FOO_CPE_ID_VALID really ought to be an internal implementaion detail.
Packages that really want to trigger their CPE defintitions really
should set one of the actual variables to a meaningful value.
There are two CPE-related variables that we could chose to set to
replace FOO_CPE_ID_VALID: FOO_CPE_ID_VENDOR and FOO_CPE_ID_PRODUCT.
Between those two, _VENDOR more often diverges from the default than
_PRODUCT does, so that's what we use.
---8<------8<------8<------8<------8<---
#!/bin/bash
# Replace FOO_CPE_ID_VALID = YES with FOO_CPE_ID_VENDOR = foo_project
for i in $(git grep -l -E '[^)]_CPE_ID_VALID = YES' package support); do
pkg="$(basename "${i%/*}")"
sed -r -i -e "s/_CPE_ID_VALID = YES/_CPE_ID_VENDOR = ${pkg}_project/" "${i}"
done
---8<------8<------8<------8<------8<---
Reported-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Cc: Matthew Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
Cc: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
[Peter: update cpe-test comment to reflect pkg3 change]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Fix the following CVEs:
- CVE-2019-17533: Mat_VarReadNextInfo4 in mat4.c in MATIO 1.5.17 omits
a certain '\0' character, leading to a heap-based buffer over-read in
strdup_vprintf when uninitialized memory is accessed.
- CVE-2019-20017: A stack-based buffer over-read was discovered in
Mat_VarReadNextInfo5 in mat5.c in matio 1.5.17.
- CVE-2019-20018: A stack-based buffer over-read was discovered in
ReadNextCell in mat5.c in matio 1.5.17.
- CVE-2019-20020: A stack-based buffer over-read was discovered in
ReadNextStructField in mat5.c in matio 1.5.17.
- CVE-2019-20052: A memory leak was discovered in Mat_VarCalloc in
mat.c in matio 1.5.17 because SafeMulDims does not consider the
rank==0 case.
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Yann E. MORIN