/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:32:07.961765604 +0000
+@@ -828,7 +828,11 @@
+ break;
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (err != REG_NOMATCH))
+ goto free_return;
++#ifdef DEBUG
++ /* Only used for assertion below when DEBUG is set, otherwise
++ it will be over-written when we loop around. */
+ match_last = -1;
++#endif
+ }
+ else
+ break; /* We found a match. */
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c
index 21cf791..98a25f5 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c
@@ -828,6 +828,10 @@ re_search_internal (const regex_t *preg, const char *string, Idx length,
break;
if (__glibc_unlikely (err != REG_NOMATCH))
goto free_return;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ /* Only used for assertion below when DEBUG is set, otherwise
+ it will be over-written when we loop around. */
+#endif
match_last = -1;
}
else
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From 75c3d3cec4f408848f575d6d5e30a95bd6313db0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 13:54:06 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized token structure
The code is assuming that the value of br_token.constraint was
initialized to zero when it wasn't.
While some compilers will ensure that, not all do, so it is better to
fix this explicitly than leave it to chance.
Fixes: CID 73749
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
[Add changes to generated files]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
Makefile.in | 1 +
conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 +
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch | 11 +++++++++++
grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index e6b287b..d58a7d7 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -2742,6 +2742,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh geninit.sh gentpl.py Makefile.util.def \
grub-core/gensyminfo.sh.in grub-core/gensymlist.sh \
grub-core/genemuinit.sh grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch \
+ grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch \
diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
index 9b01152..9e55458 100644
--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
+EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b4d9f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- a/lib/regcomp.c 2020-10-22 13:49:06.770168928 +0000
++++ b/lib/regcomp.c 2020-10-22 13:50:37.026528298 +0000
+@@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@
+ Idx alloc = 0;
+ #endif /* not RE_ENABLE_I18N */
+ reg_errcode_t ret;
+- re_token_t br_token;
++ re_token_t br_token = {0};
+ bin_tree_t *tree;
+
+ sbcset = (re_bitset_ptr_t) calloc (sizeof (bitset_t), 1);
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c
index fe7dfcb..2545d3e 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c
@@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@ build_charclass_op (re_dfa_t *dfa, RE_TRANSLATE_TYPE trans,
Idx alloc = 0;
#endif /* not RE_ENABLE_I18N */
reg_errcode_t ret;
- re_token_t br_token;
+ re_token_t br_token = {0};
bin_tree_t *tree;
sbcset = (re_bitset_ptr_t) calloc (sizeof (bitset_t), 1);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From 3a37bf120a9194c373257c70175cdb5b337bc107 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 14:43:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/argp-help: Fix dereference of a possibly NULL state
All other instances of call to __argp_failure() where there is
a dgettext() call is first checking whether state is NULL before
attempting to dereference it to get the root_argp->argp_domain.
Fixes: CID 292436
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
[Add changes to generated files]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
Makefile.in | 1 +
conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 +
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch | 12 ++++++++++++
grub-core/lib/gnulib/argp-help.c | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index d58a7d7..812b7c2 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -2742,6 +2742,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh geninit.sh gentpl.py Makefile.util.def \
grub-core/gensyminfo.sh.in grub-core/gensymlist.sh \
grub-core/genemuinit.sh grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch \
+ grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch \
diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
index 9e55458..96d7e69 100644
--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
+EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..813ec09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- a/lib/argp-help.c 2020-10-28 14:32:19.189215988 +0000
++++ b/lib/argp-help.c 2020-10-28 14:38:21.204673940 +0000
+@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@
+ if (*(int *)((char *)upptr + up->uparams_offs) >= upptr->rmargin)
+ {
+ __argp_failure (state, 0, 0,
+- dgettext (state->root_argp->argp_domain,
++ dgettext (state == NULL ? NULL
++ : state->root_argp->argp_domain,
+ "\
+ ARGP_HELP_FMT: %s value is less than or equal to %s"),
+ "rmargin", up->name);
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/argp-help.c b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/argp-help.c
index 5d8f451..c75568c 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/argp-help.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/argp-help.c
@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ validate_uparams (const struct argp_state *state, struct uparams *upptr)
if (*(int *)((char *)upptr + up->uparams_offs) >= upptr->rmargin)
{
__argp_failure (state, 0, 0,
- dgettext (state->root_argp->argp_domain,
+ dgettext (state == NULL ? NULL
+ : state->root_argp->argp_domain,
"\
ARGP_HELP_FMT: %s value is less than or equal to %s"),
"rmargin", up->name);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
From 0b7f347638153e403ee2dd518af3ce26f4f99647 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:57:14 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regexec: Fix possible null-dereference
It appears to be possible that the mctx->state_log field may be NULL,
and the name of this function, clean_state_log_if_needed(), suggests
that it should be checking that it is valid to be cleaned before
assuming that it does.
Fixes: CID 86720
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
[Add changes to generated files]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
Makefile.in | 1 +
conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 +
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch | 12 ++++++++++++
grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 812b7c2..d9da6e9 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -2743,6 +2743,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh geninit.sh gentpl.py Makefile.util.def \
grub-core/genemuinit.sh grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch \
+ grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch \
diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
index 96d7e69..d27d3a9 100644
--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
+EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db6dac9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- a/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:25:35.310195912 +0000
++++ b/lib/regexec.c 2020-11-05 10:55:09.621542984 +0000
+@@ -1692,6 +1692,9 @@
+ {
+ Idx top = mctx->state_log_top;
+
++ if (mctx->state_log == NULL)
++ return REG_NOERROR;
++
+ if ((next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.bufs_len
+ && mctx->input.bufs_len < mctx->input.len)
+ || (next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.valid_len
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c
index 98a25f5..df97667 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regexec.c
@@ -1696,6 +1696,9 @@ clean_state_log_if_needed (re_match_context_t *mctx, Idx next_state_log_idx)
{
Idx top = mctx->state_log_top;
+ if (mctx->state_log == NULL)
+ return REG_NOERROR;
+
if ((next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.bufs_len
&& mctx->input.bufs_len < mctx->input.len)
|| (next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.valid_len
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
From 03477085f9a33789ba6cca7cd49ab9326a1baa0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 18:04:22 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized re_token
This issue has been fixed in the latest version of gnulib, so to
maintain consistency, I've backported that change rather than doing
something different.
Fixes: CID 73828
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
[Add changes to generated files]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
Makefile.in | 1 +
conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 +
.../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch | 15 +++++++++++++++
grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c | 6 +-----
4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index d9da6e9..9442504 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -2743,6 +2743,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh geninit.sh gentpl.py Makefile.util.def \
grub-core/genemuinit.sh grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch \
+ grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch \
grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch \
diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
index d27d3a9..ffe6829 100644
--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
+EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02e0631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+--- a/lib/regcomp.c 2020-11-24 17:06:08.159223858 +0000
++++ b/lib/regcomp.c 2020-11-24 17:06:15.630253923 +0000
+@@ -3808,11 +3808,7 @@
+ create_tree (re_dfa_t *dfa, bin_tree_t *left, bin_tree_t *right,
+ re_token_type_t type)
+ {
+- re_token_t t;
+-#if defined GCC_LINT || defined lint
+- memset (&t, 0, sizeof t);
+-#endif
+- t.type = type;
++ re_token_t t = { .type = type };
+ return create_token_tree (dfa, left, right, &t);
+ }
+
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c
index 2545d3e..64a4fa7 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib/regcomp.c
@@ -3808,11 +3808,7 @@ static bin_tree_t *
create_tree (re_dfa_t *dfa, bin_tree_t *left, bin_tree_t *right,
re_token_type_t type)
{
- re_token_t t;
-#if defined GCC_LINT || defined lint
- memset (&t, 0, sizeof t);
-#endif
- t.type = type;
+ re_token_t t = { .type = type };
return create_token_tree (dfa, left, right, &t);
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 59666e520f44177c97b82a44c169b3b315d63b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:44:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] io/lzopio: Resolve unnecessary self-assignment errors
These 2 assignments are unnecessary since they are just assigning
to themselves.
Fixes: CID 73643
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/io/lzopio.c | 4 ----
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/io/lzopio.c b/grub-core/io/lzopio.c
index 3014485..a7d4425 100644
--- a/grub-core/io/lzopio.c
+++ b/grub-core/io/lzopio.c
@@ -125,8 +125,6 @@ read_block_header (struct grub_lzopio *lzopio)
sizeof (lzopio->block.ucheck)) !=
sizeof (lzopio->block.ucheck))
return -1;
-
- lzopio->block.ucheck = lzopio->block.ucheck;
}
/* Read checksum of compressed data. */
@@ -143,8 +141,6 @@ read_block_header (struct grub_lzopio *lzopio)
sizeof (lzopio->block.ccheck)) !=
sizeof (lzopio->block.ccheck))
return -1;
-
- lzopio->block.ccheck = lzopio->block.ccheck;
}
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 2777cf4466719921dbe4b30af358a75e7d76f217 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:29:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] zstd: Initialize seq_t structure fully
While many compilers will initialize this to zero, not all will, so it
is better to be sure that fields not being explicitly set are at known
values, and there is code that checks this fields value elsewhere in the
code.
Fixes: CID 292440
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c b/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c
index 711b5b6..e4b5670 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c
@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ typedef enum { ZSTD_lo_isRegularOffset, ZSTD_lo_isLongOffset=1 } ZSTD_longOffset
FORCE_INLINE_TEMPLATE seq_t
ZSTD_decodeSequence(seqState_t* seqState, const ZSTD_longOffset_e longOffsets)
{
- seq_t seq;
+ seq_t seq = {0};
U32 const llBits = seqState->stateLL.table[seqState->stateLL.state].nbAdditionalBits;
U32 const mlBits = seqState->stateML.table[seqState->stateML.state].nbAdditionalBits;
U32 const ofBits = seqState->stateOffb.table[seqState->stateOffb.state].nbAdditionalBits;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From bc9c468a2ce84bc767234eec888b71f1bc744fff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 09:49:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/partition: Check for NULL before dereferencing input
string
There is the possibility that the value of str comes from an external
source and continuing to use it before ever checking its validity is
wrong. So, needs fixing.
Additionally, drop unneeded part initialization.
Fixes: CID 292444
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/kern/partition.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/partition.c b/grub-core/kern/partition.c
index e499147..b10a184 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/partition.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/partition.c
@@ -109,11 +109,14 @@ grub_partition_map_probe (const grub_partition_map_t partmap,
grub_partition_t
grub_partition_probe (struct grub_disk *disk, const char *str)
{
- grub_partition_t part = 0;
+ grub_partition_t part;
grub_partition_t curpart = 0;
grub_partition_t tail;
const char *ptr;
+ if (str == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
part = tail = disk->partition;
for (ptr = str; *ptr;)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
From 23e39f50ca7a107f6b66396ed4d177a914dee035 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 11:53:03 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: Make sure comp data is freed before exiting from
make_vg()
Several error handling paths in make_vg() do not free comp data before
jumping to fail2 label and returning from the function. This will leak
memory. So, let's fix all issues of that kind.
Fixes: CID 73804
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
index 58f8a53..428415f 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
@@ -554,7 +554,11 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
comp->segments = grub_calloc (comp->segment_alloc,
sizeof (*comp->segments));
if (!comp->segments)
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ grub_free (comp);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
}
else
{
@@ -562,7 +566,11 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
comp->segment_count = 1;
comp->segments = grub_malloc (sizeof (*comp->segments));
if (!comp->segments)
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ grub_free (comp);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
comp->segments->start_extent = 0;
comp->segments->extent_count = lv->size;
comp->segments->layout = 0;
@@ -574,15 +582,26 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
comp->segments->layout = GRUB_RAID_LAYOUT_SYMMETRIC_MASK;
}
else
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (comp->segments);
+ grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ grub_free (comp);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
ptr += *ptr + 1;
ptr++;
if (!(vblk[i].flags & 0x10))
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (comp->segments);
+ grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ grub_free (comp);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
if (ptr >= vblk[i].dynamic + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic)
|| ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic
+ sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic))
{
+ grub_free (comp->segments);
grub_free (comp->internal_id);
grub_free (comp);
goto fail2;
@@ -592,6 +611,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
if (ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic
+ sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic))
{
+ grub_free (comp->segments);
grub_free (comp->internal_id);
grub_free (comp);
goto fail2;
@@ -601,7 +621,12 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
comp->segments->nodes = grub_calloc (comp->segments->node_alloc,
sizeof (*comp->segments->nodes));
if (!lv->segments->nodes)
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (comp->segments);
+ grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ grub_free (comp);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
}
if (lv->segments->node_alloc == lv->segments->node_count)
@@ -611,11 +636,23 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
if (grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, 2, &lv->segments->node_alloc) ||
grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes), &sz))
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (comp->segments->nodes);
+ grub_free (comp->segments);
+ grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ grub_free (comp);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
t = grub_realloc (lv->segments->nodes, sz);
if (!t)
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (comp->segments->nodes);
+ grub_free (comp->segments);
+ grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ grub_free (comp);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
lv->segments->nodes = t;
}
lv->segments->nodes[lv->segments->node_count].pv = 0;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From e0b83df5da538d2a38f770e60817b3a4b9d5b4d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 10:07:47 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: If failed then free vg variable too
Fixes: CID 73809
Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
index 428415f..54713f4 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
{
grub_free (vg->uuid);
grub_free (vg->name);
+ grub_free (vg);
return NULL;
}
grub_memcpy (vg->uuid, label->group_guid, LDM_GUID_STRLEN);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From 156c281a1625dc73fd350530630c6f2d5673d4f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 10:00:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: Fix memory leak on uninserted lv references
The problem here is that the memory allocated to the variable lv is not
yet inserted into the list that is being processed at the label fail2.
As we can already see at line 342, which correctly frees lv before going
to fail2, we should also be doing that at these earlier jumps to fail2.
Fixes: CID 73824
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
index 54713f4..e82e989 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
@@ -321,7 +321,10 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
lv->visible = 1;
lv->segments = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*lv->segments));
if (!lv->segments)
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (lv);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
lv->segments->start_extent = 0;
lv->segments->type = GRUB_DISKFILTER_MIRROR;
lv->segments->node_count = 0;
@@ -329,7 +332,10 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
lv->segments->nodes = grub_calloc (lv->segments->node_alloc,
sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes));
if (!lv->segments->nodes)
- goto fail2;
+ {
+ grub_free (lv);
+ goto fail2;
+ }
ptr = vblk[i].dynamic;
if (ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic
+ sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic))
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From a201ad17caa430aa710654fdf2e6ab4c8166f031 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 11:38:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] disk/cryptodisk: Fix potential integer overflow
The encrypt and decrypt functions expect a grub_size_t. So, we need to
ensure that the constant bit shift is using grub_size_t rather than
unsigned int when it is performing the shift.
Fixes: CID 307788
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
index 5037768..6883f48 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
@@ -311,10 +311,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_endecrypt (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev,
case GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MODE_CBC:
if (do_encrypt)
err = grub_crypto_cbc_encrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i,
- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
+ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
else
err = grub_crypto_cbc_decrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i,
- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
+ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
if (err)
return err;
break;
@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_endecrypt (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev,
case GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MODE_PCBC:
if (do_encrypt)
err = grub_crypto_pcbc_encrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i,
- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
+ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
else
err = grub_crypto_pcbc_decrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i,
- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
+ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
if (err)
return err;
break;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 2298f6e0d951251bb9ca97d891d1bc8b74515f8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 17:09:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] hfsplus: Check that the volume name length is valid
HFS+ documentation suggests that the maximum filename and volume name is
255 Unicode characters in length.
So, when converting from big-endian to little-endian, we should ensure
that the name of the volume has a length that is between 0 and 255,
inclusive.
Fixes: CID 73641
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
index 9c4e4c8..8fe7c12 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
@@ -1012,6 +1012,15 @@ grub_hfsplus_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
grub_hfsplus_btree_recptr (&data->catalog_tree, node, ptr);
label_len = grub_be_to_cpu16 (catkey->namelen);
+
+ /* Ensure that the length is >= 0. */
+ if (label_len < 0)
+ label_len = 0;
+
+ /* Ensure label length is at most 255 Unicode characters. */
+ if (label_len > 255)
+ label_len = 255;
+
label_name = grub_calloc (label_len, sizeof (*label_name));
if (!label_name)
{
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From a02091834d3e167320d8a262ff04b8e83c5e616d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 16:41:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix possible negative shift operation
While it is possible for the return value from zfs_log2() to be zero
(0), it is quite unlikely, given that the previous assignment to blksz
is shifted up by SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT (9) before 9 is subtracted at the
assignment to epbs.
But, while unlikely during a normal operation, it may be that a carefully
crafted ZFS filesystem could result in a zero (0) value to the
dn_datalbkszsec field, which means that the shift left does nothing
and assigns zero (0) to blksz, resulting in a negative epbs value.
Fixes: CID 73608
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
index 36d0373..0c42cba 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
@@ -2667,6 +2667,11 @@ dnode_get (dnode_end_t * mdn, grub_uint64_t objnum, grub_uint8_t type,
blksz = grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (mdn->dn.dn_datablkszsec,
mdn->endian) << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT;
epbs = zfs_log2 (blksz) - DNODE_SHIFT;
+
+ /* While this should never happen, we should check that epbs is not negative. */
+ if (epbs < 0)
+ epbs = 0;
+
blkid = objnum >> epbs;
idx = objnum & ((1 << epbs) - 1);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
From 89bdab965805e8d54d7f75349024e1a11cbe2eb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 18:54:49 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix resource leaks while constructing path
There are several exit points in dnode_get_path() that are causing possible
memory leaks.
In the while(1) the correct exit mechanism should not be to do a direct return,
but to instead break out of the loop, setting err first if it is not already set.
The reason behind this is that the dnode_path is a linked list, and while doing
through this loop, it is being allocated and built up - the only way to
correctly unravel it is to traverse it, which is what is being done at the end
of the function outside of the loop.
Several of the existing exit points correctly did a break, but not all so this
change makes that more consistent and should resolve the leaking of memory as
found by Coverity.
Fixes: CID 73741
Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
index 0c42cba..9087a72 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
@@ -2836,8 +2836,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
if (dnode_path->dn.dn.dn_type != DMU_OT_DIRECTORY_CONTENTS)
{
- grub_free (path_buf);
- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, N_("not a directory"));
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, N_("not a directory"));
+ break;
}
err = zap_lookup (&(dnode_path->dn), cname, &objnum,
data, subvol->case_insensitive);
@@ -2879,11 +2879,18 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
<< SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT);
if (blksz == 0)
- return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "0-sized block");
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "0-sized block");
+ break;
+ }
sym_value = grub_malloc (sym_sz);
if (!sym_value)
- return grub_errno;
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ break;
+ }
+
for (block = 0; block < (sym_sz + blksz - 1) / blksz; block++)
{
void *t;
@@ -2893,7 +2900,7 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
if (err)
{
grub_free (sym_value);
- return err;
+ break;
}
movesize = sym_sz - block * blksz;
@@ -2903,6 +2910,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
grub_memcpy (sym_value + block * blksz, t, movesize);
grub_free (t);
}
+ if (err)
+ break;
free_symval = 1;
}
path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sym_sz + grub_strlen (oldpath) + 1);
@@ -2911,7 +2920,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
grub_free (oldpathbuf);
if (free_symval)
grub_free (sym_value);
- return grub_errno;
+ err = grub_errno;
+ break;
}
grub_memcpy (path, sym_value, sym_sz);
if (free_symval)
@@ -2949,11 +2959,12 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
err = zio_read (bp, dnode_path->dn.endian, &sahdrp, NULL, data);
if (err)
- return err;
+ break;
}
else
{
- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem is corrupt");
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem is corrupt");
+ break;
}
hdrsize = SA_HDR_SIZE (((sa_hdr_phys_t *) sahdrp));
@@ -2974,7 +2985,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
if (!path_buf)
{
grub_free (oldpathbuf);
- return grub_errno;
+ err = grub_errno;
+ break;
}
grub_memcpy (path, sym_value, sym_sz);
path [sym_sz] = 0;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 302c12ff5714bc455949117c1c9548ccb324d55b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 22:17:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix possible integer overflows
In all cases the problem is that the value being acted upon by
a left-shift is a 32-bit number which is then being used in the
context of a 64-bit number.
To avoid overflow we ensure that the number being shifted is 64-bit
before the shift is done.
Fixes: CID 73684, CID 73695, CID 73764
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
index 9087a72..b078ccc 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ find_bestub (uberblock_phys_t * ub_array,
ubptr = (uberblock_phys_t *) ((grub_properly_aligned_t *) ub_array
+ ((i << ub_shift)
/ sizeof (grub_properly_aligned_t)));
- err = uberblock_verify (ubptr, offset, 1 << ub_shift);
+ err = uberblock_verify (ubptr, offset, (grub_size_t) 1 << ub_shift);
if (err)
{
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ read_device (grub_uint64_t offset, struct grub_zfs_device_desc *desc,
high = grub_divmod64 ((offset >> desc->ashift) + c,
desc->n_children, &devn);
- csize = bsize << desc->ashift;
+ csize = (grub_size_t) bsize << desc->ashift;
if (csize > len)
csize = len;
@@ -1635,8 +1635,8 @@ read_device (grub_uint64_t offset, struct grub_zfs_device_desc *desc,
while (len > 0)
{
- grub_size_t csize;
- csize = ((s / (desc->n_children - desc->nparity))
+ grub_size_t csize = s;
+ csize = ((csize / (desc->n_children - desc->nparity))
<< desc->ashift);
if (csize > len)
csize = len;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 7aab03418ec6a9b991aa44416cb2585aff4e7972 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 10:56:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] zfsinfo: Correct a check for error allocating memory
While arguably the check for grub_errno is correct, we should really be
checking the return value from the function since it is always possible
that grub_errno was set elsewhere, making this code behave incorrectly.
Fixes: CID 73668
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c
index c8a28ac..bf29180 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c
@@ -358,8 +358,8 @@ grub_cmd_zfs_bootfs (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc,
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("one argument expected"));
devname = grub_file_get_device_name (args[0]);
- if (grub_errno)
- return grub_errno;
+ if (devname == NULL)
+ return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
dev = grub_device_open (devname);
grub_free (devname);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
From 178ac5107389f8e5b32489d743d6824a5ebf342a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 12:48:07 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] affs: Fix memory leaks
The node structure reference is being allocated but not freed if it
reaches the end of the function. If any of the hooks had returned
a non-zero value, then node would have been copied in to the context
reference, but otherwise node is not stored and should be freed.
Similarly, the call to grub_affs_create_node() replaces the allocated
memory in node with a newly allocated structure, leaking the existing
memory pointed by node.
Finally, when dir->parent is set, then we again replace node with newly
allocated memory, which seems unnecessary when we copy in the values
from dir->parent immediately after.
Fixes: CID 73759
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/affs.c | 18 ++++++++----------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/affs.c b/grub-core/fs/affs.c
index 220b371..230e26a 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/affs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/affs.c
@@ -400,12 +400,12 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
{
unsigned int i;
struct grub_affs_file file;
- struct grub_fshelp_node *node = 0;
+ struct grub_fshelp_node *node, *orig_node;
struct grub_affs_data *data = dir->data;
grub_uint32_t *hashtable;
/* Create the directory entries for `.' and `..'. */
- node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node));
+ node = orig_node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node));
if (!node)
return 1;
@@ -414,9 +414,6 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
return 1;
if (dir->parent)
{
- node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node));
- if (!node)
- return 1;
*node = *dir->parent;
if (hook ("..", GRUB_FSHELP_DIR, node, hook_data))
return 1;
@@ -456,17 +453,18 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
if (grub_affs_create_node (dir, hook, hook_data, &node, &hashtable,
next, &file))
- return 1;
+ {
+ /* Node has been replaced in function. */
+ grub_free (orig_node);
+ return 1;
+ }
next = grub_be_to_cpu32 (file.next);
}
}
- grub_free (hashtable);
- return 0;
-
fail:
- grub_free (node);
+ grub_free (orig_node);
grub_free (hashtable);
return 0;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From e8814c811132a70f9b55418f7567378a34ad3883 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 16:43:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] libgcrypt/mpi: Fix possible unintended sign extension
The array of unsigned char gets promoted to a signed 32-bit int before
it is finally promoted to a size_t. There is the possibility that this
may result in the signed-bit being set for the intermediate signed
32-bit int. We should ensure that the promotion is to the correct type
before we bitwise-OR the values.
Fixes: CID 96697
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c | 2 +-
grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c
index 3d55dfc..faf1cd6 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format,
if (len && len < 4)
return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
- n = (s[0] << 24 | s[1] << 16 | s[2] << 8 | s[3]);
+ n = ((size_t)s[0] << 24 | (size_t)s[1] << 16 | (size_t)s[2] << 8 | (size_t)s[3]);
s += 4;
if (len)
len -= 4;
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
index a3435ed..7ecad27 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format,
if (len && len < 4)
return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
- n = (s[0] << 24 | s[1] << 16 | s[2] << 8 | s[3]);
+ n = ((size_t)s[0] << 24 | (size_t)s[1] << 16 | (size_t)s[2] << 8 | (size_t)s[3]);
s += 4;
if (len)
len -= 4;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From ae0f3fabeba7b393113d5dc185b6aff9b728136d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 10:41:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] libgcrypt/mpi: Fix possible NULL dereference
The code in gcry_mpi_scan() assumes that buffer is not NULL, but there
is no explicit check for that, so we add one.
Fixes: CID 73757
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c | 3 +++
grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c
index faf1cd6..e734dcf 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/mpi/mpicoder.c
@@ -381,6 +381,9 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format,
unsigned int len;
int secure = (buffer && gcry_is_secure (buffer));
+ if (!buffer)
+ return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
+
if (format == GCRYMPI_FMT_SSH)
len = 0;
else
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
index 7ecad27..6fe3891 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
@@ -379,6 +379,9 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format,
unsigned int len;
int secure = (buffer && gcry_is_secure (buffer));
+ if (!buffer)
+ return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
+
if (format == GCRYMPI_FMT_SSH)
len = 0;
else
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 95bc016dba94cab3d398dd74160665915cd08ad6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 15:31:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] syslinux: Fix memory leak while parsing
In syslinux_parse_real() the 2 points where return is being called
didn't release the memory stored in buf which is no longer required.
Fixes: CID 176634
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c b/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c
index 4afa992..3acc6b4 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c
@@ -737,7 +737,10 @@ syslinux_parse_real (struct syslinux_menu *menu)
&& grub_strncasecmp ("help", ptr3, ptr4 - ptr3) == 0))
{
if (helptext (ptr5, file, menu))
- return 1;
+ {
+ grub_free (buf);
+ return 1;
+ }
continue;
}
@@ -757,6 +760,7 @@ syslinux_parse_real (struct syslinux_menu *menu)
}
fail:
grub_file_close (file);
+ grub_free (buf);
return err;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 9213575b7a95b514bce80be5964a28d407d7d56d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 18:56:48 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] normal/completion: Fix leaking of memory when processing a
completion
It is possible for the code to reach the end of the function without
freeing the memory allocated to argv and argc still to be 0.
We should always call grub_free(argv). The grub_free() will handle
a NULL argument correctly if it reaches that code without the memory
being allocated.
Fixes: CID 96672
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/normal/completion.c | 10 ++++------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/normal/completion.c b/grub-core/normal/completion.c
index 5961028..46e473c 100644
--- a/grub-core/normal/completion.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/completion.c
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ char *
grub_normal_do_completion (char *buf, int *restore,
void (*hook) (const char *, grub_completion_type_t, int))
{
- int argc;
- char **argv;
+ int argc = 0;
+ char **argv = NULL;
/* Initialize variables. */
match = 0;
@@ -516,10 +516,8 @@ grub_normal_do_completion (char *buf, int *restore,
fail:
if (argc != 0)
- {
- grub_free (argv[0]);
- grub_free (argv);
- }
+ grub_free (argv[0]);
+ grub_free (argv);
grub_free (match);
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 8b6f528e52e18b7a69f90b8dc3671d7b1147d9f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 23:41:24 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] commands/hashsum: Fix a memory leak
check_list() uses grub_file_getline(), which allocates a buffer.
If the hash list file contains invalid lines, the function leaks
this buffer when it returns an error.
Fixes: CID 176635
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/commands/hashsum.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c b/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c
index 456ba90..b8a22b0 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c
@@ -128,11 +128,17 @@ check_list (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const char *hashfilename,
high = hextoval (*p++);
low = hextoval (*p++);
if (high < 0 || low < 0)
- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list");
+ {
+ grub_free (buf);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list");
+ }
expected[i] = (high << 4) | low;
}
if ((p[0] != ' ' && p[0] != '\t') || (p[1] != ' ' && p[1] != '\t'))
- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list");
+ {
+ grub_free (buf);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list");
+ }
p += 2;
if (prefix)
{
@@ -140,7 +146,10 @@ check_list (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const char *hashfilename,
filename = grub_xasprintf ("%s/%s", prefix, p);
if (!filename)
- return grub_errno;
+ {
+ grub_free (buf);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
file = grub_file_open (filename, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH
| (!uncompress ? GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS
: GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE));
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
From fc5951d3b1616055ef81a019a5affc09d13344d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:14:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] video/efi_gop: Remove unnecessary return value of
grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info()
The return value of grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info() is never able to be
anything other than GRUB_ERR_NONE. So, rather than continue to return
a value and checking it each time, it is more correct to redefine the
function to not return anything and remove checks of its return value
altogether.
Fixes: CID 96701
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/video/efi_gop.c | 25 ++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
index 7f9d1c2..db2ee98 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ grub_video_gop_fill_real_mode_info (unsigned mode,
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
-static grub_err_t
+static void
grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (unsigned mode,
struct grub_efi_gop_mode_info *in,
struct grub_video_mode_info *out)
@@ -252,8 +252,6 @@ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (unsigned mode,
out->blit_format = GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_BGRA_8888;
out->mode_type |= (GRUB_VIDEO_MODE_TYPE_DOUBLE_BUFFERED
| GRUB_VIDEO_MODE_TYPE_UPDATING_SWAP);
-
- return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
static int
@@ -266,7 +264,6 @@ grub_video_gop_iterate (int (*hook) (const struct grub_video_mode_info *info, vo
grub_efi_uintn_t size;
grub_efi_status_t status;
struct grub_efi_gop_mode_info *info = NULL;
- grub_err_t err;
struct grub_video_mode_info mode_info;
status = efi_call_4 (gop->query_mode, gop, mode, &size, &info);
@@ -277,12 +274,7 @@ grub_video_gop_iterate (int (*hook) (const struct grub_video_mode_info *info, vo
continue;
}
- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (mode, info, &mode_info);
- if (err)
- {
- grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
- continue;
- }
+ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (mode, info, &mode_info);
if (hook (&mode_info, hook_arg))
return 1;
}
@@ -466,13 +458,8 @@ grub_video_gop_setup (unsigned int width, unsigned int height,
info = gop->mode->info;
- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info,
- &framebuffer.mode_info);
- if (err)
- {
- grub_dprintf ("video", "GOP: couldn't fill mode info\n");
- return err;
- }
+ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info,
+ &framebuffer.mode_info);
framebuffer.ptr = (void *) (grub_addr_t) gop->mode->fb_base;
framebuffer.offscreen
@@ -486,8 +473,8 @@ grub_video_gop_setup (unsigned int width, unsigned int height,
{
grub_dprintf ("video", "GOP: couldn't allocate shadow\n");
grub_errno = 0;
- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info,
- &framebuffer.mode_info);
+ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info,
+ &framebuffer.mode_info);
buffer = framebuffer.ptr;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
From 7ce3259f67ac2cd93acb0ec0080c24b3b69e66c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 15:10:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/fbfill: Fix potential integer overflow
The multiplication of 2 unsigned 32-bit integers may overflow before
promotion to unsigned 64-bit. We should ensure that the multiplication
is done with overflow detection. Additionally, use grub_sub() for
subtraction.
Fixes: CID 73640, CID 73697, CID 73702, CID 73823
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c b/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c
index 11816d0..a37acd1 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <grub/fbfill.h>
#include <grub/fbutil.h>
#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
#include <grub/video.h>
/* Generic filler that works for every supported mode. */
@@ -61,7 +62,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct32 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst,
/* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line
to the beginning of the next line. */
- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width;
+ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) ||
+ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip))
+ return;
/* Get the start address. */
dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
@@ -98,7 +101,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct24 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst,
#endif
/* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line
to the beginning of the next line. */
- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width;
+ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) ||
+ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip))
+ return;
/* Get the start address. */
dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
@@ -131,7 +136,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct16 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst,
/* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line
to the beginning of the next line. */
- rowskip = (dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width);
+ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) ||
+ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip))
+ return;
/* Get the start address. */
dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
@@ -161,7 +168,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct8 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst,
/* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line
to the beginning of the next line. */
- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width;
+ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) ||
+ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip))
+ return;
/* Get the start address. */
dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
From 08e098b1dbf01e96376f594b337491bc4cfa48dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 14:43:44 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/video_fb: Fix multiple integer overflows
The calculation of the unsigned 64-bit value is being generated by
multiplying 2, signed or unsigned, 32-bit integers which may overflow
before promotion to unsigned 64-bit. Fix all of them.
Fixes: CID 73703, CID 73767, CID 73833
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
index 1a602c8..1c9a138 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/fbutil.h>
#include <grub/bitmap.h>
#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -1417,15 +1418,23 @@ doublebuf_blit_update_screen (void)
{
if (framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
<= framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line)
- grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[0]
- + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
- * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
- (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data
- + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
- * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
- framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch
- * (framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line
- - framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line));
+ {
+ grub_size_t copy_size;
+
+ if (grub_sub (framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line,
+ framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line, &copy_size) ||
+ grub_mul (framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, copy_size, &copy_size))
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */
+ return GRUB_ERR_BUG;
+ }
+
+ grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[0] + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line *
+ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
+ (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line *
+ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
+ copy_size);
+ }
framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
= framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.height;
framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line = 0;
@@ -1439,7 +1448,7 @@ grub_video_fb_doublebuf_blit_init (struct grub_video_fbrender_target **back,
volatile void *framebuf)
{
grub_err_t err;
- grub_size_t page_size = mode_info.pitch * mode_info.height;
+ grub_size_t page_size = (grub_size_t) mode_info.pitch * mode_info.height;
framebuffer.offscreen_buffer = grub_zalloc (page_size);
if (! framebuffer.offscreen_buffer)
@@ -1482,12 +1491,23 @@ doublebuf_pageflipping_update_screen (void)
last_line = framebuffer.previous_dirty.last_line;
if (first_line <= last_line)
- grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[framebuffer.render_page]
- + first_line * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
- (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data
- + first_line * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
- framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch
- * (last_line - first_line));
+ {
+ grub_size_t copy_size;
+
+ if (grub_sub (last_line, first_line, &copy_size) ||
+ grub_mul (framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, copy_size, &copy_size))
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */
+ return GRUB_ERR_BUG;
+ }
+
+ grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[framebuffer.render_page] + first_line *
+ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
+ (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data + first_line *
+ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
+ copy_size);
+ }
+
framebuffer.previous_dirty = framebuffer.current_dirty;
framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
= framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.height;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 08413f2f4edec0e2d9bf15f836f6ee5ca2e379cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 14:51:30 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/video_fb: Fix possible integer overflow
It is minimal possibility that the values being used here will overflow.
So, change the code to use the safemath function grub_mul() to ensure
that doesn't happen.
Fixes: CID 73761
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
index 1c9a138..ae6b89f 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
@@ -1537,7 +1537,13 @@ doublebuf_pageflipping_init (struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info,
volatile void *page1_ptr)
{
grub_err_t err;
- grub_size_t page_size = mode_info->pitch * mode_info->height;
+ grub_size_t page_size = 0;
+
+ if (grub_mul (mode_info->pitch, mode_info->height, &page_size))
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */
+ return GRUB_ERR_BUG;
+ }
framebuffer.offscreen_buffer = grub_malloc (page_size);
if (! framebuffer.offscreen_buffer)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 5f5eb7ca8e971227e95745abe541df3e1509360e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 15:39:00 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Test for an invalid next marker reference
from a jpeg file
While it may never happen, and potentially could be caught at the end of
the function, it is worth checking up front for a bad reference to the
next marker just in case of a maliciously crafted file being provided.
Fixes: CID 73694
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
index 31359a4..0b6ce3c 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_quan_table (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
next_marker = data->file->offset;
next_marker += grub_jpeg_get_word (data);
+ if (next_marker > data->file->size)
+ {
+ /* Should never be set beyond the size of the file. */
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: invalid next reference");
+ }
+
while (data->file->offset + sizeof (data->quan_table[id]) + 1
<= next_marker)
{
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 4a1aa5917595650efbd46b581368c470ebee42ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 14:44:47 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gfxmenu/gui_list: Remove code that coverity is flagging as
dead
The test of value for NULL before calling grub_strdup() is not required,
since the if condition prior to this has already tested for value being
NULL and cannot reach this code if it is.
Fixes: CID 73659
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c b/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c
index 01477cd..df334a6 100644
--- a/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c
+++ b/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ list_set_property (void *vself, const char *name, const char *value)
{
self->need_to_recreate_boxes = 1;
grub_free (self->selected_item_box_pattern);
- self->selected_item_box_pattern = value ? grub_strdup (value) : 0;
+ self->selected_item_box_pattern = grub_strdup (value);
self->selected_item_box_pattern_inherit = 0;
}
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 5d5391b0a05abe76e04c1eb68dcc6cbef5326c4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:47:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] loader/bsd: Check for NULL arg up-front
The code in the next block suggests that it is possible for .set to be
true but .arg may still be NULL.
This code assumes that it is never NULL, yet later is testing if it is
NULL - that is inconsistent.
So we should check first if .arg is not NULL, and remove this check that
is being flagged by Coverity since it is no longer required.
Fixes: CID 292471
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
index b92cbe9..8432283 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
@@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ grub_cmd_openbsd (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char *argv[])
kernel_type = KERNEL_TYPE_OPENBSD;
bootflags = grub_bsd_parse_flags (ctxt->state, openbsd_flags);
- if (ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].set)
+ if (ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].set && ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].arg != NULL)
{
const char *arg = ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].arg;
unsigned type, unit, part;
@@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ grub_cmd_openbsd (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char *argv[])
"unknown disk type name");
unit = grub_strtoul (arg, (char **) &arg, 10);
- if (! (arg && *arg >= 'a' && *arg <= 'z'))
+ if (! (*arg >= 'a' && *arg <= 'z'))
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
"only device specifications of form "
"<type><number><lowercase letter> are supported");
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From bcb59ece3263d118510c4440c4da0950f224bb7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 12:53:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Fix memory leak
The code here is finished with the memory stored in name, but it only
frees it if there curvalue is valid, while it could actually free it
regardless.
The fix is a simple relocation of the grub_free() to before the test
of curvalue.
Fixes: CID 96646
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
index 44fd5a9..eb14462 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
@@ -1391,9 +1391,9 @@ grub_xnu_fill_devicetree (void)
name[len] = 0;
curvalue = grub_xnu_create_value (curkey, name);
+ grub_free (name);
if (!curvalue)
return grub_errno;
- grub_free (name);
data = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (var->value) + 1);
if (!data)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From 4b4027b6b1c877d7ab467896b04c7bd1aadcfa15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 12:18:24 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Free driverkey data when an error is detected in
grub_xnu_writetree_toheap()
... to avoid memory leaks.
Fixes: CID 96640
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
index eb14462..1a590db 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
@@ -227,26 +227,33 @@ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap (grub_addr_t *target, grub_size_t *size)
if (! memorymap)
return grub_errno;
- driverkey = (struct grub_xnu_devtree_key *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*driverkey));
+ driverkey = (struct grub_xnu_devtree_key *) grub_zalloc (sizeof (*driverkey));
if (! driverkey)
return grub_errno;
driverkey->name = grub_strdup ("DeviceTree");
if (! driverkey->name)
- return grub_errno;
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
driverkey->datasize = sizeof (*extdesc);
driverkey->next = memorymap->first_child;
memorymap->first_child = driverkey;
driverkey->data = extdesc
= (struct grub_xnu_extdesc *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*extdesc));
if (! driverkey->data)
- return grub_errno;
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto fail;
+ }
/* Allocate the space based on the size with dummy value. */
*size = grub_xnu_writetree_get_size (grub_xnu_devtree_root, "/");
err = grub_xnu_heap_malloc (ALIGN_UP (*size + 1, GRUB_XNU_PAGESIZE),
&src, target);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto fail;
/* Put real data in the dummy. */
extdesc->addr = *target;
@@ -255,6 +262,15 @@ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap (grub_addr_t *target, grub_size_t *size)
/* Write the tree to heap. */
grub_xnu_writetree_toheap_real (src, grub_xnu_devtree_root, "/");
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ fail:
+ memorymap->first_child = NULL;
+
+ grub_free (driverkey->data);
+ grub_free (driverkey->name);
+ grub_free (driverkey);
+
+ return err;
}
/* Find a key or value in parent key. */
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 7c8a2b5d1421a0f2a33d33531f7561f3da93b844 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 10:36:00 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Check if pointer is NULL before using it
Fixes: CID 73654
Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
index 1a590db..1c0cf6a 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
@@ -670,6 +670,9 @@ grub_xnu_load_driver (char *infoplistname, grub_file_t binaryfile,
char *name, *nameend;
int namelen;
+ if (infoplistname == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, N_("missing p-list filename"));
+
name = get_name_ptr (infoplistname);
nameend = grub_strchr (name, '/');
@@ -701,10 +704,7 @@ grub_xnu_load_driver (char *infoplistname, grub_file_t binaryfile,
else
macho = 0;
- if (infoplistname)
- infoplist = grub_file_open (infoplistname, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_INFO_PLIST);
- else
- infoplist = 0;
+ infoplist = grub_file_open (infoplistname, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_INFO_PLIST);
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
if (infoplist)
{
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 8b3a95655b4391122e7b0315d8cc6f876caf8183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 18:35:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] util/grub-install: Fix NULL pointer dereferences
Two grub_device_open() calls does not have associated NULL checks
for returned values. Fix that and appease the Coverity.
Fixes: CID 314583
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
util/grub-install.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/util/grub-install.c b/util/grub-install.c
index a82725f..367350f 100644
--- a/util/grub-install.c
+++ b/util/grub-install.c
@@ -1775,6 +1775,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
fill_core_services (core_services);
ins_dev = grub_device_open (install_drive);
+ if (ins_dev == NULL)
+ grub_util_error ("%s", grub_errmsg);
bless (ins_dev, core_services, 0);
@@ -1875,6 +1877,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
fill_core_services(core_services);
ins_dev = grub_device_open (install_drive);
+ if (ins_dev == NULL)
+ grub_util_error ("%s", grub_errmsg);
bless (ins_dev, boot_efi, 1);
if (!removable && update_nvram)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 5dc41edc4eba259c6043ae7698c245ec1baaacc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 14:33:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] util/grub-editenv: Fix incorrect casting of a signed value
The return value of ftell() may be negative (-1) on error. While it is
probably unlikely to occur, we should not blindly cast to an unsigned
value without first testing that it is not negative.
Fixes: CID 73856
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
util/grub-editenv.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/util/grub-editenv.c b/util/grub-editenv.c
index f3662c9..db6f187 100644
--- a/util/grub-editenv.c
+++ b/util/grub-editenv.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ open_envblk_file (const char *name)
{
FILE *fp;
char *buf;
+ long loc;
size_t size;
grub_envblk_t envblk;
@@ -143,7 +144,12 @@ open_envblk_file (const char *name)
grub_util_error (_("cannot seek `%s': %s"), name,
strerror (errno));
- size = (size_t) ftell (fp);
+ loc = ftell (fp);
+ if (loc < 0)
+ grub_util_error (_("cannot get file location `%s': %s"), name,
+ strerror (errno));
+
+ size = (size_t) loc;
if (fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0)
grub_util_error (_("cannot seek `%s': %s"), name,
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From 1641d74e16f9d1ca35ba1a87ee4a0bf3afa48e72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 15:04:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] util/glue-efi: Fix incorrect use of a possibly negative value
It is possible for the ftell() function to return a negative value,
although it is fairly unlikely here, we should be checking for
a negative value before we assign it to an unsigned value.
Fixes: CID 73744
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
util/glue-efi.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/util/glue-efi.c b/util/glue-efi.c
index 68f5316..de0fa6d 100644
--- a/util/glue-efi.c
+++ b/util/glue-efi.c
@@ -39,13 +39,23 @@ write_fat (FILE *in32, FILE *in64, FILE *out, const char *out_filename,
struct grub_macho_fat_header head;
struct grub_macho_fat_arch arch32, arch64;
grub_uint32_t size32, size64;
+ long size;
char *buf;
fseek (in32, 0, SEEK_END);
- size32 = ftell (in32);
+ size = ftell (in32);
+ if (size < 0)
+ grub_util_error ("cannot get end of input file '%s': %s",
+ name32, strerror (errno));
+ size32 = (grub_uint32_t) size;
fseek (in32, 0, SEEK_SET);
+
fseek (in64, 0, SEEK_END);
- size64 = ftell (in64);
+ size = ftell (in64);
+ if (size < 0)
+ grub_util_error ("cannot get end of input file '%s': %s",
+ name64, strerror (errno));
+ size64 = (grub_uint64_t) size;
fseek (in64, 0, SEEK_SET);
head.magic = grub_cpu_to_le32_compile_time (GRUB_MACHO_FAT_EFI_MAGIC);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 41ae93b2e6c75453514629bcfe684300e3aec0ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 23:05:13 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Fix NULL dereference in
grub_script_execute_cmdline()
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/script/execute.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c
index 7e028e1..5ea2aef 100644
--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c
+++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c
@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ grub_script_execute_cmdline (struct grub_script_cmd *cmd)
struct grub_script_argv argv = { 0, 0, 0 };
/* Lookup the command. */
- if (grub_script_arglist_to_argv (cmdline->arglist, &argv) || ! argv.args[0])
+ if (grub_script_arglist_to_argv (cmdline->arglist, &argv) || ! argv.args || ! argv.args[0])
return grub_errno;
for (i = 0; i < argv.argc; i++)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 6afbe6063c95b827372f9ec310c9fc7461311eb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 16:57:37 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] commands/ls: Require device_name is not NULL before printing
This can be triggered with:
ls -l (0 0*)
and causes a NULL deref in grub_normal_print_device_info().
I'm not sure if there's any implication with the IEEE 1275 platform.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/commands/ls.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/ls.c b/grub-core/commands/ls.c
index 5b7491a..326d2d6 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/ls.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/ls.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ grub_ls_list_files (char *dirname, int longlist, int all, int human)
goto fail;
}
- if (! *path)
+ if (! *path && device_name)
{
if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_FS)
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From fe0586347ee46f927ae27bb9673532da9f5dead5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 17:30:42 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Avoid crash when using "$#" outside a
function scope
"$#" represents the number of arguments to a function. It is only
defined in a function scope, where "scope" is non-NULL. Currently,
if we attempt to evaluate "$#" outside a function scope, "scope" will
be NULL and we will crash with a NULL pointer dereference.
Do not attempt to count arguments for "$#" if "scope" is NULL. This
will result in "$#" being interpreted as an empty string if evaluated
outside a function scope.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/script/execute.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c
index 5ea2aef..23d34bd 100644
--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c
+++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ gettext_putvar (const char *str, grub_size_t len,
return 0;
/* Enough for any number. */
- if (len == 1 && str[0] == '#')
+ if (len == 1 && str[0] == '#' && scope != NULL)
{
grub_snprintf (*ptr, 30, "%u", scope->argv.argc);
*ptr += grub_strlen (*ptr);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From 2a330dba93ff11bc00eda76e9419bc52b0c7ead6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 16:07:29 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] lib/arg: Block repeated short options that require an
argument
Fuzzing found the following crash:
search -hhhhhhhhhhhhhf
We didn't allocate enough option space for 13 hints because the
allocation code counts the number of discrete arguments (i.e. argc).
However, the shortopt parsing code will happily keep processing
a combination of short options without checking if those short
options require an argument. This means you can easily end writing
past the allocated option space.
This fixes a OOB write which can cause heap corruption.
Fixes: CVE-2021-20225
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/lib/arg.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/arg.c b/grub-core/lib/arg.c
index 3288609..537c5e9 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/arg.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/arg.c
@@ -299,6 +299,19 @@ grub_arg_parse (grub_extcmd_t cmd, int argc, char **argv,
it can have an argument value. */
if (*curshort)
{
+ /*
+ * Only permit further short opts if this one doesn't
+ * require a value.
+ */
+ if (opt->type != ARG_TYPE_NONE &&
+ !(opt->flags & GRUB_ARG_OPTION_OPTIONAL))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ N_("missing mandatory option for `%s'"),
+ opt->longarg);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (parse_option (cmd, opt, 0, usr) || grub_errno)
goto fail;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 0a05f88e2bb33ed2a0cfd93f481f471efb7791aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 16:18:26 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Don't crash on a "for" loop with no items
The following crashes the parser:
for x in; do
0
done
This is because grub_script_arglist_to_argv() doesn't consider the
possibility that arglist is NULL. Catch that explicitly.
This avoids a NULL pointer dereference.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/script/execute.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c
index 23d34bd..31dac25 100644
--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c
+++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c
@@ -624,6 +624,9 @@ grub_script_arglist_to_argv (struct grub_script_arglist *arglist,
struct grub_script_arg *arg = 0;
struct grub_script_argv result = { 0, 0, 0 };
+ if (arglist == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
for (; arglist && arglist->arg; arglist = arglist->next)
{
if (grub_script_argv_next (&result))
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 2f533a89a8dfcacbf2c9dbc77d910f111f24bf33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 17:10:48 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] commands/menuentry: Fix quoting in setparams_prefix()
Commit 9acdcbf32542 (use single quotes in menuentry setparams command)
says that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters. It
actually requires (and always did require!) 4 characters:
str: a'b => a'\''b
len: 3 => 6 (2 for the letters + 4 for the quote)
This leads to not allocating enough memory and thus out of bounds writes
that have been observed to cause heap corruption.
Allocate 4 bytes for each single quote.
Commit 22e7dbb2bb81 (Fix quoting in legacy parser.) does the same
quoting, but it adds 3 as extra overhead on top of the single byte that
the quote already needs. So it's correct.
Fixes: 9acdcbf32542 (use single quotes in menuentry setparams command)
Fixes: CVE-2021-20233
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/commands/menuentry.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/menuentry.c b/grub-core/commands/menuentry.c
index 9164df7..720e6d8 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/menuentry.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/menuentry.c
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ setparams_prefix (int argc, char **args)
len += 3; /* 3 = 1 space + 2 quotes */
p = args[i];
while (*p)
- len += (*p++ == '\'' ? 3 : 1);
+ len += (*p++ == '\'' ? 4 : 1);
}
result = grub_malloc (len + 2);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From f41f0af48ab7f7c135aac17ac862c30bde0bbab7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 22:19:01 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] kern/misc: Always set *end in grub_strtoull()
Currently, if there is an error in grub_strtoull(), *end is not set.
This differs from the usual behavior of strtoull(), and also means that
some callers may use an uninitialized value for *end.
Set *end unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/kern/misc.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/misc.c b/grub-core/kern/misc.c
index a7abd36..b02693b 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/misc.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/misc.c
@@ -406,6 +406,10 @@ grub_strtoull (const char *str, char **end, int base)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
N_("overflow is detected"));
+
+ if (end)
+ *end = (char *) str;
+
return ~0ULL;
}
@@ -417,6 +421,10 @@ grub_strtoull (const char *str, char **end, int base)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER,
N_("unrecognized number"));
+
+ if (end)
+ *end = (char *) str;
+
return 0;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 693989598fd38c3c0b2a928f4f64865b5681762f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 12:57:04 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Catch files with unsupported quantization
or Huffman tables
Our decoder only supports 2 quantization tables. If a file asks for
a quantization table with index > 1, reject it.
Similarly, our decoder only supports 4 Huffman tables. If a file asks
for a Huffman table with index > 3, reject it.
This fixes some out of bounds reads. It's not clear what degree of control
over subsequent execution could be gained by someone who can carefully
set up the contents of memory before loading an invalid JPEG file.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
index 0b6ce3c..23f919a 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
@@ -333,7 +333,11 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sof (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
else if (ss != JPEG_SAMPLING_1x1)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
"jpeg: sampling method not supported");
+
data->comp_index[id][0] = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data);
+ if (data->comp_index[id][0] > 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "jpeg: too many quantization tables");
}
if (data->file->offset != next_marker)
@@ -602,6 +606,10 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sos (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
ht = grub_jpeg_get_byte (data);
data->comp_index[id][1] = (ht >> 4);
data->comp_index[id][2] = (ht & 0xF) + 2;
+
+ if ((data->comp_index[id][1] < 0) || (data->comp_index[id][1] > 3) ||
+ (data->comp_index[id][2] < 0) || (data->comp_index[id][2] > 3))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: invalid hufftable index");
}
grub_jpeg_get_byte (data); /* Skip 3 unused bytes. */
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 34b85a6e07014383ddcad09f99ff239ad752dd1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 13:29:53 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Catch OOB reads/writes in
grub_jpeg_decode_du()
The key line is:
du[jpeg_zigzag_order[pos]] = val * (int) data->quan_table[qt][pos];
jpeg_zigzag_order is grub_uint8_t[64].
I don't understand JPEG decoders quite well enough to explain what's
going on here. However, I observe sometimes pos=64, which leads to an
OOB read of the jpeg_zigzag_order global then an OOB write to du.
That leads to various unpleasant memory corruption conditions.
Catch where pos >= ARRAY_SIZE(jpeg_zigzag_order) and bail.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
index 23f919a..e514812 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
@@ -526,6 +526,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_du (struct grub_jpeg_data *data, int id, jpeg_data_unit_t du)
val = grub_jpeg_get_number (data, num & 0xF);
num >>= 4;
pos += num;
+
+ if (pos >= ARRAY_SIZE (jpeg_zigzag_order))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "jpeg: invalid position in zigzag order!?");
+ return;
+ }
+
du[jpeg_zigzag_order[pos]] = val * (int) data->quan_table[qt][pos];
pos++;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 8338a8238f08d9f3ae4c2ddfff0603eff80af9e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 14:06:46 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Don't decode data before start of stream
When a start of stream marker is encountered, we call grub_jpeg_decode_sos()
which allocates space for a bitmap.
When a restart marker is encountered, we call grub_jpeg_decode_data() which
then fills in that bitmap.
If we get a restart marker before the start of stream marker, we will
attempt to write to a bitmap_ptr that hasn't been allocated. Catch this
and bail out. This fixes an attempt to write to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
index e514812..e31602f 100644
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
@@ -646,6 +646,10 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
nr1 = (data->image_height + vb - 1) >> (3 + data->log_vs);
nc1 = (data->image_width + hb - 1) >> (3 + data->log_hs);
+ if (data->bitmap_ptr == NULL)
+ return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream");
+
for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
for (c1 = 0; c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From 829329bddb2c3e623270cc634cc9ab32e6455fe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 20:03:20 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] term/gfxterm: Don't set up a font with glyphs that are too
big
Catch the case where we have a font so big that it causes the number of
rows or columns to be 0. Currently we continue and allocate a
virtual_screen.text_buffer of size 0. We then try to use that for glpyhs
and things go badly.
On the emu platform, malloc() may give us a valid pointer, in which case
we'll access heap memory which we shouldn't. Alternatively, it may give us
NULL, in which case we'll crash. For other platforms, if I understand
grub_memalign() correctly, we will receive a valid but small allocation
that we will very likely later overrun.
Prevent the creation of a virtual screen that isn't at least 40 cols
by 12 rows. This is arbitrary, but it seems that if your width or height
is half a standard 80x24 terminal, you're probably going to struggle to
read anything anyway.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/term/gfxterm.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/term/gfxterm.c b/grub-core/term/gfxterm.c
index af7c090..b40fcce 100644
--- a/grub-core/term/gfxterm.c
+++ b/grub-core/term/gfxterm.c
@@ -232,6 +232,15 @@ grub_virtual_screen_setup (unsigned int x, unsigned int y,
virtual_screen.columns = virtual_screen.width / virtual_screen.normal_char_width;
virtual_screen.rows = virtual_screen.height / virtual_screen.normal_char_height;
+ /*
+ * There must be a minimum number of rows and columns for the screen to
+ * make sense. Arbitrarily pick half of 80x24. If either dimensions is 0
+ * we would allocate 0 bytes for the text_buffer.
+ */
+ if (virtual_screen.columns < 40 || virtual_screen.rows < 12)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FONT,
+ "font: glyphs too large to fit on screen");
+
/* Allocate memory for text buffer. */
virtual_screen.text_buffer =
(struct grub_colored_char *) grub_malloc (virtual_screen.columns
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From b5bc456f664bc301ab4cd5a17d3d23c6661c259e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 11:46:39 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/fshelp: Catch impermissibly large block sizes in read
helper
A fuzzed HFS+ filesystem had log2blocksize = 22. This gave
log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS = 31. 1 << 31 = 0x80000000,
which is -1 as an int. This caused some wacky behavior later on in
the function, leading to out-of-bounds writes on the destination buffer.
Catch log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS >= 31. We could be stricter,
but this is the minimum that will prevent integer size weirdness.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/fshelp.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/fshelp.c b/grub-core/fs/fshelp.c
index 4c902ad..a2d0d29 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/fshelp.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/fshelp.c
@@ -362,6 +362,18 @@ grub_fshelp_read_file (grub_disk_t disk, grub_fshelp_node_t node,
grub_disk_addr_t i, blockcnt;
int blocksize = 1 << (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
+ /*
+ * Catch blatantly invalid log2blocksize. We could be a lot stricter, but
+ * this is the most permissive we can be before we start to see integer
+ * overflow/underflow issues.
+ */
+ if (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS >= 31)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ N_("blocksize too large"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (pos > filesize)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 58ea11d5b9ca0966bd9c68d8ba5240cf7dc3ba83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 18:13:56 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/hfsplus: Don't fetch a key beyond the end of the node
Otherwise you get a wild pointer, leading to a bunch of invalid reads.
Check it falls inside the given node.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
index 8fe7c12..1c7791b 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
@@ -635,6 +635,10 @@ grub_hfsplus_btree_search (struct grub_hfsplus_btree *btree,
pointer = ((char *) currkey
+ grub_be_to_cpu16 (currkey->keylen)
+ 2);
+
+ if ((char *) pointer > node + btree->nodesize - 2)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "HFS+ key beyond end of node");
+
currnode = grub_be_to_cpu32 (grub_get_unaligned32 (pointer));
match = 1;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
From 2ca0e5dbcdcb6fc93ccae39a0f39d0dba4a7ff20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 16:59:35 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/hfsplus: Don't use uninitialized data on corrupt
filesystems
Valgrind identified the following use of uninitialized data:
==2782220== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
==2782220== at 0x42B364: grub_hfsplus_btree_search (hfsplus.c:566)
==2782220== by 0x42B21D: grub_hfsplus_read_block (hfsplus.c:185)
==2782220== by 0x42A693: grub_fshelp_read_file (fshelp.c:386)
==2782220== by 0x42C598: grub_hfsplus_read_file (hfsplus.c:219)
==2782220== by 0x42C598: grub_hfsplus_mount (hfsplus.c:330)
==2782220== by 0x42B8C5: grub_hfsplus_dir (hfsplus.c:958)
==2782220== by 0x4C1AE6: grub_fs_probe (fs.c:73)
==2782220== by 0x407C94: grub_ls_list_files (ls.c:186)
==2782220== by 0x407C94: grub_cmd_ls (ls.c:284)
==2782220== by 0x4D7130: grub_extcmd_dispatcher (extcmd.c:55)
==2782220== by 0x4045A6: execute_command (grub-fstest.c:59)
==2782220== by 0x4045A6: fstest (grub-fstest.c:433)
==2782220== by 0x4045A6: main (grub-fstest.c:772)
==2782220== Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
==2782220== at 0x483C7F3: malloc (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==2782220== by 0x4C0305: grub_malloc (mm.c:42)
==2782220== by 0x42C21D: grub_hfsplus_mount (hfsplus.c:239)
==2782220== by 0x42B8C5: grub_hfsplus_dir (hfsplus.c:958)
==2782220== by 0x4C1AE6: grub_fs_probe (fs.c:73)
==2782220== by 0x407C94: grub_ls_list_files (ls.c:186)
==2782220== by 0x407C94: grub_cmd_ls (ls.c:284)
==2782220== by 0x4D7130: grub_extcmd_dispatcher (extcmd.c:55)
==2782220== by 0x4045A6: execute_command (grub-fstest.c:59)
==2782220== by 0x4045A6: fstest (grub-fstest.c:433)
==2782220== by 0x4045A6: main (grub-fstest.c:772)
This happens when the process of reading the catalog file goes sufficiently
wrong that there's an attempt to read the extent overflow file, which has
not yet been loaded. Keep track of when the extent overflow file is
fully loaded and refuse to use it before then.
The load valgrind doesn't like is btree->nodesize, and that's then used
to allocate a data structure. It looks like there are subsequently a lot
of reads based on that pointer so OOB reads are likely, and indeed crashes
(albeit difficult-to-replicate ones) have been observed in fuzzing.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
include/grub/hfsplus.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
index 1c7791b..361e5be 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
@@ -177,6 +177,17 @@ grub_hfsplus_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock)
break;
}
+ /*
+ * If the extent overflow tree isn't ready yet, we can't look
+ * in it. This can happen where the catalog file is corrupted.
+ */
+ if (!node->data->extoverflow_tree_ready)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
+ "attempted to read extent overflow tree before loading");
+ break;
+ }
+
/* Set up the key to look for in the extent overflow file. */
extoverflow.extkey.fileid = node->fileid;
extoverflow.extkey.type = 0;
@@ -241,6 +252,7 @@ grub_hfsplus_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
return 0;
data->disk = disk;
+ data->extoverflow_tree_ready = 0;
/* Read the bootblock. */
grub_disk_read (disk, GRUB_HFSPLUS_SBLOCK, 0, sizeof (volheader),
@@ -357,6 +369,8 @@ grub_hfsplus_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
if (data->extoverflow_tree.nodesize < 2)
goto fail;
+ data->extoverflow_tree_ready = 1;
+
if (grub_hfsplus_read_file (&data->attr_tree.file, 0, 0,
sizeof (struct grub_hfsplus_btnode),
sizeof (header), (char *) &header) <= 0)
diff --git a/include/grub/hfsplus.h b/include/grub/hfsplus.h
index 117740a..e14dd31 100644
--- a/include/grub/hfsplus.h
+++ b/include/grub/hfsplus.h
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ struct grub_hfsplus_data
struct grub_hfsplus_btree extoverflow_tree;
struct grub_hfsplus_btree attr_tree;
+ int extoverflow_tree_ready;
+
struct grub_hfsplus_file dirroot;
struct grub_hfsplus_file opened_file;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 1c15848838d924552611247110723e2a1c17a5a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 12:19:07 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/hfs: Disable under lockdown
HFS has issues such as infinite mutual recursion that are simply too
complex to fix for such a legacy format. So simply do not permit
it to be loaded under lockdown.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/hfs.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
index 3fe842b..9a5b7bb 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <grub/hfs.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
#include <grub/fshelp.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -1433,11 +1434,13 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_hfs_fs =
GRUB_MOD_INIT(hfs)
{
- grub_fs_register (&grub_hfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown ())
+ grub_fs_register (&grub_hfs_fs);
my_mod = mod;
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(hfs)
{
- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_hfs_fs);
+ if (!grub_is_lockdown())
+ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_hfs_fs);
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 8d3ae59dee2930d640add3bba983006e1f5dd1b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 14:34:58 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/sfs: Fix over-read of root object name
There's a read of the name of the root object that assumes that the name
is nul-terminated within the root block. This isn't guaranteed - it seems
SFS would require you to read multiple blocks to get a full name in general,
but maybe that doesn't apply to the root object.
Either way, figure out how much space is left in the root block and don't
over-read it. This fixes some OOB reads.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/sfs.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
index de2b107..983e880 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c
@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ grub_sfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
struct grub_sfs_objc *rootobjc;
char *rootobjc_data = 0;
grub_uint32_t blk;
+ unsigned int max_len;
data = grub_malloc (sizeof (*data));
if (!data)
@@ -421,7 +422,13 @@ grub_sfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
data->diropen.data = data;
data->diropen.cache = 0;
data->disk = disk;
- data->label = grub_strdup ((char *) (rootobjc->objects[0].filename));
+
+ /* We only read 1 block of data, so truncate the name if needed. */
+ max_len = ((GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE << data->log_blocksize)
+ - 24 /* offsetof (struct grub_sfs_objc, objects) */
+ - 25); /* offsetof (struct grub_sfs_obj, filename) */
+ data->label = grub_zalloc (max_len + 1);
+ grub_strncpy (data->label, (char *) rootobjc->objects[0].filename, max_len);
grub_free (rootobjc_data);
return data;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From ffd5a46f68710e2781899d0be4d701429a5a817d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 14:51:11 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/jfs: Do not move to leaf level if name length is negative
Fuzzing JFS revealed crashes where a negative number would be passed
to le_to_cpu16_copy(). There it would be cast to a large positive number
and the copy would read and write off the end of the respective buffers.
Catch this at the top as well as the bottom of the loop.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index d5a6d65..e5bbda6 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ grub_jfs_getent (struct grub_jfs_diropen *diro)
/* Move down to the leaf level. */
nextent = leaf->next;
- if (leaf->next != 255)
+ if (leaf->next != 255 && len > 0)
do
{
next_leaf = &diro->next_leaf[nextent];
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From bd0cf8148ccf721f6e39ffbd70f8abad0c8897f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 14:57:17 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/jfs: Limit the extents that getblk() can consider
getblk() implicitly trusts that treehead->count is an accurate count of
the number of extents. However, that value is read from disk and is not
trustworthy, leading to OOB reads and crashes. I am not sure to what
extent the data read from OOB can influence subsequent program execution.
Require callers to pass in the maximum number of extents for which
they have storage.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index e5bbda6..804c42d 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -261,13 +261,15 @@ static grub_err_t grub_jfs_lookup_symlink (struct grub_jfs_data *data, grub_uint
static grub_int64_t
getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
struct grub_jfs_tree_extent *extents,
+ int max_extents,
struct grub_jfs_data *data,
grub_uint64_t blk)
{
int found = -1;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (treehead->count) - 2; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (treehead->count) - 2 &&
+ i < max_extents; i++)
{
if (treehead->flags & GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF)
{
@@ -302,7 +304,7 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
<< (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz)
- GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS), 0,
sizeof (*tree), (char *) tree))
- ret = getblk (&tree->treehead, &tree->extents[0], data, blk);
+ ret = getblk (&tree->treehead, &tree->extents[0], 254, data, blk);
grub_free (tree);
return ret;
}
@@ -316,7 +318,7 @@ static grub_int64_t
grub_jfs_blkno (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode,
grub_uint64_t blk)
{
- return getblk (&inode->file.tree, &inode->file.extents[0], data, blk);
+ return getblk (&inode->file.tree, &inode->file.extents[0], 16, data, blk);
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 223120dd83745126cb232a0248c9a8901d7e350d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 15:47:24 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/jfs: Catch infinite recursion
It's possible with a fuzzed filesystem for JFS to keep getblk()-ing
the same data over and over again, leading to stack exhaustion.
Check if we'd be calling the function with exactly the same data as
was passed in, and if so abort.
I'm not sure what the performance impact of this is and am open to
better ideas.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
index 804c42d..6f7c439 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c
@@ -304,7 +304,16 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead,
<< (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz)
- GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS), 0,
sizeof (*tree), (char *) tree))
- ret = getblk (&tree->treehead, &tree->extents[0], 254, data, blk);
+ {
+ if (grub_memcmp (&tree->treehead, treehead, sizeof (struct grub_jfs_treehead)) ||
+ grub_memcmp (&tree->extents, extents, 254 * sizeof (struct grub_jfs_tree_extent)))
+ ret = getblk (&tree->treehead, &tree->extents[0], 254, data, blk);
+ else
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "jfs: infinite recursion detected");
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ }
grub_free (tree);
return ret;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 20ab8cb44bc140a1dedda82a3fccdd45e9bc6929 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 16:49:09 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/nilfs2: Reject too-large keys
NILFS2 has up to 7 keys, per the data structure. Do not permit array
indices in excess of that.
This catches some OOB reads. I don't know how controllable the invalidly
read data is or if that could be used later in the program.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
index 7ed148d..fee2242 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
@@ -569,6 +569,11 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
static inline grub_uint64_t
grub_nilfs2_direct_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_inode *inode, grub_uint64_t key)
{
+ if (1 + key > 6)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "key is too large");
+ return 0xffffffffffffffff;
+ }
return grub_le_to_cpu64 (inode->i_bmap[1 + key]);
}
@@ -584,7 +589,7 @@ grub_nilfs2_bmap_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
{
grub_uint64_t ptr;
ptr = grub_nilfs2_direct_lookup (inode, key);
- if (need_translate)
+ if (ptr != ((grub_uint64_t) 0xffffffffffffffff) && need_translate)
ptr = grub_nilfs2_dat_translate (data, ptr);
return ptr;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
From 37c0eb05cdcc64c28d31c4ebd300f14d5239d05e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 16:49:44 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/nilfs2: Don't search children if provided number is too
large
NILFS2 reads the number of children a node has from the node. Unfortunately,
that's not trustworthy. Check if it's beyond what the filesystem permits and
reject it if so.
This blocks some OOB reads. I'm not sure how controllable the read is and what
could be done with invalidly read data later on.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
index fee2242..43ac1ad 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
@@ -416,14 +416,34 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_node_get_key (struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node *node,
}
static inline int
-grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node *node,
+grub_nilfs2_btree_node_nchildren_max (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
+ struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node *node)
+{
+ int node_children_max = ((NILFS2_BLOCK_SIZE (data) -
+ sizeof (struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node) -
+ NILFS_BTREE_NODE_EXTRA_PAD_SIZE) /
+ (sizeof (grub_uint64_t) + sizeof (grub_uint64_t)));
+
+ return (node->bn_flags & NILFS_BTREE_NODE_ROOT) ? 3 : node_children_max;
+}
+
+static inline int
+grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
+ struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node *node,
grub_uint64_t key, int *indexp)
{
grub_uint64_t nkey;
int index, low, high, s;
low = 0;
+
high = grub_le_to_cpu16 (node->bn_nchildren) - 1;
+ if (high >= grub_nilfs2_btree_node_nchildren_max (data, node))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "too many children");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
index = 0;
s = 0;
while (low <= high)
@@ -459,18 +479,6 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node *node,
return s == 0;
}
-static inline int
-grub_nilfs2_btree_node_nchildren_max (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
- struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node *node)
-{
- int node_children_max = ((NILFS2_BLOCK_SIZE (data) -
- sizeof (struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node) -
- NILFS_BTREE_NODE_EXTRA_PAD_SIZE) /
- (sizeof (grub_uint64_t) + sizeof (grub_uint64_t)));
-
- return (node->bn_flags & NILFS_BTREE_NODE_ROOT) ? 3 : node_children_max;
-}
-
static inline grub_uint64_t *
grub_nilfs2_btree_node_dptrs (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
struct grub_nilfs2_btree_node *node)
@@ -517,7 +525,7 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
node = grub_nilfs2_btree_get_root (inode);
level = grub_nilfs2_btree_get_level (node);
- found = grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (node, key, &index);
+ found = grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (data, node, key, &index);
ptr = grub_nilfs2_btree_node_get_ptr (data, node, index);
if (need_translate)
ptr = grub_nilfs2_dat_translate (data, ptr);
@@ -538,7 +546,7 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
}
if (!found)
- found = grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (node, key, &index);
+ found = grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (data, node, key, &index);
else
index = 0;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From ca5d9ac206043b1fb4cb06259272fb1c5946bb6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 17:06:19 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/nilfs2: Properly bail on errors in
grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup()
We just introduced an error return in grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup().
Make sure the callers catch it.
At the same time, make sure that grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup() always
inits the index pointer passed to it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
index 43ac1ad..aaba002 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
grub_uint64_t key, int *indexp)
{
grub_uint64_t nkey;
- int index, low, high, s;
+ int index = 0, low, high, s;
low = 0;
@@ -441,10 +441,10 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
if (high >= grub_nilfs2_btree_node_nchildren_max (data, node))
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "too many children");
+ *indexp = index;
return 0;
}
- index = 0;
s = 0;
while (low <= high)
{
@@ -526,6 +526,10 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
level = grub_nilfs2_btree_get_level (node);
found = grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup (data, node, key, &index);
+
+ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto fail;
+
ptr = grub_nilfs2_btree_node_get_ptr (data, node, index);
if (need_translate)
ptr = grub_nilfs2_dat_translate (data, ptr);
@@ -550,7 +554,8 @@ grub_nilfs2_btree_lookup (struct grub_nilfs2_data *data,
else
index = 0;
- if (index < grub_nilfs2_btree_node_nchildren_max (data, node))
+ if (index < grub_nilfs2_btree_node_nchildren_max (data, node) &&
+ grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
{
ptr = grub_nilfs2_btree_node_get_ptr (data, node, index);
if (need_translate)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From 3334a5e6c86f10e715cca3bf66ce0fc2f164b61b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 20:59:09 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] io/gzio: Bail if gzio->tl/td is NULL
This is an ugly fix that doesn't address why gzio->tl comes to be NULL.
However, it seems to be sufficient to patch up a bunch of NULL derefs.
It would be good to revisit this in future and see if we can have
a cleaner solution that addresses some of the causes of the unexpected
NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/io/gzio.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/io/gzio.c b/grub-core/io/gzio.c
index 43d98a7..4a8eaea 100644
--- a/grub-core/io/gzio.c
+++ b/grub-core/io/gzio.c
@@ -669,6 +669,13 @@ inflate_codes_in_window (grub_gzio_t gzio)
{
if (! gzio->code_state)
{
+
+ if (gzio->tl == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSED_DATA, "NULL gzio->tl");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
NEEDBITS ((unsigned) gzio->bl);
if ((e = (t = gzio->tl + ((unsigned) b & ml))->e) > 16)
do
@@ -707,6 +714,12 @@ inflate_codes_in_window (grub_gzio_t gzio)
n = t->v.n + ((unsigned) b & mask_bits[e]);
DUMPBITS (e);
+ if (gzio->td == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSED_DATA, "NULL gzio->td");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/* decode distance of block to copy */
NEEDBITS ((unsigned) gzio->bd);
if ((e = (t = gzio->td + ((unsigned) b & md))->e) > 16)
@@ -917,6 +930,13 @@ init_dynamic_block (grub_gzio_t gzio)
n = nl + nd;
m = mask_bits[gzio->bl];
i = l = 0;
+
+ if (gzio->tl == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSED_DATA, "NULL gzio->tl");
+ return;
+ }
+
while ((unsigned) i < n)
{
NEEDBITS ((unsigned) gzio->bl);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From 18490336d91da2b532277cba56473bfed1376fc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 00:05:58 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] io/gzio: Add init_dynamic_block() clean up if unpacking codes
fails
init_dynamic_block() didn't clean up gzio->tl and td in some error
paths. This left td pointing to part of tl. Then in grub_gzio_close(),
when tl was freed the storage for td would also be freed. The code then
attempts to free td explicitly, performing a UAF and then a double free.
Explicitly clean up tl and td in the error paths.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/io/gzio.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/io/gzio.c b/grub-core/io/gzio.c
index 4a8eaea..4236f0f 100644
--- a/grub-core/io/gzio.c
+++ b/grub-core/io/gzio.c
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ init_dynamic_block (grub_gzio_t gzio)
if ((unsigned) i + j > n)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSED_DATA, "too many codes found");
- return;
+ goto fail;
}
while (j--)
ll[i++] = l;
@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ init_dynamic_block (grub_gzio_t gzio)
if ((unsigned) i + j > n)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSED_DATA, "too many codes found");
- return;
+ goto fail;
}
while (j--)
ll[i++] = 0;
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ init_dynamic_block (grub_gzio_t gzio)
if ((unsigned) i + j > n)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSED_DATA, "too many codes found");
- return;
+ goto fail;
}
while (j--)
ll[i++] = 0;
@@ -1019,6 +1019,12 @@ init_dynamic_block (grub_gzio_t gzio)
/* indicate we're now working on a block */
gzio->code_state = 0;
gzio->block_len++;
+ return;
+
+ fail:
+ huft_free (gzio->tl);
+ gzio->td = NULL;
+ gzio->tl = NULL;
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 4e76b08f7171a8603d74fcafb27409a91f578647 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 12:20:49 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] io/gzio: Catch missing values in huft_build() and bail
In huft_build(), "v" is a table of values in order of bit length.
The code later (when setting up table entries in "r") assumes that all
elements of this array corresponding to a code are initialized and less
than N_MAX. However, it doesn't enforce this.
With sufficiently manipulated inputs (e.g. from fuzzing), there can be
elements of "v" that are not filled. Therefore a lookup into "e" or "d"
will use an uninitialized value. This can lead to an invalid/OOB read on
those values, often leading to a crash.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/io/gzio.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/io/gzio.c b/grub-core/io/gzio.c
index 4236f0f..19adebe 100644
--- a/grub-core/io/gzio.c
+++ b/grub-core/io/gzio.c
@@ -507,6 +507,7 @@ huft_build (unsigned *b, /* code lengths in bits (all assumed <= BMAX) */
}
/* Make a table of values in order of bit lengths */
+ grub_memset (v, N_MAX, ARRAY_SIZE (v));
p = b;
i = 0;
do
@@ -588,11 +589,18 @@ huft_build (unsigned *b, /* code lengths in bits (all assumed <= BMAX) */
r.v.n = (ush) (*p); /* simple code is just the value */
p++; /* one compiler does not like *p++ */
}
- else
+ else if (*p < N_MAX)
{
r.e = (uch) e[*p - s]; /* non-simple--look up in lists */
r.v.n = d[*p++ - s];
}
+ else
+ {
+ /* Detected an uninitialised value, abort. */
+ if (h)
+ huft_free (u[0]);
+ return 2;
+ }
/* fill code-like entries with r */
f = 1 << (k - w);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From b5a2b59cc5b8f5ee7ba3b951e7693e402d5b3a6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 12:22:28 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] io/gzio: Zero gzio->tl/td in init_dynamic_block() if
huft_build() fails
If huft_build() fails, gzio->tl or gzio->td could contain pointers that
are no longer valid. Zero them out.
This prevents a double free when grub_gzio_close() comes through and
attempts to free them again.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/io/gzio.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/io/gzio.c b/grub-core/io/gzio.c
index 19adebe..aea86a0 100644
--- a/grub-core/io/gzio.c
+++ b/grub-core/io/gzio.c
@@ -1010,6 +1010,7 @@ init_dynamic_block (grub_gzio_t gzio)
gzio->bl = lbits;
if (huft_build (ll, nl, 257, cplens, cplext, &gzio->tl, &gzio->bl) != 0)
{
+ gzio->tl = 0;
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSED_DATA,
"failed in building a Huffman code table");
return;
@@ -1019,6 +1020,7 @@ init_dynamic_block (grub_gzio_t gzio)
{
huft_free (gzio->tl);
gzio->tl = 0;
+ gzio->td = 0;
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSED_DATA,
"failed in building a Huffman code table");
return;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From a8cc95de74ccc3ad090e8062ac335c844f13c9f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 17:59:14 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] disk/lvm: Don't go beyond the end of the data we read from
disk
We unconditionally trusted offset_xl from the LVM label header, even if
it told us that the PV header/disk locations were way off past the end
of the data we read from disk.
Require that the offset be sane, fixing an OOB read and crash.
Fixes: CID 314367, CID 314371
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index 139fafd..8136122 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -141,6 +141,20 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
goto fail;
}
+ /*
+ * We read a grub_lvm_pv_header and then 2 grub_lvm_disk_locns that
+ * immediately follow the PV header. Make sure we have space for both.
+ */
+ if (grub_le_to_cpu32 (lh->offset_xl) >=
+ GRUB_LVM_LABEL_SIZE - sizeof (struct grub_lvm_pv_header) -
+ 2 * sizeof (struct grub_lvm_disk_locn))
+ {
+#ifdef GRUB_UTIL
+ grub_util_info ("LVM PV header/disk locations are beyond the end of the block");
+#endif
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
pvh = (struct grub_lvm_pv_header *) (buf + grub_le_to_cpu32(lh->offset_xl));
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < GRUB_LVM_ID_LEN; i++)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 27a79bf38e6d050e497eb96a3fdddce43af25577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 18:19:51 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] disk/lvm: Don't blast past the end of the circular metadata
buffer
This catches at least some OOB reads, and it's possible I suppose that
if 2 * mda_size is less than GRUB_LVM_MDA_HEADER_SIZE it might catch some
OOB writes too (although that hasn't showed up as a crash in fuzzing yet).
It's a bit ugly and I'd appreciate better suggestions.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index 8136122..36da575 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -214,6 +214,16 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
if (grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->offset) + grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->size) >
grub_le_to_cpu64 (mdah->size))
{
+ if (2 * mda_size < GRUB_LVM_MDA_HEADER_SIZE ||
+ (grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->offset) + grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->size) -
+ grub_le_to_cpu64 (mdah->size) > mda_size - GRUB_LVM_MDA_HEADER_SIZE))
+ {
+#ifdef GRUB_UTIL
+ grub_util_info ("cannot copy metadata wrap in circular buffer");
+#endif
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
/* Metadata is circular. Copy the wrap in place. */
grub_memcpy (metadatabuf + mda_size,
metadatabuf + GRUB_LVM_MDA_HEADER_SIZE,
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 2958695c4cdc785de6ed708709af071a2d20afef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 18:54:29 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] disk/lvm: Bail on missing PV list
There's an if block for the presence of "physical_volumes {", but if
that block is absent, then p remains NULL and a NULL-deref will result
when looking for logical volumes.
It doesn't seem like LVM makes sense without physical volumes, so error
out rather than crashing.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index 36da575..8e560f3 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
goto fail4;
}
}
+ else
+ goto fail4;
p = grub_strstr (p, "logical_volumes {");
if (p)
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
From db29073fc7aec71a40dabfc722a96ea9f3280907 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 18:35:22 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] disk/lvm: Do not crash if an expected string is not found
Clean up a bunch of cases where we could have strstr() fail and lead to
us dereferencing NULL.
We'll still leak memory in some cases (loops don't clean up allocations
from earlier iterations if a later iteration fails) but at least we're
not crashing.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index 8e560f3..bd5ae87 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -539,7 +539,16 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
}
if (seg->node_count != 1)
- seg->stripe_size = grub_lvm_getvalue (&p, "stripe_size = ");
+ {
+ seg->stripe_size = grub_lvm_getvalue (&p, "stripe_size = ");
+ if (p == NULL)
+ {
+#ifdef GRUB_UTIL
+ grub_util_info ("unknown stripe_size");
+#endif
+ goto lvs_segment_fail;
+ }
+ }
seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count,
sizeof (*stripe));
@@ -559,7 +568,7 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
{
p = grub_strchr (p, '"');
if (p == NULL)
- continue;
+ goto lvs_segment_fail2;
q = ++p;
while (*q != '"')
q++;
@@ -578,7 +587,10 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
stripe->start = grub_lvm_getvalue (&p, ",")
* vg->extent_size;
if (p == NULL)
- continue;
+ {
+ grub_free (stripe->name);
+ goto lvs_segment_fail2;
+ }
stripe++;
}
@@ -615,7 +627,7 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
p = grub_strchr (p, '"');
if (p == NULL)
- continue;
+ goto lvs_segment_fail2;
q = ++p;
while (*q != '"')
q++;
@@ -703,7 +715,7 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
p = p ? grub_strchr (p + 1, '"') : 0;
p = p ? grub_strchr (p + 1, '"') : 0;
if (p == NULL)
- continue;
+ goto lvs_segment_fail2;
q = ++p;
while (*q != '"')
q++;
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
From 1155d7dffd3337942cb7583706b429d567d4db86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 18:35:22 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] disk/lvm: Do not overread metadata
We could reach the end of valid metadata and not realize, leading to
some buffer overreads. Check if we have reached the end and bail.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index bd5ae87..742ecd6 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -313,17 +313,23 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
while (1)
{
grub_ssize_t s;
- while (grub_isspace (*p))
+ while (grub_isspace (*p) && p < mda_end)
p++;
+ if (p == mda_end)
+ goto fail4;
+
if (*p == '}')
break;
pv = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*pv));
q = p;
- while (*q != ' ')
+ while (*q != ' ' && q < mda_end)
q++;
+ if (q == mda_end)
+ goto pvs_fail_noname;
+
s = q - p;
pv->name = grub_malloc (s + 1);
grub_memcpy (pv->name, p, s);
@@ -366,6 +372,7 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
continue;
pvs_fail:
grub_free (pv->name);
+ pvs_fail_noname:
grub_free (pv);
goto fail4;
}
@@ -387,18 +394,24 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
struct grub_diskfilter_segment *seg;
int is_pvmove;
- while (grub_isspace (*p))
+ while (grub_isspace (*p) && p < mda_end)
p++;
+ if (p == mda_end)
+ goto fail4;
+
if (*p == '}')
break;
lv = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*lv));
q = p;
- while (*q != ' ')
+ while (*q != ' ' && q < mda_end)
q++;
+ if (q == mda_end)
+ goto lvs_fail;
+
s = q - p;
lv->name = grub_strndup (p, s);
if (!lv->name)
@@ -570,9 +583,12 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
if (p == NULL)
goto lvs_segment_fail2;
q = ++p;
- while (*q != '"')
+ while (q < mda_end && *q != '"')
q++;
+ if (q == mda_end)
+ goto lvs_segment_fail2;
+
s = q - p;
stripe->name = grub_malloc (s + 1);
@@ -629,9 +645,12 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
if (p == NULL)
goto lvs_segment_fail2;
q = ++p;
- while (*q != '"')
+ while (q < mda_end && *q != '"')
q++;
+ if (q == mda_end)
+ goto lvs_segment_fail2;
+
s = q - p;
lvname = grub_malloc (s + 1);
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From 701293684742d00133b39bf957d3642c81dc83f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 14:43:58 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] disk/lvm: Sanitize rlocn->offset to prevent wild read
rlocn->offset is read directly from disk and added to the metadatabuf
pointer to create a pointer to a block of metadata. It's a 64-bit
quantity so as long as you don't overflow you can set subsequent
pointers to point anywhere in memory.
Require that rlocn->offset fits within the metadata buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index 742ecd6..ed0712f 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -211,6 +211,14 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
}
rlocn = mdah->raw_locns;
+ if (grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->offset) >= grub_le_to_cpu64 (mda_size))
+ {
+#ifdef GRUB_UTIL
+ grub_util_info ("metadata offset is beyond end of metadata area");
+#endif
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
if (grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->offset) + grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->size) >
grub_le_to_cpu64 (mdah->size))
{
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From e18a00073890021362b4a48097672f1d4b340d3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 14:42:21 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] disk/lvm: Do not allow a LV to be it's own segment's node's
LV
This prevents infinite recursion in the diskfilter verification code.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
index ed0712f..81dc375 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
@@ -838,9 +838,13 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
}
if (lv1->segments[i].nodes[j].pv == NULL)
for (lv2 = vg->lvs; lv2; lv2 = lv2->next)
- if (grub_strcmp (lv2->name,
- lv1->segments[i].nodes[j].name) == 0)
- lv1->segments[i].nodes[j].lv = lv2;
+ {
+ if (lv1 == lv2)
+ continue;
+ if (grub_strcmp (lv2->name,
+ lv1->segments[i].nodes[j].name) == 0)
+ lv1->segments[i].nodes[j].lv = lv2;
+ }
}
}
--
2.14.2
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From b88a82e78cdd0ab8e0339c1c3f9564c4d8c0c969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 17:17:16 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fs/btrfs: Validate the number of stripes/parities in RAID5/6
This prevents a divide by zero if nstripes == nparities, and
also prevents propagation of invalid values if nstripes ends up
less than nparities.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
index 2b65bd5..e4e87ba 100644
--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
+++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c
@@ -1076,6 +1076,9 @@ grub_btrfs_read_logical (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, grub_disk_addr_t addr,
* stripen is computed without the parities
* (0 for A0, A1, A2, 1 for B0, B1, B2, etc.).
*/
+ if (nparities >= nstripes)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS,
+ "invalid RAID5/6: nparities >= nstripes");
high = grub_divmod64 (stripe_nr, nstripes - nparities, &stripen);
/*
--
2.14.2

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More