From ff898623af2ed564300752bba83a680a1e4fec8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Mattson Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2024 10:32:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET AMD's initial implementation of IBPB did not clear the return address predictor. Beginning with Zen4, AMD's IBPB *does* clear the return address predictor. This behavior is enumerated by CPUID.80000008H:EBX.IBPB_RET[30]. Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET for use in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, when determining cross-vendor capabilities. Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index dd4682857c12..a222a24677d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ #define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* "ibrs" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ -#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier without a guaranteed RSB flush */ #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* "stibp" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* Generic flag for all Zen and newer */ #define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* L1TF workaround PTE inversion */ @@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CPPC (13*32+27) /* "cppc" Collaborative Processor Performance Control */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PSFD (13*32+28) /* Predictive Store Forwarding Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO (13*32+29) /* Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET (13*32+30) /* IBPB clears return address predictor */ #define X86_FEATURE_BRS (13*32+31) /* "brs" Branch Sampling available */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */ From 3ea87dfa31a7b0bb0ff1675e67b9e54883013074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Wikner Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 20:49:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flag Set this flag if the CPU has an IBPB implementation that does not invalidate return target predictions. Zen generations < 4 do not flush the RSB when executing an IBPB and this bug flag denotes that. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index a222a24677d7..913fd3a7bac6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -524,4 +524,5 @@ #define X86_BUG_DIV0 X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* "div0" AMD DIV0 speculation bug */ #define X86_BUG_RFDS X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* "rfds" CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */ #define X86_BUG_BHI X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* "bhi" CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */ +#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 07a34d723505..f1040cb64841 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1443,6 +1443,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_BHI); + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; From 50e4b3b94090babe8d4bb85c95f0d3e6b07ea86e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Wikner Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 20:49:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] x86/entry: Have entry_ibpb() invalidate return predictions entry_ibpb() should invalidate all indirect predictions, including return target predictions. Not all IBPB implementations do this, in which case the fallback is RSB filling. Prevent SRSO-style hijacks of return predictions following IBPB, as the return target predictor can be corrupted before the IBPB completes. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: --- arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S index d9feadffa972..324686bca368 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include "calling.h" @@ -19,6 +21,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb) movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax xorl %edx, %edx wrmsr + + /* Make sure IBPB clears return stack preductions too. */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET RET SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb) /* For KVM */ From 0fad2878642ec46225af2054564932745ac5c765 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Wikner Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 12:36:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] x86/bugs: Skip RSB fill at VMEXIT entry_ibpb() is designed to follow Intel's IBPB specification regardless of CPU. This includes invalidating RSB entries. Hence, if IBPB on VMEXIT has been selected, entry_ibpb() as part of the RET untraining in the VMEXIT path will take care of all BTB and RSB clearing so there's no need to explicitly fill the RSB anymore. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner Cc: --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d1915427b4ff..4474c5a1cd9a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1117,6 +1117,14 @@ do_cmd_auto: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); mitigate_smt = true; + + /* + * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures + * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, + * regardless of IBPB implementation. + */ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); + break; case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF: @@ -2638,6 +2646,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT; + + /* + * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures + * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, + * regardless of IBPB implementation. + */ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); } } else { pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n"); From c62fa117c32bd1abed9304c58e0da6940f8c7fc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Wikner Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 12:58:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] x86/bugs: Do not use UNTRAIN_RET with IBPB on entry Since X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB will invalidate all harmful predictions with IBPB, no software-based untraining of returns is needed anymore. Currently, this change affects retbleed and SRSO mitigations so if either of the mitigations is doing IBPB and the other one does the software sequence, the latter is not needed anymore. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner Cc: --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 4474c5a1cd9a..47a01d4028f6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1115,6 +1115,15 @@ do_cmd_auto: case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + + /* + * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for + * software-based untraining so clear those in case some + * other mitigation like SRSO has selected them. + */ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); mitigate_smt = true; @@ -2635,6 +2644,14 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) if (has_microcode) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB; + + /* + * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for + * software-based untraining so clear those in case some + * other mitigation like Retbleed has selected them. + */ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); } } else { pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");