Changelog (for details see [1] and [2]):
Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
*) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)
This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
(e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
no ABI change.
[Hugo Landau]
*) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
be called directly by end user applications.
The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
(CVE-2023-0215)
[Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
will most likely lead to a crash.
The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
(CVE-2022-4450)
[Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
(CVE-2022-4304)
[Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]
Changes between 1.1.1r and 1.1.1s [1 Nov 2022]
*) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1r version not refreshing the
certificate data to be signed before signing the certificate.
[Gibeom Gwon]
Changes between 1.1.1q and 1.1.1r [11 Oct 2022]
*) Fixed the linux-mips64 Configure target which was missing the
SIXTY_FOUR_BIT bn_ops flag. This was causing heap corruption on that
platform.
[Adam Joseph]
*) Fixed a strict aliasing problem in bn_nist. Clang-14 optimisation was
causing incorrect results in some cases as a result.
[Paul Dale]
*) Fixed SSL_pending() and SSL_has_pending() with DTLS which were failing to
report correct results in some cases
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1o for re-signing certificates with
different key sizes
[Todd Short]
*) Added the loongarch64 target
[Shi Pujin]
*) Fixed a DRBG seed propagation thread safety issue
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed a memory leak in tls13_generate_secret
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed reported performance degradation on aarch64. Restored the
implementation prior to commit 2621751 ("aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid
32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode") for 64bit targets only, since it is
reportedly 2-17% slower and the silicon errata only affects 32bit targets.
The new algorithm is still used for 32 bit targets.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Added a missing header for memcmp that caused compilation failure on some
platforms
[Gregor Jasny]
[1] https://www.openssl.org/news/cl111.txt
[2] https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Commit 3dbc86f098 (openssl: bump version, enable mdc2+camellia+tlsext)
form 2010-06-03, forced the build of mdc2. Commit a83d41867c
(package/libopenssl: add option to enable some features) added an option
to explicitly disable mdc2, but forgot to amend the existing enabling
option.
It appears that, like most (all?) openssl config options, mdc2 ends up
enabled unless explicitly disabled.
Additionally, mdc2 depends on DES, so without DES, mdc2 gets disabled.
So, drop the explicit enabling option, and make mdc2 select DES.
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: "GAUTRON, Erwan" <erwan.gautron@bertin.fr>
Cc: "Weber, Matthew L Collins" <Matthew.Weber@collins.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
Commit a83d41867c (package/libopenssl: add option to enable some
features) added an option to enable rc5. However, since commit
1fff941219 (Fixup non-x86 openssl build), dated 2002-12-30, rc5
has always been forcibly disabled in Buildroot.
Given that it was unconditionally disabled all this time, and no
one complained, it means there is virtually no-one using rc5, so we
can just drop the option.
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: "GAUTRON, Erwan" <erwan.gautron@bertin.fr>
Cc: "Weber, Matthew L Collins" <Matthew.Weber@collins.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
The openssl configure script disables the afalg engine when it detects
cross-compilation, but the detection missfires because it is based on
the CROSS_COMPILE environment variable, which we do not set (as we pass
fully qualified CC et al.).
So, the afalg engine is built, but it is built for the host, not the
target, so it does not make sense to build and install it. Besides, it
leaks build host info.
Signed-off-by: Nuno Gonçalves <nunog@fr24.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: extend commit log]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Drop unneeded SED hacks (including build_tests) to fix the following
build failure with BR2_OPTIMIZE_FAST:
In file included from crypto/async/arch/../async_local.h:30,
from crypto/async/arch/async_null.c:11:
crypto/async/arch/../arch/async_posix.h:32:5: error: unknown type name 'ucontext_t'
32 | ucontext_t fibre;
| ^~~~~~~~~~
While at it, also "drop parentheses as all it does is spawn a useless
sub-shell" as noticed by Yann E. Morin
Fixes:
- http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/3ce202f11a821940ff55eafa1dc7cea54b8c0da2
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Fixes the following security issues:
AES OCB fails to encrypt some bytes (CVE-2022-2097)
===================================================
Severity: MODERATE
AES OCB mode for 32-bit x86 platforms using the AES-NI assembly optimised
implementation will not encrypt the entirety of the data under some
circumstances. This could reveal sixteen bytes of data that was
preexisting in the memory that wasn't written. In the special case of
"in place" encryption, sixteen bytes of the plaintext would be revealed.
Since OpenSSL does not support OCB based cipher suites for TLS and DTLS,
they are both unaffected.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The c_rehash script allows command injection (CVE-2022-2068)
============================================================
Severity: Moderate
In addition to the c_rehash shell command injection identified in
CVE-2022-1292, further circumstances where the c_rehash script does not
properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection were
found by code review.
When the CVE-2022-1292 was fixed it was not discovered that there
are other places in the script where the file names of certificates
being hashed were possibly passed to a command executed through the
shell.
This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where
it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker
could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.
Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220621.txt
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Fixes the following security issues:
- The c_rehash script allows command injection (CVE-2022-1292)
The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to
prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating
systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating
systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of
the script.
Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced by
the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220503.txt
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]
*) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever
for non-prime moduli.
Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain
elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve
parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.
It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that
has invalid explicit curve parameters.
Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate
signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may
thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also
be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit
elliptic curve parameters.
Thus vulnerable situations include:
- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters
Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker
can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue.
(CVE-2022-0778)
[Tomáš Mráz]
*) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489)
to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as
required by SECLEVEL >= 3.
[Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Minor bugfix release:
Changes between 1.1.1l and 1.1.1m [14 Dec 2021]
*) Avoid loading of a dynamic engine twice.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed building on Debian with kfreebsd kernels
[Mattias Ellert]
*) Prioritise DANE TLSA issuer certs over peer certs
[Viktor Dukhovni]
*) Fixed random API for MacOS prior to 10.12
These MacOS versions don't support the CommonCrypto APIs
[Lenny Primak]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Openssl implements lot of algorithms that are not required in some
emdedded devices and cyphers known as weak. Secure embedded systems
shall disable unused algorithms (and weak algo) in order to be
certified.
This patch allows to select weak algorithms and mecanims to enable
such as md5.
To ensure backward compatibility, all items are selected by default.
Signed-off-by: Erwan GAUTRON <erwan.gautron@bertin.fr>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- drop help texts that just repeat the prompts
- fix check-package
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
This reverts commit 2bb26c1a1d.
There was some negative feedback from Arnd Bergmann on that patch:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/5b5e2985f355c8e99c196d9ce5d02c15bebadfbc#commitcomment-44782859
The patch looks wrong to me: __NR_io_pgetevents_time64 must be used
whenever time_t is 64-bit wide on a 32-bit architecture, while
__NR_io_getevents/__NR_io_pgetevents must be used when time_t is the
same width as 'long'.
Checking whether __NR_io_getevents is defined is wrong for all
architectures other than riscv
And in light of the above, indeed the patch does not look so correct
after all.
Reported-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Fixes the following security issues:
- CVE-2021-23841: Null pointer deref in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash()
The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts to
create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
contained within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly
handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which
might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may
subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a
potential denial of service attack.
The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by
OpenSSL itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this
function directly and they use it on certificates that may have been
obtained from untrusted sources.
- CVE-2021-23839: Incorrect SSLv2 rollback protection
OpenSSL 1.0.2 supports SSLv2. If a client attempts to negotiate SSLv2
with a server that is configured to support both SSLv2 and more recent SSL
and TLS versions then a check is made for a version rollback attack when
unpadding an RSA signature. Clients that support SSL or TLS versions
greater than SSLv2 are supposed to use a special form of padding. A
server that supports greater than SSLv2 is supposed to reject connection
attempts from a client where this special form of padding is present,
because this indicates that a version rollback has occurred (i.e. both
client and server support greater than SSLv2, and yet this is the version
that is being requested).
The implementation of this padding check inverted the logic so that the
connection attempt is accepted if the padding is present, and rejected if
it is absent. This means that such as server will accept a connection if
a version rollback attack has occurred. Further the server will
erroneously reject a connection if a normal SSLv2 connection attempt is
made.
OpenSSL 1.1.1 does not have SSLv2 support and therefore is not vulnerable
to this issue. The underlying error is in the implementation of the
RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function. This also affects the
RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode used by various other functions. Although
1.1.1 does not support SSLv2 the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function still
exists, as does the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode. Applications that
directly call that function or use that padding mode will encounter this
issue. However since there is no support for the SSLv2 protocol in 1.1.1
this is considered a bug and not a security issue in that version.
- CVE-2021-23840: Integer overflow in CipherUpdate
Calls to EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate may
overflow the output length argument in some cases where the input length
is close to the maximum permissable length for an integer on the platform.
In such cases the return value from the function call will be 1
(indicating success), but the output length value will be negative. This
could cause applications to behave incorrectly or crash.
For more details, see the advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210216.txt
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
For instance on risc-v 64 arch the build would otherwise fail because
of undefined ucontext_t because "-DOPENSSL_NO_ASYNC" would not propagate
through to CFLAGS in the Makefile.
Signed-off-by: Yann Sionneau <ysionneau@kalray.eu>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Commit 1ebb35ee5f changed the libopenssl
target architecture to 'linux-generic64' for 64-bit archs based on
BR2_ARCH_IS_64. However, MIPS64n32 has BR2_ARCH_IS_64 set, but is a 32-bit
ABI. On such board, libopenssl needs to be configured with linux-generic32
to function properly.
One symptom of this problem is that ssh-keygen hangs on key generation,
waiting for more random bits. See [1] for the discussion with openssl
upstream.
Thanks to Ronny Meeus for investigating the issue and kudos to the openssl
community for their responsive and helpful interaction!
Reported-by: Ronny Meeus <ronny.meeus@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de_schampheleire@nokia.com>
[1] https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2020-June/012565.html
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
musl libc uses ELFv2 by default for all PPC64 targets.
Now, OpenSSL libraries built with musl targeting PPC64BE should build
and function as expected.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Fazio <vfazio@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
This fixes CVE-2020-1967:
Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function during
or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer dereference as a
result of incorrect handling of the "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension.
The crash occurs if an invalid or unrecognised signature algorithm is received
from the peer. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of
Service attack. OpenSSL version 1.1.1d, 1.1.1e, and 1.1.1f are affected by this
issue. This issue did not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.1d.
See https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20200421.txt
Also update the hash file to the new two spaces convention
Signed-off-by: Titouan Christophe <titouan.christophe@railnova.eu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Fixes the following security issues (1.1.1e):
CVE-2019-1551 [Low severity]: There is an overflow bug in the x64_64
Montgomery squaring procedure used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli.
No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against
2-prime RSA1024, 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect
would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks
against DH512 are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the
target would have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended
anyway. Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may
be affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. Reported by OSS-Fuzz and Guido
Vranken.
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20191206.txt
CVE-2019-1563 [Low severity]: In situations where an attacker receives
automated notification of the success or failure of a decryption attempt an
attacker, after sending a very large number of messages to be decrypted, can
recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption key or decrypt any RSA encrypted
message that was encrypted with the public RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher
padding oracle attack. Applications are not affected if they use a
certificate together with the private RSA key to the CMS_decrypt or
PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info to decrypt.
Reported by Bernd Edlinger.
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190910.txt
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
[Peter: mention security impact]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Since e3159cad71 (package/libopenssl: move target arch selection
to Config.in), we have a Config.in that contains a few options to
configure libopenssl (openSSL, the original).
As such, it makes sense to move the remaining options there too.
We also move the condition there, mimicking what is done for the
external toolchains' options too.
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Cc: Matt Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
The logic to select the proper OpenSSL target arch in libopenssl.mk is
not easy to read, so let's move it to Config.in where we have some
nice constructs for that kind of value selection.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Fixes the following security vulnerabilities:
- ECDSA remote timing attack (CVE-2019-1547)
Severity: Low
- Fork Protection (CVE-2019-1549)
Severity: Low
- Padding Oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey (CVE-2019-1563)
Severity: Low
For more details, see the advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190910.txt
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Fixes the following security issues:
Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 (CVE-2019-1543)
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
ignored.
It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
reused nonce.
Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is
safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Drop patches 4..6 as they are now upstream.
Update the hash of the license file as the copyright dates changed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
- use BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_UCONTEXT
This is used to set -DOPENSSL_NO_ASYNC if needed.
- apply the CFLAGS correctly when compiling with -Os (bugfix).
- use -latomic when needed
This fixes the build for br-sparc-uclibc-2018.05
- don't use madvise() if no MMU
Trying to do so results in undefined reference to madvise() as
it is not available on uclibc without MMU.
The original openssl code checks if a macro used in the madvise call
is defined. The problem comes from the fact that the code in
crypto/mem_sec.c also includes a kernel header defining the same macro
unconditionally. Thus the check is always true in that case.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8089
- don't compile test/fuzzers
These binaries introduced with 1.1.x sometimes do not compile.
This is the case with the br-arm-cortex-m4-full toolchain
- don't build ocsp daemon if no MMU.
Patch from Richard Levitte.
- correctly enable cryptodev engine
Thanks to Arnout Vandecappelle for spotting this.
- remove all parallel build patches (openssl build-system changed)
- rebased 0001-Dont-waste-time-building-manpages-if-we-re-not-going.patch
to apply to Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl (Makefile template)
- removed 0002-cryptodev-Fix-issue-with-signature-generation.patch
(upstream applied)
- rebased 0003-Reproducible-build-do-not-leak-compiler-path.patch to
apply to crypto/build.info (Makefile template)
- fix musl/uclibc build failure, use '-DOPENSSL_NO_ASYNC'
- remove legacy enable-tlsext configure option
- remove target/host libdir configure options, fixes openssl.pc installation
path, fixes wget compile
- change legacy INSTALL_PREFIX to DESTDIR
- remove 'libraries gets installed read only, so strip fails'
workaround (not needed anymore)
- change engine directory from /usr/lib/engines to
/usr/lib/engines-1.1
- change license file hash, no license change, only the following
hint was removed:
Actually both licenses are BSD-style Open Source licenses.
In case of any license issues related to OpenSSL please
contact openssl-core@openssl.org.
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Tested-by: Ryan Coe <bluemrp9@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vadim Kochan <vadim4j@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Havelange <patrick.havelange@essensium.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Fixes the following security vulnerabilities:
*) Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication
OpenSSL ECC scalar multiplication, used in e.g. ECDSA and ECDH, has been
shown to be vulnerable to a microarchitecture timing side channel attack.
An attacker with sufficient access to mount local timing attacks during
ECDSA signature generation could recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th October 2018 by Alejandro
Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Cesar Pereida Garcia and
Nicola Tuveri.
(CVE-2018-5407)
[Billy Brumley]
*) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
(CVE-2018-0734)
[Paul Dale]
For more information, see the changelog:
https://www.openssl.org/news/cl102.txt
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Fixes the following security issues:
Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
(CVE-2018-0739)
Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in
PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack.
There are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted
sources so this is considered safe.
Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC (CVE-2018-0733)
Because of an implementation bug the PA-RISC CRYPTO_memcmp function is
effectively reduced to only comparing the least significant bit of each
byte. This allows an attacker to forge messages that would be considered as
authenticated in an amount of tries lower than that guaranteed by the
security claims of the scheme. The module can only be compiled by the HP-UX
assembler, so that only HP-UX PA-RISC targets are affected.
rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738)
This issue has been reported in a previous OpenSSL security advisory and a
fix was provided for OpenSSL 1.0.2. Due to the low severity no fix was
released at that time for OpenSSL 1.1.0. The fix is now available in
OpenSSL 1.1.0h.
There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this
defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely.
Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the
work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed
offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be
significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server
would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is
no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701.
This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
For more details, see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20180327.txt
The copyright year changed in LICENSE, so adjust the hash to match.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Bernd Kuhls