Copied from Debian.

From fcafb522a0509bfd6f4f6b57e4a1e93c0092eeb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 12:51:47 -0400
Subject: Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697]

In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a
copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of
bytes and do not read past the end of the input string.  This bug
affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and
krb5_build_principal_alloc_va().  krb5_build_principal_ext() is not
affected.

CVE-2015-2697:

In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to
cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field
beginning with a null byte.  If the KDC attempts to find a referral to
answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using
krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm.  Due to a bug in this
function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the
realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length.
Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond
the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash.

CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C

ticket: 8252 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup

(cherry picked from commit f0c094a1b745d91ef2f9a4eae2149aac026a5789)
Patch-Category: upstream
---
 src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
index ab6fed8..8604268 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
@@ -40,10 +40,8 @@ build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
     data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
     if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
 
-    if (!retval) {
-        r = strdup(realm);
-        if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; }
-    }
+    if (!retval)
+        r = k5memdup0(realm, rlen, &retval);
 
     while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
         if (count == size) {
