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Author SHA1 Message Date
unclejack d344625847 Bump version to v1.3.3 2014-12-11 17:37:17 +02:00
Hans Rødtang 496c2748cf Updated cover tool import path.
Signed-off-by: Hans Rødtang <hansrodtang@gmail.com>
2014-12-11 17:37:17 +02:00
Tibor Vass ee8504bc5a docs: Add release notes
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-12-10 18:19:10 -05:00
Alexandr Morozov 994e4a1c69 Change path breakout detection logic in archive package
Fixes #9375

Signed-off-by: Alexandr Morozov <lk4d4@docker.com>

Conflicts:
	integration-cli/docker_cli_cp_test.go
		removed extra test
2014-12-09 23:16:03 +02:00
Arnaud Porterie 0de96a8163 Fix client-side HTTP hijacking over TLS
Properly CloseWrite() the client socket once done with stdin when using
TLS connection (this used to rely on an erroneous type assertion).

Fixes #8658.
Fixes #8642.

Signed-off-by: Arnaud Porterie <arnaud.porterie@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosby.michael@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:17 -05:00
Michael Crosby c8fc8768b6 Flush stdin from within chroot archive
This makes sure that we don't buffer in memory and that we also flush
stdin from diff as well as untar.

Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	pkg/chrootarchive/diff.go
2014-12-09 14:56:17 -05:00
Lewis Marshall f2008c5359 Fix chroot untar for zero padded archive from slow reader
Signed-off-by: Lewis Marshall <lewis@lmars.net>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
unclejack acf1720b3f validate image ID properly & before load
Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Arnaud Porterie 0e9a7bc3ce Add integration test for xz path issue
Signed-off-by: Arnaud Porterie <arnaud.porterie@docker.com>

Conflicts:
	integration-cli/docker_cli_build_test.go
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Michael Crosby 313a1b7620 Decompress archive before streaming the unpack in a chroot
Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	pkg/archive/archive.go
	pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Michael Crosby 62d83404b5 Update chroot apply layer to handle decompression outside chroot
Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	pkg/archive/diff.go
	pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Cristian Staretu aef842e7df Add build tests covering extraction in chroot
Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
unclejack e629e255d8 integ-cli: add test for links in volumes
Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
unclejack 134f8e6b47 integ-cli: add build test for absolute symlink
Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Tibor Vass 1cd89729d5 Add another symlink breakout test
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Tibor Vass 566146bc13 symlink: add more tests
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Tibor Vass 1ebafeb635 symlink: cleanup names and break big test into multiple smaller ones
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Tibor Vass 18193ae0a3 Refactor of symlink tests to remove testdata dir
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Tianon Gravi cd745d5c6e Simplify FollowSymlinkInScope based on Go 1.3.3's EvalSymlinks
Signed-off-by: Andrew Page <admwiggin@gmail.com>
2014-12-09 14:56:16 -05:00
Tibor Vass 6f514d28c0 Merge pull request #9316 from tiborvass/bump_v1.3.2
Bump v1.3.2
2014-11-24 16:49:28 -05:00
Tibor Vass 39fa2faad2 Bump to version v1.3.2
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-11-24 12:38:01 -05:00
Tibor Vass 324953d74a docs: Add 1.3.2 release notes
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-11-24 12:38:01 -05:00
Tibor Vass b256616589 archive: do not call FollowSymlinkInScope in createTarFile
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-11-24 11:51:37 -05:00
unclejack 409f65bfd1 pkg/chrootarchive: provide TMPDIR for ApplyLayer
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com> (github: unclejack)
2014-11-24 11:51:37 -05:00
Derek McGowan 87f59e3802 Skip V2 registry and immediately fallback to V1 when mirrors are provided
Since V2 registry does not yet implement mirrors, when mirrors are given automatically fallback to V1 without checking V2 first.

Signed-off-by: Derek McGowan <derek@mcgstyle.net> (github: dmcgowan)
2014-11-14 15:30:58 -08:00
Tibor Vass c650d17a26 Rewrite documentation for insecure registries
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	docs/sources/reference/commandline/cli.md
2014-11-14 14:20:19 -08:00
Tibor Vass 5e2d02ab73 Add the possibility of specifying a subnet for --insecure-registry
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	registry/endpoint.go
2014-11-14 14:20:19 -08:00
Tibor Vass eb3738347a registry: parse INDEXSERVERADDRESS into a URL for easier check in isSecure
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-11-14 14:20:19 -08:00
Tibor Vass 6152460c1e Put mock registry address in insecureRegistries for unit tests
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	registry/registry_mock_test.go
2014-11-14 14:20:19 -08:00
Tibor Vass 1527979e87 registry: refactor registry.IsSecure calls into registry.NewEndpoint
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	registry/endpoint.go
	registry/endpoint_test.go
	registry/registry_test.go
2014-11-14 14:05:31 -08:00
Tibor Vass 04175d0763 archive: prevent breakout in ApplyLayer
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-11-14 23:45:37 +02:00
Tibor Vass a111eea20c archive: prevent breakout in Untar
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-11-14 23:45:29 +02:00
Tibor Vass ea361c0476 archive: add breakout tests
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	pkg/archive/archive.go
		fixed conflict which git couldn't fix with the added BreakoutError
2014-11-14 23:44:20 +02:00
Thomas Orozco 967f80f3cc Fix: Failed Start breaks VolumesFrom
Running parseVolumesFromSpec on all VolumesFrom specs before initialize
any mounts endures that we don't leave container.Volumes in an
inconsistent (partially initialized) if one of out mount groups is not
available (e.g. the container we're trying to mount from does not
exist).

Keeping container.Volumes in a consistent state ensures that next time
we Start() the container, it'll run prepareVolumes() again.

The attached test demonstrates that when a container fails to start due
to a missing container specified in VolumesFrom, it "remembers" a Volume
that worked.

Fixes: #8726

Signed-off-by: Thomas Orozco <thomas@orozco.fr>

Conflicts:
	integration-cli/docker_cli_start_test.go
		cli integration test
2014-11-12 00:14:04 +02:00
unclejack 8d90b0faf8 don't call reexec.Init from chrootarchive
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com> (github: unclejack)
2014-11-11 23:20:16 +02:00
Tibor Vass 3ac6394b80 pkg/chrootarchive: pass TarOptions via CLI arg
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com>
2014-11-11 23:20:09 +02:00
unclejack 0357b26c1b add pkg/chrootarchive and use it on the daemon
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com> (github: unclejack)
2014-11-11 23:20:02 +02:00
unclejack 1d4a82365b pkg/archive: add interface for Untar
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com> (github: unclejack)
2014-11-11 23:19:54 +02:00
Josh Hawn 3ab5251f56 Use archive.CopyWithTar in vfs.Create
The vfs storage driver currently shells out to the `cp` binary on the host
system to perform an 'archive' copy of the base image to a new directory.
The archive option preserves the modified time of the files which are created
but there was an issue where it was unable to preserve the modified time of
copied symbolic links on some host systems with an outdated version of `cp`.

This change no longer relies on the host system implementation and instead
utilizes the `CopyWithTar` function found in `pkg/archive` which is used
to copy from source to destination directory using a Tar archive, which
should correctly preserve file attributes.

Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Josh Hawn <josh.hawn@docker.com> (github: jlhawn)
2014-11-11 23:19:43 +02:00
unclejack d51a02091c pkg/reexec: move reexec code to a new package
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com> (github: unclejack)

Conflicts:
	integration/runtime_test.go
		fixed imports
2014-11-11 23:19:34 +02:00
Michael Crosby 0573b17b24 Add AppArmorProfile to container inspect json
Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
2014-11-10 21:04:17 +02:00
Michael Crosby c9379eb3fb Move security opts to HostConfig
These settings need to be in the HostConfig so that they are not
committed to an image and cannot introduce a security issue.

We can safely move this field from the Config to the HostConfig
without any regressions because these settings are consumed at container
created and used to populate fields on the Container struct.  Because of
this, existing settings will be honored for containers already created
on a daemon with custom security settings and prevent values being
consumed via an Image.

Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
2014-11-10 21:04:01 +02:00
unclejack 662ca4114d pkg/symlink: avoid following out of scope
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com> (github: unclejack)
2014-11-10 17:57:54 +02:00
shuai-z 1d1b813d25 removed redundant Clean
The doc (or src) says: The result is Cleaned.

http://golang.org/pkg/path/filepath/#Join

Signed-off-by: shuai-z <zs.broccoli@gmail.com>
2014-11-10 17:57:01 +02:00
Alexandr Morozov fd9c2ae27d Fix deadlock in ps exited filter
Fixes #8909

Signed-off-by: Alexandr Morozov <lk4d4@docker.com>

Conflicts:
	integration-cli/docker_cli_ps_test.go
		fixed merge issue caused by missing tests
2014-11-07 16:35:50 +02:00
unclejack 09c38a8d43 bump fpm to 1.3.2
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com> (github: unclejack)
2014-11-07 16:18:53 +02:00
Tibor Vass 86292adbd9 Merge pull request #8861 from tiborvass/bump_v1.3.1
Bump v1.3.1
2014-10-30 12:43:43 -04:00
Michael Crosby c78b920e01 Merge pull request #8323 from crosbymichael/bump_v1.3.0
Bump to version 1.3.0
2014-10-16 10:08:54 -07:00
75 changed files with 2830 additions and 345 deletions
+30
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,35 @@
# Changelog
## 1.3.3 (2014-12-11)
#### Security
- Fix path traversal vulnerability in processing of absolute symbolic links (CVE-2014-9356)
- Fix decompression of xz image archives, preventing privilege escalation (CVE-2014-9357)
- Validate image IDs (CVE-2014-9358)
#### Runtime
- Fix an issue when image archives are being read slowly
#### Client
- Fix a regression related to stdin redirection
- Fix a regression with `docker cp` when destination is the current directory
## 1.3.2 (2014-11-20)
#### Security
- Fix tar breakout vulnerability
* Extractions are now sandboxed chroot
- Security options are no longer committed to images
#### Runtime
- Fix deadlock in `docker ps -f exited=1`
- Fix a bug when `--volumes-from` references a container that failed to start
#### Registry
+ `--insecure-registry` now accepts CIDR notation such as 10.1.0.0/16
* Private registries whose IPs fall in the 127.0.0.0/8 range do no need the `--insecure-registry` flag
- Skip the experimental registry v2 API when mirroring is enabled
## 1.3.1 (2014-10-28)
#### Security
+2 -2
View File
@@ -75,10 +75,10 @@ ENV GOARM 5
RUN cd /usr/local/go/src && bash -xc 'for platform in $DOCKER_CROSSPLATFORMS; do GOOS=${platform%/*} GOARCH=${platform##*/} ./make.bash --no-clean 2>&1; done'
# Grab Go's cover tool for dead-simple code coverage testing
RUN go get code.google.com/p/go.tools/cmd/cover
RUN go get golang.org/x/tools/cmd/cover
# TODO replace FPM with some very minimal debhelper stuff
RUN gem install --no-rdoc --no-ri fpm --version 1.0.2
RUN gem install --no-rdoc --no-ri fpm --version 1.3.2
# Install man page generator
RUN mkdir -p /go/src/github.com/cpuguy83 \
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
1.3.1
1.3.3
+98 -7
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package client
import (
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"os"
"runtime"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/docker/docker/api"
"github.com/docker/docker/dockerversion"
@@ -19,9 +21,99 @@ import (
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/term"
)
type tlsClientCon struct {
*tls.Conn
rawConn net.Conn
}
func (c *tlsClientCon) CloseWrite() error {
// Go standard tls.Conn doesn't provide the CloseWrite() method so we do it
// on its underlying connection.
if cwc, ok := c.rawConn.(interface {
CloseWrite() error
}); ok {
return cwc.CloseWrite()
}
return nil
}
func tlsDial(network, addr string, config *tls.Config) (net.Conn, error) {
return tlsDialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config)
}
// We need to copy Go's implementation of tls.Dial (pkg/cryptor/tls/tls.go) in
// order to return our custom tlsClientCon struct which holds both the tls.Conn
// object _and_ its underlying raw connection. The rationale for this is that
// we need to be able to close the write end of the connection when attaching,
// which tls.Conn does not provide.
func tlsDialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *tls.Config) (net.Conn, error) {
// We want the Timeout and Deadline values from dialer to cover the
// whole process: TCP connection and TLS handshake. This means that we
// also need to start our own timers now.
timeout := dialer.Timeout
if !dialer.Deadline.IsZero() {
deadlineTimeout := dialer.Deadline.Sub(time.Now())
if timeout == 0 || deadlineTimeout < timeout {
timeout = deadlineTimeout
}
}
var errChannel chan error
if timeout != 0 {
errChannel = make(chan error, 2)
time.AfterFunc(timeout, func() {
errChannel <- errors.New("")
})
}
rawConn, err := dialer.Dial(network, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":")
if colonPos == -1 {
colonPos = len(addr)
}
hostname := addr[:colonPos]
// If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName
// from the hostname we're connecting to.
if config.ServerName == "" {
// Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default.
c := *config
c.ServerName = hostname
config = &c
}
conn := tls.Client(rawConn, config)
if timeout == 0 {
err = conn.Handshake()
} else {
go func() {
errChannel <- conn.Handshake()
}()
err = <-errChannel
}
if err != nil {
rawConn.Close()
return nil, err
}
// This is Docker difference with standard's crypto/tls package: returned a
// wrapper which holds both the TLS and raw connections.
return &tlsClientCon{conn, rawConn}, nil
}
func (cli *DockerCli) dial() (net.Conn, error) {
if cli.tlsConfig != nil && cli.proto != "unix" {
return tls.Dial(cli.proto, cli.addr, cli.tlsConfig)
// Notice this isn't Go standard's tls.Dial function
return tlsDial(cli.proto, cli.addr, cli.tlsConfig)
}
return net.Dial(cli.proto, cli.addr)
}
@@ -109,12 +201,11 @@ func (cli *DockerCli) hijack(method, path string, setRawTerminal bool, in io.Rea
io.Copy(rwc, in)
log.Debugf("[hijack] End of stdin")
}
if tcpc, ok := rwc.(*net.TCPConn); ok {
if err := tcpc.CloseWrite(); err != nil {
log.Debugf("Couldn't send EOF: %s", err)
}
} else if unixc, ok := rwc.(*net.UnixConn); ok {
if err := unixc.CloseWrite(); err != nil {
if conn, ok := rwc.(interface {
CloseWrite() error
}); ok {
if err := conn.CloseWrite(); err != nil {
log.Debugf("Couldn't send EOF: %s", err)
}
}
+6 -4
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon"
imagepkg "github.com/docker/docker/image"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/chrootarchive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/log"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/parsers"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/promise"
@@ -46,7 +47,8 @@ func (b *Builder) readContext(context io.Reader) error {
if b.context, err = tarsum.NewTarSum(decompressedStream, true, tarsum.Version0); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := archive.Untar(b.context, tmpdirPath, nil); err != nil {
if err := chrootarchive.Untar(b.context, tmpdirPath, nil); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -620,7 +622,7 @@ func (b *Builder) addContext(container *daemon.Container, orig, dest string, dec
}
// try to successfully untar the orig
if err := archive.UntarPath(origPath, tarDest); err == nil {
if err := chrootarchive.UntarPath(origPath, tarDest); err == nil {
return nil
} else if err != io.EOF {
log.Debugf("Couldn't untar %s to %s: %s", origPath, tarDest, err)
@@ -630,7 +632,7 @@ func (b *Builder) addContext(container *daemon.Container, orig, dest string, dec
if err := os.MkdirAll(path.Dir(destPath), 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := archive.CopyWithTar(origPath, destPath); err != nil {
if err := chrootarchive.CopyWithTar(origPath, destPath); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -643,7 +645,7 @@ func (b *Builder) addContext(container *daemon.Container, orig, dest string, dec
}
func copyAsDirectory(source, destination string, destinationExists bool) error {
if err := archive.CopyWithTar(source, destination); err != nil {
if err := chrootarchive.CopyWithTar(source, destination); err != nil {
return err
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ ENV GOARM 5
RUN cd /usr/local/go/src && bash -xc 'for platform in $DOCKER_CROSSPLATFORMS; do GOOS=${platform%/*} GOARCH=${platform##*/} ./make.bash --no-clean 2>&1; done'
# Grab Go's cover tool for dead-simple code coverage testing
RUN go get code.google.com/p/go.tools/cmd/cover
RUN go get golang.org/x/tools/cmd/cover
# TODO replace FPM with some very minimal debhelper stuff
RUN gem install --no-rdoc --no-ri fpm --version 1.0.2
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
(env "DOCKER_CROSSPLATFORMS" "linux/386 linux/arm darwin/amd64 darwin/386 freebsd/amd64 freebsd/386 freebsd/arm")
(env "GOARM" "5")
(run "cd /usr/local/go/src && bash -xc 'for platform in $DOCKER_CROSSPLATFORMS; do GOOS=${platform%/*} GOARCH=${platform##*/} ./make.bash --no-clean 2>&1; done'")
(run "go get code.google.com/p/go.tools/cmd/cover")
(run "go get golang.org/x/tools/cmd/cover")
(run "gem install --no-rdoc --no-ri fpm --version 1.0.2")
(run "git clone -b buildroot-2014.02 https://github.com/jpetazzo/docker-busybox.git /docker-busybox")
(run "/bin/echo -e '[default]\\naccess_key=$AWS_ACCESS_KEY\\nsecret_key=$AWS_SECRET_KEY' > /.s3cfg")
+9 -1
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func (config *Config) InstallFlags() {
flag.StringVar(&config.BridgeIP, []string{"#bip", "-bip"}, "", "Use this CIDR notation address for the network bridge's IP, not compatible with -b")
flag.StringVar(&config.BridgeIface, []string{"b", "-bridge"}, "", "Attach containers to a pre-existing network bridge\nuse 'none' to disable container networking")
flag.StringVar(&config.FixedCIDR, []string{"-fixed-cidr"}, "", "IPv4 subnet for fixed IPs (ex: 10.20.0.0/16)\nthis subnet must be nested in the bridge subnet (which is defined by -b or --bip)")
opts.ListVar(&config.InsecureRegistries, []string{"-insecure-registry"}, "Enable insecure communication with specified registries (no certificate verification for HTTPS and enable HTTP fallback)")
opts.ListVar(&config.InsecureRegistries, []string{"-insecure-registry"}, "Enable insecure communication with specified registries (no certificate verification for HTTPS and enable HTTP fallback) (e.g., localhost:5000 or 10.20.0.0/16)")
flag.BoolVar(&config.InterContainerCommunication, []string{"#icc", "-icc"}, true, "Enable inter-container communication")
flag.StringVar(&config.GraphDriver, []string{"s", "-storage-driver"}, "", "Force the Docker runtime to use a specific storage driver")
flag.StringVar(&config.ExecDriver, []string{"e", "-exec-driver"}, "native", "Force the Docker runtime to use a specific exec driver")
@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@ func (config *Config) InstallFlags() {
opts.IPListVar(&config.Dns, []string{"#dns", "-dns"}, "Force Docker to use specific DNS servers")
opts.DnsSearchListVar(&config.DnsSearch, []string{"-dns-search"}, "Force Docker to use specific DNS search domains")
opts.MirrorListVar(&config.Mirrors, []string{"-registry-mirror"}, "Specify a preferred Docker registry mirror")
// Localhost is by default considered as an insecure registry
// This is a stop-gap for people who are running a private registry on localhost (especially on Boot2docker).
//
// TODO: should we deprecate this once it is easier for people to set up a TLS registry or change
// daemon flags on boot2docker?
// If so, do not forget to check the TODO in TestIsSecure
config.InsecureRegistries = append(config.InsecureRegistries, "127.0.0.0/8")
}
func GetDefaultNetworkMtu() int {
+5 -6
View File
@@ -528,10 +528,10 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) getEntrypointAndArgs(configEntrypoint, configCmd []string)
return entrypoint, args
}
func parseSecurityOpt(container *Container, config *runconfig.Config) error {
func parseSecurityOpt(container *Container, config *runconfig.HostConfig) error {
var (
label_opts []string
err error
labelOpts []string
err error
)
for _, opt := range config.SecurityOpt {
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ func parseSecurityOpt(container *Container, config *runconfig.Config) error {
}
switch con[0] {
case "label":
label_opts = append(label_opts, con[1])
labelOpts = append(labelOpts, con[1])
case "apparmor":
container.AppArmorProfile = con[1]
default:
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ func parseSecurityOpt(container *Container, config *runconfig.Config) error {
}
}
container.ProcessLabel, container.MountLabel, err = label.InitLabels(label_opts)
container.ProcessLabel, container.MountLabel, err = label.InitLabels(labelOpts)
return err
}
@@ -583,7 +583,6 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) newContainer(name string, config *runconfig.Config, img *i
execCommands: newExecStore(),
}
container.root = daemon.containerRoot(container.ID)
err = parseSecurityOpt(container, config)
return container, err
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
func TestParseSecurityOpt(t *testing.T) {
container := &Container{}
config := &runconfig.Config{}
config := &runconfig.HostConfig{}
// test apparmor
config.SecurityOpt = []string{"apparmor:test_profile"}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"syscall"
"github.com/docker/docker/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
"github.com/docker/libcontainer/netlink"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
"runtime"
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon/execdriver"
"github.com/docker/docker/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
"github.com/docker/libcontainer"
"github.com/docker/libcontainer/namespaces"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"github.com/docker/docker/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
"github.com/docker/libcontainer"
"github.com/docker/libcontainer/namespaces"
"github.com/docker/libcontainer/syncpipe"
+2 -1
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import (
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon/graphdriver"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/chrootarchive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/log"
mountpk "github.com/docker/docker/pkg/mount"
"github.com/docker/docker/utils"
@@ -304,7 +305,7 @@ func (a *Driver) Diff(id, parent string) (archive.Archive, error) {
}
func (a *Driver) applyDiff(id string, diff archive.ArchiveReader) error {
return archive.Untar(diff, path.Join(a.rootPath(), "diff", id), nil)
return chrootarchive.Untar(diff, path.Join(a.rootPath(), "diff", id), nil)
}
// DiffSize calculates the changes between the specified id
+8 -2
View File
@@ -4,18 +4,24 @@ import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon/graphdriver"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path"
"testing"
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon/graphdriver"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
var (
tmp = path.Join(os.TempDir(), "aufs-tests", "aufs")
)
func init() {
reexec.Init()
}
func testInit(dir string, t *testing.T) graphdriver.Driver {
d, err := Init(dir, nil)
if err != nil {
+2 -1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/chrootarchive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/ioutils"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/log"
"github.com/docker/docker/utils"
@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ func (gdw *naiveDiffDriver) ApplyDiff(id, parent string, diff archive.ArchiveRea
start := time.Now().UTC()
log.Debugf("Start untar layer")
if err = archive.ApplyLayer(layerFs, diff); err != nil {
if err = chrootarchive.ApplyLayer(layerFs, diff); err != nil {
return
}
log.Debugf("Untar time: %vs", time.Now().UTC().Sub(start).Seconds())
+2 -16
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"path"
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon/graphdriver"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/chrootarchive"
"github.com/docker/libcontainer/label"
)
@@ -46,21 +47,6 @@ func isGNUcoreutils() bool {
return false
}
func copyDir(src, dst string) error {
argv := make([]string, 0, 4)
if isGNUcoreutils() {
argv = append(argv, "-aT", "--reflink=auto", src, dst)
} else {
argv = append(argv, "-a", src+"/.", dst+"/.")
}
if output, err := exec.Command("cp", argv...).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Error VFS copying directory: %s (%s)", err, output)
}
return nil
}
func (d *Driver) Create(id, parent string) error {
dir := d.dir(id)
if err := os.MkdirAll(path.Dir(dir), 0700); err != nil {
@@ -80,7 +66,7 @@ func (d *Driver) Create(id, parent string) error {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s: %s", parent, err)
}
if err := copyDir(parentDir, dir); err != nil {
if err := chrootarchive.CopyWithTar(parentDir, dir); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
+8 -1
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@
package vfs
import (
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon/graphdriver/graphtest"
"testing"
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon/graphdriver/graphtest"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
func init() {
reexec.Init()
}
// This avoids creating a new driver for each test if all tests are run
// Make sure to put new tests between TestVfsSetup and TestVfsTeardown
func TestVfsSetup(t *testing.T) {
+1
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) ContainerInspect(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
out.Set("ProcessLabel", container.ProcessLabel)
out.SetJson("Volumes", container.Volumes)
out.SetJson("VolumesRW", container.VolumesRW)
out.SetJson("AppArmorProfile", container.AppArmorProfile)
if children, err := daemon.Children(container.Name); err == nil {
for linkAlias, child := range children {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) Containers(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
if len(filt_exited) > 0 && !container.Running {
should_skip := true
for _, code := range filt_exited {
if code == container.GetExitCode() {
if code == container.ExitCode {
should_skip = false
break
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/proxy"
"github.com/docker/docker/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
const userlandProxyCommandName = "docker-proxy"
+3
View File
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) ContainerStart(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
}
func (daemon *Daemon) setHostConfig(container *Container, hostConfig *runconfig.HostConfig) error {
if err := parseSecurityOpt(container, hostConfig); err != nil {
return err
}
// Validate the HostConfig binds. Make sure that:
// the source exists
for _, bind := range hostConfig.Binds {
+9 -4
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
"syscall"
"github.com/docker/docker/daemon/execdriver"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/chrootarchive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/log"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/symlink"
"github.com/docker/docker/volumes"
@@ -191,15 +191,20 @@ func parseBindMountSpec(spec string) (string, string, bool, error) {
func (container *Container) applyVolumesFrom() error {
volumesFrom := container.hostConfig.VolumesFrom
mountGroups := make([]map[string]*Mount, 0, len(volumesFrom))
for _, spec := range volumesFrom {
mounts, err := parseVolumesFromSpec(container.daemon, spec)
mountGroup, err := parseVolumesFromSpec(container.daemon, spec)
if err != nil {
return err
}
mountGroups = append(mountGroups, mountGroup)
}
for _, mounts := range mountGroups {
for _, mnt := range mounts {
mnt.container = container
if err = mnt.initialize(); err != nil {
if err := mnt.initialize(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@@ -302,7 +307,7 @@ func copyExistingContents(source, destination string) error {
if len(srcList) == 0 {
// If the source volume is empty copy files from the root into the volume
if err := archive.CopyWithTar(source, destination); err != nil {
if err := chrootarchive.CopyWithTar(source, destination); err != nil {
return err
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
"github.com/docker/docker/api/client"
"github.com/docker/docker/dockerversion"
flag "github.com/docker/docker/pkg/mflag"
"github.com/docker/docker/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/utils"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
import (
_ "github.com/docker/docker/daemon/execdriver/lxc"
_ "github.com/docker/docker/daemon/execdriver/native"
"github.com/docker/docker/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
func main() {
+33 -13
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ expect an integer, and they can only be specified once.
-g, --graph="/var/lib/docker" Path to use as the root of the Docker runtime
-H, --host=[] The socket(s) to bind to in daemon mode or connect to in client mode, specified using one or more tcp://host:port, unix:///path/to/socket, fd://* or fd://socketfd.
--icc=true Enable inter-container communication
--insecure-registry=[] Enable insecure communication with specified registries (no certificate verification for HTTPS and enable HTTP fallback)
--insecure-registry=[] Enable insecure communication with specified registries (disables certificate verification for HTTPS and enables HTTP fallback) (e.g., localhost:5000 or 10.20.0.0/16)
--ip=0.0.0.0 Default IP address to use when binding container ports
--ip-forward=true Enable net.ipv4.ip_forward
--ip-masq=true Enable IP masquerading for bridge's IP range
@@ -193,24 +193,44 @@ To set the DNS server for all Docker containers, use
To set the DNS search domain for all Docker containers, use
`docker -d --dns-search example.com`.
### Insecure registries
Docker considers a private registry either secure or insecure.
In the rest of this section, *registry* is used for *private registry*, and `myregistry:5000`
is a placeholder example for a private registry.
A secure registry uses TLS and a copy of its CA certificate is placed on the Docker host at
`/etc/docker/certs.d/myregistry:5000/ca.crt`.
An insecure registry is either not using TLS (i.e., listening on plain text HTTP), or is using
TLS with a CA certificate not known by the Docker daemon. The latter can happen when the
certificate was not found under `/etc/docker/certs.d/myregistry:5000/`, or if the certificate
verification failed (i.e., wrong CA).
By default, Docker assumes all, but local (see local registries below), registries are secure.
Communicating with an insecure registry is not possible if Docker assumes that registry is secure.
In order to communicate with an insecure registry, the Docker daemon requires `--insecure-registry`
in one of the following two forms:
* `--insecure-registry myregistry:5000` tells the Docker daemon that myregistry:5000 should be considered insecure.
* `--insecure-registry 10.1.0.0/16` tells the Docker daemon that all registries whose domain resolve to an IP address is part
of the subnet described by the CIDR syntax, should be considered insecure.
The flag can be used multiple times to allow multiple registries to be marked as insecure.
If an insecure registry is not marked as insecure, `docker pull`, `docker push`, and `docker search`
will result in an error message prompting the user to either secure or pass the `--insecure-registry`
flag to the Docker daemon as described above.
Local registries, whose IP address falls in the 127.0.0.0/8 range, are automatically marked as insecure
as of Docker 1.3.2. It is not recommended to rely on this, as it may change in the future.
### Miscellaneous options
IP masquerading uses address translation to allow containers without a public IP to talk
to other machines on the Internet. This may interfere with some network topologies and
can be disabled with --ip-masq=false.
By default, Docker will assume all registries are secured via TLS with certificate verification
enabled. Prior versions of Docker used an auto fallback if a registry did not support TLS
(or if the TLS connection failed). This introduced the opportunity for Man In The Middle (MITM)
attacks, so as of Docker 1.3.1, the user must now specify the `--insecure-registry` daemon flag
for each insecure registry. An insecure registry is either not using TLS (i.e. plain text HTTP),
or is using TLS with a CA certificate not known by the Docker daemon (i.e. certification
verification disabled). For example, if there is a registry listening for HTTP at 127.0.0.1:5000,
as of Docker 1.3.1 you are required to specify `--insecure-registry 127.0.0.1:5000` when starting
the Docker daemon.
Docker supports softlinks for the Docker data directory
(`/var/lib/docker`) and for `/var/lib/docker/tmp`. The `DOCKER_TMPDIR` and the data directory can be set like this:
+63
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,69 @@ understanding, release
#Release Notes
##Version 1.3.3
(2014-12-11)
This release fixes several security issues. In order to encourage immediate
upgrading, this release also patches some critical bugs. All users are highly
encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible.
*Security fixes*
Patches and changes were made to address the following vulnerabilities:
* CVE-2014-9356: Path traversal during processing of absolute symlinks.
Absolute symlinks were not adequately checked for traversal which created a
vulnerability via image extraction and/or volume mounts.
* CVE-2014-9357: Escalation of privileges during decompression of LZMA (.xz)
archives. Docker 1.3.2 added `chroot` for archive extraction. This created a
vulnerability that could allow malicious images or builds to write files to the
host system and escape containerization, leading to privilege escalation.
* CVE-2014-9358: Path traversal and spoofing opportunities via image
identifiers. Image IDs passed either via `docker load` or registry communications
were not sufficiently validated. This created a vulnerability to path traversal
attacks wherein malicious images or repository spoofing could lead to graph
corruption and manipulation.
*Runtime fixes*
* Fixed an issue that cause image archives to be read slowly.
*Client fixes*
* Fixed a regression related to STDIN redirection.
* Fixed a regression involving `docker cp` when the current directory is the
destination.
##Version 1.3.2
(2014-11-24)
This release fixes some bugs and addresses some security issues. We have also
made improvements to aspects of `docker run`.
*Security fixes*
Patches and changes were made to address CVE-2014-6407 and CVE-2014-6408.
Specifically, changes were made in order to:
* Prevent host privilege escalation from an image extraction vulnerability (CVE-2014-6407).
* Prevent container escalation from malicious security options applied to images (CVE-2014-6408).
*Daemon fixes*
The `--insecure-registry` flag of the `docker run` command has undergone
several refinements and additions. For details, please see the
[command-line reference](http://docs.docker.com/reference/commandline/cli/#run).
* You can now specify a sub-net in order to set a range of registries which the Docker daemon will consider insecure.
* By default, Docker now defines `localhost` as an insecure registry.
* Registries can now be referenced using the Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) format.
* When mirroring is enabled, the experimental registry v2 API is skipped.
##Version 1.3.1
(2014-10-28)
+7 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ import (
"github.com/docker/docker/engine"
"github.com/docker/docker/image"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/chrootarchive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/log"
"github.com/docker/docker/utils"
)
// Loads a set of images into the repository. This is the complementary of ImageExport.
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ func (s *TagStore) CmdLoad(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
excludes[i] = k
i++
}
if err := archive.Untar(repoFile, repoDir, &archive.TarOptions{Excludes: excludes}); err != nil {
if err := chrootarchive.Untar(repoFile, repoDir, &archive.TarOptions{Excludes: excludes}); err != nil {
return job.Error(err)
}
@@ -111,6 +113,10 @@ func (s *TagStore) recursiveLoad(eng *engine.Engine, address, tmpImageDir string
log.Debugf("Error unmarshalling json", err)
return err
}
if err := utils.ValidateID(img.ID); err != nil {
log.Debugf("Error validating ID: %s", err)
return err
}
if img.Parent != "" {
if !s.graph.Exists(img.Parent) {
if err := s.recursiveLoad(eng, img.Parent, tmpImageDir); err != nil {
+9 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
package graph
import "testing"
import (
"testing"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
func init() {
reexec.Init()
}
func TestPools(t *testing.T) {
s := &TagStore{
+2 -4
View File
@@ -113,9 +113,7 @@ func (s *TagStore) CmdPull(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
return job.Error(err)
}
secure := registry.IsSecure(hostname, s.insecureRegistries)
endpoint, err := registry.NewEndpoint(hostname, secure)
endpoint, err := registry.NewEndpoint(hostname, s.insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
return job.Error(err)
}
@@ -139,7 +137,7 @@ func (s *TagStore) CmdPull(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
mirrors = s.mirrors
}
if isOfficial || endpoint.Version == registry.APIVersion2 {
if len(mirrors) == 0 && (isOfficial || endpoint.Version == registry.APIVersion2) {
j := job.Eng.Job("trust_update_base")
if err = j.Run(); err != nil {
return job.Errorf("error updating trust base graph: %s", err)
+1 -3
View File
@@ -214,9 +214,7 @@ func (s *TagStore) CmdPush(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
return job.Error(err)
}
secure := registry.IsSecure(hostname, s.insecureRegistries)
endpoint, err := registry.NewEndpoint(hostname, secure)
endpoint, err := registry.NewEndpoint(hostname, s.insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
return job.Error(err)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import (
const (
testImageName = "myapp"
testImageID = "foo"
testImageID = "1a2d3c4d4e5fa2d2a21acea242a5e2345d3aefc3e7dfa2a2a2a21a2a2ad2d234"
)
func fakeTar() (io.Reader, error) {
+322
View File
@@ -1167,6 +1167,133 @@ func TestBuildCopyDisallowRemote(t *testing.T) {
logDone("build - copy - disallow copy from remote")
}
func TestBuildAddBadLinks(t *testing.T) {
const (
dockerfile = `
FROM scratch
ADD links.tar /
ADD foo.txt /symlink/
`
targetFile = "foo.txt"
)
var (
name = "test-link-absolute"
)
defer deleteImages(name)
ctx, err := fakeContext(dockerfile, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer ctx.Close()
tempDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "test-link-absolute-temp-")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create temporary directory: %s", tempDir)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tempDir)
symlinkTarget := fmt.Sprintf("/../../../../../../../../../../../..%s", tempDir)
tarPath := filepath.Join(ctx.Dir, "links.tar")
nonExistingFile := filepath.Join(tempDir, targetFile)
fooPath := filepath.Join(ctx.Dir, targetFile)
tarOut, err := os.Create(tarPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tarWriter := tar.NewWriter(tarOut)
header := &tar.Header{
Name: "symlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: symlinkTarget,
Mode: 0755,
Uid: 0,
Gid: 0,
}
err = tarWriter.WriteHeader(header)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tarWriter.Close()
tarOut.Close()
foo, err := os.Create(fooPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer foo.Close()
if _, err := foo.WriteString("test"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := buildImageFromContext(name, ctx, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(nonExistingFile); err == nil || err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("%s shouldn't have been written and it shouldn't exist", nonExistingFile)
}
logDone("build - ADD must add files in container")
}
func TestBuildAddBadLinksVolume(t *testing.T) {
const (
dockerfileTemplate = `
FROM busybox
RUN ln -s /../../../../../../../../%s /x
VOLUME /x
ADD foo.txt /x/`
targetFile = "foo.txt"
)
var (
name = "test-link-absolute-volume"
dockerfile = ""
)
defer deleteImages(name)
tempDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "test-link-absolute-volume-temp-")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create temporary directory: %s", tempDir)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tempDir)
dockerfile = fmt.Sprintf(dockerfileTemplate, tempDir)
nonExistingFile := filepath.Join(tempDir, targetFile)
ctx, err := fakeContext(dockerfile, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer ctx.Close()
fooPath := filepath.Join(ctx.Dir, targetFile)
foo, err := os.Create(fooPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer foo.Close()
if _, err := foo.WriteString("test"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := buildImageFromContext(name, ctx, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(nonExistingFile); err == nil || err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("%s shouldn't have been written and it shouldn't exist", nonExistingFile)
}
logDone("build - ADD should add files in volume")
}
// Issue #5270 - ensure we throw a better error than "unexpected EOF"
// when we can't access files in the context.
func TestBuildWithInaccessibleFilesInContext(t *testing.T) {
@@ -2867,6 +2994,118 @@ RUN cat /existing-directory-trailing-slash/test/foo | grep Hi`
logDone("build - ADD tar")
}
func TestBuildAddTarXz(t *testing.T) {
name := "testbuildaddtarxz"
defer deleteImages(name)
ctx := func() *FakeContext {
dockerfile := `
FROM busybox
ADD test.tar.xz /
RUN cat /test/foo | grep Hi`
tmpDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "fake-context")
testTar, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test.tar"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create test.tar archive: %v", err)
}
defer testTar.Close()
tw := tar.NewWriter(testTar)
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{
Name: "test/foo",
Size: 2,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write tar file header: %v", err)
}
if _, err := tw.Write([]byte("Hi")); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write tar file content: %v", err)
}
if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to close tar archive: %v", err)
}
xzCompressCmd := exec.Command("xz", "test.tar")
xzCompressCmd.Dir = tmpDir
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(xzCompressCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err, out)
}
if err := ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "Dockerfile"), []byte(dockerfile), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to open destination dockerfile: %v", err)
}
return &FakeContext{Dir: tmpDir}
}()
defer ctx.Close()
if _, err := buildImageFromContext(name, ctx, true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("build failed to complete for TestBuildAddTarXz: %v", err)
}
logDone("build - ADD tar.xz")
}
func TestBuildAddTarXzGz(t *testing.T) {
name := "testbuildaddtarxzgz"
defer deleteImages(name)
ctx := func() *FakeContext {
dockerfile := `
FROM busybox
ADD test.tar.xz.gz /
RUN ls /test.tar.xz.gz`
tmpDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "fake-context")
testTar, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test.tar"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create test.tar archive: %v", err)
}
defer testTar.Close()
tw := tar.NewWriter(testTar)
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{
Name: "test/foo",
Size: 2,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write tar file header: %v", err)
}
if _, err := tw.Write([]byte("Hi")); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write tar file content: %v", err)
}
if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to close tar archive: %v", err)
}
xzCompressCmd := exec.Command("xz", "test.tar")
xzCompressCmd.Dir = tmpDir
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(xzCompressCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err, out)
}
gzipCompressCmd := exec.Command("gzip", "test.tar.xz")
gzipCompressCmd.Dir = tmpDir
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(gzipCompressCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err, out)
}
if err := ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "Dockerfile"), []byte(dockerfile), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to open destination dockerfile: %v", err)
}
return &FakeContext{Dir: tmpDir}
}()
defer ctx.Close()
if _, err := buildImageFromContext(name, ctx, true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("build failed to complete for TestBuildAddTarXz: %v", err)
}
logDone("build - ADD tar.xz.gz")
}
func TestBuildFromGIT(t *testing.T) {
name := "testbuildfromgit"
defer deleteImages(name)
@@ -3175,3 +3414,86 @@ func TestBuildExoticShellInterpolation(t *testing.T) {
logDone("build - exotic shell interpolation")
}
func TestBuildSymlinkBreakout(t *testing.T) {
name := "testbuildsymlinkbreakout"
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", name)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
ctx := filepath.Join(tmpdir, "context")
if err := os.MkdirAll(ctx, 0755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(ctx, "Dockerfile"), []byte(`
from busybox
add symlink.tar /
add inject /symlink/
`), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
inject := filepath.Join(ctx, "inject")
if err := ioutil.WriteFile(inject, nil, 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(ctx, "symlink.tar"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
w := tar.NewWriter(f)
w.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{
Name: "symlink2",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../",
Uid: os.Getuid(),
Gid: os.Getgid(),
})
w.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{
Name: "symlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: filepath.Join("symlink2", tmpdir),
Uid: os.Getuid(),
Gid: os.Getgid(),
})
w.Close()
f.Close()
if _, err := buildImageFromContext(name, &FakeContext{Dir: ctx}, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(tmpdir, "inject")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("symlink breakout - inject")
} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
logDone("build - symlink breakout")
}
func TestBuildXZHost(t *testing.T) {
name := "testbuildxzhost"
defer deleteImages(name)
ctx, err := fakeContext(`
FROM busybox
ADD xz /usr/local/sbin/
RUN chmod 755 /usr/local/sbin/xz
ADD test.xz /
RUN [ ! -e /injected ]`,
map[string]string{
"test.xz": "\xfd\x37\x7a\x58\x5a\x00\x00\x04\xe6\xd6\xb4\x46\x02\x00" +
"\x21\x01\x16\x00\x00\x00\x74\x2f\xe5\xa3\x01\x00\x3f\xfd" +
"\x37\x7a\x58\x5a\x00\x00\x04\xe6\xd6\xb4\x46\x02\x00\x21",
"xz": "#!/bin/sh\ntouch /injected",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer ctx.Close()
if _, err := buildImageFromContext(name, ctx, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
logDone("build - xz host is being used")
}
+38
View File
@@ -371,3 +371,41 @@ func TestCpUnprivilegedUser(t *testing.T) {
logDone("cp - unprivileged user")
}
func TestCpToDot(t *testing.T) {
out, exitCode, err := dockerCmd(t, "run", "-d", "busybox", "/bin/sh", "-c", "echo lololol > /test")
if err != nil || exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatal("failed to create a container", out, err)
}
cleanedContainerID := stripTrailingCharacters(out)
defer deleteContainer(cleanedContainerID)
out, _, err = dockerCmd(t, "wait", cleanedContainerID)
if err != nil || stripTrailingCharacters(out) != "0" {
t.Fatal("failed to set up container", out, err)
}
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "docker-integration")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.Chdir(cwd)
if err := os.Chdir(tmpdir); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, _, err = dockerCmd(t, "cp", cleanedContainerID+":/test", ".")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("couldn't docker cp to \".\" path: %s", err)
}
content, err := ioutil.ReadFile("./test")
if string(content) != "lololol\n" {
t.Fatal("Wrong content in copied file %q, should be %q", content, "lololol\n")
}
logDone("cp - to dot path")
}
+78
View File
@@ -282,3 +282,81 @@ func TestPsListContainersFilterStatus(t *testing.T) {
logDone("ps - test ps filter status")
}
func TestPsListContainersFilterExited(t *testing.T) {
deleteAllContainers()
defer deleteAllContainers()
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--name", "zero1", "busybox", "true")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(out, err)
}
firstZero, err := getIDByName("zero1")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--name", "zero2", "busybox", "true")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(out, err)
}
secondZero, err := getIDByName("zero2")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--name", "nonzero1", "busybox", "false")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Should fail.", out, err)
}
firstNonZero, err := getIDByName("nonzero1")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--name", "nonzero2", "busybox", "false")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Should fail.", out, err)
}
secondNonZero, err := getIDByName("nonzero2")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// filter containers by exited=0
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "ps", "-a", "-q", "--no-trunc", "--filter=exited=0")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(out, err)
}
ids := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(out), "\n")
if len(ids) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("Should be 2 zero exited containerst got %d", len(ids))
}
if ids[0] != secondZero {
t.Fatalf("First in list should be %q, got %q", secondZero, ids[0])
}
if ids[1] != firstZero {
t.Fatalf("Second in list should be %q, got %q", firstZero, ids[1])
}
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "ps", "-a", "-q", "--no-trunc", "--filter=exited=1")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(out, err)
}
ids = strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(out), "\n")
if len(ids) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("Should be 2 zero exited containerst got %d", len(ids))
}
if ids[0] != secondNonZero {
t.Fatalf("First in list should be %q, got %q", secondNonZero, ids[0])
}
if ids[1] != firstNonZero {
t.Fatalf("Second in list should be %q, got %q", firstNonZero, ids[1])
}
logDone("ps - test ps filter exited")
}
@@ -62,6 +62,140 @@ func TestSaveAndLoadRepoStdout(t *testing.T) {
logDone("load - load a repo using stdout")
}
// save a repo using gz compression and try to load it using stdout
func TestSaveXzAndLoadRepoStdout(t *testing.T) {
tempDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "test-save-xz-gz-load-repo-stdout")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tempDir)
tarballPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "foobar-save-load-test.tar.xz.gz")
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "-d", "busybox", "true")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create a container: %v %v", out, err)
}
cleanedContainerID := stripTrailingCharacters(out)
repoName := "foobar-save-load-test-xz-gz"
inspectCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "inspect", cleanedContainerID)
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(inspectCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("output should've been a container id: %v %v", cleanedContainerID, err)
}
commitCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "commit", cleanedContainerID, repoName)
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(commitCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to commit container: %v %v", out, err)
}
inspectCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "inspect", repoName)
before, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(inspectCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the repo should exist before saving it: %v %v", before, err)
}
saveCmdTemplate := `%v save %v | xz -c | gzip -c > %s`
saveCmdFinal := fmt.Sprintf(saveCmdTemplate, dockerBinary, repoName, tarballPath)
saveCmd := exec.Command("bash", "-c", saveCmdFinal)
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(saveCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to save repo: %v %v", out, err)
}
deleteImages(repoName)
loadCmdFinal := fmt.Sprintf(`cat %s | docker load`, tarballPath)
loadCmd := exec.Command("bash", "-c", loadCmdFinal)
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(loadCmd)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error, but succeeded with no error and output: %v", out)
}
inspectCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "inspect", repoName)
after, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(inspectCmd)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("the repo should not exist: %v", after)
}
deleteContainer(cleanedContainerID)
deleteImages(repoName)
logDone("load - save a repo with xz compression & load it using stdout")
}
// save a repo using xz+gz compression and try to load it using stdout
func TestSaveXzGzAndLoadRepoStdout(t *testing.T) {
tempDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "test-save-xz-gz-load-repo-stdout")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tempDir)
tarballPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "foobar-save-load-test.tar.xz.gz")
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "-d", "busybox", "true")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create a container: %v %v", out, err)
}
cleanedContainerID := stripTrailingCharacters(out)
repoName := "foobar-save-load-test-xz-gz"
inspectCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "inspect", cleanedContainerID)
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(inspectCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("output should've been a container id: %v %v", cleanedContainerID, err)
}
commitCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "commit", cleanedContainerID, repoName)
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(commitCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to commit container: %v %v", out, err)
}
inspectCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "inspect", repoName)
before, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(inspectCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the repo should exist before saving it: %v %v", before, err)
}
saveCmdTemplate := `%v save %v | xz -c | gzip -c > %s`
saveCmdFinal := fmt.Sprintf(saveCmdTemplate, dockerBinary, repoName, tarballPath)
saveCmd := exec.Command("bash", "-c", saveCmdFinal)
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(saveCmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to save repo: %v %v", out, err)
}
deleteImages(repoName)
loadCmdFinal := fmt.Sprintf(`cat %s | docker load`, tarballPath)
loadCmd := exec.Command("bash", "-c", loadCmdFinal)
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(loadCmd)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error, but succeeded with no error and output: %v", out)
}
inspectCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "inspect", repoName)
after, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(inspectCmd)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("the repo should not exist: %v", after)
}
deleteContainer(cleanedContainerID)
deleteImages(repoName)
logDone("load - save a repo with xz+gz compression & load it using stdout")
}
func TestSaveSingleTag(t *testing.T) {
repoName := "foobar-save-single-tag-test"
+29
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package main
import (
"os/exec"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
@@ -36,3 +37,31 @@ func TestStartAttachReturnsOnError(t *testing.T) {
logDone("start - error on start with attach exits")
}
// gh#8726: a failed Start() breaks --volumes-from on subsequent Start()'s
func TestStartVolumesFromFailsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
defer deleteAllContainers()
// Create the first data volume
cmd(t, "run", "-d", "--name", "data_before", "-v", "/foo", "busybox")
// Expect this to fail because the data test after contaienr doesn't exist yet
if _, err := runCommand(exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "-d", "--name", "consumer", "--volumes-from", "data_before", "--volumes-from", "data_after", "busybox")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Expected error but got none")
}
// Create the second data volume
cmd(t, "run", "-d", "--name", "data_after", "-v", "/bar", "busybox")
// Now, all the volumes should be there
cmd(t, "start", "consumer")
// Check that we have the volumes we want
out, _, _ := cmd(t, "inspect", "--format='{{ len .Volumes }}'", "consumer")
n_volumes := strings.Trim(out, " \r\n'")
if n_volumes != "2" {
t.Fatalf("Missing volumes: expected 2, got %s", n_volumes)
}
logDone("start - missing containers in --volumes-from did not affect subsequent runs")
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import (
"github.com/docker/docker/nat"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/ioutils"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/log"
"github.com/docker/docker/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
"github.com/docker/docker/runconfig"
"github.com/docker/docker/utils"
)
+99 -51
View File
@@ -35,10 +35,22 @@ type (
Compression Compression
NoLchown bool
}
// Archiver allows the reuse of most utility functions of this package
// with a pluggable Untar function.
Archiver struct {
Untar func(io.Reader, string, *TarOptions) error
}
// breakoutError is used to differentiate errors related to breaking out
// When testing archive breakout in the unit tests, this error is expected
// in order for the test to pass.
breakoutError error
)
var (
ErrNotImplemented = errors.New("Function not implemented")
defaultArchiver = &Archiver{Untar}
)
const (
@@ -263,11 +275,25 @@ func createTarFile(path, extractDir string, hdr *tar.Header, reader io.Reader, L
}
case tar.TypeLink:
if err := os.Link(filepath.Join(extractDir, hdr.Linkname), path); err != nil {
targetPath := filepath.Join(extractDir, hdr.Linkname)
// check for hardlink breakout
if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, extractDir) {
return breakoutError(fmt.Errorf("invalid hardlink %q -> %q", targetPath, hdr.Linkname))
}
if err := os.Link(targetPath, path); err != nil {
return err
}
case tar.TypeSymlink:
// path -> hdr.Linkname = targetPath
// e.g. /extractDir/path/to/symlink -> ../2/file = /extractDir/path/2/file
targetPath := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), hdr.Linkname)
// the reason we don't need to check symlinks in the path (with FollowSymlinkInScope) is because
// that symlink would first have to be created, which would be caught earlier, at this very check:
if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, extractDir) {
return breakoutError(fmt.Errorf("invalid symlink %q -> %q", path, hdr.Linkname))
}
if err := os.Symlink(hdr.Linkname, path); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -406,30 +432,7 @@ func TarWithOptions(srcPath string, options *TarOptions) (io.ReadCloser, error)
return pipeReader, nil
}
// Untar reads a stream of bytes from `archive`, parses it as a tar archive,
// and unpacks it into the directory at `path`.
// The archive may be compressed with one of the following algorithms:
// identity (uncompressed), gzip, bzip2, xz.
// FIXME: specify behavior when target path exists vs. doesn't exist.
func Untar(archive io.Reader, dest string, options *TarOptions) error {
if options == nil {
options = &TarOptions{}
}
if archive == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Empty archive")
}
if options.Excludes == nil {
options.Excludes = []string{}
}
decompressedArchive, err := DecompressStream(archive)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer decompressedArchive.Close()
func Unpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *TarOptions) error {
tr := tar.NewReader(decompressedArchive)
trBuf := pools.BufioReader32KPool.Get(nil)
defer pools.BufioReader32KPool.Put(trBuf)
@@ -449,6 +452,7 @@ loop:
}
// Normalize name, for safety and for a simple is-root check
// This keeps "../" as-is, but normalizes "/../" to "/"
hdr.Name = filepath.Clean(hdr.Name)
for _, exclude := range options.Excludes {
@@ -470,6 +474,13 @@ loop:
}
path := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Name)
rel, err := filepath.Rel(dest, path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") {
return breakoutError(fmt.Errorf("%q is outside of %q", hdr.Name, dest))
}
// If path exits we almost always just want to remove and replace it
// The only exception is when it is a directory *and* the file from
@@ -504,49 +515,74 @@ loop:
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// TarUntar is a convenience function which calls Tar and Untar, with
// the output of one piped into the other. If either Tar or Untar fails,
// TarUntar aborts and returns the error.
func TarUntar(src string, dst string) error {
// Untar reads a stream of bytes from `archive`, parses it as a tar archive,
// and unpacks it into the directory at `dest`.
// The archive may be compressed with one of the following algorithms:
// identity (uncompressed), gzip, bzip2, xz.
// FIXME: specify behavior when target path exists vs. doesn't exist.
func Untar(archive io.Reader, dest string, options *TarOptions) error {
if archive == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Empty archive")
}
dest = filepath.Clean(dest)
if options == nil {
options = &TarOptions{}
}
if options.Excludes == nil {
options.Excludes = []string{}
}
decompressedArchive, err := DecompressStream(archive)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer decompressedArchive.Close()
return Unpack(decompressedArchive, dest, options)
}
func (archiver *Archiver) TarUntar(src, dst string) error {
log.Debugf("TarUntar(%s %s)", src, dst)
archive, err := TarWithOptions(src, &TarOptions{Compression: Uncompressed})
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer archive.Close()
return Untar(archive, dst, nil)
return archiver.Untar(archive, dst, nil)
}
// UntarPath is a convenience function which looks for an archive
// at filesystem path `src`, and unpacks it at `dst`.
func UntarPath(src, dst string) error {
// TarUntar is a convenience function which calls Tar and Untar, with the output of one piped into the other.
// If either Tar or Untar fails, TarUntar aborts and returns the error.
func TarUntar(src, dst string) error {
return defaultArchiver.TarUntar(src, dst)
}
func (archiver *Archiver) UntarPath(src, dst string) error {
archive, err := os.Open(src)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer archive.Close()
if err := Untar(archive, dst, nil); err != nil {
if err := archiver.Untar(archive, dst, nil); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// CopyWithTar creates a tar archive of filesystem path `src`, and
// unpacks it at filesystem path `dst`.
// The archive is streamed directly with fixed buffering and no
// intermediary disk IO.
//
func CopyWithTar(src, dst string) error {
// UntarPath is a convenience function which looks for an archive
// at filesystem path `src`, and unpacks it at `dst`.
func UntarPath(src, dst string) error {
return defaultArchiver.UntarPath(src, dst)
}
func (archiver *Archiver) CopyWithTar(src, dst string) error {
srcSt, err := os.Stat(src)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !srcSt.IsDir() {
return CopyFileWithTar(src, dst)
return archiver.CopyFileWithTar(src, dst)
}
// Create dst, copy src's content into it
log.Debugf("Creating dest directory: %s", dst)
@@ -554,16 +590,18 @@ func CopyWithTar(src, dst string) error {
return err
}
log.Debugf("Calling TarUntar(%s, %s)", src, dst)
return TarUntar(src, dst)
return archiver.TarUntar(src, dst)
}
// CopyFileWithTar emulates the behavior of the 'cp' command-line
// for a single file. It copies a regular file from path `src` to
// path `dst`, and preserves all its metadata.
//
// If `dst` ends with a trailing slash '/', the final destination path
// will be `dst/base(src)`.
func CopyFileWithTar(src, dst string) (err error) {
// CopyWithTar creates a tar archive of filesystem path `src`, and
// unpacks it at filesystem path `dst`.
// The archive is streamed directly with fixed buffering and no
// intermediary disk IO.
func CopyWithTar(src, dst string) error {
return defaultArchiver.CopyWithTar(src, dst)
}
func (archiver *Archiver) CopyFileWithTar(src, dst string) (err error) {
log.Debugf("CopyFileWithTar(%s, %s)", src, dst)
srcSt, err := os.Stat(src)
if err != nil {
@@ -611,7 +649,17 @@ func CopyFileWithTar(src, dst string) (err error) {
err = er
}
}()
return Untar(r, filepath.Dir(dst), nil)
return archiver.Untar(r, filepath.Dir(dst), nil)
}
// CopyFileWithTar emulates the behavior of the 'cp' command-line
// for a single file. It copies a regular file from path `src` to
// path `dst`, and preserves all its metadata.
//
// If `dst` ends with a trailing slash '/', the final destination path
// will be `dst/base(src)`.
func CopyFileWithTar(src, dst string) (err error) {
return defaultArchiver.CopyFileWithTar(src, dst)
}
// CmdStream executes a command, and returns its stdout as a stream.
+205 -1
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -169,7 +170,12 @@ func TestTarWithOptions(t *testing.T) {
// Failing prevents the archives from being uncompressed during ADD
func TestTypeXGlobalHeaderDoesNotFail(t *testing.T) {
hdr := tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeXGlobalHeader}
err := createTarFile("pax_global_header", "some_dir", &hdr, nil, true)
tmpDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "docker-test-archive-pax-test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
err = createTarFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "pax_global_header"), tmpDir, &hdr, nil, true)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -242,3 +248,201 @@ func BenchmarkTarUntar(b *testing.B) {
os.RemoveAll(target)
}
}
func TestUntarInvalidFilenames(t *testing.T) {
for i, headers := range [][]*tar.Header{
{
{
Name: "../victim/dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{
{
// Note the leading slash
Name: "/../victim/slash-dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
} {
if err := testBreakout("untar", "docker-TestUntarInvalidFilenames", headers); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("i=%d. %v", i, err)
}
}
}
func TestUntarInvalidHardlink(t *testing.T) {
for i, headers := range [][]*tar.Header{
{ // try reading victim/hello (../)
{
Name: "dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (/../)
{
Name: "slash-dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
// Note the leading slash
Linkname: "/../victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try writing victim/file
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "loophole-victim/file",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (hardlink, symlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "symlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "loophole-victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // Try reading victim/hello (hardlink, hardlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "hardlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "loophole-victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // Try removing victim directory (hardlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
} {
if err := testBreakout("untar", "docker-TestUntarInvalidHardlink", headers); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("i=%d. %v", i, err)
}
}
}
func TestUntarInvalidSymlink(t *testing.T) {
for i, headers := range [][]*tar.Header{
{ // try reading victim/hello (../)
{
Name: "dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (/../)
{
Name: "slash-dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
// Note the leading slash
Linkname: "/../victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try writing victim/file
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "loophole-victim/file",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (symlink, symlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "symlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "loophole-victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (symlink, hardlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "hardlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "loophole-victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try removing victim directory (symlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try writing to victim/newdir/newfile with a symlink in the path
{
// this header needs to be before the next one, or else there is an error
Name: "dir/loophole",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "dir/loophole/newdir/newfile",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
} {
if err := testBreakout("untar", "docker-TestUntarInvalidSymlink", headers); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("i=%d. %v", i, err)
}
}
}
+24 -13
View File
@@ -21,18 +21,7 @@ func mkdev(major int64, minor int64) uint32 {
return uint32(((minor & 0xfff00) << 12) | ((major & 0xfff) << 8) | (minor & 0xff))
}
// ApplyLayer parses a diff in the standard layer format from `layer`, and
// applies it to the directory `dest`.
func ApplyLayer(dest string, layer ArchiveReader) error {
// We need to be able to set any perms
oldmask := syscall.Umask(0)
defer syscall.Umask(oldmask)
layer, err := DecompressStream(layer)
if err != nil {
return err
}
func UnpackLayer(dest string, layer ArchiveReader) error {
tr := tar.NewReader(layer)
trBuf := pools.BufioReader32KPool.Get(tr)
defer pools.BufioReader32KPool.Put(trBuf)
@@ -92,7 +81,15 @@ func ApplyLayer(dest string, layer ArchiveReader) error {
}
path := filepath.Join(dest, hdr.Name)
rel, err := filepath.Rel(dest, path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") {
return breakoutError(fmt.Errorf("%q is outside of %q", hdr.Name, dest))
}
base := filepath.Base(path)
if strings.HasPrefix(base, ".wh.") {
originalBase := base[len(".wh."):]
originalPath := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), originalBase)
@@ -151,6 +148,20 @@ func ApplyLayer(dest string, layer ArchiveReader) error {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// ApplyLayer parses a diff in the standard layer format from `layer`, and
// applies it to the directory `dest`.
func ApplyLayer(dest string, layer ArchiveReader) error {
dest = filepath.Clean(dest)
// We need to be able to set any perms
oldmask := syscall.Umask(0)
defer syscall.Umask(oldmask)
layer, err := DecompressStream(layer)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return UnpackLayer(dest, layer)
}
+191
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
package archive
import (
"testing"
"github.com/docker/docker/vendor/src/code.google.com/p/go/src/pkg/archive/tar"
)
func TestApplyLayerInvalidFilenames(t *testing.T) {
for i, headers := range [][]*tar.Header{
{
{
Name: "../victim/dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{
{
// Note the leading slash
Name: "/../victim/slash-dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
} {
if err := testBreakout("applylayer", "docker-TestApplyLayerInvalidFilenames", headers); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("i=%d. %v", i, err)
}
}
}
func TestApplyLayerInvalidHardlink(t *testing.T) {
for i, headers := range [][]*tar.Header{
{ // try reading victim/hello (../)
{
Name: "dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (/../)
{
Name: "slash-dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
// Note the leading slash
Linkname: "/../victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try writing victim/file
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "loophole-victim/file",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (hardlink, symlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "symlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "loophole-victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // Try reading victim/hello (hardlink, hardlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "hardlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "loophole-victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // Try removing victim directory (hardlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
} {
if err := testBreakout("applylayer", "docker-TestApplyLayerInvalidHardlink", headers); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("i=%d. %v", i, err)
}
}
}
func TestApplyLayerInvalidSymlink(t *testing.T) {
for i, headers := range [][]*tar.Header{
{ // try reading victim/hello (../)
{
Name: "dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (/../)
{
Name: "slash-dotdot",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
// Note the leading slash
Linkname: "/../victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try writing victim/file
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "loophole-victim/file",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (symlink, symlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "symlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "loophole-victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try reading victim/hello (symlink, hardlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "hardlink",
Typeflag: tar.TypeLink,
Linkname: "loophole-victim/hello",
Mode: 0644,
},
},
{ // try removing victim directory (symlink)
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink,
Linkname: "../victim",
Mode: 0755,
},
{
Name: "loophole-victim",
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
Mode: 0644,
},
},
} {
if err := testBreakout("applylayer", "docker-TestApplyLayerInvalidSymlink", headers); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("i=%d. %v", i, err)
}
}
}
+166
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
package archive
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"time"
"github.com/docker/docker/vendor/src/code.google.com/p/go/src/pkg/archive/tar"
)
var testUntarFns = map[string]func(string, io.Reader) error{
"untar": func(dest string, r io.Reader) error {
return Untar(r, dest, nil)
},
"applylayer": func(dest string, r io.Reader) error {
return ApplyLayer(dest, ArchiveReader(r))
},
}
// testBreakout is a helper function that, within the provided `tmpdir` directory,
// creates a `victim` folder with a generated `hello` file in it.
// `untar` extracts to a directory named `dest`, the tar file created from `headers`.
//
// Here are the tested scenarios:
// - removed `victim` folder (write)
// - removed files from `victim` folder (write)
// - new files in `victim` folder (write)
// - modified files in `victim` folder (write)
// - file in `dest` with same content as `victim/hello` (read)
//
// When using testBreakout make sure you cover one of the scenarios listed above.
func testBreakout(untarFn string, tmpdir string, headers []*tar.Header) error {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", tmpdir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
dest := filepath.Join(tmpdir, "dest")
if err := os.Mkdir(dest, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
victim := filepath.Join(tmpdir, "victim")
if err := os.Mkdir(victim, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
hello := filepath.Join(victim, "hello")
helloData, err := time.Now().MarshalText()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := ioutil.WriteFile(hello, helloData, 0644); err != nil {
return err
}
helloStat, err := os.Stat(hello)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reader, writer := io.Pipe()
go func() {
t := tar.NewWriter(writer)
for _, hdr := range headers {
t.WriteHeader(hdr)
}
t.Close()
}()
untar := testUntarFns[untarFn]
if untar == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not find untar function %q in testUntarFns", untarFn)
}
if err := untar(dest, reader); err != nil {
if _, ok := err.(breakoutError); !ok {
// If untar returns an error unrelated to an archive breakout,
// then consider this an unexpected error and abort.
return err
}
// Here, untar detected the breakout.
// Let's move on verifying that indeed there was no breakout.
fmt.Printf("breakoutError: %v\n", err)
}
// Check victim folder
f, err := os.Open(victim)
if err != nil {
// codepath taken if victim folder was removed
return fmt.Errorf("archive breakout: error reading %q: %v", victim, err)
}
defer f.Close()
// Check contents of victim folder
//
// We are only interested in getting 2 files from the victim folder, because if all is well
// we expect only one result, the `hello` file. If there is a second result, it cannot
// hold the same name `hello` and we assume that a new file got created in the victim folder.
// That is enough to detect an archive breakout.
names, err := f.Readdirnames(2)
if err != nil {
// codepath taken if victim is not a folder
return fmt.Errorf("archive breakout: error reading directory content of %q: %v", victim, err)
}
for _, name := range names {
if name != "hello" {
// codepath taken if new file was created in victim folder
return fmt.Errorf("archive breakout: new file %q", name)
}
}
// Check victim/hello
f, err = os.Open(hello)
if err != nil {
// codepath taken if read permissions were removed
return fmt.Errorf("archive breakout: could not lstat %q: %v", hello, err)
}
defer f.Close()
b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(f)
if err != nil {
return err
}
fi, err := f.Stat()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if helloStat.IsDir() != fi.IsDir() ||
// TODO: cannot check for fi.ModTime() change
helloStat.Mode() != fi.Mode() ||
helloStat.Size() != fi.Size() ||
!bytes.Equal(helloData, b) {
// codepath taken if hello has been modified
return fmt.Errorf("archive breakout: file %q has been modified. Contents: expected=%q, got=%q. FileInfo: expected=%#v, got=%#v.", hello, helloData, b, helloStat, fi)
}
// Check that nothing in dest/ has the same content as victim/hello.
// Since victim/hello was generated with time.Now(), it is safe to assume
// that any file whose content matches exactly victim/hello, managed somehow
// to access victim/hello.
return filepath.Walk(dest, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
if info.IsDir() {
if err != nil {
// skip directory if error
return filepath.SkipDir
}
// enter directory
return nil
}
if err != nil {
// skip file if error
return nil
}
b, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
// Houston, we have a problem. Aborting (space)walk.
return err
}
if bytes.Equal(helloData, b) {
return fmt.Errorf("archive breakout: file %q has been accessed via %q", hello, path)
}
return nil
})
}
+111
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
package chrootarchive
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"syscall"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
var chrootArchiver = &archive.Archiver{Untar}
func chroot(path string) error {
if err := syscall.Chroot(path); err != nil {
return err
}
return syscall.Chdir("/")
}
func untar() {
runtime.LockOSThread()
flag.Parse()
if err := chroot(flag.Arg(0)); err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
var options *archive.TarOptions
if err := json.NewDecoder(strings.NewReader(flag.Arg(1))).Decode(&options); err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
if err := archive.Unpack(os.Stdin, "/", options); err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
// fully consume stdin in case it is zero padded
flush(os.Stdin)
os.Exit(0)
}
func Untar(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error {
if tarArchive == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Empty archive")
}
if options == nil {
options = &archive.TarOptions{}
}
if options.Excludes == nil {
options.Excludes = []string{}
}
var (
buf bytes.Buffer
enc = json.NewEncoder(&buf)
)
if err := enc.Encode(options); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Untar json encode: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(dest); os.IsNotExist(err) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0777); err != nil {
return err
}
}
dest = filepath.Clean(dest)
decompressedArchive, err := archive.DecompressStream(tarArchive)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer decompressedArchive.Close()
cmd := reexec.Command("docker-untar", dest, buf.String())
cmd.Stdin = decompressedArchive
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Untar %s %s", err, out)
}
return nil
}
func TarUntar(src, dst string) error {
return chrootArchiver.TarUntar(src, dst)
}
// CopyWithTar creates a tar archive of filesystem path `src`, and
// unpacks it at filesystem path `dst`.
// The archive is streamed directly with fixed buffering and no
// intermediary disk IO.
func CopyWithTar(src, dst string) error {
return chrootArchiver.CopyWithTar(src, dst)
}
// CopyFileWithTar emulates the behavior of the 'cp' command-line
// for a single file. It copies a regular file from path `src` to
// path `dst`, and preserves all its metadata.
//
// If `dst` ends with a trailing slash '/', the final destination path
// will be `dst/base(src)`.
func CopyFileWithTar(src, dst string) (err error) {
return chrootArchiver.CopyFileWithTar(src, dst)
}
// UntarPath is a convenience function which looks for an archive
// at filesystem path `src`, and unpacks it at `dst`.
func UntarPath(src, dst string) error {
return chrootArchiver.UntarPath(src, dst)
}
+101
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
package chrootarchive
import (
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
func init() {
reexec.Init()
}
func TestChrootTarUntar(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "docker-TestChrootTarUntar")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
src := filepath.Join(tmpdir, "src")
if err := os.MkdirAll(src, 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(src, "toto"), []byte("hello toto"), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(src, "lolo"), []byte("hello lolo"), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stream, err := archive.Tar(src, archive.Uncompressed)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
dest := filepath.Join(tmpdir, "src")
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := Untar(stream, dest, &archive.TarOptions{Excludes: []string{"lolo"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
type slowEmptyTarReader struct {
size int
offset int
chunkSize int
}
// Read is a slow reader of an empty tar (like the output of "tar c --files-from /dev/null")
func (s *slowEmptyTarReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
count := s.chunkSize
if len(p) < s.chunkSize {
count = len(p)
}
for i := 0; i < count; i++ {
p[i] = 0
}
s.offset += count
if s.offset > s.size {
return count, io.EOF
}
return count, nil
}
func TestChrootUntarEmptyArchiveFromSlowReader(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "docker-TestChrootUntarEmptyArchiveFromSlowReader")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
dest := filepath.Join(tmpdir, "dest")
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stream := &slowEmptyTarReader{size: 10240, chunkSize: 1024}
if err := Untar(stream, dest, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestChrootApplyEmptyArchiveFromSlowReader(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "docker-TestChrootApplyEmptyArchiveFromSlowReader")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
dest := filepath.Join(tmpdir, "dest")
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stream := &slowEmptyTarReader{size: 10240, chunkSize: 1024}
if err := ApplyLayer(dest, stream); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
+60
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
package chrootarchive
import (
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"syscall"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
func applyLayer() {
runtime.LockOSThread()
flag.Parse()
if err := chroot(flag.Arg(0)); err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
// We need to be able to set any perms
oldmask := syscall.Umask(0)
defer syscall.Umask(oldmask)
tmpDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("/", "temp-docker-extract")
if err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
os.Setenv("TMPDIR", tmpDir)
err = archive.UnpackLayer("/", os.Stdin)
os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
fatal(err)
}
os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
flush(os.Stdin)
os.Exit(0)
}
func ApplyLayer(dest string, layer archive.ArchiveReader) error {
dest = filepath.Clean(dest)
decompressed, err := archive.DecompressStream(layer)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() {
if c, ok := decompressed.(io.Closer); ok {
c.Close()
}
}()
cmd := reexec.Command("docker-applyLayer", dest)
cmd.Stdin = decompressed
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ApplyLayer %s %s", err, out)
}
return nil
}
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
package chrootarchive
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec"
)
func init() {
reexec.Register("docker-untar", untar)
reexec.Register("docker-applyLayer", applyLayer)
}
func fatal(err error) {
fmt.Fprint(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
// flush consumes all the bytes from the reader discarding
// any errors
func flush(r io.Reader) {
io.Copy(ioutil.Discard, r)
}
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
Michael Crosby <michael@docker.com> (@crosbymichael)
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
// +build linux
package reexec
import (
"os/exec"
"syscall"
)
func Command(args ...string) *exec.Cmd {
return &exec.Cmd{
Path: Self(),
Args: args,
SysProcAttr: &syscall.SysProcAttr{
Pdeathsig: syscall.SIGTERM,
},
}
}
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
// +build !linux
package reexec
import (
"os/exec"
)
func Command(args ...string) *exec.Cmd {
return nil
}
@@ -27,19 +27,16 @@ func Init() bool {
return true
}
return false
}
// Self returns the path to the current processes binary
func Self() string {
name := os.Args[0]
if filepath.Base(name) == name {
if lp, err := exec.LookPath(name); err == nil {
name = lp
}
}
return name
}
+191
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
Apache License
Version 2.0, January 2004
http://www.apache.org/licenses/
TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
1. Definitions.
"License" shall mean the terms and conditions for use, reproduction,
and distribution as defined by Sections 1 through 9 of this document.
"Licensor" shall mean the copyright owner or entity authorized by
the copyright owner that is granting the License.
"Legal Entity" shall mean the union of the acting entity and all
other entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common
control with that entity. For the purposes of this definition,
"control" means (i) the power, direct or indirect, to cause the
direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or
otherwise, or (ii) ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the
outstanding shares, or (iii) beneficial ownership of such entity.
"You" (or "Your") shall mean an individual or Legal Entity
exercising permissions granted by this License.
"Source" form shall mean the preferred form for making modifications,
including but not limited to software source code, documentation
source, and configuration files.
"Object" form shall mean any form resulting from mechanical
transformation or translation of a Source form, including but
not limited to compiled object code, generated documentation,
and conversions to other media types.
"Work" shall mean the work of authorship, whether in Source or
Object form, made available under the License, as indicated by a
copyright notice that is included in or attached to the work
(an example is provided in the Appendix below).
"Derivative Works" shall mean any work, whether in Source or Object
form, that is based on (or derived from) the Work and for which the
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
represent, as a whole, an original work of authorship. For the purposes
of this License, Derivative Works shall not include works that remain
separable from, or merely link (or bind by name) to the interfaces of,
the Work and Derivative Works thereof.
"Contribution" shall mean any work of authorship, including
the original version of the Work and any modifications or additions
to that Work or Derivative Works thereof, that is intentionally
submitted to Licensor for inclusion in the Work by the copyright owner
or by an individual or Legal Entity authorized to submit on behalf of
the copyright owner. For the purposes of this definition, "submitted"
means any form of electronic, verbal, or written communication sent
to the Licensor or its representatives, including but not limited to
communication on electronic mailing lists, source code control systems,
and issue tracking systems that are managed by, or on behalf of, the
Licensor for the purpose of discussing and improving the Work, but
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on behalf of whom a Contribution has been received by Licensor and
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(c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works
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of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed
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of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and
do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution
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as modifying the License.
You may add Your own copyright statement to Your modifications and
may provide additional or different license terms and conditions
for use, reproduction, or distribution of Your modifications, or
for any such Derivative Works as a whole, provided Your use,
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the conditions stated in this License.
5. Submission of Contributions. Unless You explicitly state otherwise,
any Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the Work
by You to the Licensor shall be under the terms and conditions of
this License, without any additional terms or conditions.
Notwithstanding the above, nothing herein shall supersede or modify
the terms of any separate license agreement you may have executed
with Licensor regarding such Contributions.
6. Trademarks. This License does not grant permission to use the trade
names, trademarks, service marks, or product names of the Licensor,
except as required for reasonable and customary use in describing the
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7. Disclaimer of Warranty. Unless required by applicable law or
agreed to in writing, Licensor provides the Work (and each
Contributor provides its Contributions) on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
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of TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, or FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE. You are solely responsible for determining the
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risks associated with Your exercise of permissions under this License.
8. Limitation of Liability. In no event and under no legal theory,
whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise,
unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly
negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall any Contributor be
liable to You for damages, including any direct, indirect, special,
incidental, or consequential damages of any character arising as a
result of this License or out of the use or inability to use the
Work (including but not limited to damages for loss of goodwill,
work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all
other commercial damages or losses), even if such Contributor
has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
9. Accepting Warranty or Additional Liability. While redistributing
the Work or Derivative Works thereof, You may choose to offer,
and charge a fee for, acceptance of support, warranty, indemnity,
or other liability obligations and/or rights consistent with this
License. However, in accepting such obligations, You may act only
on Your own behalf and on Your sole responsibility, not on behalf
of any other Contributor, and only if You agree to indemnify,
defend, and hold each Contributor harmless for any liability
incurred by, or claims asserted against, such Contributor by reason
of your accepting any such warranty or additional liability.
END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Copyright 2014 Docker, Inc.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
Copyright (c) 2014 The Docker & Go Authors. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
met:
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
distribution.
* Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
this software without specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (@crosbymichael)
Victor Vieux <vieux@docker.com> (@vieux)
Tibor Vass <teabee89@gmail.com> (@tiborvass)
Cristian Staretu <cristian.staretu@gmail.com> (@unclejack)
Tianon Gravi <admwiggin@gmail.com> (@tianon)
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Package symlink implements EvalSymlinksInScope which is an extension of filepath.EvalSymlinks
from the [Go standard library](https://golang.org/pkg/path/filepath).
The code from filepath.EvalSymlinks has been adapted in fs.go.
Please read the LICENSE.BSD file that governs fs.go and LICENSE.APACHE for fs_test.go.
+116 -70
View File
@@ -1,85 +1,131 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE.BSD file.
// This code is a modified version of path/filepath/symlink.go from the Go standard library.
package symlink
import (
"fmt"
"bytes"
"errors"
"os"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const maxLoopCounter = 100
// FollowSymlink will follow an existing link and scope it to the root
// path provided.
func FollowSymlinkInScope(link, root string) (string, error) {
root, err := filepath.Abs(root)
// FollowSymlinkInScope is a wrapper around evalSymlinksInScope that returns an absolute path
func FollowSymlinkInScope(path, root string) (string, error) {
path, err := filepath.Abs(path)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
link, err = filepath.Abs(link)
root, err = filepath.Abs(root)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if link == root {
return root, nil
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Dir(link), root) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%s is not within %s", link, root)
}
prev := "/"
for _, p := range strings.Split(link, "/") {
prev = filepath.Join(prev, p)
prev = filepath.Clean(prev)
loopCounter := 0
for {
loopCounter++
if loopCounter >= maxLoopCounter {
return "", fmt.Errorf("loopCounter reached MAX: %v", loopCounter)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(prev, root) {
// Don't resolve symlinks outside of root. For example,
// we don't have to check /home in the below.
//
// /home -> usr/home
// FollowSymlinkInScope("/home/bob/foo/bar", "/home/bob/foo")
break
}
stat, err := os.Lstat(prev)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
break
}
return "", err
}
if stat.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == os.ModeSymlink {
dest, err := os.Readlink(prev)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if path.IsAbs(dest) {
prev = filepath.Join(root, dest)
} else {
prev, _ = filepath.Abs(prev)
if prev = filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(prev), dest)); len(prev) < len(root) {
prev = filepath.Join(root, filepath.Base(dest))
}
}
} else {
break
}
}
}
return prev, nil
return evalSymlinksInScope(path, root)
}
// evalSymlinksInScope will evaluate symlinks in `path` within a scope `root` and return
// a result guaranteed to be contained within the scope `root`, at the time of the call.
// Symlinks in `root` are not evaluated and left as-is.
// Errors encountered while attempting to evaluate symlinks in path will be returned.
// Non-existing paths are valid and do not constitute an error.
// `path` has to contain `root` as a prefix, or else an error will be returned.
// Trying to break out from `root` does not constitute an error.
//
// Example:
// If /foo/bar -> /outside,
// FollowSymlinkInScope("/foo/bar", "/foo") == "/foo/outside" instead of "/oustide"
//
// IMPORTANT: it is the caller's responsibility to call evalSymlinksInScope *after* relevant symlinks
// are created and not to create subsequently, additional symlinks that could potentially make a
// previously-safe path, unsafe. Example: if /foo/bar does not exist, evalSymlinksInScope("/foo/bar", "/foo")
// would return "/foo/bar". If one makes /foo/bar a symlink to /baz subsequently, then "/foo/bar" should
// no longer be considered safely contained in "/foo".
func evalSymlinksInScope(path, root string) (string, error) {
root = filepath.Clean(root)
if path == root {
return path, nil
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(path, root) {
return "", errors.New("evalSymlinksInScope: " + path + " is not in " + root)
}
const maxIter = 255
originalPath := path
// given root of "/a" and path of "/a/b/../../c" we want path to be "/b/../../c"
path = path[len(root):]
if root == string(filepath.Separator) {
path = string(filepath.Separator) + path
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(path, string(filepath.Separator)) {
return "", errors.New("evalSymlinksInScope: " + path + " is not in " + root)
}
path = filepath.Clean(path)
// consume path by taking each frontmost path element,
// expanding it if it's a symlink, and appending it to b
var b bytes.Buffer
// b here will always be considered to be the "current absolute path inside
// root" when we append paths to it, we also append a slash and use
// filepath.Clean after the loop to trim the trailing slash
for n := 0; path != ""; n++ {
if n > maxIter {
return "", errors.New("evalSymlinksInScope: too many links in " + originalPath)
}
// find next path component, p
i := strings.IndexRune(path, filepath.Separator)
var p string
if i == -1 {
p, path = path, ""
} else {
p, path = path[:i], path[i+1:]
}
if p == "" {
continue
}
// this takes a b.String() like "b/../" and a p like "c" and turns it
// into "/b/../c" which then gets filepath.Cleaned into "/c" and then
// root gets prepended and we Clean again (to remove any trailing slash
// if the first Clean gave us just "/")
cleanP := filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator) + b.String() + p)
if cleanP == string(filepath.Separator) {
// never Lstat "/" itself
b.Reset()
continue
}
fullP := filepath.Clean(root + cleanP)
fi, err := os.Lstat(fullP)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
// if p does not exist, accept it
b.WriteString(p)
b.WriteRune(filepath.Separator)
continue
}
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == 0 {
b.WriteString(p + string(filepath.Separator))
continue
}
// it's a symlink, put it at the front of path
dest, err := os.Readlink(fullP)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if filepath.IsAbs(dest) {
b.Reset()
}
path = dest + string(filepath.Separator) + path
}
// see note above on "fullP := ..." for why this is double-cleaned and
// what's happening here
return filepath.Clean(root + filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+b.String())), nil
}
+346 -65
View File
@@ -1,121 +1,402 @@
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0; See LICENSE.APACHE
package symlink
import (
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func abs(t *testing.T, p string) string {
o, err := filepath.Abs(p)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return o
type dirOrLink struct {
path string
target string
}
func TestFollowSymLinkNormal(t *testing.T) {
link := "testdata/fs/a/d/c/data"
func makeFs(tmpdir string, fs []dirOrLink) error {
for _, s := range fs {
s.path = filepath.Join(tmpdir, s.path)
if s.target == "" {
os.MkdirAll(s.path, 0755)
continue
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(s.path), 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := os.Symlink(s.target, s.path); err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
rewrite, err := FollowSymlinkInScope(link, "testdata")
func testSymlink(tmpdir, path, expected, scope string) error {
rewrite, err := FollowSymlinkInScope(filepath.Join(tmpdir, path), filepath.Join(tmpdir, scope))
if err != nil {
return err
}
expected, err = filepath.Abs(filepath.Join(tmpdir, expected))
if err != nil {
return err
}
if expected != rewrite {
return fmt.Errorf("Expected %q got %q", expected, rewrite)
}
return nil
}
func TestFollowSymlinkAbsolute(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkAbsolute")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if expected := abs(t, "testdata/b/c/data"); expected != rewrite {
t.Fatalf("Expected %s got %s", expected, rewrite)
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "testdata/fs/a/d", target: "/b"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/a/d/c/data", "testdata/b/c/data", "testdata"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymLinkRelativePath(t *testing.T) {
link := "testdata/fs/i"
rewrite, err := FollowSymlinkInScope(link, "testdata")
func TestFollowSymlinkRelativePath(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkRelativePath")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if expected := abs(t, "testdata/fs/a"); expected != rewrite {
t.Fatalf("Expected %s got %s", expected, rewrite)
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "testdata/fs/i", target: "a"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/i", "testdata/fs/a", "testdata"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymLinkUnderLinkedDir(t *testing.T) {
dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "docker-fs-test")
func TestFollowSymlinkSkipSymlinksOutsideScope(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkSkipSymlinksOutsideScope")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(dir, "realdir"), 0700)
os.Symlink("realdir", filepath.Join(dir, "linkdir"))
linkDir := filepath.Join(dir, "linkdir", "foo")
dirUnderLinkDir := filepath.Join(dir, "linkdir", "foo", "bar")
os.MkdirAll(dirUnderLinkDir, 0700)
rewrite, err := FollowSymlinkInScope(dirUnderLinkDir, linkDir)
if err != nil {
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{
{path: "linkdir", target: "realdir"},
{path: "linkdir/foo/bar"},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if rewrite != dirUnderLinkDir {
t.Fatalf("Expected %s got %s", dirUnderLinkDir, rewrite)
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "linkdir/foo/bar", "linkdir/foo/bar", "linkdir/foo"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymLinkRandomString(t *testing.T) {
func TestFollowSymlinkInvalidScopePathPair(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := FollowSymlinkInScope("toto", "testdata"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Random string should fail but didn't")
t.Fatal("expected an error")
}
}
func TestFollowSymLinkLastLink(t *testing.T) {
link := "testdata/fs/a/d"
rewrite, err := FollowSymlinkInScope(link, "testdata")
func TestFollowSymlinkLastLink(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkLastLink")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if expected := abs(t, "testdata/b"); expected != rewrite {
t.Fatalf("Expected %s got %s", expected, rewrite)
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "testdata/fs/a/d", target: "/b"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/a/d", "testdata/b", "testdata"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymLinkRelativeLink(t *testing.T) {
link := "testdata/fs/a/e/c/data"
rewrite, err := FollowSymlinkInScope(link, "testdata")
func TestFollowSymlinkRelativeLinkChangeScope(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkRelativeLinkChangeScope")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if expected := abs(t, "testdata/fs/b/c/data"); expected != rewrite {
t.Fatalf("Expected %s got %s", expected, rewrite)
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "testdata/fs/a/e", target: "../b"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/a/e/c/data", "testdata/fs/b/c/data", "testdata"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// avoid letting allowing symlink e lead us to ../b
// normalize to the "testdata/fs/a"
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/a/e", "testdata/fs/a/b", "testdata/fs/a"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymLinkRelativeLinkScope(t *testing.T) {
link := "testdata/fs/a/f"
rewrite, err := FollowSymlinkInScope(link, "testdata")
func TestFollowSymlinkDeepRelativeLinkChangeScope(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkDeepRelativeLinkChangeScope")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if expected := abs(t, "testdata/test"); expected != rewrite {
t.Fatalf("Expected %s got %s", expected, rewrite)
}
link = "testdata/fs/b/h"
rewrite, err = FollowSymlinkInScope(link, "testdata")
if err != nil {
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "testdata/fs/a/f", target: "../../../../test"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if expected := abs(t, "testdata/root"); expected != rewrite {
t.Fatalf("Expected %s got %s", expected, rewrite)
// avoid letting symlink f lead us out of the "testdata" scope
// we don't normalize because symlink f is in scope and there is no
// information leak
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/a/f", "testdata/test", "testdata"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// avoid letting symlink f lead us out of the "testdata/fs" scope
// we don't normalize because symlink f is in scope and there is no
// information leak
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/a/f", "testdata/fs/test", "testdata/fs"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkRelativeLinkChain(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkRelativeLinkChain")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
// avoid letting symlink g (pointed at by symlink h) take out of scope
// TODO: we should probably normalize to scope here because ../[....]/root
// is out of scope and we leak information
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{
{path: "testdata/fs/b/h", target: "../g"},
{path: "testdata/fs/g", target: "../../../../../../../../../../../../root"},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/b/h", "testdata/root", "testdata"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkBreakoutPath(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkBreakoutPath")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
// avoid letting symlink -> ../directory/file escape from scope
// normalize to "testdata/fs/j"
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "testdata/fs/j/k", target: "../i/a"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "testdata/fs/j/k", "testdata/fs/j/i/a", "testdata/fs/j"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkToRoot(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkToRoot")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
// make sure we don't allow escaping to /
// normalize to dir
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "foo", target: "/"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "foo", "", ""); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkSlashDotdot(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkSlashDotdot")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
tmpdir = filepath.Join(tmpdir, "dir", "subdir")
// make sure we don't allow escaping to /
// normalize to dir
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "foo", target: "/../../"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "foo", "", ""); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkDotdot(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkDotdot")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
tmpdir = filepath.Join(tmpdir, "dir", "subdir")
// make sure we stay in scope without leaking information
// this also checks for escaping to /
// normalize to dir
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "foo", target: "../../"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "foo", "", ""); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkRelativePath2(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkRelativePath2")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "bar/foo", target: "baz/target"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "bar/foo", "bar/baz/target", ""); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkScopeLink(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkScopeLink")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{
{path: "root2"},
{path: "root", target: "root2"},
{path: "root2/foo", target: "../bar"},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "root/foo", "root/bar", "root"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkRootScope(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkRootScope")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
expected, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(tmpdir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rewrite, err := FollowSymlinkInScope(tmpdir, "/")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if rewrite != expected {
t.Fatalf("expected %q got %q", expected, rewrite)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkEmpty(t *testing.T) {
res, err := FollowSymlinkInScope("", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
wd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if res != wd {
t.Fatal("expected %q got %q", wd, res)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkCircular(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkCircular")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{{path: "root/foo", target: "foo"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "root/foo", "", "root"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error for foo -> foo")
}
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{
{path: "root/bar", target: "baz"},
{path: "root/baz", target: "../bak"},
{path: "root/bak", target: "/bar"},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "root/foo", "", "root"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error for bar -> baz -> bak -> bar")
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkComplexChainWithTargetPathsContainingLinks(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkComplexChainWithTargetPathsContainingLinks")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{
{path: "root2"},
{path: "root", target: "root2"},
{path: "root/a", target: "r/s"},
{path: "root/r", target: "../root/t"},
{path: "root/root/t/s/b", target: "/../u"},
{path: "root/u/c", target: "."},
{path: "root/u/x/y", target: "../v"},
{path: "root/u/v", target: "/../w"},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "root/a/b/c/x/y/z", "root/w/z", "root"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkBreakoutNonExistent(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkBreakoutNonExistent")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{
{path: "root/slash", target: "/"},
{path: "root/sym", target: "/idontexist/../slash"},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "root/sym/file", "root/file", "root"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFollowSymlinkNoLexicalCleaning(t *testing.T) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "TestFollowSymlinkNoLexicalCleaning")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
if err := makeFs(tmpdir, []dirOrLink{
{path: "root/sym", target: "/foo/bar"},
{path: "root/hello", target: "/sym/../baz"},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := testSymlink(tmpdir, "root/hello", "root/foo/baz", "root"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
/b
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
../b
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
../../../../test
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
../g
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
../../../../../../../../../../../../root
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
a
+10
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"path"
"strings"
@@ -27,8 +28,17 @@ const (
var (
ErrConfigFileMissing = errors.New("The Auth config file is missing")
IndexServerURL *url.URL
)
func init() {
url, err := url.Parse(INDEXSERVER)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
IndexServerURL = url
}
type AuthConfig struct {
Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
Password string `json:"password,omitempty"`
+88 -33
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
@@ -11,6 +12,9 @@ import (
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/log"
)
// for mocking in unit tests
var lookupIP = net.LookupIP
// scans string for api version in the URL path. returns the trimmed hostname, if version found, string and API version.
func scanForApiVersion(hostname string) (string, APIVersion) {
var (
@@ -33,9 +37,40 @@ func scanForApiVersion(hostname string) (string, APIVersion) {
return hostname, DefaultAPIVersion
}
func NewEndpoint(hostname string, secure bool) (*Endpoint, error) {
func NewEndpoint(hostname string, insecureRegistries []string) (*Endpoint, error) {
endpoint, err := newEndpoint(hostname, insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Try HTTPS ping to registry
endpoint.URL.Scheme = "https"
if _, err := endpoint.Ping(); err != nil {
//TODO: triggering highland build can be done there without "failing"
if endpoint.secure {
// If registry is secure and HTTPS failed, show user the error and tell them about `--insecure-registry`
// in case that's what they need. DO NOT accept unknown CA certificates, and DO NOT fallback to HTTP.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Invalid registry endpoint %s: %v. If this private registry supports only HTTP or HTTPS with an unknown CA certificate, please add `--insecure-registry %s` to the daemon's arguments. In the case of HTTPS, if you have access to the registry's CA certificate, no need for the flag; simply place the CA certificate at /etc/docker/certs.d/%s/ca.crt", endpoint, err, endpoint.URL.Host, endpoint.URL.Host)
}
// If registry is insecure and HTTPS failed, fallback to HTTP.
log.Debugf("Error from registry %q marked as insecure: %v. Insecurely falling back to HTTP", endpoint, err)
endpoint.URL.Scheme = "http"
_, err2 := endpoint.Ping()
if err2 == nil {
return endpoint, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Invalid registry endpoint %q. HTTPS attempt: %v. HTTP attempt: %v", endpoint, err, err2)
}
return endpoint, nil
}
func newEndpoint(hostname string, insecureRegistries []string) (*Endpoint, error) {
var (
endpoint = Endpoint{secure: secure}
endpoint = Endpoint{}
trimmedHostname string
err error
)
@@ -47,30 +82,10 @@ func NewEndpoint(hostname string, secure bool) (*Endpoint, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Try HTTPS ping to registry
endpoint.URL.Scheme = "https"
if _, err := endpoint.Ping(); err != nil {
//TODO: triggering highland build can be done there without "failing"
if secure {
// If registry is secure and HTTPS failed, show user the error and tell them about `--insecure-registry`
// in case that's what they need. DO NOT accept unknown CA certificates, and DO NOT fallback to HTTP.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Invalid registry endpoint %s: %v. If this private registry supports only HTTP or HTTPS with an unknown CA certificate, please add `--insecure-registry %s` to the daemon's arguments. In the case of HTTPS, if you have access to the registry's CA certificate, no need for the flag; simply place the CA certificate at /etc/docker/certs.d/%s/ca.crt", endpoint, err, endpoint.URL.Host, endpoint.URL.Host)
}
// If registry is insecure and HTTPS failed, fallback to HTTP.
log.Debugf("Error from registry %q marked as insecure: %v. Insecurely falling back to HTTP", endpoint, err)
endpoint.URL.Scheme = "http"
_, err2 := endpoint.Ping()
if err2 == nil {
return &endpoint, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Invalid registry endpoint %q. HTTPS attempt: %v. HTTP attempt: %v", endpoint, err, err2)
endpoint.secure, err = isSecure(endpoint.URL.Host, insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &endpoint, nil
}
@@ -141,18 +156,58 @@ func (e Endpoint) Ping() (RegistryInfo, error) {
return info, nil
}
// IsSecure returns false if the provided hostname is part of the list of insecure registries.
// isSecure returns false if the provided hostname is part of the list of insecure registries.
// Insecure registries accept HTTP and/or accept HTTPS with certificates from unknown CAs.
func IsSecure(hostname string, insecureRegistries []string) bool {
if hostname == IndexServerAddress() {
return true
//
// The list of insecure registries can contain an element with CIDR notation to specify a whole subnet.
// If the subnet contains one of the IPs of the registry specified by hostname, the latter is considered
// insecure.
//
// hostname should be a URL.Host (`host:port` or `host`)
func isSecure(hostname string, insecureRegistries []string) (bool, error) {
if hostname == IndexServerURL.Host {
return true, nil
}
for _, h := range insecureRegistries {
if hostname == h {
return false
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostname)
if err != nil {
// assume hostname is of the form `host` without the port and go on.
host = hostname
}
addrs, err := lookupIP(host)
if err != nil {
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
if ip == nil {
// if resolving `host` fails, error out, since host is to be net.Dial-ed anyway
return true, fmt.Errorf("issecure: could not resolve %q: %v", host, err)
}
addrs = []net.IP{ip}
}
if len(addrs) == 0 {
return true, fmt.Errorf("issecure: could not resolve %q", host)
}
for _, addr := range addrs {
for _, r := range insecureRegistries {
// hostname matches insecure registry
if hostname == r {
return false, nil
}
// now assume a CIDR was passed to --insecure-registry
_, ipnet, err := net.ParseCIDR(r)
if err != nil {
// if could not parse it as a CIDR, even after removing
// assume it's not a CIDR and go on with the next candidate
continue
}
// check if the addr falls in the subnet
if ipnet.Contains(addr) {
return false, nil
}
}
}
return true
return true, nil
}
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
package registry
import "testing"
func TestEndpointParse(t *testing.T) {
testData := []struct {
str string
expected string
}{
{IndexServerAddress(), IndexServerAddress()},
{"http://0.0.0.0:5000", "http://0.0.0.0:5000/v1/"},
{"0.0.0.0:5000", "https://0.0.0.0:5000/v1/"},
}
for _, td := range testData {
e, err := newEndpoint(td.str, insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%q: %s", td.str, err)
}
if e == nil {
t.Logf("something's fishy, endpoint for %q is nil", td.str)
continue
}
if e.String() != td.expected {
t.Errorf("expected %q, got %q", td.expected, e.String())
}
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ var (
ErrInvalidRepositoryName = errors.New("Invalid repository name (ex: \"registry.domain.tld/myrepos\")")
ErrDoesNotExist = errors.New("Image does not exist")
errLoginRequired = errors.New("Authentication is required.")
validHex = regexp.MustCompile(`^([a-f0-9]{64})$`)
validNamespace = regexp.MustCompile(`^([a-z0-9_]{4,30})$`)
validRepo = regexp.MustCompile(`^([a-z0-9-_.]+)$`)
)
@@ -177,7 +176,8 @@ func validateRepositoryName(repositoryName string) error {
namespace = "library"
name = nameParts[0]
if validHex.MatchString(name) {
// the repository name must not be a valid image ID
if err := utils.ValidateID(name); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid repository name (%s), cannot specify 64-byte hexadecimal strings", name)
}
} else {
+37 -5
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,11 @@ package registry
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
@@ -19,8 +21,9 @@ import (
)
var (
testHttpServer *httptest.Server
testLayers = map[string]map[string]string{
testHTTPServer *httptest.Server
insecureRegistries []string
testLayers = map[string]map[string]string{
"77dbf71da1d00e3fbddc480176eac8994025630c6590d11cfc8fe1209c2a1d20": {
"json": `{"id":"77dbf71da1d00e3fbddc480176eac8994025630c6590d11cfc8fe1209c2a1d20",
"comment":"test base image","created":"2013-03-23T12:53:11.10432-07:00",
@@ -79,6 +82,11 @@ var (
"latest": "42d718c941f5c532ac049bf0b0ab53f0062f09a03afd4aa4a02c098e46032b9d",
},
}
mockHosts = map[string][]net.IP{
"": {net.ParseIP("0.0.0.0")},
"localhost": {net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), net.ParseIP("::1")},
"example.com": {net.ParseIP("42.42.42.42")},
}
)
func init() {
@@ -99,7 +107,31 @@ func init() {
// /v2/
r.HandleFunc("/v2/version", handlerGetPing).Methods("GET")
testHttpServer = httptest.NewServer(handlerAccessLog(r))
testHTTPServer = httptest.NewServer(handlerAccessLog(r))
URL, err := url.Parse(testHTTPServer.URL)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
insecureRegistries = []string{URL.Host}
// override net.LookupIP
lookupIP = func(host string) ([]net.IP, error) {
if host == "127.0.0.1" {
// I believe in future Go versions this will fail, so let's fix it later
return net.LookupIP(host)
}
for h, addrs := range mockHosts {
if host == h {
return addrs, nil
}
for _, addr := range addrs {
if addr.String() == host {
return []net.IP{addr}, nil
}
}
}
return nil, errors.New("lookup: no such host")
}
}
func handlerAccessLog(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -111,7 +143,7 @@ func handlerAccessLog(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {
}
func makeURL(req string) string {
return testHttpServer.URL + req
return testHTTPServer.URL + req
}
func writeHeaders(w http.ResponseWriter) {
@@ -301,7 +333,7 @@ func handlerUsers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
func handlerImages(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
u, _ := url.Parse(testHttpServer.URL)
u, _ := url.Parse(testHTTPServer.URL)
w.Header().Add("X-Docker-Endpoints", fmt.Sprintf("%s , %s ", u.Host, "test.example.com"))
w.Header().Add("X-Docker-Token", fmt.Sprintf("FAKE-SESSION-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()))
if r.Method == "PUT" {
+39 -2
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ var (
func spawnTestRegistrySession(t *testing.T) *Session {
authConfig := &AuthConfig{}
endpoint, err := NewEndpoint(makeURL("/v1/"), false)
endpoint, err := NewEndpoint(makeURL("/v1/"), insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ func spawnTestRegistrySession(t *testing.T) *Session {
}
func TestPingRegistryEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
ep, err := NewEndpoint(makeURL("/v1/"), false)
ep, err := NewEndpoint(makeURL("/v1/"), insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -316,3 +316,40 @@ func TestAddRequiredHeadersToRedirectedRequests(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
func TestIsSecure(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
addr string
insecureRegistries []string
expected bool
}{
{IndexServerURL.Host, nil, true},
{"example.com", []string{}, true},
{"example.com", []string{"example.com"}, false},
{"localhost", []string{"localhost:5000"}, false},
{"localhost:5000", []string{"localhost:5000"}, false},
{"localhost", []string{"example.com"}, false},
{"127.0.0.1:5000", []string{"127.0.0.1:5000"}, false},
{"localhost", nil, false},
{"localhost:5000", nil, false},
{"127.0.0.1", nil, false},
{"localhost", []string{"example.com"}, false},
{"127.0.0.1", []string{"example.com"}, false},
{"example.com", nil, true},
{"example.com", []string{"example.com"}, false},
{"127.0.0.1", []string{"example.com"}, false},
{"127.0.0.1:5000", []string{"example.com"}, false},
{"example.com:5000", []string{"42.42.0.0/16"}, false},
{"example.com", []string{"42.42.0.0/16"}, false},
{"example.com:5000", []string{"42.42.42.42/8"}, false},
{"127.0.0.1:5000", []string{"127.0.0.0/8"}, false},
{"42.42.42.42:5000", []string{"42.1.1.1/8"}, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
// TODO: remove this once we remove localhost insecure by default
insecureRegistries := append(tt.insecureRegistries, "127.0.0.0/8")
if sec, err := isSecure(tt.addr, insecureRegistries); err != nil || sec != tt.expected {
t.Fatalf("isSecure failed for %q %v, expected %v got %v. Error: %v", tt.addr, insecureRegistries, tt.expected, sec, err)
}
}
}
+2 -4
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func (s *Service) Auth(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
job.GetenvJson("authConfig", authConfig)
if addr := authConfig.ServerAddress; addr != "" && addr != IndexServerAddress() {
endpoint, err := NewEndpoint(addr, IsSecure(addr, s.insecureRegistries))
endpoint, err := NewEndpoint(addr, s.insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
return job.Error(err)
}
@@ -92,9 +92,7 @@ func (s *Service) Search(job *engine.Job) engine.Status {
return job.Error(err)
}
secure := IsSecure(hostname, s.insecureRegistries)
endpoint, err := NewEndpoint(hostname, secure)
endpoint, err := NewEndpoint(hostname, s.insecureRegistries)
if err != nil {
return job.Error(err)
}
-2
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ type Config struct {
Entrypoint []string
NetworkDisabled bool
OnBuild []string
SecurityOpt []string
}
func ContainerConfigFromJob(job *engine.Job) *Config {
@@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ func ContainerConfigFromJob(job *engine.Job) *Config {
}
job.GetenvJson("ExposedPorts", &config.ExposedPorts)
job.GetenvJson("Volumes", &config.Volumes)
config.SecurityOpt = job.GetenvList("SecurityOpt")
if PortSpecs := job.GetenvList("PortSpecs"); PortSpecs != nil {
config.PortSpecs = PortSpecs
}
+2
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ type HostConfig struct {
CapAdd []string
CapDrop []string
RestartPolicy RestartPolicy
SecurityOpt []string
}
// This is used by the create command when you want to set both the
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ func ContainerHostConfigFromJob(job *engine.Job) *HostConfig {
job.GetenvJson("PortBindings", &hostConfig.PortBindings)
job.GetenvJson("Devices", &hostConfig.Devices)
job.GetenvJson("RestartPolicy", &hostConfig.RestartPolicy)
hostConfig.SecurityOpt = job.GetenvList("SecurityOpt")
if Binds := job.GetenvList("Binds"); Binds != nil {
hostConfig.Binds = Binds
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -256,7 +256,6 @@ func Parse(cmd *flag.FlagSet, args []string, sysInfo *sysinfo.SysInfo) (*Config,
Volumes: flVolumes.GetMap(),
Entrypoint: entrypoint,
WorkingDir: *flWorkingDir,
SecurityOpt: flSecurityOpt.GetAll(),
}
hostConfig := &HostConfig{
@@ -276,6 +275,7 @@ func Parse(cmd *flag.FlagSet, args []string, sysInfo *sysinfo.SysInfo) (*Config,
CapAdd: flCapAdd.GetAll(),
CapDrop: flCapDrop.GetAll(),
RestartPolicy: restartPolicy,
SecurityOpt: flSecurityOpt.GetAll(),
}
if sysInfo != nil && flMemory > 0 && !sysInfo.SwapLimit {
+7 -5
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ type KeyValuePair struct {
Value string
}
var (
validHex = regexp.MustCompile(`^([a-f0-9]{64})$`)
)
// Request a given URL and return an io.Reader
func Download(url string) (resp *http.Response, err error) {
if resp, err = http.Get(url); err != nil {
@@ -190,11 +194,9 @@ func GenerateRandomID() string {
}
func ValidateID(id string) error {
if id == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Id can't be empty")
}
if strings.Contains(id, ":") {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid character in id: ':'")
if ok := validHex.MatchString(id); !ok {
err := fmt.Errorf("image ID '%s' is invalid", id)
return err
}
return nil
}