From 1a35c88302a3b2827ec47f0b2d0530b543938fb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zaid Alali Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 12:30:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 01/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Fix kernel test sparse warnings This patch fixes the kernel test robot warning reported here: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202410241620.oApALow5-lkp@intel.com/ Use pointers annotated with the __iomem marker for all iomem map calls, and creates a local copy of the mapped IO memory for future access in the code. memcpy_fromio() and memcpy_toio() are used to read/write data from/to mapped IO memory. Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Zaid Alali Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617193026.637510-2-zaidal@os.amperecomputing.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index 9b041415a9d0..e4fb4405deae 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(einj_mutex); */ bool einj_initialized __ro_after_init; -static void *einj_param; +static void __iomem *einj_param; static void einj_exec_ctx_init(struct apei_exec_context *ctx) { @@ -216,24 +216,26 @@ static void check_vendor_extension(u64 paddr, struct set_error_type_with_address *v5param) { int offset = v5param->vendor_extension; - struct vendor_error_type_extension *v; + struct vendor_error_type_extension v; + struct vendor_error_type_extension __iomem *p; u32 sbdf; if (!offset) return; - v = acpi_os_map_iomem(paddr + offset, sizeof(*v)); - if (!v) + p = acpi_os_map_iomem(paddr + offset, sizeof(*p)); + if (!p) return; - get_oem_vendor_struct(paddr, offset, v); - sbdf = v->pcie_sbdf; + memcpy_fromio(&v, p, sizeof(v)); + get_oem_vendor_struct(paddr, offset, &v); + sbdf = v.pcie_sbdf; sprintf(vendor_dev, "%x:%x:%x.%x vendor_id=%x device_id=%x rev_id=%x\n", sbdf >> 24, (sbdf >> 16) & 0xff, (sbdf >> 11) & 0x1f, (sbdf >> 8) & 0x7, - v->vendor_id, v->device_id, v->rev_id); - acpi_os_unmap_iomem(v, sizeof(*v)); + v.vendor_id, v.device_id, v.rev_id); + acpi_os_unmap_iomem(p, sizeof(v)); } -static void *einj_get_parameter_address(void) +static void __iomem *einj_get_parameter_address(void) { int i; u64 pa_v4 = 0, pa_v5 = 0; @@ -254,26 +256,30 @@ static void *einj_get_parameter_address(void) entry++; } if (pa_v5) { - struct set_error_type_with_address *v5param; + struct set_error_type_with_address v5param; + struct set_error_type_with_address __iomem *p; - v5param = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v5, sizeof(*v5param)); - if (v5param) { + p = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v5, sizeof(*p)); + if (p) { + memcpy_fromio(&v5param, p, sizeof(v5param)); acpi5 = 1; - check_vendor_extension(pa_v5, v5param); - return v5param; + check_vendor_extension(pa_v5, &v5param); + return p; } } if (param_extension && pa_v4) { - struct einj_parameter *v4param; + struct einj_parameter v4param; + struct einj_parameter __iomem *p; - v4param = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v4, sizeof(*v4param)); - if (!v4param) + p = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v4, sizeof(*p)); + if (!p) return NULL; - if (v4param->reserved1 || v4param->reserved2) { - acpi_os_unmap_iomem(v4param, sizeof(*v4param)); + memcpy_fromio(&v4param, p, sizeof(v4param)); + if (v4param.reserved1 || v4param.reserved2) { + acpi_os_unmap_iomem(p, sizeof(v4param)); return NULL; } - return v4param; + return p; } return NULL; @@ -319,7 +325,7 @@ static struct acpi_generic_address *einj_get_trigger_parameter_region( static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, u64 param1, u64 param2) { - struct acpi_einj_trigger *trigger_tab = NULL; + struct acpi_einj_trigger trigger_tab; struct apei_exec_context trigger_ctx; struct apei_resources trigger_resources; struct acpi_whea_header *trigger_entry; @@ -327,54 +333,57 @@ static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, u32 table_size; int rc = -EIO; struct acpi_generic_address *trigger_param_region = NULL; + struct acpi_einj_trigger __iomem *p; - r = request_mem_region(trigger_paddr, sizeof(*trigger_tab), + r = request_mem_region(trigger_paddr, sizeof(trigger_tab), "APEI EINJ Trigger Table"); if (!r) { pr_err("Can not request [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] for Trigger table\n", (unsigned long long)trigger_paddr, (unsigned long long)trigger_paddr + - sizeof(*trigger_tab) - 1); + sizeof(trigger_tab) - 1); goto out; } - trigger_tab = ioremap_cache(trigger_paddr, sizeof(*trigger_tab)); - if (!trigger_tab) { + p = ioremap_cache(trigger_paddr, sizeof(*p)); + if (!p) { pr_err("Failed to map trigger table!\n"); goto out_rel_header; } - rc = einj_check_trigger_header(trigger_tab); + memcpy_fromio(&trigger_tab, p, sizeof(trigger_tab)); + rc = einj_check_trigger_header(&trigger_tab); if (rc) { pr_warn(FW_BUG "Invalid trigger error action table.\n"); goto out_rel_header; } /* No action structures in the TRIGGER_ERROR table, nothing to do */ - if (!trigger_tab->entry_count) + if (!trigger_tab.entry_count) goto out_rel_header; rc = -EIO; - table_size = trigger_tab->table_size; - r = request_mem_region(trigger_paddr + sizeof(*trigger_tab), - table_size - sizeof(*trigger_tab), + table_size = trigger_tab.table_size; + r = request_mem_region(trigger_paddr + sizeof(trigger_tab), + table_size - sizeof(trigger_tab), "APEI EINJ Trigger Table"); if (!r) { pr_err("Can not request [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] for Trigger Table Entry\n", - (unsigned long long)trigger_paddr + sizeof(*trigger_tab), + (unsigned long long)trigger_paddr + sizeof(trigger_tab), (unsigned long long)trigger_paddr + table_size - 1); goto out_rel_header; } - iounmap(trigger_tab); - trigger_tab = ioremap_cache(trigger_paddr, table_size); - if (!trigger_tab) { + iounmap(p); + p = ioremap_cache(trigger_paddr, table_size); + if (!p) { pr_err("Failed to map trigger table!\n"); goto out_rel_entry; } + memcpy_fromio(&trigger_tab, p, sizeof(trigger_tab)); trigger_entry = (struct acpi_whea_header *) - ((char *)trigger_tab + sizeof(struct acpi_einj_trigger)); + ((char *)&trigger_tab + sizeof(struct acpi_einj_trigger)); apei_resources_init(&trigger_resources); apei_exec_ctx_init(&trigger_ctx, einj_ins_type, ARRAY_SIZE(einj_ins_type), - trigger_entry, trigger_tab->entry_count); + trigger_entry, trigger_tab.entry_count); rc = apei_exec_collect_resources(&trigger_ctx, &trigger_resources); if (rc) goto out_fini; @@ -392,7 +401,7 @@ static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, apei_resources_init(&addr_resources); trigger_param_region = einj_get_trigger_parameter_region( - trigger_tab, param1, param2); + &trigger_tab, param1, param2); if (trigger_param_region) { rc = apei_resources_add(&addr_resources, trigger_param_region->address, @@ -421,13 +430,13 @@ out_release: out_fini: apei_resources_fini(&trigger_resources); out_rel_entry: - release_mem_region(trigger_paddr + sizeof(*trigger_tab), - table_size - sizeof(*trigger_tab)); + release_mem_region(trigger_paddr + sizeof(trigger_tab), + table_size - sizeof(trigger_tab)); out_rel_header: - release_mem_region(trigger_paddr, sizeof(*trigger_tab)); + release_mem_region(trigger_paddr, sizeof(trigger_tab)); out: - if (trigger_tab) - iounmap(trigger_tab); + if (p) + iounmap(p); return rc; } @@ -446,8 +455,10 @@ static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, return rc; apei_exec_ctx_set_input(&ctx, type); if (acpi5) { - struct set_error_type_with_address *v5param = einj_param; + struct set_error_type_with_address *v5param, v5_struct; + v5param = &v5_struct; + memcpy_fromio(v5param, einj_param, sizeof(*v5param)); v5param->type = type; if (type & ACPI5_VENDOR_BIT) { switch (vendor_flags) { @@ -492,15 +503,18 @@ static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, break; } } + memcpy_toio(einj_param, v5param, sizeof(*v5param)); } else { rc = apei_exec_run(&ctx, ACPI_EINJ_SET_ERROR_TYPE); if (rc) return rc; if (einj_param) { - struct einj_parameter *v4param = einj_param; + struct einj_parameter v4param; - v4param->param1 = param1; - v4param->param2 = param2; + memcpy_fromio(&v4param, einj_param, sizeof(v4param)); + v4param.param1 = param1; + v4param.param2 = param2; + memcpy_toio(einj_param, &v4param, sizeof(v4param)); } } rc = apei_exec_run(&ctx, ACPI_EINJ_EXECUTE_OPERATION); From 0c6176e1e1862fd09484c50de17c04b3ca388c22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zaid Alali Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 12:30:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 02/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Enable the discovery of EINJv2 capabilities Enable the driver to show all supported error injections for EINJ and EINJv2 at the same time. EINJv2 capabilities can be discovered by checking the return value of get_error_type, where bit 30 set indicates EINJv2 support. Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny Signed-off-by: Zaid Alali Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617193026.637510-3-zaidal@os.amperecomputing.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/apei-internal.h | 2 +- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------ drivers/acpi/apei/einj-cxl.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-internal.h b/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-internal.h index cd2766c69d78..77c10a7a7a9f 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-internal.h +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-internal.h @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static inline u32 cper_estatus_len(struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus) int apei_osc_setup(void); -int einj_get_available_error_type(u32 *type); +int einj_get_available_error_type(u32 *type, int einj_action); int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, u64 param3, u64 param4); int einj_cxl_rch_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index e4fb4405deae..a1ff42c226fb 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #define SLEEP_UNIT_MAX 5000 /* 5ms */ /* Firmware should respond within 1 seconds */ #define FIRMWARE_TIMEOUT (1 * USEC_PER_SEC) +#define ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP BIT(30) #define ACPI5_VENDOR_BIT BIT(31) #define MEM_ERROR_MASK (ACPI_EINJ_MEMORY_CORRECTABLE | \ ACPI_EINJ_MEMORY_UNCORRECTABLE | \ @@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ static struct debugfs_blob_wrapper vendor_errors; static char vendor_dev[64]; static u32 available_error_type; +static u32 available_error_type_v2; /* * Some BIOSes allow parameters to the SET_ERROR_TYPE entries in the @@ -159,13 +161,13 @@ static void einj_exec_ctx_init(struct apei_exec_context *ctx) EINJ_TAB_ENTRY(einj_tab), einj_tab->entries); } -static int __einj_get_available_error_type(u32 *type) +static int __einj_get_available_error_type(u32 *type, int einj_action) { struct apei_exec_context ctx; int rc; einj_exec_ctx_init(&ctx); - rc = apei_exec_run(&ctx, ACPI_EINJ_GET_ERROR_TYPE); + rc = apei_exec_run(&ctx, einj_action); if (rc) return rc; *type = apei_exec_ctx_get_output(&ctx); @@ -174,17 +176,34 @@ static int __einj_get_available_error_type(u32 *type) } /* Get error injection capabilities of the platform */ -int einj_get_available_error_type(u32 *type) +int einj_get_available_error_type(u32 *type, int einj_action) { int rc; mutex_lock(&einj_mutex); - rc = __einj_get_available_error_type(type); + rc = __einj_get_available_error_type(type, einj_action); mutex_unlock(&einj_mutex); return rc; } +static int einj_get_available_error_types(u32 *type1, u32 *type2) +{ + int rc; + + rc = einj_get_available_error_type(type1, ACPI_EINJ_GET_ERROR_TYPE); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (*type1 & ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP) { + rc = einj_get_available_error_type(type2, + ACPI_EINJV2_GET_ERROR_TYPE); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return 0; +} + static int einj_timedout(u64 *t) { if ((s64)*t < SLEEP_UNIT_MIN) { @@ -646,6 +665,7 @@ static u64 error_param2; static u64 error_param3; static u64 error_param4; static struct dentry *einj_debug_dir; +static char einj_buf[32]; static struct { u32 mask; const char *str; } const einj_error_type_string[] = { { BIT(0), "Processor Correctable" }, { BIT(1), "Processor Uncorrectable non-fatal" }, @@ -662,6 +682,12 @@ static struct { u32 mask; const char *str; } const einj_error_type_string[] = { { BIT(31), "Vendor Defined Error Types" }, }; +static struct { u32 mask; const char *str; } const einjv2_error_type_string[] = { + { BIT(0), "EINJV2 Processor Error" }, + { BIT(1), "EINJV2 Memory Error" }, + { BIT(2), "EINJV2 PCI Express Error" }, +}; + static int available_error_type_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { @@ -669,17 +695,22 @@ static int available_error_type_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (available_error_type & einj_error_type_string[pos].mask) seq_printf(m, "0x%08x\t%s\n", einj_error_type_string[pos].mask, einj_error_type_string[pos].str); - + if (available_error_type & ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP) { + for (int pos = 0; pos < ARRAY_SIZE(einjv2_error_type_string); pos++) { + if (available_error_type_v2 & einjv2_error_type_string[pos].mask) + seq_printf(m, "V2_0x%08x\t%s\n", einjv2_error_type_string[pos].mask, + einjv2_error_type_string[pos].str); + } + } return 0; } DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(available_error_type); -static int error_type_get(void *data, u64 *val) +static ssize_t error_type_get(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - *val = error_type; - - return 0; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, einj_buf, strlen(einj_buf)); } bool einj_is_cxl_error_type(u64 type) @@ -712,9 +743,23 @@ int einj_validate_error_type(u64 type) return 0; } -static int error_type_set(void *data, u64 val) +static ssize_t error_type_set(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { int rc; + u64 val; + + memset(einj_buf, 0, sizeof(einj_buf)); + if (copy_from_user(einj_buf, buf, count)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (strncmp(einj_buf, "V2_", 3) == 0) { + if (!sscanf(einj_buf, "V2_%llx", &val)) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + if (!sscanf(einj_buf, "%llx", &val)) + return -EINVAL; + } rc = einj_validate_error_type(val); if (rc) @@ -722,11 +767,13 @@ static int error_type_set(void *data, u64 val) error_type = val; - return 0; + return count; } -DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(error_type_fops, error_type_get, error_type_set, - "0x%llx\n"); +static const struct file_operations error_type_fops = { + .read = error_type_get, + .write = error_type_set, +}; static int error_inject_set(void *data, u64 val) { @@ -778,7 +825,7 @@ static int __init einj_probe(struct faux_device *fdev) goto err_put_table; } - rc = einj_get_available_error_type(&available_error_type); + rc = einj_get_available_error_types(&available_error_type, &available_error_type_v2); if (rc) goto err_put_table; diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-cxl.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-cxl.c index 78da9ae543a2..e70a416ec925 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-cxl.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-cxl.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ int einj_cxl_available_error_type_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) int cxl_err, rc; u32 available_error_type = 0; - rc = einj_get_available_error_type(&available_error_type); + rc = einj_get_available_error_type(&available_error_type, ACPI_EINJ_GET_ERROR_TYPE); if (rc) return rc; From 21cd921b1a5a4c8d0097343bda7e6e78d21e9773 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zaid Alali Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 12:30:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 03/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Add einjv2 extension struct Add einjv2 extension struct and EINJv2 error types to prepare the driver for EINJv2 support. ACPI specifications[1] enables EINJv2 by extending set_error_type_with_address struct. Link: https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.6/18_Platform_Error_Interfaces.html#einjv2-extension-structure [1] Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Zaid Alali Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617193026.637510-4-zaidal@os.amperecomputing.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index a1ff42c226fb..1ffe8270634c 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #define SLEEP_UNIT_MAX 5000 /* 5ms */ /* Firmware should respond within 1 seconds */ #define FIRMWARE_TIMEOUT (1 * USEC_PER_SEC) +#define COMPONENT_LEN 16 #define ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP BIT(30) #define ACPI5_VENDOR_BIT BIT(31) #define MEM_ERROR_MASK (ACPI_EINJ_MEMORY_CORRECTABLE | \ @@ -50,6 +51,28 @@ */ static int acpi5; +struct syndrome_array { + union { + u8 acpi_id[COMPONENT_LEN]; + u8 device_id[COMPONENT_LEN]; + u8 pcie_sbdf[COMPONENT_LEN]; + u8 vendor_id[COMPONENT_LEN]; + } comp_id; + union { + u8 proc_synd[COMPONENT_LEN]; + u8 mem_synd[COMPONENT_LEN]; + u8 pcie_synd[COMPONENT_LEN]; + u8 vendor_synd[COMPONENT_LEN]; + } comp_synd; +}; + +struct einjv2_extension_struct { + u32 length; + u16 revision; + u16 component_arr_count; + struct syndrome_array component_arr[] __counted_by(component_arr_count); +}; + struct set_error_type_with_address { u32 type; u32 vendor_extension; @@ -58,6 +81,7 @@ struct set_error_type_with_address { u64 memory_address; u64 memory_address_range; u32 pcie_sbdf; + struct einjv2_extension_struct einjv2_struct; }; enum { SETWA_FLAGS_APICID = 1, From 691a0f0a557b19316ef533f9ca34c72ab6c7ae56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zaid Alali Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 12:30:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 04/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Discover EINJv2 parameters The EINJv2 set_error_type_with_address structure has a flex array to hold the component IDs and syndrome values used when injecting multiple errors at once. Discover the size of this array by taking the address from the ACPI_EINJ_SET_ERROR_TYPE_WITH_ADDRESS entry in the EINJ table and reading the BIOS copy of the structure. Derive the maximum number of components from the length field in the einjv2_extension_struct at the end of the BIOS copy. Map the whole of the structure into kernel memory (and unmap on module unload). [Tony: Code unchanged from Zaid's original. New commit message] Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny Signed-off-by: Zaid Alali Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617193026.637510-5-zaidal@os.amperecomputing.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index 1ffe8270634c..ea6fd4343e63 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ static struct debugfs_blob_wrapper vendor_blob; static struct debugfs_blob_wrapper vendor_errors; static char vendor_dev[64]; +static u32 max_nr_components; static u32 available_error_type; static u32 available_error_type_v2; @@ -178,6 +179,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(einj_mutex); bool einj_initialized __ro_after_init; static void __iomem *einj_param; +static u32 v5param_size; static void einj_exec_ctx_init(struct apei_exec_context *ctx) { @@ -302,11 +304,31 @@ static void __iomem *einj_get_parameter_address(void) struct set_error_type_with_address v5param; struct set_error_type_with_address __iomem *p; + v5param_size = sizeof(v5param); p = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v5, sizeof(*p)); if (p) { - memcpy_fromio(&v5param, p, sizeof(v5param)); + int offset, len; + + memcpy_fromio(&v5param, p, v5param_size); acpi5 = 1; check_vendor_extension(pa_v5, &v5param); + if (available_error_type & ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP) { + len = v5param.einjv2_struct.length; + offset = offsetof(struct einjv2_extension_struct, component_arr); + max_nr_components = (len - offset) / + sizeof(v5param.einjv2_struct.component_arr[0]); + /* + * The first call to acpi_os_map_iomem above does not include the + * component array, instead it is used to read and calculate maximum + * number of components supported by the system. Below, the mapping + * is expanded to include the component array. + */ + acpi_os_unmap_iomem(p, v5param_size); + offset = offsetof(struct set_error_type_with_address, einjv2_struct); + v5param_size = offset + struct_size(&v5param.einjv2_struct, + component_arr, max_nr_components); + p = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v5, v5param_size); + } return p; } } @@ -933,7 +955,7 @@ static void __exit einj_remove(struct faux_device *fdev) if (einj_param) { acpi_size size = (acpi5) ? - sizeof(struct set_error_type_with_address) : + v5param_size : sizeof(struct einj_parameter); acpi_os_unmap_iomem(einj_param, size); From 90711f7bdf76faa9ed766236bc1f1fbd4364b5e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Luck Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 12:30:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 05/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Create debugfs files to enter device id and syndrome EINJv2 allows users to inject multiple errors at the same time by specifying the device id and syndrome bits for each error in a flex array. Create files in the einj debugfs directory to enter data for each device id and syndrome value. Note that the specification says these are 128-bit little-endian values. Linux doesn't have a handy helper to manage objects of this type. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny Signed-off-by: Zaid Alali Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617193026.637510-6-zaidal@os.amperecomputing.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index ea6fd4343e63..87f1b8718387 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static char vendor_dev[64]; static u32 max_nr_components; static u32 available_error_type; static u32 available_error_type_v2; +static struct syndrome_array *syndrome_data; /* * Some BIOSes allow parameters to the SET_ERROR_TYPE entries in the @@ -712,6 +713,7 @@ static u64 error_param3; static u64 error_param4; static struct dentry *einj_debug_dir; static char einj_buf[32]; +static bool einj_v2_enabled; static struct { u32 mask; const char *str; } const einj_error_type_string[] = { { BIT(0), "Processor Correctable" }, { BIT(1), "Processor Uncorrectable non-fatal" }, @@ -848,6 +850,98 @@ static int einj_check_table(struct acpi_table_einj *einj_tab) return 0; } +static ssize_t u128_read(struct file *f, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *off) +{ + char output[2 * COMPONENT_LEN + 1]; + u8 *data = f->f_inode->i_private; + int i; + + if (*off >= sizeof(output)) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < COMPONENT_LEN; i++) + sprintf(output + 2 * i, "%.02x", data[COMPONENT_LEN - i - 1]); + output[2 * COMPONENT_LEN] = '\n'; + + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, off, output, sizeof(output)); +} + +static ssize_t u128_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *off) +{ + char input[2 + 2 * COMPONENT_LEN + 2]; + u8 *save = f->f_inode->i_private; + u8 tmp[COMPONENT_LEN]; + char byte[3] = {}; + char *s, *e; + size_t c; + long val; + int i; + + /* Require that user supply whole input line in one write(2) syscall */ + if (*off) + return -EINVAL; + + c = simple_write_to_buffer(input, sizeof(input), off, buf, count); + if (c < 0) + return c; + + if (c < 1 || input[c - 1] != '\n') + return -EINVAL; + + /* Empty line means invalidate this entry */ + if (c == 1) { + memset(save, 0xff, COMPONENT_LEN); + return c; + } + + if (input[0] == '0' && (input[1] == 'x' || input[1] == 'X')) + s = input + 2; + else + s = input; + e = input + c - 1; + + for (i = 0; i < COMPONENT_LEN; i++) { + byte[1] = *--e; + byte[0] = e > s ? *--e : '0'; + if (kstrtol(byte, 16, &val)) + return -EINVAL; + tmp[i] = val; + if (e <= s) + break; + } + while (++i < COMPONENT_LEN) + tmp[i] = 0; + + memcpy(save, tmp, COMPONENT_LEN); + + return c; +} + +static const struct file_operations u128_fops = { + .read = u128_read, + .write = u128_write, +}; + +static bool setup_einjv2_component_files(void) +{ + char name[32]; + + syndrome_data = kcalloc(max_nr_components, sizeof(syndrome_data[0]), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!syndrome_data) + return false; + + for (int i = 0; i < max_nr_components; i++) { + sprintf(name, "component_id%d", i); + debugfs_create_file(name, 0600, einj_debug_dir, + &syndrome_data[i].comp_id, &u128_fops); + sprintf(name, "component_syndrome%d", i); + debugfs_create_file(name, 0600, einj_debug_dir, + &syndrome_data[i].comp_synd, &u128_fops); + } + + return true; +} + static int __init einj_probe(struct faux_device *fdev) { int rc; @@ -919,6 +1013,8 @@ static int __init einj_probe(struct faux_device *fdev) &error_param4); debugfs_create_x32("notrigger", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, einj_debug_dir, ¬rigger); + if (available_error_type & ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP) + einj_v2_enabled = setup_einjv2_component_files(); } if (vendor_dev[0]) { @@ -967,6 +1063,7 @@ static void __exit einj_remove(struct faux_device *fdev) apei_resources_release(&einj_resources); apei_resources_fini(&einj_resources); debugfs_remove_recursive(einj_debug_dir); + kfree(syndrome_data); acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)einj_tab); } From b47610296d17f90ccb24085dcd75fd083acc736d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zaid Alali Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 12:30:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 06/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Enable EINJv2 error injections Enable injection using EINJv2 mode of operation. [Tony: Mostly Zaid's original code. I just changed how the error ID and syndrome bits are implemented. Also swapped out some camelcase variable names] Co-developed-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Zaid Alali Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617193026.637510-7-zaidal@os.amperecomputing.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index 87f1b8718387..d6d7e36e3647 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ enum { SETWA_FLAGS_APICID = 1, SETWA_FLAGS_MEM = 2, SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF = 4, + SETWA_FLAGS_EINJV2 = 8, }; /* @@ -181,6 +182,7 @@ bool einj_initialized __ro_after_init; static void __iomem *einj_param; static u32 v5param_size; +static bool is_v2; static void einj_exec_ctx_init(struct apei_exec_context *ctx) { @@ -507,12 +509,20 @@ out: return rc; } +static bool is_end_of_list(u8 *val) +{ + for (int i = 0; i < COMPONENT_LEN; ++i) { + if (val[i] != 0xFF) + return false; + } + return true; +} static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, u64 param3, u64 param4) { struct apei_exec_context ctx; u64 val, trigger_paddr, timeout = FIRMWARE_TIMEOUT; - int rc; + int i, rc; einj_exec_ctx_init(&ctx); @@ -521,10 +531,10 @@ static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, return rc; apei_exec_ctx_set_input(&ctx, type); if (acpi5) { - struct set_error_type_with_address *v5param, v5_struct; + struct set_error_type_with_address *v5param; - v5param = &v5_struct; - memcpy_fromio(v5param, einj_param, sizeof(*v5param)); + v5param = kmalloc(v5param_size, GFP_KERNEL); + memcpy_fromio(v5param, einj_param, v5param_size); v5param->type = type; if (type & ACPI5_VENDOR_BIT) { switch (vendor_flags) { @@ -544,8 +554,21 @@ static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, v5param->flags = flags; v5param->memory_address = param1; v5param->memory_address_range = param2; - v5param->apicid = param3; - v5param->pcie_sbdf = param4; + + if (is_v2) { + for (i = 0; i < max_nr_components; i++) { + if (is_end_of_list(syndrome_data[i].comp_id.acpi_id)) + break; + v5param->einjv2_struct.component_arr[i].comp_id = + syndrome_data[i].comp_id; + v5param->einjv2_struct.component_arr[i].comp_synd = + syndrome_data[i].comp_synd; + } + v5param->einjv2_struct.component_arr_count = i; + } else { + v5param->apicid = param3; + v5param->pcie_sbdf = param4; + } } else { switch (type) { case ACPI_EINJ_PROCESSOR_CORRECTABLE: @@ -569,7 +592,8 @@ static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, break; } } - memcpy_toio(einj_param, v5param, sizeof(*v5param)); + memcpy_toio(einj_param, v5param, v5param_size); + kfree(v5param); } else { rc = apei_exec_run(&ctx, ACPI_EINJ_SET_ERROR_TYPE); if (rc) @@ -631,10 +655,15 @@ int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, u64 param3, u64 base_addr, size; /* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */ - if (flags && (flags & - ~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF))) + if (flags && (flags & ~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID | SETWA_FLAGS_MEM | + SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF | SETWA_FLAGS_EINJV2))) return -EINVAL; + /* check if type is a valid EINJv2 error type */ + if (is_v2) { + if (!(type & available_error_type_v2)) + return -EINVAL; + } /* * We need extra sanity checks for memory errors. * Other types leap directly to injection. @@ -743,7 +772,7 @@ static int available_error_type_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (available_error_type & einj_error_type_string[pos].mask) seq_printf(m, "0x%08x\t%s\n", einj_error_type_string[pos].mask, einj_error_type_string[pos].str); - if (available_error_type & ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP) { + if ((available_error_type & ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP) && einj_v2_enabled) { for (int pos = 0; pos < ARRAY_SIZE(einjv2_error_type_string); pos++) { if (available_error_type_v2 & einjv2_error_type_string[pos].mask) seq_printf(m, "V2_0x%08x\t%s\n", einjv2_error_type_string[pos].mask, @@ -785,7 +814,7 @@ int einj_validate_error_type(u64 type) if (tval & (tval - 1)) return -EINVAL; if (!vendor) - if (!(type & available_error_type)) + if (!(type & (available_error_type | available_error_type_v2))) return -EINVAL; return 0; @@ -804,9 +833,11 @@ static ssize_t error_type_set(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (strncmp(einj_buf, "V2_", 3) == 0) { if (!sscanf(einj_buf, "V2_%llx", &val)) return -EINVAL; + is_v2 = true; } else { if (!sscanf(einj_buf, "%llx", &val)) return -EINVAL; + is_v2 = false; } rc = einj_validate_error_type(val); @@ -828,6 +859,11 @@ static int error_inject_set(void *data, u64 val) if (!error_type) return -EINVAL; + if (is_v2) + error_flags |= SETWA_FLAGS_EINJV2; + else + error_flags &= ~SETWA_FLAGS_EINJV2; + return einj_error_inject(error_type, error_flags, error_param1, error_param2, error_param3, error_param4); } From 8b148a97931db247771c43a0b5abdc31936c35f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zaid Alali Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 12:30:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 07/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Update the documentation for EINJv2 support Add documentation based on implementation of EINJv2 as described in ACPI 6.5.A specification. [Tony: New user interface for device id and syndrome] Link: https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5_A/18_Platform_Error_Interfaces.html#error-injection Co-developed-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Zaid Alali Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617193026.637510-8-zaidal@os.amperecomputing.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- .../firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst b/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst index c52b9da08fa9..7d8435d35a18 100644 --- a/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst +++ b/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst @@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ The following files belong to it: 0x00000200 Platform Correctable 0x00000400 Platform Uncorrectable non-fatal 0x00000800 Platform Uncorrectable fatal + V2_0x00000001 EINJV2 Processor Error + V2_0x00000002 EINJV2 Memory Error + V2_0x00000004 EINJV2 PCI Express Error ================ =================================== The format of the file contents are as above, except present are only @@ -88,6 +91,8 @@ The following files belong to it: Memory address and mask valid (param1 and param2). Bit 2 PCIe (seg,bus,dev,fn) valid (see param4 below). + Bit 3 + EINJv2 extension structure is valid If set to zero, legacy behavior is mimicked where the type of injection specifies just one bit set, and param1 is multiplexed. @@ -122,6 +127,13 @@ The following files belong to it: this actually works depends on what operations the BIOS actually includes in the trigger phase. +- component_id0 .. component_idN, component_syndrome0 .. component_syndromeN + + These files are used to set the "Component Array" field + of the EINJv2 Extension Structure. Each holds a 128-bit + hex value. Writing just a newline to any of these files + sets an invalid (all-ones) value. + CXL error types are supported from ACPI 6.5 onwards (given a CXL port is present). The EINJ user interface for CXL error types is at /cxl. The following files belong to it: @@ -194,6 +206,27 @@ An error injection example:: # echo 0x8 > error_type # Choose correctable memory error # echo 1 > error_inject # Inject now +An EINJv2 error injection example:: + + # cd /sys/kernel/debug/apei/einj + # cat available_error_type # See which errors can be injected + 0x00000002 Processor Uncorrectable non-fatal + 0x00000008 Memory Correctable + 0x00000010 Memory Uncorrectable non-fatal + V2_0x00000001 EINJV2 Processor Error + V2_0x00000002 EINJV2 Memory Error + + # echo 0x12345000 > param1 # Set memory address for injection + # echo 0xfffffffffffff000 > param2 # Range - anywhere in this page + # echo 0x1 > component_id0 # First device ID + # echo 0x4 > component_syndrome0 # First error syndrome + # echo 0x2 > component_id1 # Second device ID + # echo 0x4 > component_syndrome1 # Second error syndrome + # echo '' > component_id2 # Mark id2 invalid to terminate list + # echo V2_0x2 > error_type # Choose EINJv2 memory error + # echo 0xa > flags # set flags to indicate EINJv2 + # echo 1 > error_inject # Inject now + You should see something like this in dmesg:: [22715.830801] EDAC sbridge MC3: HANDLING MCE MEMORY ERROR From 80744a3bed8ce65071ca6e970a5f8b7c12213d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 13:57:52 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 08/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: prevent memory corruption in error_type_set() The "einj_buf" buffer is 32 chars. If "count" is larger than that it results in memory corruption. Cap it at 31 so that we leave the last character as a NUL terminator. By the way, the highest reasonable value for "count" is 24. Fixes: 0c6176e1e186 ("ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Enable the discovery of EINJv2 capabilities") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ae6286cf-4d73-4b97-8c0f-0782a65b8f51@sabinyo.mountain Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index d6d7e36e3647..f5cfa6310f0e 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -826,6 +826,10 @@ static ssize_t error_type_set(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int rc; u64 val; + /* Leave the last character for the NUL terminator */ + if (count > sizeof(einj_buf) - 1) + return -EINVAL; + memset(einj_buf, 0, sizeof(einj_buf)); if (copy_from_user(einj_buf, buf, count)) return -EFAULT; From c13d38bc9b00eaab19ba4d7608677371d2d2f480 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 21:10:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 09/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Fix less than zero comparison on a size_t variable The check for c < 0 is always false because variable c is a size_t which is not a signed type. Fix this by making c a ssize_t. Fixes: 90711f7bdf76 ("ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Create debugfs files to enter device id and syndrome") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250624201032.522168-1-colin.i.king@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index f5cfa6310f0e..59777a292ffc 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static ssize_t u128_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t count, u8 tmp[COMPONENT_LEN]; char byte[3] = {}; char *s, *e; - size_t c; + ssize_t c; long val; int i; From 0fd0541b6770b190afa9534c9208c0aa774d533c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 21:29:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 10/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Fix check and iounmap of uninitialized pointer p In the case where a request_mem_region call fails and pointer r is null the error exit path via label 'out' will check for a non-null pointer p and try to iounmap it. However, pointer p has not been assigned a value at this point, so it may potentially contain any garbage value. Fix this by ensuring pointer p is initialized to NULL. Fixes: 1a35c88302a3 ("ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Fix kernel test sparse warnings") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250624202937.523013-1-colin.i.king@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index 59777a292ffc..3d37978418e8 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, u32 table_size; int rc = -EIO; struct acpi_generic_address *trigger_param_region = NULL; - struct acpi_einj_trigger __iomem *p; + struct acpi_einj_trigger __iomem *p = NULL; r = request_mem_region(trigger_paddr, sizeof(trigger_tab), "APEI EINJ Trigger Table"); From 4734c8b46b901cff2feda8b82abc710b65dc31c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Breno Leitao Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 08:39:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 11/15] ACPI: APEI: GHES: add TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK on GHES panic path When a GHES (Generic Hardware Error Source) triggers a panic, add the TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK taint flag to the kernel. This explicitly marks the kernel as tainted due to a machine check event, improving diagnostics and post-mortem analysis. The taint is set with LOCKDEP_STILL_OK to indicate lockdep remains valid. At large scale deployment, this helps to quickly determine panics that are coming due to hardware failures. Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250702-add_tain-v1-1-9187b10914b9@debian.org Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c index f0584ccad451..3d44f926afe8 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c @@ -1088,6 +1088,8 @@ static void __ghes_panic(struct ghes *ghes, __ghes_print_estatus(KERN_EMERG, ghes->generic, estatus); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); + ghes_clear_estatus(ghes, estatus, buf_paddr, fixmap_idx); if (!panic_timeout) From c8aea83c735ec5a853db495592a1b6b5e6db859b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Luck Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2025 13:04:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 12/15] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Fix trigger actions The trigger events are in BIOS memory immediately following the acpi_einj_trigger structure. These were not copied to regular kernel memory for use by apei_exec_ctx_init() so injections in "notrigger=0" mode failed with a message like this: APEI: Invalid action table, unknown instruction type: 123 Fix by allocating a "table_size" block of memory and copying the whole table for use in the rest of the trigger flow. Fixes: 1a35c88302a3 ("ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Fix kernel test sparse warnings") Reported-by: Yi1 Lai Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250703200421.28012-1-tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c index 3d37978418e8..bf8dc92a373a 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -394,6 +394,7 @@ static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, u64 param1, u64 param2) { struct acpi_einj_trigger trigger_tab; + struct acpi_einj_trigger *full_trigger_tab; struct apei_exec_context trigger_ctx; struct apei_resources trigger_resources; struct acpi_whea_header *trigger_entry; @@ -430,6 +431,9 @@ static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, rc = -EIO; table_size = trigger_tab.table_size; + full_trigger_tab = kmalloc(table_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!full_trigger_tab) + goto out_rel_header; r = request_mem_region(trigger_paddr + sizeof(trigger_tab), table_size - sizeof(trigger_tab), "APEI EINJ Trigger Table"); @@ -437,7 +441,7 @@ static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, pr_err("Can not request [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] for Trigger Table Entry\n", (unsigned long long)trigger_paddr + sizeof(trigger_tab), (unsigned long long)trigger_paddr + table_size - 1); - goto out_rel_header; + goto out_free_trigger_tab; } iounmap(p); p = ioremap_cache(trigger_paddr, table_size); @@ -445,9 +449,9 @@ static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, pr_err("Failed to map trigger table!\n"); goto out_rel_entry; } - memcpy_fromio(&trigger_tab, p, sizeof(trigger_tab)); + memcpy_fromio(full_trigger_tab, p, table_size); trigger_entry = (struct acpi_whea_header *) - ((char *)&trigger_tab + sizeof(struct acpi_einj_trigger)); + ((char *)full_trigger_tab + sizeof(struct acpi_einj_trigger)); apei_resources_init(&trigger_resources); apei_exec_ctx_init(&trigger_ctx, einj_ins_type, ARRAY_SIZE(einj_ins_type), @@ -469,7 +473,7 @@ static int __einj_error_trigger(u64 trigger_paddr, u32 type, apei_resources_init(&addr_resources); trigger_param_region = einj_get_trigger_parameter_region( - &trigger_tab, param1, param2); + full_trigger_tab, param1, param2); if (trigger_param_region) { rc = apei_resources_add(&addr_resources, trigger_param_region->address, @@ -500,6 +504,8 @@ out_fini: out_rel_entry: release_mem_region(trigger_paddr + sizeof(trigger_tab), table_size - sizeof(trigger_tab)); +out_free_trigger_tab: + kfree(full_trigger_tab); out_rel_header: release_mem_region(trigger_paddr, sizeof(trigger_tab)); out: From 3ee9f060826e8262b2c40fec5944994562d4aa10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2025 15:20:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/15] ACPI: APEI: MAINTAINERS: Update reviewers for APEI Update the ACPI APEI entry in MAINTAINERS by dropping the reviewers who have not been responsive for over a year and adding a list of new reviewers. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Acked-by: Hanjun Guo Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Acked-by: Shuai Xue Link: https://patch.msgid.link/12722151.O9o76ZdvQC@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- MAINTAINERS | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 0c1d245bf7b8..e9f49c6f9244 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -306,10 +306,11 @@ F: tools/power/acpi/ ACPI APEI M: "Rafael J. Wysocki" -R: Len Brown -R: James Morse R: Tony Luck R: Borislav Petkov +R: Hanjun Guo +R: Mauro Carvalho Chehab +R: Shuai Xue L: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org F: drivers/acpi/apei/ From 79a5ae3c4c5eb7e38e0ebe4d6bf602d296080060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuai Xue Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 19:42:11 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 14/15] ACPI: APEI: send SIGBUS to current task if synchronous memory error not recovered If a synchronous error is detected as a result of user-space process triggering a 2-bit uncorrected error, the CPU will take a synchronous error exception such as Synchronous External Abort (SEA) on Arm64. The kernel will queue a memory_failure() work which poisons the related page, unmaps the page, and then sends a SIGBUS to the process, so that a system wide panic can be avoided. However, no memory_failure() work will be queued when abnormal synchronous errors occur. These errors can include situations like invalid PA, unexpected severity, no memory failure config support, invalid GUID section, etc. In such a case, the user-space process will trigger SEA again. This loop can potentially exceed the platform firmware threshold or even trigger a kernel hard lockup, leading to a system reboot. Fix it by performing a force kill if no memory_failure() work is queued for synchronous errors. Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam Reviewed-by: Jane Chu Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250714114212.31660-2-xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c index 3d44f926afe8..bda33a0f0a01 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c @@ -902,6 +902,17 @@ static bool ghes_do_proc(struct ghes *ghes, } } + /* + * If no memory failure work is queued for abnormal synchronous + * errors, do a force kill. + */ + if (sync && !queued) { + dev_err(ghes->dev, + HW_ERR GHES_PFX "%s:%d: synchronous unrecoverable error (SIGBUS)\n", + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); + force_sig(SIGBUS); + } + return queued; } From c1f1fda141373d7253b4c1497043b0ef85f534ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuai Xue Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 19:42:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 15/15] ACPI: APEI: handle synchronous exceptions in task work The memory uncorrected error could be signaled by asynchronous interrupt (specifically, SPI in arm64 platform), e.g. when an error is detected by a background scrubber, or signaled by synchronous exception (specifically, data abort exception in arm64 platform), e.g. when a CPU tries to access a poisoned cache line. Currently, both synchronous and asynchronous errors use memory_failure_queue() to schedule memory_failure() to exectute in a kworker context. As a result, when a user-space process is accessing a poisoned data, a data abort is taken and the memory_failure() is executed in the kworker context, which: - will send wrong si_code by SIGBUS signal in early_kill mode, and - can not kill the user-space in some cases resulting a synchronous error infinite loop Issue 1: send wrong si_code in early_kill mode Since commit a70297d22132 ("ACPI: APEI: set memory failure flags as MF_ACTION_REQUIRED on synchronous events")', the flag MF_ACTION_REQUIRED could be used to determine whether a synchronous exception occurs on ARM64 platform. When a synchronous exception is detected, the kernel is expected to terminate the current process which has accessed a poisoned page. This is done by sending a SIGBUS signal with error code BUS_MCEERR_AR, indicating an action-required machine check error on read. However, when kill_proc() is called to terminate the processes who has the poisoned page mapped, it sends the incorrect SIGBUS error code BUS_MCEERR_AO because the context in which it operates is not the one where the error was triggered. To reproduce this problem: #sysctl -w vm.memory_failure_early_kill=1 vm.memory_failure_early_kill = 1 # STEP2: inject an UCE error and consume it to trigger a synchronous error #einj_mem_uc single 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400 injecting ... triggering ... signal 7 code 5 addr 0xffffb0d75000 page not present Test passed The si_code (code 5) from einj_mem_uc indicates that it is BUS_MCEERR_AO error and it is not factually correct. After this change: # STEP1: enable early kill mode #sysctl -w vm.memory_failure_early_kill=1 vm.memory_failure_early_kill = 1 # STEP2: inject an UCE error and consume it to trigger a synchronous error #einj_mem_uc single 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400 injecting ... triggering ... signal 7 code 4 addr 0xffffb0d75000 page not present Test passed The si_code (code 4) from einj_mem_uc indicates that it is a BUS_MCEERR_AR error as expected. Issue 2: a synchronous error infinite loop If a user-space process, e.g. devmem, accesses a poisoned page for which the HWPoison flag is set, kill_accessing_process() is called to send SIGBUS to current processs with error info. Since the memory_failure() is executed in the kworker context, it will just do nothing but return EFAULT. So, devmem will access the posioned page and trigger an exception again, resulting in a synchronous error infinite loop. Such exception loop may cause platform firmware to exceed some threshold and reboot when Linux could have recovered from this error. To reproduce this problem: # STEP 1: inject an UCE error, and kernel will set HWPosion flag for related page #einj_mem_uc single 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400 injecting ... triggering ... signal 7 code 4 addr 0xffffb0d75000 page not present Test passed # STEP 2: access the same page and it will trigger a synchronous error infinite loop devmem 0x4092d55b400 To fix above two issues, queue memory_failure() as a task_work so that it runs in the context of the process that is actually consuming the poisoned data. Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue Tested-by: Ma Wupeng Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang Reviewed-by: Xiaofei Tan Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Jane Chu Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250714114212.31660-3-xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- include/acpi/ghes.h | 3 -- include/linux/mm.h | 1 - mm/memory-failure.c | 13 ------- 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c index bda33a0f0a01..a0d54993edb3 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c @@ -464,28 +464,41 @@ static void ghes_clear_estatus(struct ghes *ghes, ghes_ack_error(ghes->generic_v2); } -/* - * Called as task_work before returning to user-space. - * Ensure any queued work has been done before we return to the context that - * triggered the notification. +/** + * struct ghes_task_work - for synchronous RAS event + * + * @twork: callback_head for task work + * @pfn: page frame number of corrupted page + * @flags: work control flags + * + * Structure to pass task work to be handled before + * returning to user-space via task_work_add(). */ -static void ghes_kick_task_work(struct callback_head *head) +struct ghes_task_work { + struct callback_head twork; + u64 pfn; + int flags; +}; + +static void memory_failure_cb(struct callback_head *twork) { - struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus; - struct ghes_estatus_node *estatus_node; - u32 node_len; + struct ghes_task_work *twcb = container_of(twork, struct ghes_task_work, twork); + int ret; - estatus_node = container_of(head, struct ghes_estatus_node, task_work); - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_MEMORY_FAILURE)) - memory_failure_queue_kick(estatus_node->task_work_cpu); + ret = memory_failure(twcb->pfn, twcb->flags); + gen_pool_free(ghes_estatus_pool, (unsigned long)twcb, sizeof(*twcb)); - estatus = GHES_ESTATUS_FROM_NODE(estatus_node); - node_len = GHES_ESTATUS_NODE_LEN(cper_estatus_len(estatus)); - gen_pool_free(ghes_estatus_pool, (unsigned long)estatus_node, node_len); + if (!ret || ret == -EHWPOISON || ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) + return; + + pr_err("%#llx: Sending SIGBUS to %s:%d due to hardware memory corruption\n", + twcb->pfn, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); + force_sig(SIGBUS); } static bool ghes_do_memory_failure(u64 physical_addr, int flags) { + struct ghes_task_work *twcb; unsigned long pfn; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_MEMORY_FAILURE)) @@ -499,6 +512,18 @@ static bool ghes_do_memory_failure(u64 physical_addr, int flags) return false; } + if (flags == MF_ACTION_REQUIRED && current->mm) { + twcb = (void *)gen_pool_alloc(ghes_estatus_pool, sizeof(*twcb)); + if (!twcb) + return false; + + twcb->pfn = pfn; + twcb->flags = flags; + init_task_work(&twcb->twork, memory_failure_cb); + task_work_add(current, &twcb->twork, TWA_RESUME); + return true; + } + memory_failure_queue(pfn, flags); return true; } @@ -842,7 +867,7 @@ int cxl_cper_kfifo_get(struct cxl_cper_work_data *wd) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_cper_kfifo_get, "CXL"); -static bool ghes_do_proc(struct ghes *ghes, +static void ghes_do_proc(struct ghes *ghes, const struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus) { int sev, sec_sev; @@ -912,8 +937,6 @@ static bool ghes_do_proc(struct ghes *ghes, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); force_sig(SIGBUS); } - - return queued; } static void __ghes_print_estatus(const char *pfx, @@ -1219,9 +1242,7 @@ static void ghes_proc_in_irq(struct irq_work *irq_work) struct ghes_estatus_node *estatus_node; struct acpi_hest_generic *generic; struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus; - bool task_work_pending; u32 len, node_len; - int ret; llnode = llist_del_all(&ghes_estatus_llist); /* @@ -1236,25 +1257,16 @@ static void ghes_proc_in_irq(struct irq_work *irq_work) estatus = GHES_ESTATUS_FROM_NODE(estatus_node); len = cper_estatus_len(estatus); node_len = GHES_ESTATUS_NODE_LEN(len); - task_work_pending = ghes_do_proc(estatus_node->ghes, estatus); + + ghes_do_proc(estatus_node->ghes, estatus); + if (!ghes_estatus_cached(estatus)) { generic = estatus_node->generic; if (ghes_print_estatus(NULL, generic, estatus)) ghes_estatus_cache_add(generic, estatus); } - - if (task_work_pending && current->mm) { - estatus_node->task_work.func = ghes_kick_task_work; - estatus_node->task_work_cpu = smp_processor_id(); - ret = task_work_add(current, &estatus_node->task_work, - TWA_RESUME); - if (ret) - estatus_node->task_work.func = NULL; - } - - if (!estatus_node->task_work.func) - gen_pool_free(ghes_estatus_pool, - (unsigned long)estatus_node, node_len); + gen_pool_free(ghes_estatus_pool, (unsigned long)estatus_node, + node_len); llnode = next; } @@ -1315,7 +1327,6 @@ static int ghes_in_nmi_queue_one_entry(struct ghes *ghes, estatus_node->ghes = ghes; estatus_node->generic = ghes->generic; - estatus_node->task_work.func = NULL; estatus = GHES_ESTATUS_FROM_NODE(estatus_node); if (__ghes_read_estatus(estatus, buf_paddr, fixmap_idx, len)) { diff --git a/include/acpi/ghes.h b/include/acpi/ghes.h index be1dd4c1a917..ebd21b05fe6e 100644 --- a/include/acpi/ghes.h +++ b/include/acpi/ghes.h @@ -35,9 +35,6 @@ struct ghes_estatus_node { struct llist_node llnode; struct acpi_hest_generic *generic; struct ghes *ghes; - - int task_work_cpu; - struct callback_head task_work; }; struct ghes_estatus_cache { diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 0ef2ba0c667a..02dffff2508b 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -3896,7 +3896,6 @@ enum mf_flags { int mf_dax_kill_procs(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index, unsigned long count, int mf_flags); extern int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags); -extern void memory_failure_queue_kick(int cpu); extern int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn); extern atomic_long_t num_poisoned_pages __read_mostly; extern int soft_offline_page(unsigned long pfn, int flags); diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index b91a33fb6c69..5278132a2b6d 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -2503,19 +2503,6 @@ static void memory_failure_work_func(struct work_struct *work) } } -/* - * Process memory_failure work queued on the specified CPU. - * Used to avoid return-to-userspace racing with the memory_failure workqueue. - */ -void memory_failure_queue_kick(int cpu) -{ - struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu; - - mf_cpu = &per_cpu(memory_failure_cpu, cpu); - cancel_work_sync(&mf_cpu->work); - memory_failure_work_func(&mf_cpu->work); -} - static int __init memory_failure_init(void) { struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu;