improved security of secure subscription server

This commit is contained in:
robert@mrspurr
2012-05-29 14:36:04 +02:00
parent ce1b022025
commit fa3badcfd0
2 changed files with 67 additions and 0 deletions
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
#!/usr/bin/perl
use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
use IO::Socket::INET;
open PK,$ARGV[3];
my @lines = <PK>;
close PK;
$rsa_priv = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key(join('',@lines));
my %items = {};
$items{'key'} = $ARGV[1];
$items{'address'} = $ARGV[2];
my $uwsgi_pkt = '';
foreach(keys %items) {
$uwsgi_pkt .= pack('v', length($_)).$_.pack('v', length($items{$_})).$items{$_};
}
my $unix_check = time();
$uwsgi_pkt .= pack('v', 4).'unix'.pack('v', length($unix_check)).$unix_check;
my $signature = $rsa_priv->sign($uwsgi_pkt);
$uwsgi_pkt .= pack('v', 4).'sign'.pack('v', length($signature)).$signature;
my $udp = new IO::Socket::INET(PeerAddr => $ARGV[0], Proto => 'udp');
$udp->send(pack('CvC', 224, length($uwsgi_pkt), 0).$uwsgi_pkt);
print ''.(length($uwsgi_pkt)+4).' bytes sent to '.$ARGV[0]."\n";
+31
View File
@@ -587,6 +587,37 @@ void uwsgi_send_subscription(char *udp_address, char *key, size_t keysize, uint8
#ifdef UWSGI_SSL
if (sign) {
// add space for "unix" item
char unix_dst[sizeof(UMAX64_STR)+1];
if (snprintf(unix_dst, sizeof(UMAX64_STR)+1, "%lu", (unsigned long) uwsgi_now()) < 1) {
uwsgi_error("unable to generate unix time for subscription !!!\n");
free(subscrbuf);
return;
}
ssb_size += 2 + 4 + 2 + strlen(unix_dst);
char *new_buf = realloc(subscrbuf, ssb_size);
if (!new_buf) {
uwsgi_error("realloc()");
free(subscrbuf);
return;
}
// fix ssb (new_buf base could be changed)
ssb = (new_buf + (ssb-subscrbuf));
subscrbuf = new_buf;
ustrlen = 4;
*ssb++ = (uint8_t) (ustrlen & 0xff);
*ssb++ = (uint8_t) ((ustrlen >>8) & 0xff);
memcpy(ssb, "unix", ustrlen);
ssb+=ustrlen;
ustrlen = strlen(unix_dst);
*ssb++ = (uint8_t) (ustrlen & 0xff);
*ssb++ = (uint8_t) ((ustrlen >>8) & 0xff);
memcpy(ssb, unix_dst, strlen(unix_dst));
ssb+=ustrlen;
unsigned int signature_len = 0;
char *signature = uwsgi_rsa_sign(sign, subscrbuf+4, ssb_size-4, &signature_len);
if (signature && signature_len > 0) {